A Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall Refrain From Inappropriate Political Activity

A. All Judges and Candidates.

(1) Except as authorized in subsections B(1)(b) and B(3), a judge or a candidate for election to judicial office shall not:

(a) act as a leader or hold an office in a political organization;
(b) publicly endorse or publicly oppose another candidate for public office;
(c) make speeches on behalf of a political organization;
(d) solicit funds for, or pay an assessment to a political organization or candidate.

(2) A judge shall resign from judicial office upon becoming a candidate for a non-judicial office either in a primary or in a general election.

(3) A candidate for a judicial office:

(a) shall maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office and act in a manner consistent with the integrity and independence of the judiciary, and shall encourage members of the candidate’s family to adhere to the same standards of political conduct in support of the candidate as apply to the candidate;
(b) shall prohibit employees and officials who serve at the pleasure of the candidate, and shall discourage other employees and officials subject to the candidate’s direction and control from doing on the candidate’s behalf what the candidate is prohibited from doing under the provisions of this Canon;
(c) except to the extent permitted by subsection B(2), shall not authorize or knowingly permit any other person to do for the candidate what the candidate is prohibited from doing under the provisions of this Canon;
(d) shall not:

(i) make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues within cases that are likely to come before the court; or
(ii) knowingly misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position or other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent; and
(e) may respond to personal attacks or attacks on the candidate’s record as long as the response does not violate subsection A(3)(d).

B. Authorized Activities for Judges and Candidates.

(1) A judge or candidate may, except as prohibited by law:

(a) at any time,

(i) purchase tickets for and attend political gatherings;
(ii) identify himself or herself as a member of a political party; and
(iii) contribute to a political organization;
(b) when a candidate for public election
(i) speak to gatherings on his or her own behalf;
(ii) appear in newspaper, television and other media advertisements supporting his or her candidacy;
(iii) distribute pamphlets and other promotional campaign literature supporting his or her candidacy; and
(iv) publicly endorse or publicly oppose other candidates in a public election in which the judge or judicial candidate is running.

(2) A candidate shall not personally solicit or accept campaign contributions. A candidate may establish committees of responsible persons to conduct campaigns for the candidate through media advertisements, brochures, mailings, candidate forums and other means not prohibited by law. Such committees may solicit and accept reasonable campaign contributions, manage the expenditure of funds for the candidate’s campaign and obtain public statements of support for his or her candidacy. Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting and accepting reasonable campaign contributions and public support from lawyers. A candidate’s committees may solicit contributions and public support for the candidate’s campaign no earlier than one year before an election and no later than 90 days after the last election in which the candidate participates during the election year. A candidate shall not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the private benefit of the candidate or others.

(3) Except as prohibited by law, a candidate for judicial office in a public election may permit the candidate’s name: (a) to be listed on election materials along with the names of other candidates for elective public office, and (b) to appear in promotions of the ticket.

C. Incumbent Judges. A judge shall not engage in any political activity except (i) as authorized under any other provision of this Code, (ii) on behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system or the administration of justice, or (iii) as expressly authorized by law.

D. Applicability. Canon 7 generally applies to all incumbent judges and judicial candidates. A successful candidate, whether or not an incumbent, is subject to judicial discipline for his or her campaign conduct; an unsuccessful candidate who is a lawyer is subject to lawyer discipline for his or her campaign conduct. A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office is subject to Rule 8.2(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

JUSTICE HEIPLE, concurring:

First and foremost, Rule 67 and these canons of judicial ethics are intended as a working guide of conduct for judges and judicial candidates. They indicate areas of activity that are deemed to be within and without proper limits of judicial conduct. In between, of course, are uncertain areas which lack definition. What the canons seek is judicial conduct that is in keeping with the high calling of judicial office. They are not intended to facilitate the filing of casual or vindictive charges against judges or judicial candidates.

The application of these canons require a high measure of common sense and good judgment. Matters that are either minor in nature or susceptible to differing interpretations ought
not result in charges being filed. Charges of misconduct should be limited to matters that are both clearly defined and commonly accepted as serious.

The canons have attempted to recognize that Illinois has an elective judiciary. As a practical matter, the Illinois judge must involve himself in matters political. That is to say, the judge or candidate must be a participant in the system. A corollary of this activity is the public’s right to know whom they are voting for. Realistically speaking, it is not enough for the judge or candidate to merely give name, rank and serial number as though he were a prisoner of war. Rather, the public has a right to know the candidate’s core beliefs on matters of deep conviction and principle. While the candidate is not required to disclose these beliefs, he should neither be deterred nor penalized for doing so. In so doing, however, the judge or judicial candidate ought to refrain from stultifying himself as to his evenhanded participation in future cases. Rule 67 attempts to make that clear.

What fair-minded people seek in a judge is a person who will be fair and impartial and who will follow the law. Those considerations overshadow matters of nonjudicial ideology such as socialism, antivivisection, membership in the Flat Earth Society, an obsession with gender neutral language, or whatever. The matter of nonjudicial ideology is of direct and primary concern, of course, when judges begin to act as legislators rather than jurists. Judges who adhere to the rule that their conscience is their guide and that the law must accommodate their conscience are especially deserving of close scrutiny and concern. Under our Illinois constitutional scheme, however, it is the voters who are to make that call, not a governmental prosecutorial body or an association of lawyers.

JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting:

I dissent from the adoption of certain portions of new Rule 67 of the Code.

At the time of this writing, Illinois elects its judges. Irrespective of the merits or demerits of the elective process, it is essential to the justice system that judges be “independent, fair, and competent” so as to honor the public trust placed in them by virtue of their position. The purposes of the Code of Judicial Conduct are set forth in the Preamble to the Code. That Preamble, as amended, inter alia, provides:

“Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern us. The role of the judiciary is central to American concepts of justice and the rule of law. Intrinsic to all provisions of this code are precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our legal system.”

In this Code of Judicial Conduct, the Supreme Court of Illinois has set the standard by which judges are to be guided in their professional conduct. In my opinion, these standards should be high, and should be in keeping with the principles espoused in the Preamble. They are the guidelines which tell judges in this State in what activities they may or may not participate. The primary goal of the Code should be the attainment of a fair and impartial judiciary.

Today, in adopting certain amendments to Rule 67, the majority apparently wishes to
accommodate the elective process to which judges are presently subjected. In so doing, the majority has substantially broadened the political activity in which judges may participate. For example, by deleting certain prohibitions which appeared in Rule 67 prior to the amendments, a judge may now at any time attend political gatherings, may make unlimited contributions to a political organization, may identify himself or herself as a member of a political party, or may purchase tickets for political dinners or other functions. Rules 67(B)(1)(a)(i), (B)(1)(a)(ii), (B)(1)(a)(iii).

However, our prior Rule 67 was not unduly restrictive. Indeed, no hardship to judges under the former rule has been demonstrated, nor has there been any hue or cry for the changes which have been adopted. I am unaware of any need for judges to make unlimited contributions to a political party, to attend political gatherings, or to identify their political party allegiance. On the contrary, upon election to judicial office, judges are to be impartial; they are to be unbiased with respect to race, gender, and political party affiliation. Upon election, judges should no longer be Democrats or Republicans. Rather, judges are elected to apply the rule of law without respect to political organization affiliation. Although I recognize the need to solicit political organizational support at the time a candidate is seeking election to the judiciary, or at such time as a judge is seeking retention, I am particularly disturbed by the amendments’ allowance of a judge to engage in the political activities permitted by these amendments at any time.

I submit that the new rule “abandon[s] several important ethical standards that uphold the independence and dignity of judicial office” and will surely cause severe problems in the public perception of judicial candidates. (Report of the Committee on Judicial Performance and Conduct of the Lawyers’ Conference of the Judicial Administration Division of the American Bar Association on the Final Draft of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct 28 (1990) (hereinafter Report of the Committee on Judicial Performance).) In my view, the new standards of the rule are too permissive with respect to the political activities of judicial candidates. The increased permissiveness in judicial candidates’ political activities fosters a misguided over-politicization of the judicial election process in this State. In my judgment the time and efforts of the Illinois Supreme Court might be better expended by addressing the myriad of problems confronting the justice system, rather than considering and adopting amendments which allow judges to participate in additional political activity. I dissent from the adoption of these amendments because they are imprudent, unnecessary, and lend themselves to abuse.

In addition, I cannot agree with the majority’s new view of the appropriate scope of a judicial candidate’s public comment on matters that may or are likely to come before the court, provided the candidate does not “make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues within cases that are likely to come before the court.” (Rule 67(A)(3)(d)(i).) Ultimately, the new Rule is short-sighted because it places candidates for judicial office in an unseemly position where they may feel compelled to “pander” for votes by publicly adopting views which appear popular to the electorate. See Report of the Committee on Judicial Performance at 31.

The Commentary indicates that this amendment was adopted in response to the decision of the Federal court in *Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board* (7th Cir. 1993), 997 F.2d 224.
that case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held unconstitutional the portion of our rule that forbids a judicial candidate from “announc[ing] his views on disputed legal or political issues.” (134 Ill. 2d R. 67(B)(l)(c).) The Federal court concluded that this “announcement” prohibition invaded a candidate’s constitutional rights, because it “reach[ed] far beyond speech that could reasonably be interpreted as committing the candidate in a way that would compromise his impartiality should he be successful in the election.” *Buckley*, 997 F.2d at 228.

It is indisputable that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech must be balanced against the right of the public to a judiciary which will decide the issues presented to it in the courtroom setting, on the basis of the facts and applicable law. A judicial candidate’s right to free speech may be restricted where a compelling State interest is present which counterbalances the candidate’s ability to speak freely. The integrity and impartiality and independence of the judiciary is, in my opinion, such a compelling State interest to which deference should be paid.

The key words in the amendment which now appear in Rule 67(A)(3)(d)(i) are “commit or appear to commit.” These words are subject to varying interpretations and, I submit, are unnecessarily too broad to cure the fault found by the Federal court in the *Buckley* case. I question whether the amendment permitting a judge to speak on issues which may come before the court, provided the judge uses the magic words that the judge “is not committing” will be more problematic than the rule was prior to this amendment.

I also find disturbing the Commentary to the amendments to the effect that a judge or judicial candidate may respond to “false information concerning a judicial candidate [that] is made public.” (Rule 67, Committee Commentary.) The Report of the Committee on Judicial Performance stated the following with regard to this provision:

“This new expansion of free speech for judges who might be tempted to come to the aid of another judge or judicial candidate who has been the subject of criticism in a political campaign is totally without merit. There is no reason for a judge to become involved as a spokesperson or in any other capacity for another judge who has been publicly maligned. Publicly ‘correcting’ what the judge regards as a misstatement of fact in a judicial campaign is one of the acts presently prohibited by the existing Code, and it should continue to be prohibited.

Most issues of ‘fact’ in the context of judicial elections are, at best, mixed issues of fact and opinion and at worst are pure issues of opinion. Thus, the ‘narrow’ exception anticipated by the draftspersons would, in reality, become a large loophole.

The new provision would put enormous pressure on judges to become actively involved in campaigns of other judges or candidates.” Report of the Committee on Judicial Performance at 5-6.

I agree with these comments from the Report of the Committee on Judicial Performance regarding this new amendment to Rule 67.

In my opinion, public perception of a fair and impartial judiciary is diminished by adoption of the amendments to which I have made reference. Because the majority permits potential further politicization of the Illinois judiciary by adoption of the above-referenced amendments, I
respectfully dissent.


Committee Commentary

This canon regulates the extent to which a judicial officer may engage in political activity. Canon 7 adopts as its foundation the provisions of Canon 5 of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which was adopted by the ABA in 1990.

Paragraph 7A(1). A judge or candidate for judicial office retains the right to participate in the political process as a voter.

Where false information concerning a judicial candidate is made public, a judge or another judicial candidate having knowledge of the facts is not prohibited by paragraph 7A(1) from making the facts public.

Subparagraph 7A(1)(a) does not prohibit a candidate for elective judicial office from retaining during candidacy a public office such as State’s Attorney, which is not “an office in a political organization.”

Subparagraph 7A(1)(b) does not prohibit a judge or judicial candidate from privately expressing his or her views on judicial candidates or other candidates for public office.

A candidate does not publicly endorse another candidate for public office by having that candidate’s name on the same ticket.

Subparagraph 7A(1)(d). The ABA provisions that prohibit the following activities were deleted: attending political gatherings (5A(1)(d) of ABA), making contributions to political organizations or candidates (5A(1)(e)), and purchasing tickets for political party dinners or other functions (5A(1)(e)). These provisions were deleted because the ABA provisions adopted in subparagraph 7B(1)(a) were modified to authorize all judges and candidates to engage in such activities at any time. However, the prohibition on the solicitation of funds for, or paying an assessment to, a political organization or candidate, is adopted and renumbered as subparagraph (d).

Subparagraph 7A(3)(a). Although a judicial candidate must encourage members of his or her family to adhere to the same standards of political conduct in support of the candidate that apply to the candidate, family members are free to participate in other political activity.

Subparagraph 7A(3)(d). The ABA clause prohibiting “pledges and promises of conduct in office,” found in Canon 5A(3)(d) of the Model Code (which was similar to the language of Canon 7B(1)(c) of our previous rules on political conduct) was deleted. This change was made to clarify the limitations of the rule (see In re Buckley (Ill. Cts. Comm’n Oct. 25, 1991), No. 91-CC-1), which gave a broader construction to the rule. Subparagraph 7A(3)(d) prohibits a candidate for judicial office from making statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues within cases that are likely to come
before the court. However, as a corollary, a candidate should emphasize in any public statement the candidate’s duty to uphold the law regardless of his or her personal views. See also paragraph 3A(6), the general rule on public comment by judges. Subparagraph 7A(3)(d) does not prohibit a candidate from making pledges or promises respecting improvements in court administration. Nor does this provision prohibit an incumbent judge from making private statements to other judges or court personnel in the performance of judicial duties. This subparagraph applies to any statement made in the process of securing judicial office. See also Rule 8.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The ABA Model Code of 1990 was modified to remove the provisions pertaining to candidates seeking appointment to judicial or other governmental office that are found in subsection B of Canon 5. Hence ABA subsections C, D and E were renumbered and are now subsections B, C and D of our Canon 7.

Paragraph 7B(1). This paragraph permits judges at any time to be involved in limited political activity. Subsection 7C, applicable solely to judges, would otherwise bar this activity.

Paragraph 7B(2). This paragraph is substantially identical to the Section 5C(2) of the 1990 ABA Model Code. The one difference is that the language prohibiting the candidates from personally soliciting publicly stated support is omitted to allow judicial candidates to appear before editorial boards of newspapers and other organizations. Paragraph 7B(2) permits a candidate to solicit publicly stated support, and to establish campaign committees to solicit and accept public support and reasonable financial contributions. At the start of the campaign, the candidate must instruct his or her campaign committees to solicit or accept only contributions that are reasonable under the circumstances. Though not prohibited, campaign contributions of which a judge has knowledge, made by lawyers or others who appear before the judge, may be relevant to disqualification under subsection C of Canon 3.

Campaign committees established under Section 7B(2) should manage campaign finances responsibly; avoiding deficits that might necessitate post-election fund-raising, to the extent possible.

Paragraph 7B(3). This paragraph provides a limited exception to the restrictions imposed by paragraph 7A(1).

Subsection 7C. Neither subsection 7C nor any other section of the Code prohibits a judge in the exercise of administrative functions from engaging in planning and other official activities with members of the executive and legislative branches of government.