2026 IL App (1st) 250537-U
No. 1-25-0537
Order filed November 16, 2026

NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedential except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

FIRST DIVISION

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TYRELLE HENDERSON, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County.
Honorable Charles P. Burns, Judge, Presiding.
No. 20 CR 02643

JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Fitzgerald Smith and Howse concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 *Held*: Defendant's resisting or obstructing a peace officer conviction is affirmed where the evidence was sufficient to show that he knowingly resisted a correctional institution employee and, while resisting, proximately caused the employee's injury.

¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant Tyrelle Henderson was found guilty of resisting or obstructing a peace officer and sentenced to 27 months in prison. On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove that he knowingly resisted a correctional institution employee during a physical altercation at the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC) and that he proximately caused the officer's injury. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated battery of correctional institution employee Leonardo Robles for allegedly striking Robles' head while Robles performed his official duties. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i) (West 2020). Defendant was also charged with one count of resisting or obstructing a peace officer for knowingly resisting correctional institution employee Andre Rogers in performing an authorized act within Rogers' official capacity and proximately causing Rogers' injury (*id.* §§ 31-1(a)(2), (a-7)).

¶ 5 Defendant proceeded *pro se*.

¶ 6 At trial, retired correctional institution employee Ronnie Williams, along with Robles and Rogers, testified that they were correctional officers on duty at CCDOC on January 25, 2020. That day they were moving 40 to 44 detainees, including defendant, from one part of the jail to another. All three officers wore a uniform comprised of navy blue pants, a navy blue polo shirt and a badge.

¶ 7 Williams testified that while the detainees were in the hallway, defendant stepped out of the line, in violation of jail rules, and walked towards another tier shouting "super loud" at someone through a door. Williams repeatedly ordered defendant to return to the line, but defendant failed to comply or respond.

¶ 8 Williams "tugged" defendant's shirt, and defendant stated that "you don't have any right to put your f*** hands on me." Williams ordered defendant to step towards the wall for being "belligerent." Williams held up his hands, which defendant slapped down, and Robles then joined them. Robles asked defendant to move to the wall to be handcuffed. Defendant refused and started punching Robles' face and "everywhere." Defendant threw the first punch. Robles "[d]efended himself" and kept trying to handcuff defendant. Williams gave verbal commands and attempted to gain physical control of defendant, who fought back. Around this time, Rogers ran to assist but

disengaged after hurting his shoulder. Other officers arrived and defendant was subdued and placed in handcuffs.

¶ 9 Robles testified that he observed Williams put his hand up while talking to defendant and then saw defendant push the hand away. Detainees were prohibited from making contact with correctional officers, so Robles approached and asked defendant to step against the wall to be handcuffed. Defendant was "irate," said "b*** you're not cuffing me up," and punched Robles in the face. Robles "went to *** take him down" to handcuff him and "at that moment [defendant] mounted on top" of Robles and repeatedly hit him in the face and head area. Other officers pulled defendant off Robles and detained defendant. Robles felt dizzy and was treated for a concussion.

¶ 10 Rogers testified that he was standing at the front of the tier when he observed defendant on top of Robles and they were "exchanging punches." Rogers pulled defendant off Robles. Defendant was "irate." Rogers and defendant then "went at each other." Rogers was holding defendant's arm and, after they went to the ground, Rogers felt a sharp pain in his right shoulder. While they were on the ground, defendant resisted other officers' attempts to handcuff his right arm. Rogers could not remember whether other officers gained control of defendant because Rogers was in "excruciating pain." Rogers was treated for a dislocated and fractured shoulder.

¶ 11 Rogers and Robles identified themselves in surveillance videos, which the State published at trial. Rogers confirmed that People's Exhibit No. 3 shows him running towards the altercation and then "trying to hold [his] shoulder up" after the altercation, and People's Exhibit No. 2 shows him exiting the jail while holding his shoulder.

¶ 12 We have viewed the surveillance videos. In the videos, the correctional officers depicted appear in dark clothing and the inmates appear in tan shirts and tan pants. The video exhibits are consistent with Rogers' and Robles' testimony.

¶ 13 Cook County correctional sergeant Cierra Ford testified that she evaluated defendant after the incident and did not observe any visible injuries.

¶ 14 Cook County Sheriff's police investigator Terrence Whittler testified that he recovered surveillance videos from before and after the altercation, but the altercation occurred in a "blind spot" between cameras. On cross-examination, Whittler testified that an incident report indicated that defendant had been injured.

¶ 15 Defendant testified that before the incident, he stopped to speak with his younger brother, Taveyon Turnbo, who was housed in a different tier. As defendant spoke to Turnbo, Williams pulled him out of the line. Defendant never swiped at Williams' arm, but defendant stepped back to see whether Willams would let defendant speak with Turnbo. As defendant waited, he was "blindsided" and punched by Robles. Defendant did not know that an officer had punched him, so his "instant reflex" was to defend himself. It was "[w]ell into the fight" when defendant noticed that an officer had hit him but "it was already too late." Other officers then got involved and defendant "was being punched" and thrown around "from all types of different angles."

¶ 16 On cross-examination, defendant confirmed that he knew Williams was a correctional officer, and that Williams was uniformed during the incident. Defendant also confirmed that the video surveillance footage shows Rogers in full uniform.

¶ 17 Defendant further confirmed that he left the line to speak with his brother, knowing that it was against jail rules to do so. Just as Williams was telling defendant that he "wasn't supposed to be doing that," defendant was "blindsided" and punched in the face by Robles. At the time, defendant thought another inmate had punched him, but he realized shortly thereafter that he was fighting a correctional officer and stopped. Once correctional officers placed one handcuff on defendant, he "gave up" and stopped. Defendant had seen Rogers run past him, but Rogers "never

laid a hand" on defendant. Defendant asserted that Rogers "lie[d]" and tried to grab defendant but "didn't succeed." Defendant acknowledged that Rogers fell to the ground and injured his shoulder. Defendant denied slapping Williams' hand.

¶ 18 Turnbo testified that he saw defendant's jail tier being moved and stopped in the hallway in front of his own tier. When Turnbo went to speak with defendant, a correctional officer "snatched" defendant. Turnbo then observed the correctional officer swing at defendant, who dodged, and a fight started. Two more correctional officers "got to tussling" with defendant, who was not the aggressor.

¶ 19 On cross-examination, Turnbo confirmed that he observed defendant throw a Hispanic officer to the ground and slam a Black officer to the ground after the officer punched defendant. Turnbo acknowledged that the correctional officers were uniformed.

¶ 20 In rebuttal, the State entered a certified copy of defendant's 2017 convictions for possession of a stolen motor vehicle and aggravated battery of a police officer.

¶ 21 The jury found defendant guilty of resisting or obstructing a peace officer and acquitted him of aggravated battery.

¶ 22 After defendant filed a *pro se* motion for new trial, he requested and was appointed new counsel. Counsel filed a motion for new trial, arguing, *inter alia*, that the State failed to prove the material elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. At the hearing on the motion, counsel argued that when the jury "clearly found" that defendant was not the initial aggressor, it followed that the jury "clearly believe[d]" that defendant was acting in self-defense or "certainly" did not commit an aggravated battery. Counsel maintained that the evidence did not prove that defendant proximately caused Rogers' injury because he was acquitted of aggravated battery, and that "it

does not hold" that the State nonetheless met its burden for the charge of resisting. The court denied the motion.

¶ 23 The court sentenced defendant to 27 months in prison. Defendant's motion for reconsideration was denied and this appeal followed.

¶ 24 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 25 On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he knowingly resisted or obstructed correctional officer Rogers and proximately caused his shoulder injury.

¶ 26 In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court examines " 'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' " (Emphasis omitted.) *People v. McLaurin*, 2020 IL 124563, ¶ 22 (quoting *Jackson v. Virginia*, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). "That standard applies whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial and does not allow this court to substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues that involve the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence." *People v. Jones*, 2019 IL App (1st) 170478, ¶ 25. All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in the State's favor. *People v. Jones*, 2023 IL 127810 ¶ 28.

¶ 27 A conviction will not be overturned "unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory" that reasonable doubt exists as to the defendant's guilt. *People v. Wright*, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 70. We will not reverse a conviction just because the evidence is contradictory or the defendant claims a witness was not credible. *People v. Bonaparte*, 2014 IL App (1st) 112209, ¶ 41. Rather, "[t]he positive, credible testimony of a single witness, even if contradicted by the defendant, is sufficient to convict a defendant." *People v. Sauls*, 2022 IL 127732, ¶ 52. An eyewitness's testimony is insufficient "only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that

no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt." *People v. Cunningham*, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004).

¶ 28 To establish guilt for resisting or obstructing a peace officer, the State must show that the defendant knowingly resisted or obstructed the person known to be a correctional institution employee from performing any authorized act within his official capacity. 720 ILCS 5/31-1(2) (West 2020). To elevate the offense from a misdemeanor to a felony, as charged here, the State must establish that the defendant's violation proximately caused an injury to a correctional institution employee. *Id.* § 31-1(a-7); *People v. Jenkins*, 2016 IL App (1st) 133656, ¶ 27.

¶ 29 A defendant knowingly resists or obstructs a peace officer or correctional institution employee when the defendant knows both that (1) the person obstructed or resisted was a peace officer or correctional institution employee and (2) the defendant's actions would obstruct or resist the peace officer or correctional institution employee's authorized act within his or her official capacity. *People v. Borders*, 2020 IL App (2d) 180324, ¶ 33. Circumstantial evidence may establish the defendant's knowledge. *People v. Leib*, 2022 IL 126645, ¶ 37. Resisting is "a physical act that impedes, hinders, interrupts, prevents, or delays the performance of the officer's duties, such as going limp or forcefully resisting arrest." *People v. Agnew-Downs*, 404 Ill. App. 3d 218, 226 (2010). Struggling and wrestling with a peace officer or correctional institution employee are "physical acts of resistance that will support a conviction for resisting a peace officer." *People v. McCoy*, 378 Ill. App. 3d 954, 962 (2008).

¶ 30 Here, ample evidence supports the reasonable inference that defendant knowingly resisted correctional officer Rogers from handcuffing him. All three correctional officers testified that they wore dark uniforms while performing their duties of escorting inmates between jail tiers. The surveillance videos show that the officers' dark uniforms were distinguishable from the inmate's

tan jumpsuits. Defendant acknowledged that Williams and Rogers were uniformed on the day of the altercation. A finder of fact could reasonably infer that defendant knew he was involved in an altercation with correctional officers based on the dark coloring of their uniforms compared to the tan colored jumpsuits worn by inmates.

¶ 31 Additionally, defendant acknowledged that he was not following jail rules when he stepped out of line. He repeatedly refused Williams' request to return and became "belligerent." Defendant also refused Robles' attempt to detain him and engaged in a physical altercation with Robles. Defendant had seen Rogers run past him during the incident. Rogers intervened in the physical altercation and "[i]n the process" of holding defendant's arm and attempting to restrain him, Rogers "went to the ground." Defendant asserted he "was being punched" and thrown around "from all types of different angles" and stopped fighting when he realized that he was fighting correctional officers.

¶ 32 When reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, as we must, a rational trier of fact could reasonably infer that defendant knew he was resisting a correctional institutional employee and not an inmate during the physical altercation after repeatedly receiving instructions to go to the wall to be handcuffed. *People v. Harris*, 2025 IL App (1st) 241518, ¶ 25. Nothing in the record makes the inference that defendant knew he was resisting a correctional institution employee unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory so as to leave reasonable doubt. *Id.*

¶ 33 Nevertheless, defendant argues that the evidence failed to prove that he knew he was resisting Rogers, as defendant was already engaged in an altercation with Robles when Rogers intervened. Defendant essentially argues that because he did not specifically recognize or direct his conduct towards Rogers during the altercation, he could not have knowingly resisted him. Ultimately, the only evidence supporting defendant's position is his own self-serving testimony,

which the jury was not obligated to accept. See *People v. Jones*, 2025 IL App (1st) 230771, ¶ 92. In essence, defendant asks us to reassess the witness testimony and inferences therefrom in his favor, which this court cannot do. *People v. Kimble*, 2019 IL 122830, ¶ 46.

¶ 34 Next, defendant argues that the evidence failed to show that he proximately caused Rogers' injury.

¶ 35 Generally, resisting a correctional institutional employee is a Class A misdemeanor. 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a)(2) (West 2020). Where the State proves that the defendant's actions proximately caused an injury to a correctional institution employee, the defendant will be found guilty of a Class 4 felony. *Id*. § 31-1(a-7) (West 2020). The State must prove that the defendant did so beyond a reasonable doubt. *People v. Cervantes*, 408 Ill. App 3d 906, 908 (2011). The State need not show that the defendant's actions were the sole cause of injury, but a contributing cause. *Id.* at 910.

¶ 36 Proximate cause means "any cause that, in natural or probable sequence, produced the injury complained of." *Stanphill v. Ortberg*, 2017 IL App (2d) 161086, ¶ 41. Proximate cause raises a question of fact and requires the facts to establish both cause in fact and legal cause. *Schultz v. St. Clair County*, 2022 IL 126856, ¶ 37. A defendant is the cause in fact of an injury "only if that conduct is a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury." *Id.* (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The defendant's action is a material element if, absent the defendant's conduct, the injury would not have occurred. *Id.* Legal cause raises a question of foreseeability and is "established where the injury is the type of injury that a reasonable person would see as a 'likely result' of his conduct." *Steed v. Rezin Orthopedics & Sports Medicine*, 2021 IL 125150, ¶ 37.

¶ 37 Here, defendant's resistance to Rogers' attempts to restrain him were a material element and substantial factor in Rogers' injury. Rogers fell to the ground because he intervened in the

physical altercation that defendant started against Robles. Rogers felt pain in his shoulder when he went to the ground while holding onto defendant, who was resisting being handcuffed. Absent defendant's resistance to Rogers' attempt to handcuff him during the physical altercation, Rogers would not have been injured. Defendant's conduct therefore was the cause in fact of Rogers' injury.

¶ 38 Defendant's conduct was also the legal cause of Rogers' injury. Defendant knowingly violated jail rules when he stepped out of the detainee line to speak to his brother, which escalated into a physical altercation with Robles and required the assistance of other correctional officers, including Rogers. Given that defendant was in jail, it was reasonably foreseeable that other correctional officers would intervene. Likewise, it was reasonably foreseeable that if defendant continued to resist and act violently towards the correctional officers, he could injure a correctional officer. As such, defendant's conduct was the cause in fact and legal cause of Rogers' injury.

¶ 39 Nevertheless, defendant disputes that he proximately caused Rogers' injury. He argues that he was not the cause in fact of Rogers' injury because Rogers' testimony did not directly state that defendant injured him, but that he was injured when he "went to the ground." However, Defendant's argument is in direct contravention of the testimony of at least two witnesses, including defendant's witness who saw defendant throw two officers, including one Black officer, to the ground. The witnesses' testimony is supported by the video, which shows Rogers, who is Black, holding his shoulder following the altercation.

¶ 40 As to legal cause, defendant argues that Rogers "mysteriously sustaining a shoulder injury" was not foreseeable, and defendant's conduct "was not the direct cause of Rogers rushing in and hurting his shoulder." However, had defendant not disobeyed the rules, Rogers would never have needed to intervene. Defendant was an inmate, and the intervention of correctional officers and an injury during an altercation was foreseeable. When it is reasonably foreseeable that an injury may

occur, the precise manner in which the injury would occur or the extent of the injury need not be foreseeable. *Atchley v. University of Chicago Medical Center*, 2016 IL App (1st) 152481, ¶ 45. Rogers' shoulder injury was foreseeable where defendant was refusing to obey the rules and attacking correctional institution employees, requiring intervention by other employees and, as such, defendant's conduct was the legal cause of the injury.

¶ 41 In sum, defendant actively resisted Rogers in the performance of his official duty and his conduct was the proximate cause of Rogers' injury. The evidence was therefore sufficient to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony resisting a peace or correctional institutional employee.

¶ 42 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 43 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 44 Affirmed.