

No. 125124

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,) On Appeal from the Appellate Court
) of Illinois,
) First Judicial District,
Respondent-Appellant,) No. 1-11-0580
)
) There on Appeal from the Circuit
v.) Court of Cook County, Illinois
) No. 93 CR 26477
)
ANTONIO HOUSE,) The Honorable
) Kenneth J. Wadas,
Petitioner-Appellee.) Judge Presiding.

**BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF RESPONDENT-APPELLANT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS**

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NATURE OF THE CASE

In September 1998, a Cook County jury convicted defendant Antonio House (age 19 at the time of the offenses) of two counts of first degree murder and two counts of aggravated kidnapping, based on his active participation in the abductions and shooting deaths of 15-year-old Stanton Burch and 18-year-old Michael Purham. TC26-48; TR.E71, E76, F35-41, F71-92, G284, H7.¹ The circuit court sentenced defendant to a mandatory natural life term for the murder convictions, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (1992), and 30 years for each aggravated kidnapping conviction, to run consecutively to the life term. TR.H13-14; LRC69; LRR.X13-14.

Defendant filed a postconviction petition in which he raised an as-applied challenge to his mandatory life sentence under article I, section 11 of the Illinois Constitution (the penalties provision), Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. PC2.C70, 95-97. In 2011, the circuit court dismissed the petition at the second stage. PC2R.V27-28. The appellate court found that defendant's

¹ Citations appear as follows: "TC__" and "TR.__" refer to the direct appeal (No. 1-98-4324) common law record and report of proceedings, respectively; "PC__" refers to the first postconviction appeal (No. 1-02-0346) common law record; "LRC__" and "LRR.__" refer to the common law record and report of proceedings following limited remand proceedings (1-05-0994); "PC2.C__," "PC2R.__," and "PC2SuppR.__" refer to the second postconviction appeal (No. 1-11-0580) common law record, report of proceedings, and supplemental report of proceedings, respectively; and "A__" refers to this brief's appendix.

Pursuant to Rule 318(c), the People asked the Appellate Court to certify copies of the appellate court briefs for this Court. Citations to defendant's opening brief appear as "Def. App. Ct. Br. __."

mandatory sentence violated the penalties provision, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. A45-70. In November 2018, this Court vacated the appellate court's judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of *People v. Harris*, 2018 IL 121932. A44.

On remand, defendant's attorney filed an agreed motion that asked the appellate court to remand "for further second-stage post-conviction proceedings, including compliance with [Supreme Court] Rule 651(c)." A38, 40-41. The appellate court denied the motion, found that applying the mandatory sentence to defendant violated the penalties provision, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. A30-36. The People appeal that determination. An issue is raised on the pleadings: whether defendant sufficiently pleaded a claim for postconviction relief.

ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Whether the appellate court erroneously granted relief on defendant's as-applied constitutional challenge where he failed to develop a record to support that claim in the trial court.
2. Whether, on the record before this Court, defendant's sentence comports with article I, section 11 of the Illinois Constitution.

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction lies under Supreme Court Rules 315 and 612. This Court allowed the People's petition for appeal as a matter of right, or, in the alternative, petition for leave to appeal on January 29, 2020.

**RELEVANT STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS**

730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (1992)

§ 5–8–1. Sentence of Imprisonment for Felony.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court under this Section, according to the following limitations:

(1) for first degree murder, *** (c) if the defendant *** (ii) is found guilty of murdering more than one victim, . . . the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment

Ill. Const. 1970, Art. I, § 11

All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Trial Court Proceedings

The evidence at trial showed that during an intra-gang conflict over control of drug sales, defendant and approximately ten other armed Unknown Vice Lords ambushed the unarmed victims — 15-year-old Stanton Burch and 18-year-old Michael Purham — one afternoon in September 1993. TR.E71, E76, F35-41, F71-92, F214-23. The victims were members of an Unknown Vice Lords faction led by Willie Lloyd and were selling drugs on a

spot controlled by Artez Thigpen (known as Ted), the “right hand man” to the leader of defendant’s faction, Tyrone Williams (known as Baby Tye). TR.F37-38, F72-78, F215-24, F294-95. On the afternoon of the offenses, defendant, Antonio Bealer (known as Fats or Fat Face), Fred Weatherspoon, Derrick Harvey, Hulon Verser, and others held the victims at gunpoint and helped Thigpen force them into the backseat of Thigpen’s car. TR.F75-83, F116-17, F219-22, F267, F289-90. Weatherspoon then put his “mini uzi” into the backseat and may have fired a shot. Trial F.88-89, F105-06, F219-23. Thigpen remarked that the victims were “about to make the news” before he drove them away. TR.F89-90.

Knowing that the victims would be “violated” — *i.e.*, “physically punished,” “beat up,” “shot,” or “killed,” TR.F38-39, G76 — defendant drove Weatherspoon and another gang member to an area a couple of miles away where Thigpen and others had taken the victims. TR.F35-40, F93, G26, G124. There, defendant saw Harvey standing by two cars that were parked on a main street; each car had its hood up to make it appear that a car battery was being jump-started. TR.F39. Harvey said Thigpen was “violating Willie’s boys” in a nearby abandoned junk yard. *Id.*; TR.F263-64, G7-13. Defendant parked his car and acted as a lookout, while the victims were shot multiple times by other gang members. TR.F39-40. Burch was shot nine times, three times in the chest, twice on his thighs, and once each on his head, abdomen, ankle, and hand; and Purham sustained close range

gunshot wounds to his head and chest. TR.F45-64, G7-24. When they returned to the cars, Verser bragged that “he got the mark,” and Williams said “they had got Willie’s boys,” which defendant understood to mean that the victims had been killed. TR.F39-40.

Approximately one month later, at Williams’s direction, defendant and Bealer attempted to force Eunice Clark, a witness to the offenses, into defendant’s car, hit the back of her neck with a hard object when she continued to resist, told her not to testify, and then left. TR.F40, F98-102, F265-67. About two weeks later, defendant fled when police attempted to question him; following a chase, he was apprehended with a loaded handgun that was not connected to the victims’ murders and falsely said that his name was Jerome Morris. TR.F233-40, G44-45. The jury convicted defendant of the first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping of both victims. TC101-04; TR.G284.

The People sought the death penalty, and defendant waived his right to jury sentencing. TR.H7. A presentence investigation report (PSI) showed that defendant (then 24 years old) had three felony convictions for possession with intent to deliver cocaine. TC125, 127. He had one daughter, was never married, and dropped out of high school in his senior year. TC126. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel added that defendant never knew his father, his mother died when he was 18 years old, he had a sister and was raised by his maternal grandmother, and in 1992, he was shot on two

separate occasions. TR.H5-6. The parties stipulated that defendant was 19 years old at the time of his crimes. TR.H6-7.

The trial court heard arguments in aggravation and mitigation. TR.H7-13. The prosecutor argued that the offenses were intentional, planned, and brutal, the motive for the crimes was drug sales, and defendant was on probation for dealing drugs at the time he committed the crimes. TR.H7-11. After the murders, defendant attempted to silence the main witness, and possessed a loaded gun when he was arrested. *Id.* Defense counsel emphasized that defendant's participation in the offenses "was minor" because he did not "actually kill[]" the victims, and asked the court to sentence defendant to natural life. TR.H11-13.

After finding defendant death eligible, the trial court found that defendant's age, his role in the offenses, and other mitigating factors precluded imposition of such a sentence. TR.H13-15. The trial court observed that defendant's offenses were part of a "brand of street justice" driven by the sale of narcotics, "a violent crime that fosters violence." TR.H13-14. The court found the offenses "cruel" and emphasized that defendant was arrested with a handgun and "prepared to do what was ever [sic] necessary even after being involved in a double murder." *Id.* The court sentenced defendant to mandatory natural life for the murder convictions, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (1992), and 60-year extended term sentences for

each aggravated kidnapping conviction, to run consecutively to the life term. TR.H14-15.

In a motion to reconsider sentence, defendant argued that his mandatory life sentence violated both the penalties provision and the Eighth Amendment because it precluded consideration of his rehabilitative potential. TC146; TR.H16. The trial court denied the motion. TR.H17.

Direct appeal and resentencing

On direct appeal, defendant did not challenge his natural-life sentence; instead, he argued, as relevant here, that his extended term sentences for aggravated kidnapping violated *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). LRC102. The appellate court affirmed defendant's convictions, but agreed with defendant's *Apprendi* claim, and remanded for resentencing on the aggravated kidnapping convictions. LRC103-05.

On remand, the trial court ordered an updated PSI, *see* PC2SuppR.D3, which provided additional details about defendant's background, *see* LRC29-55. Defendant reported that he never knew his father, was raised by his mother and stepfather, and has a half-sister. LRC33. His mother was a nurse, and his stepfather worked in the steel mills. *Id.* Defendant had a good relationship with his mother until her death in 1992, possibly due to a homicide. *Id.* He lived with his grandmother for the year before his incarceration. *Id.* Defendant dropped out of high school about two months before graduation and earned his GED while in prison. *Id.* He had a good

relationship with his stepfather and half-sister, and maintained contact with his ten-year-old daughter. LRC33-34. Defendant acknowledged that he had been a member of the Unknown Vice Lords from 1988 through 1998. LRC35. He had asthma but was otherwise in good health. LRC34.

In February 2005, the trial court resentenced defendant to 30 years for each aggravated kidnapping conviction, to be served consecutively to his natural-life sentence. LRC69; LRR.X13-14.

Postconviction petition

In September 2001, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. PC46-58. The circuit court denied the petition because defendant's direct appeal was pending, but the appellate court reversed and remanded. LRC59-60.

In April 2010, defendant's appointed counsel filed an amended postconviction petition that raised, among other claims, (1) an as-applied challenge to the mandatory natural-life sentencing statute under the penalties provision and the Eighth Amendment and (2) an ineffective assistance claim premised upon direct appeal counsel's failure to raise the as-applied challenge. PC2.C70, 95-97. Defendant argued that the mandatory sentencing statute was unconstitutional as applied to him because it precluded consideration of "the offender or of the degree of his participation in the offense." PC2.C96. Relying on *People v. Leon Miller*, 202 Ill. 2d 328 (2002), defendant claimed that his sentence was "grossly excessive" because

he was a lookout and thus “far less culpable than the principals” and because his “criminal record was limited to three non-violent drug possession cases.” PC2.C95-96. He concluded that the record did not demonstrate that he was “so incorrigible that life without parole, imposed on a teenager, was a just and appropriate sentence.” PC2.C96-97.

In October 2010, the People moved to dismiss the postconviction petition, arguing that *Leon Miller* did not apply because unlike 15-year-old Miller, who minimally participated in the offenses, defendant was 19 years old and actively participated in the kidnappings and murders of Burch and Purham. PC2.C427. Defendant’s response did not address the sentencing challenge. PC2.C452-62. At a hearing on the motion, defendant emphasized that he was young, “a lookout or decoy some distance away,” and “not shown to have foreseen the extent of harm that would take place.” PC2R.V23-24. In February 2011, the trial court granted the People’s motion to dismiss. PC2R.V27-28.

Postconviction appeal

On appeal, relying on *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting capital punishment for juvenile offenders), *Graham v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (prohibiting life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders), and *Miller v. Alabama*, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders), defendant argued, in relevant part, that the statute mandating natural life was

unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him under both the Eighth Amendment and the penalties provision. Def. App. Ct. Br. 58-65. He asserted that “his brain was still continuing to mature” at age 19, and cited secondary sources from 1999, 2002, 2004, and 2006, to support his position. *Id.* at 61-65. Defendant concluded that because he was not “a fully mature adult,” “was minimally culpable,” and had “no violent criminal history,” his mandatory natural-life sentence “shocks the moral sense of the community.” *Id.* at 64-65.

The appellate court ruled that applying the mandatory sentencing statute to defendant violated the penalties provision because it precluded consideration of mitigating factors, specifically, defendant’s age, level of culpability, and criminal history. A68-69. Citing a newspaper opinion, a publication from an advocacy organization, and practices of select European countries, the appellate court found that the United States Supreme Court’s “division between juvenile and adult at [age] 18” did not “create[] a bright line rule,” the designation of age 18 as an adult “appear[ed] to be somewhat arbitrary,” and the characteristics of juvenile offenders applied to young adult offenders. A67-68. The court concluded that defendant’s mandatory natural-life sentence shocked the moral sense of the community, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. A69. Because it found the mandatory sentence unconstitutional as applied to defendant under the penalties provision, the appellate court declined to address defendant’s

remaining constitutional challenges, including those under the Eighth Amendment. *Id.*

The People filed a petition for appeal as a matter of right, or alternatively, leave to appeal. While the petition was pending, this Court rejected a young adult's as-applied challenge to his mandatory life sentence under the penalties provision because he had failed to develop a factual record to support the claim. *Harris*, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 34-48. Following this decision, the Court issued a supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate its judgment and consider the effect of *Harris* on defendant's penalties provision claim. A44. On remand, defendant filed an agreed motion for summary disposition that asked the appellate court to remand to the circuit court "for further second-stage post-conviction proceedings, including compliance with Rule 651(c)." A38, A40-41. The motion explained that under *Harris* and *People v. Thompson*, 2015 IL 118151, defendant should be given the opportunity to develop his as-applied challenge, *i.e.*, to "present evidence to the trial court . . . demonstrating how the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development relied on by the court in *Miller* applies to an emerging adult and to his specific circumstances." A40-41.

The appellate court denied the agreed motion and again found defendant's mandatory sentence unconstitutional under the penalties provision, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. A20-31.

The court repeated much of its 2015 opinion and added that (1) recent legislative enactments supported its conclusion, and (2) defendant's sentence was disproportionate when compared to that of Fred Weatherspoon, who was a juvenile at the time of the offenses and had been resentenced under *Miller*. A15-17, 20, 29-30, 34, 36. The court determined that *Harris* had no effect on defendant's claim because he raised it in a postconviction petition, was not the principal offender, and no further record development was necessary. A13-14, 34-35.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Statutes are presumed constitutional and defendant must overcome that presumption by clearly establishing that the mandatory sentencing statute is invalid when applied to him. *People v. Coty*, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 22; *People v. Rizzo*, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 23. Defendant's constitutional challenge is reviewed *de novo*. *Coty*, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 22.

ARGUMENT

I. Under *Harris* and *Thompson*, the Appellate Court Should Not Have Considered Defendant's As-Applied Claim Because He Failed to Develop a Record to Support It in the Trial Court.

The appellate court should not have addressed defendant's as-applied challenge because he failed to develop the claim in the trial court. "By definition, an as-applied constitutional challenge is dependent on the particular circumstances and facts of the individual defendant[.]" *Thompson*, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 37. It is therefore "paramount that the record be

sufficiently developed in terms of those facts and circumstances for purposes of appellate review.” *Harris*, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 39 (citation omitted).

As the parties agreed in the appellate court, A40-41, *Harris* and *Thompson* required defendant to develop a trial court record “contain[ing] evidence about how the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development that helped form the basis for the *Miller* decision applies to defendant’s specific facts and circumstances.” *Harris*, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 46; *see also Thompson*, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 37-38. In the trial court, defendant neither provided nor cited any evidence relating to young adult development. PC2.C95-97. As a result, no evidentiary hearing was held, and the trial court made no factual findings critical to determining whether the science concerning juvenile maturity and brain development applies equally to young adults, or to defendant specifically, as he argued in the appellate court, Def. App. Ct. Br. 58-65. *See Harris*, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 46. Accordingly, as in *Harris*, the appellate court improperly found that defendant’s sentence violated the Illinois Constitution without an evidentiary record on defendant’s as-applied claim. 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 40-46.

Contrary to the appellate court’s view, A14, *Harris* and *Thompson* are not limited to cases in which a defendant raises an as-applied challenge on appeal, or where the defendant is guilty as a principal rather than as an accomplice. The principle that a litigant must develop an evidentiary record to support an as-applied challenge is well established. *See, e.g., In re*

Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d 253, 268 (2004) (citing cases). As *Harris* explained, “[t]he critical point is not whether the claim is raised on collateral review or direct review, but whether the record has been developed sufficiently to address the defendant’s constitutional claim.” 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 41. And, as *Thompson* emphasized, “the trial court is the most appropriate tribunal for the type of factual development necessary to adequately address defendant’s as-applied challenge.” 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 38.

Indeed, the appellate court’s opinion equating young adult offenders to juvenile offenders rests on selected articles from a newspaper and an advocacy group. A25-26. But, as *Harris* observed, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 59, no trial court has made factual findings concerning the scientific research cited in these articles, the limits of that research, or the competing scientific research, let alone how that research applies to defendant’s facts and circumstances. *See, e.g.,* Elizabeth S. Scott, *et al., Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social Change, & Justice Policy*, 85 *Fordham L. Rev.* 641, 643-44, 664 (2016) (available scientific research does *not* “indicate that individuals between the ages of eighteen and twenty are indistinguishable from younger adolescents in attributes relevant to criminal offending and punishment”; “scientific evidence is simply not robust enough to support a response of categorical leniency toward young adult offenders”). That the appellate court exceeded its authority in addressing and granting relief on defendant’s as-applied claim is particularly clear where, as here,

defendant conceded that this Court's precedent required him to develop the record. *See* A38-41.

Accordingly, consistent with the parties' request below, this Court should reverse the appellate court's judgment and remand to the circuit court for second-stage postconviction proceedings where defendant can amend his petition and attach evidence to support his as-applied claim.

II. On the Record Before This Court, Defendant's Mandatory Natural-Life Sentence Is Constitutional.

Relying on the qualitative "differences between juveniles under age 18 and adults," *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 569, as confirmed by common sense, sociology, psychology, and neuroscience, the United States Supreme Court prohibited capital punishment for juvenile offenders in 2005, *id.* at 569-70, 578-79, and life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders in 2010, *Graham*, 560 U.S. at 67-71, 74-75. Defendant filed his amended postconviction petition after *Roper*, and he responded to the People's motion to dismiss after *Graham*. *See* PC2.C452-62. Yet in postconviction proceedings before the trial court, defendant cited neither case and relied solely on the trial record, without attaching or citing any evidence concerning young adult development. *See id.*; PC2R.V23-24. On appeal, defendant cited only secondary sources relating to young adult development that predate *Graham*. *See* Def. App. Ct. Br. 61-65. This Court could therefore review defendant's claim on the record before it because defendant "ha[d] an adequate opportunity to present evidence in support of [his] as-applied, constitutional

claim.” *Coty*, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 22. Contrary to the appellate court’s conclusion, however, on this undeveloped record, the mandatory sentencing statute is constitutional as applied to defendant under this Court’s established legal standards and precedent.

A. Legal standards and principles

Article I, section 11 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides, in relevant part: “All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” This provision “requires the legislature, in defining crimes and their penalties, to consider the constitutional goals of restoring an offender to useful citizenship and of providing a penalty according to the seriousness of the offense.” *People v. Taylor*, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 206 (1984); accord *People v. Clemons*, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 29.

However, “this [C]ourt has repeatedly recognized that the legislature has the power to prescribe penalties for defined offenses, and that power necessarily includes the authority to prescribe mandatory sentences, even if such sentences restrict the judiciary’s discretion in imposing sentences.” *Coty*, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 24. Moreover, nothing in the penalties provision requires the legislature to give greater weight or consideration to the possibility of rehabilitating an offender than to the seriousness of the offense. *Id.*; *Rizzo*, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 39; *Taylor*, 102 Ill. 2d at 206. Instead, consistent with article I, section 11, the legislature may consider the severity

of an offense and determine that no set of mitigating circumstances, including the possibility of rehabilitation, could permit an appropriate punishment less than a mandatory minimum. *Rizzo*, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 39 (discussing *People v. Sharpe*, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 525 (2005)); *People v. Huddleston*, 212 Ill. 2d 107, 145 (2004); *People v. Dunigan*, 165 Ill. 2d 235, 244-47 (1995); *Taylor*, 102 Ill. 2d at 206. Thus, the legislature presumptively does not “violate[] article I, section 11, when it enacts statutes imposing mandatory minimum sentences,” even when the minimums are lengthy. *Rizzo*, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 39 (quoting *Sharpe*, 216 Ill. 2d at 525); *Huddleston*, 212 Ill. 2d at 129.

Aside from an identical elements challenge — which is not at issue here, *see generally Clemons*, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 30 — the only basis for challenging a mandatory sentence under the penalties provision is under the “cruel or degrading standard.” *Rizzo*, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 28. Under that standard, a defendant must show that the challenged penalty is “so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.” *Coty*, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 31 (citation omitted); *accord Rizzo*, 2016 IL 118599, ¶¶ 28, 36-39, 41. This standard defies precise definition because “as our society evolves, so too do our concepts of elemental decency and fairness which shape the ‘moral sense’ of the community.” *Rizzo*, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 38 (quotation marks omitted).

In determining whether a sentence shocks the moral sense of our community, this Court reviews “the gravity of the defendant’s offense in connection with the severity of the statutorily mandated sentence within our community’s evolving standard of decency.” *Id.* (quoting *Leon Miller*, 202 Ill. 2d at 340). For an as-applied challenge, this Court also considers the particular offender and whether it shocks the moral sense of the community to apply the designated penalty to him, bearing in mind that the legislature may constitutionally consider the severity of an offense and determine that no set of mitigating circumstances could permit an appropriate punishment of less than the minimum. *See Rizzo*, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 39; *Huddleston*, 212 Ill. 2d at 141-45; *Taylor*, 102 Ill. 2d at 206.

B. Defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence does not shock the moral sense of the community.

1. This Court has never found a mandatory prison term cruel or degrading when applied to an adult homicide offender.

The legislature enjoys broad discretion in setting criminal penalties, and “courts generally decline to overrule legislative determinations in this area unless the challenged penalty is clearly in excess of the general constitutional limitations on this authority.” *Coty*, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 43 (quoting *Sharpe*, 216 Ill. 2d at 487). This is because the legislature is institutionally better equipped and more capable than the judiciary to identify and remedy the evils confronting our society, gauge the seriousness of various offenses, and fashion sentences accordingly. *Rizzo*, 2016 IL

118599, ¶ 36; *Huddleston*, 212 Ill. 2d at 129-30. In fixing a penalty, the legislature may consider myriad factors, including the degree of harm inflicted, the frequency of the crime, and the high risk of bodily harm associated with it. *Coty*, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 24. Or it “may perceive a need to enact a more stringent penalty provision in order to halt an increase in the commission of a particular crime.” *Id.* (quoting *Huddleston*, 212 Ill. 2d at 129-30). In sum, this Court is reluctant to overturn a legislatively designated penalty as “cruel or degrading” because the legislative judgment “*itself* says something about the general moral ideas of the people.” *Id.* ¶ 43 (emphasis in original) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

For these reasons, this Court has consistently rejected facial and as-applied challenges under the “cruel or degrading” standard to statutes that mandate minimum sentences for adult offenders, including statutes that mandate lifetime imprisonment or lengthen sentences through application of mandatory firearm enhancements or consecutive sentencing provisions. *See id.* ¶¶ 43-44; *Rizzo*, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 39; *Sharpe*, 216 Ill. 2d at 524-27; *Huddleston*, 212 Ill. 2d at 129-45; *People v. Morgan*, 203 Ill. 2d 470, 487-89 (2003), *overruled in part on other grounds*, *Sharpe*, 216 Ill. 2d at 519; *People v. Hill*, 199 Ill. 2d 440, 452-54 (2002), *overruled in part on other grounds*, *Sharpe*, 216 Ill. 2d at 519; *People v. Arna*, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 114 (1995), *abrogated on other grounds*, *People v. Castleberry*, 2015 IL 116916, ¶¶ 13, 19; *Dunigan*, 165 Ill. 2d at 244-48; *Taylor*, 102 Ill. 2d at 204-10.

In fact, this Court has found it cruel or degrading to apply the legislatively mandated minimum penalty to a particular offender just once. *See Leon Miller*, 202 Ill. 2d at 340-43. In *Leon Miller*, the convergence of three statutes — the Juvenile Court Act’s automatic transfer statute, the accountability statute, and the multiple-murder sentencing statute — required a natural-life sentence for the defendant, “a 15-year-old with one minute to contemplate his decision to participate in the incident and [who] stood as a lookout during the shooting, but never handled a gun.” *Id.* at 340-41. Upholding the trial court’s finding of unconstitutionality, this Court concluded that the mandatory natural-life sentence “grossly distort[ed] the factual realities of the case and d[id] not accurately represent [Miller]’s personal culpability such that it shock[ed] the moral sense of the community” to apply it to him. *Id.* at 341. The Court explained that subjecting Miller — “the least culpable offender imaginable” — to “the same sentence applicable to the actual shooter” was “particularly harsh and unconstitutionally disproportionate.” *Id.*

Two factors were essential to the Court’s holding: (1) Miller was a juvenile; and (2) his degree of participation in the offenses was minimal. *Id.* at 340-43. As to age, the Court noted “the longstanding distinction made in this State between adult and juvenile offenders,” including the societal recognition that “young defendants have greater rehabilitative potential.” *Id.* at 341-42 (citations omitted). This “marked distinction between persons of

mature age and those who are minors” is reflected in both nature and law, and grounded in the presumption that “[t]he habits and characters of [minors] are . . . to a large extent as yet unformed and unsettled.” *Id.* at 342 (citation omitted). Sentencing courts therefore often have discretion to grant leniency to juveniles. *Id.* Likewise, sentencing courts may grant leniency to offenders guilty by accountability. *Id.* The Court explained that a natural-life sentence might be appropriate under article I, section 11 for a juvenile offender who actively participated in the planning of a crime that results in multiple murders. *Id.* at 343. But because Miller was not an active participant, this Court held that applying the mandatory natural-life sentence to him violated article I, section 11. *Id.* at 341-43.

Cases decided both before and after *Leon Miller* demonstrate that the finding of unconstitutionality there depended on the unique facts and circumstances of that case, and does not dictate the same result here. *See Huddleston*, 212 Ill. 2d at 130-31. In *People v. Davis*, 2014 IL 115595, for example, this Court declined to re-litigate the 14-year-old offender’s article I, section 11 challenge to his mandatory natural-life sentence. *Id.* ¶ 45. After finding that the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, *id.* ¶ 43, this Court reaffirmed that the penalties provision “does not necessarily prohibit a sentence of natural life without parole where a juvenile offender actively participates in the planning of a crime that results in multiple murders,” *id.* ¶ 45 (citing *Leon Miller*, 202 Ill. 2d at 341-42); *see also Taylor*, 102 Ill. 2d at

204-06 (upholding mandatory life sentence for juvenile offender convicted of multiple murders against, *inter alia*, challenge under penalties provision).

Accordingly, *Davis* reaffirms that the penalties provision permits the legislature to fix a penalty based on the severity of the offense, and to conclude that some offenses are sufficiently severe that no mitigating factor, including the possibility of rehabilitation, warrants less than the minimum sentence. *See supra*, Part II.A.

2. The legislature did not clearly exceed its constitutional authority in requiring life imprisonment for defendant, an adult convicted of two first degree murders.

“[I]n terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public” murder cannot be compared to other serious violent offenses. *Kennedy v. Louisiana*, 554 U.S. 407, 428 (2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted); *see also Graham*, 560 U.S. at 69. Thus, when enacting the statute under which defendant was sentenced, “[t]he legislature considered the possible rehabilitation of an offender, as well as the seriousness of the offense of multiple murders,” and “determin[ed] that in the public interest there must be a mandatory minimum sentence of natural life imprisonment.” *Taylor*, 102 Ill. 2d at 206. Moreover, as *Taylor* observed, Illinois’s “mandatory life imprisonment [statute] is certainly not novel.” *Id.* at 208-09 (collecting statutes from other jurisdictions). And since *Taylor*, statutes mandating life imprisonment for murder have become even more prevalent. *See Miller*, 567 U.S. at 495 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); *see also id.* at 482

(observing that 29 jurisdictions mandated life without parole for murder). These legislative judgments confirm what this Court has consistently held: it does not shock our community's moral sense to mandate lifetime imprisonment for adults convicted of murdering more than one victim. *See Taylor*, 102 Ill. 2d at 206-07; *see also People v. Wooters*, 188 Ill. 2d 500, 502-03, 505-09 (1999) (three-justice opinion upholding mandatory natural life for 20-year-old with no criminal history convicted of murdering child under age 12). In fact, both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have upheld mandatory natural-life sentences for adults who commit crimes less serious than murder. *See, e.g., Coty*, 2020 IL 123972, ¶¶ 43-44 (upholding mandatory natural-life sentence for intellectually-disabled adult convicted of second predatory criminal sexual assault of a child); *Huddleston*, 212 Ill. 2d at 110-11, 145 (similar); *Harmelin v. Michigan*, 501 U.S. 957, 1002-05 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (upholding mandatory life-without-parole sentence for possession of large quantity of cocaine where offender had no prior felony convictions); *see also Graham*, 560 U.S. at 59-60 (observing that Justice Kennedy's opinion in *Harmelin* is controlling opinion).

The appellate court's contrary decision here thus stands alone. Consistent with the precedent described above, when it has not remanded for further record development, the appellate court has uniformly upheld mandatory sentences requiring lifetime imprisonment for young adult

homicide offenders, even when they were guilty as accomplices.² Other jurisdictions have similarly upheld mandatory life without parole sentences for young adult homicide offenders. *See Harris*, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 59-61 (citing cases and observing that challenges to such sentences “have been repeatedly rejected”).³ Given this broad consensus, the General Assembly did not clearly exceed its authority in requiring life in prison for defendant.

² *See, e.g., People v. McClurkin*, 2020 IL App (1st) 171274, ¶¶ 14-23; *People v. White*, 2020 IL App (5th) 170345, ¶¶ 17-33; *People v. Ramsey*, 2019 IL App (3d) 160759, ¶¶ 23-24, *PLA denied*, No. 125312 (Ill. Nov. 26, 2019); *People v. Pittman*, 2018 IL App (1st) 152030, ¶¶ 20-42, *PLA denied*, No. 123410 (Ill. Nov. 28, 2018); *People v. McKee*, 2017 IL App (3d) 140881, ¶¶ 22-36, *PLA denied*, No. 122468 (Ill. Nov. 28, 2018); *People v. Thomas*, 2017 IL App (1st) 142557, ¶¶ 21-48, *PLA denied*, No. 122101 (Ill. Nov. 28, 2018); *People v. Ybarra*, 2016 IL App (1st) 142407, ¶¶ 22-34, *PLA denied*, No. 121587 (Ill. Jan. 25, 2017); *People v. Brown*, 2012 IL App (1st) 091940, ¶¶ 60, 70-79, *PLA denied*, No. 114360 (Ill. Sep. 26, 2012).

³ *See also, e.g., United States v. Sierra*, 933 F.3d 95, 97-99 (2d Cir. 2019); *United States v. Bernard*, 762 F.3d 467, 482-83 (5th Cir. 2014); *State v. Endreson*, No. 1 CA-CR 14-0577 PRPC, 2016 WL 5073985, at *1-2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sep. 20, 2016) (non-precedential); *People v. Perez*, 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 34, 37-38 (Ct. App. 2016); *Woods v. Comm’r of Corr.*, __ A.3d __, 2020 WL 2798106, at *11 (Conn. App. Ct. June 2, 2020); *Zebroski v. State*, 179 A.3d 855 (Del. 2018); *Hill v. State*, 921 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2006); *Janvier v. State*, 123 So. 3d 647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); *State v. Lyle*, 854 N.W.2d 378, 403 (Iowa 2014); *Crawley v. State*, 895 N.W.2d 922, 2017 WL 108298, at *2-3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017) (non-precedential); *State v. Ruggles*, 304 P.3d 338, 344-46 (Kan. 2013); *State v. Caesar*, __ So. 3d __, 2018 WL 1082436, *2 (La. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2018); *Commonwealth v. Garcia*, 123 N.E.3d 766, 770-71 (Mass. 2019); *People v. Brown*, 811 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011); *State v. Barnett*, 598 S.W.3d 127, 131-32 (Mo. 2020); *State v. Nolan*, 870 N.W.2d 806, 828 (Neb. 2015); *State v. Garcell*, 678 S.E.2d 618, 645-47 (N.C. 2009); *State v. Nitsche*, 66 N.E.3d 135, 151-53 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016); *Commonwealth v. Lee*, 206 A.3d 1, 4-11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019); *Pike v. State*, No. E2009-00016-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 1544207, at *67 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2011); *Martinez v. State*, 08-14-00130-CR, 2016 WL 4447660, at *13-16 (Tex. App. Aug. 24,

Nothing on this undeveloped record establishes that defendant's sentence is "so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community." *E.g., Coty*, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 31. In the 14 months after he turned 18, defendant was arrested (and later convicted) three times for trying to sell cocaine, and then actively participated in the planned kidnappings and murders of two individuals followed by the attempted intimidation of an eyewitness to the offenses. Defendant knew that the unarmed 15- and 18-year-old victims would be killed or seriously harmed when he (1) pointed a gun at them while fellow armed gang members forced them into a car, (2) drove two miles to a junk yard where the victims were taken to be killed, (3) acted as a decoy while his confederates shot them 11 times, and (4) abandoned the victims in the junk yard. He continued to aid the shooters in the weeks after the crimes by using force to intimidate the prosecution's main witness. And, after attempting to flee from police, he was arrested with a loaded handgun and provided a false name. In sum, defendant actively facilitated the kidnappings and murders, including efforts to cover up the offenses and evade responsibility for his participation in them, and his conduct revealed a reckless indifference to the value of human life. *See Leon Miller*, 202 Ill. 2d at 341 (natural life appropriate sentence for active participant in multiple murders); *compare Tison v. Arizona*, 481 U.S. 137,

2016) (not designated for publication); *State v. Berget*, 826 N.W.2d 1, 27-28 (S.D. 2013); *Nicodemus v. State*, 392 P.3d 408, 413-17 (Wyo. 2017).

142-43, 150 (1987) (upholding capital sentences for 19- and 20-year-olds convicted of felony murder because although neither “took any act which he desired to, or was substantially certain would, cause death,” they were actively involved in the underlying felonies and “reckless[ly] indifferen[t] to the value of human life”).

Defendant’s age, family background, and criminal history do not mitigate his culpability or reveal a prospect for rehabilitation sufficient to overturn the legislative judgment that natural life is the appropriate punishment for defendant’s serious offenses. To be sure, defendant’s young age is a mitigating factor, but on this undeveloped record, that fact alone does not make his sentence “wholly disproportionate to the offense committed.” *E.g., Coty*, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 31; *see infra*, Part II.B.3.

Likewise, defendant appears to have been raised in a supportive and stable family environment with two working parents, and even after his mother died when he was 18, defendant maintained a good relationship with his stepfather, half-sister, and grandmother. *Compare Miller*, 567 U.S. at 477-78 (chaotic, brutal, or dysfunctional home environment mitigates a juvenile’s culpability); *State v. Sweet*, 879 N.W.2d 811, 838 (Iowa 2016) (offender from stable family environment might be considered less redeemable than offender whose family life was characterized by chaos and deprivation); *but see id.* (stable family environment could also suggest greater rehabilitative prospects because offender’s “character and personality have

not been irreparably damaged”). The record contains no evidence on the role his mother’s death played on defendant’s later actions, but even assuming it had some influence and considering defendant’s age, the presumptively constitutional sentence is not disproportionate in light of the seriousness of the offenses.

Finally, the appellate court improperly minimized defendant’s criminal history. A30-31. Distribution of illegal drugs has “pernicious effects” on our society, often resulting in “crimes of violence” that “occur as part of the drug business or culture.” *Harmelin*, 501 U.S. at 1002-03. And that appears to be what happened here. Defendant was a cocaine distributor for his gang and on probation when he decided to participate in the kidnapping-murder plan to preserve his gang faction’s territory. He was armed with a gun both during the crimes and when arrested, and he used force to intimidate the State’s main witness into not testifying. Thus, defendant’s criminal history does not mitigate his culpability.

But even if there were facts or circumstances in this record to suggest that defendant has some rehabilitative potential, the legislature acted within its authority in concluding that the gravity of defendant’s offenses and the harm he helped inflict outweigh any rehabilitative potential that defendant’s individual circumstances may suggest. *See, e.g., McKee*, 2017 IL App (3d) 140881, ¶¶ 35-36 (upholding mandatory natural-life sentence for 18-year-old guilty by accountability for actively participating in planning of two first

degree murders, notwithstanding that she had “significant mental health issues and at least two extended and extremely tragic and traumatizing experiences as a 14-year-old”); *Brown*, 2012 IL App (1st) 091940, ¶¶ 60, 70-79 (same for 19-year-old intellectually disabled offender convicted of two murders as an unarmed accomplice). For these reasons, defendant’s as-applied challenge fails.

3. Recent legislative enactments confirm that defendant’s mandatory sentence is constitutional.

Contrary to the appellate court’s suggestion, A29-31, recent legislative enactments reaffirm that for purposes of criminal punishment, a person is an adult when he turns 18 years old. In 2013, the General Assembly amended the Juvenile Court Act to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction from persons under 17 years old to persons under 18 years old. *People v. Richardson*, 2015 IL 118255, ¶¶ 1-3 (describing 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (2012 & 2014)). In 2015, the legislature passed a separate sentencing provision for “individuals under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of an offense,” which requires courts to consider youth-related mitigating factors when sentencing juveniles and removes the mandatory firearm enhancements for that category of offenders. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (capitalization omitted). The legislature could have applied these changes to, or enacted separate sentencing provisions for, older individuals, as it has done in other contexts. *See, e.g.*, 325 ILCS 40/2(d) (2020) (“child” defined as “a person under 21 years of age” in Intergovernmental Missing Child

Recovery Act of 1984); 750 ILCS 5/513 (2020) (specific provision concerning distribution of educational expenses for “non-minor child” in marriage dissolution proceedings). But the legislature chose to continue to draw the line at age 18 — the same age that it marks as the line for adulthood in many areas. *See, e.g.*, 10 ILCS 5/3-6 (2020) (eligible to vote in general or consolidated election at age 18); 105 ILCS 5/14-6.10 (2020) (in School Code provision governing transfer of parental rights, “age of majority” is 18 years); 705 ILCS 305/2 (2020) (eligible to serve on jury at age 18); 735 ILCS 5/13-211 (2020) (Code of Civil Procedure defines “minor” as person under 18 years of age); 755 ILCS 5/11-1 (2020) (same under Probate Act).

Indeed, even more recently, the legislature made the considered and deliberate judgment *after Miller* that young adults who are convicted of the most serious offenses should be imprisoned for life. Effective June 1, 2019, the legislature enacted a scheme that prospectively provides parole review to certain individuals who were under age 21 at the time of their offenses. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (2019). But the legislature excluded from any parole review those individuals, like defendant, who are “subject to a term of natural life imprisonment under Section 5-8-1 of th[e] [Criminal] Code.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b) (2019). As this Court has repeatedly emphasized, this legislative “action represents the general moral ideas of the people.” *Rizzo*, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 37 (citing *Leon Miller*, 202 Ill. 2d at 339, and *People ex rel. Bradley v. Ill. State Reformatory*, 148 Ill. 413, 421-22 (1894)) (quotation marks and

emphasis omitted). Thus, defendant's sentence cannot be said to be shocking to the moral sense of the community, as is required for a violation of the penalties provision.

In reaching the contrary conclusion, the appellate court faulted the legislature for not providing the trial court with sufficient sentencing discretion. *See* A27-32. But as discussed above, this Court has repeatedly held that the penalties provision empowers the General Assembly to determine the criminal sentences that are required to protect society, and that this legislative power “necessarily includes the authority to establish mandatory minimum sentences, even though such sentences, by definition, restrict the inquiry and function of the judiciary in imposing sentence.” *Hill*, 199 Ill. 2d at 447-48. Although the Eighth Amendment mandates individualized sentencing in capital cases and for juvenile offenders subject to natural life imprisonment, it does not require such sentencing for adult offenders in non-capital cases. *Coty*, 2020 IL 123972, ¶¶ 33, 41 & n.8 (“a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual does not become so simply because it is mandatory” (citations omitted)). And this Court has never interpreted the penalties provision as categorically requiring individualized sentencing for a particular type of offender or offense. *See id.* ¶ 41; *Hill*, 199 Ill. 2d at 448-49 (individualized sentencing is matter of public policy for legislature, not constitutional requirement); *cf. Harris*, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 77 (Burke, J., concurring) (“determining the age at which human beings should

be held fully responsible for their criminal conduct is ultimately a matter of social policy that rests on the community's moral sense").

Yet the appellate court granted to defendant the same protections that the United States Supreme Court limited to offenders under age 18. *See Harris*, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 55-61. And it did so on a record devoid of any evidence to support extending *Miller's* rationale to young adults over 18, contrary to *Harris* and *Thompson*, as discussed in Part I. Instead, the appellate court relied on a newspaper opinion, a publication from an advocacy organization, and the fact that some other countries structure their juvenile court provisions to include certain categories of young adult offenders.

A25-28. But these secondary sources are insufficient to support overruling the General Assembly's policy decision to draw the line for criminal sentencing and juvenile court treatment at age 18. *Cf. Blumenthal v. Brewer*, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 82 (secondary sources are not binding on this Court and are unpersuasive when they do not adequately consider deeply rooted public policy in Illinois). The materials relied on by the appellate court thus do not demonstrate that the legislature's decision to draw the same line as the Eighth Amendment and sentence defendant like other adult offenders is shocking to the community's moral sense.

Moreover, although the appellate court purported to rest its decision on facts specific to defendant, the central premise of the appellate court's decision is defendant's relatively young age. *See* A28-31. But as discussed in

Part I, the record reveals “nothing about how th[e] science [concerning juvenile development] applies to the circumstances of defendant’s case, the key showing for an as-applied constitutional challenge.” *Thompson*, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 38. Nor does the record contain any evidence suggesting that defendant was a “passive accomplice” like 15-year-old Leon Miller, *see supra*, Part II.B.1; or that his actions resulted from relative immaturity or impetuosity, features that distinguish juveniles from adults, *see Miller*, 567 U.S. at 473, 477-78. Thus, despite its attempt to limit its analysis to the facts of this case, the appellate court’s judgment effectively precludes mandatory life-without-parole sentences for an undefined class of young adult offenders who are convicted as accomplices.

In sum, the General Assembly recently reaffirmed that “for sentencing purposes, the age of 18 marks the present line between juveniles and adults.” *Harris*, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 61; *see also Thomas*, 2017 IL App (1st) 142557, ¶¶ 46-47. Although “imprecise,” it is a bright line based on our society’s widespread recognition of the special status of juveniles and is consistent with that of most, if not all, other jurisdictions. *Harris*, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 56-58, 60-61; *see also supra* n.3. The legislature was within its constitutional authority to draw that line and treat defendant as an adult. *See Harris*, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 61; *see also id.* ¶ 77 (Burke, J., concurring) (“I cannot say that, for purposes of criminal sentencing, the Illinois Constitution

prohibits the General Assembly from maintaining th[e] traditional line” between childhood and adulthood).

4. The appellate court improperly compared defendant’s sentence to that of other offenders.

Finally, the appellate court found defendant’s sentence disproportionate under article I, section 11 in part because it perceived a disparity between defendant’s sentence and that of other individuals involved in these offenses. A15-16, 20, 34, 36. But the appellate court’s approach has no constitutional or factual basis.

As discussed in Part II.B.1, a defendant may challenge a legislatively mandated sentence under *either* the identical elements test *or* the cruel or degrading standard. *Rizzo*, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 28. Neither basis includes a “comparative proportionality review,” *i.e.*, an inquiry into whether an otherwise proportionate penalty is nevertheless unacceptable because it is disparate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime. *See People v. Caballero*, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 213 (1997) (disparate sentencing claim not same as disproportionate or excessive sentence claim); *see also Pulley v. Harris*, 465 U.S. 37, 43-44, 46 (1984) (describing comparative proportionality review and holding that federal constitution does not require it); *People v. Williams*, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 576 (2000) (same under Illinois Constitution); *see generally Coty*, 2020 IL 123972 (applying cruel or degrading standard); *Clemons*, 2012 IL 107821 (applying identical elements test).

Rather, to the extent this Court has recognized a disparate-sentencing claim, it was pursuant to a judicially created doctrine that evaluates whether a trial court abused its discretion in imposing “arbitrary or unreasonably disparate sentences” on similarly situated codefendants. *Williams*, 192 Ill. 2d at 576; *see also People v. Godinez*, 91 Ill. 2d 47, 54-57 (1982); *People v. Stroup*, 397 Ill. App. 3d 271, 273-75 (2d Dist. 2010). By its terms, however, the doctrine applies to discretionary, not mandatory, sentences. *See Williams*, 192 Ill. 2d at 576. Indeed, it would seem illogical to apply it to defendant’s mandatory sentence, which was designed to treat adults convicted of murdering two or more victims the same. *See generally Hill*, 199 Ill. 2d at 447-48; *Taylor*, 102 Ill. 2d at 206. There was thus no basis for the appellate court to consider the sentences of other persons involved in these offenses when evaluating defendant’s article I, section 11 challenge.

Moreover, the appellate court’s conclusions lack factual support. Even when conducting a comparative proportionality review of a discretionary sentence, courts recognize that “a disparity in sentences does not, by itself, establish fundamental unfairness.” *People v. Horta*, 2016 IL App (2d) 140714, ¶ 52 (citing *Caballero*, 179 Ill. 2d at 216). Rather, “[a] defendant who contends that his sentence is unfairly disparate to that of a codefendant has the burden to produce a record that is sufficient to support his claim.” *Id.* (citing *People v. Kline*, 92 Ill. 2d 490, 509 (1982)). If a court has “no record of the factors that the trial court relied on in sentencing the codefendant, [it]

cannot decide whether any sentencing disparity was unfair, and [it] must therefore deny relief.” *Id.* (citing *Kline*, 92 Ill. 2d at 509).

Here, defendant did not even allege a disparate sentencing claim, let alone produce a record that would sufficiently support one. Thus, the appellate court resorted to relying on docket sheets and unpublished Rule 23 orders to ascertain basic “facts” about the codefendants, A15-17, and not a “record of the factors that the trial court relied on in sentencing the codefendant[s],” *Horta*, 2016 IL App (2d) 140714, ¶ 52 (citing *Kline*, 92 Ill. 2d at 509). Furthermore, the appellate court limited its analysis to Fred Weatherspoon and Hulon Verser, while failing to acknowledge that Antonio Bealer — who was 18 years old at the time of the offenses and most closely shared defendant’s level of participation — is also serving a natural life sentence for the murders. *See* TR.F78-83, F98-102, F219-22, F265-67 (testimony showing that Bealer helped abduct victims at gunpoint and attempted to intimidate eyewitness with defendant); Br. of Appellant, *People v. Bealer*, No. 1-98-4568, 2000 WL 34247197, at *4-9 (Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 5, 2000) (evidence at Bealer’s trial showed same and that Bealer acted as a decoy with defendant while codefendants shot victims); Ill. Dept. of Corr. website, search for Antonio Bealer, *available at* <http://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/Offender/Pages/InmateSearch.aspx> (last visited June 29, 2020).

Moreover, the appellate court should not have compared defendant to Weatherspoon because the two were not similarly situated. As this Court

explained when addressing a disparate sentencing challenge to a discretionary sentence, an adult defendant sentenced to death is not similarly situated to a juvenile codefendant because the juvenile is ineligible for capital punishment. *People v. Burt*, 168 Ill. 2d 49, 80 (1995); *People v. Szabo*, 94 Ill. 2d 327, 353 (1983). Similarly, Weatherspoon was a juvenile, A15, and ineligible for mandatory natural life under *Miller*. See *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016) (*Miller* applies retroactively to cases on collateral review). Defendant's sentence thus cannot be compared to Weatherspoon's. See *Burt*, 168 Ill. 2d at 80; *Szabo*, 94 Ill. 2d at 353; see also *Coty*, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 41 (“a sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so for children”).

In sum, consistent with the parties' request following this Court's grant of supervisory relief, this Court should reverse the appellate court's judgment and remand to the circuit court for second-stage postconviction proceedings where defendant will have an opportunity to create a record in support of his as-applied claim and the trial court may make the factual findings critical to determining whether the science concerning juvenile maturity and brain development applies equally to young adults. In the alternative, this Court should hold that the mandatory sentencing statute is constitutional as applied to defendant under the Court's established legal standards and precedent.

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the appellate court's judgment and remand to the circuit court for second-stage proceedings. Alternatively, this Court should reverse the appellate court's judgment and affirm defendant's sentence.

June 29, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

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RULE 341(c) CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this brief conforms to the requirements of Rule 341. The length of this brief, excluding the pages permitted to be excluded under Rule 341, is 37 pages.

/s/ Gopi Kashyap
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APPENDIX

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2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B

FOURTH DIVISION

May 16, 2019

Modified Upon Denial of Rehearing June 27, 2019

No. 1-11-0580

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,)	Appeal from the
)	Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee,)	Cook County.
)	
v.)	No. 93 CR 26477
)	
ANTONIO HOUSE,)	Honorable
)	Kenneth J. Wadas,
Defendant-Appellant.)	Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Gordon and Reyes concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Our initial opinion in this case was filed December 24, 2015. Subsequently, both parties filed petitions for rehearing, which this court denied. The parties then filed respective petitions for leave to appeal in the Illinois Supreme Court in 2017. On November 28, 2018, the Illinois Supreme Court denied the petitions for leave to appeal from both the State and defendant Antonio House. However, on the petition for leave to appeal filed by the State, the supreme court issued a supervisory order directing this court to vacate our opinion and “to consider the effect of [the supreme] court’s opinion in *People v. Harris*, 2018 IL 121932, on the issue of whether defendant’s sentence violates the Proportionate Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution.” *People v. House*, No. 122134 (Ill. Nov. 28, 2018) (supervisory order).

¶ 2 In addressing the supervisory order, defendant filed a motion to file additional briefing, which this court allowed. In lieu of filing the additional briefs, the parties later filed an agreed motion for summary disposition asking this court to remand defendant’s case for further second-

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stage postconviction proceedings. We deny the motion and explain the basis for the denial later in this opinion.

¶ 3 Because the supreme court's supervisory order is limited to the discrete issue of defendant's proportionate penalties claim, we do not address the other issues initially raised by defendant on appeal. See *People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n*, 2012 IL App (2d) 100024, ¶ 32 (where a matter is remanded by a court of review to a lower court with directions to enter a certain order or decree, the latter court has no discretion but to enter the decree as directed). This court upheld the second stage dismissal of defendant's additional claims, and the supreme court denied leave to appeal as to those claims. Thus, those claims have been fully adjudicated, and the dismissal is final. Accordingly, we review only those facts relevant to the singular issue raised on appeal.

¶ 4 Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder and two counts of aggravated kidnapping in the September 1993 deaths of Stanton Burch and Michael Purham. The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to two consecutive life sentences for the murder convictions and two terms of 30 years for the aggravating kidnapping convictions to run consecutive to the life sentences.

¶ 5 We previously described the general circumstances of this case as follows:

“The facts of this case arise out of an intra-gang conflict regarding the right to sell drugs on a street corner. In 1993, there was a split in the Unknown Vice Lords (UVL) street gang. The two warring factions were led by Tyrone ‘Baby Tye’ Williams and Willie Lloyd. Artez ‘Ted’ Thigpen, a UVL member who remained loyal to Williams, controlled drug sales at the corner of Springfield

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Avenue and Fillmore Street in Chicago, Illinois. The victims in this case, Stanton Burch and Michael Purham, were UVL members who were loyal to Lloyd. The day before the victim[s'] deaths, Lloyd and some of his men went to the corner, where they beat up and robbed one of Thigpen's drug sellers. The following day, Burch and Purham were dropped off at the corner, where they announced to Thigpen's drug sellers that the corner now belonged to Lloyd. Burch and Purham then began to sell drugs. Soon thereafter, Thigpen and an armed group of his men arrived at the corner. Defendant allegedly was a member of this group. The group forced Burch and Purham into a car at gun point. Burch and Purham were then taken to a vacant field where they were shot and killed. Defendant was arrested on October 27, 1993, and on the following day gave a handwritten statement regarding his involvement in the kidnapping and murder of the victims." *People v. House*, 377 Ill. App. 3d 1141 (2007) (table) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 6 At trial, the State presented the testimony of Eunice Clark and her boyfriend Barry "Smurf" Williams (Barry). Clark admitted that at the time of trial, she was serving an 11-year sentence for two attempted murder convictions. Clark testified that in September 1993, she was 16 years old and a member of the Traveling Vice Lords gang. At around 10 a.m. on September 12, 1993, Clark was at the corner of South Springfield Avenue and West Fillmore Street in Chicago. She was at that location to sell drugs for Thigpen and Williams with several other drug

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dealers, including Barry. That day, Clark saw Lloyd and his bodyguards call over one of the drug dealers, "Larry." Lloyd and his bodyguards beat up Larry and took Larry's drugs and money.

¶ 7 The next day, on September 13, 1993, Clark was on the same corner with other dealers waiting to sell drugs. Lloyd then drove up and dropped off Burch and Purham. Burch and Purham began selling drugs. Later, Thigpen and Williams drove by the corner. They returned a short time later with two additional men in the vehicle. Clark testified that several other men ran over from nearby railroad tracks. She testified that all of the men were armed with a handgun. Clark identified defendant as one of those men. Thigpen and the men surrounded Burch and Purham and forced them into Thigpen's vehicle at gunpoint. Clark heard a loud noise inside the car but was not positive if it was a gunshot.

¶ 8 Clark testified that Thigpen told her that if anyone asked where Burch and Purham were that she was to say that the police picked them up. Thigpen entered his vehicle and drove off. The rest of the men returned to the area near the railroad tracks on foot. Later that day, Clark told Burch's girlfriend what happened. That evening, Clark was approached by Burch's mother and the police. Clark was taken to the Area 4 police station and spoke with detectives. She returned and gave a signed statement on September 16, 1993.

¶ 9 Clark also testified that on October 12, 1993, she was walking near 18th Street and St. Louis Avenue when she saw defendant and another individual in a gray vehicle. They pulled the car over and asked Clark to get into the car. Clark refused, and the men tried to force her into the vehicle with one man striking her in the back of the neck. When the men let go, defendant told her that he did not want her to testify. Clark said she told them that she had to testify.

¶ 10 Clark admitted that she received a total of \$1200 in relocation expenses from the State, but she used the majority of the money on clothes and personal items.

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¶ 11 Barry testified at trial that he also went by the name Aaron Lamar. At the time of trial, he was serving a six-year sentence for a narcotics conviction. In September 1993, he was 23 years old and was in a relationship with Clark. Barry was a member of the UVL gang. Barry was unable to recall most of his prior statements and testimony, but his handwritten statement and grand jury testimony were introduced at trial. His prior statements corroborate Clark's testimony regarding the events of September 13, 1993, including defendant's involvement.

¶ 12 Barry testified that on the morning of September 13, 1993, he was waiting for Thigpen to bring drugs for him to sell on the corner of Springfield Avenue and Fillmore Street with Clark and two other individuals. Another car approached the intersection and two men exited the vehicle. He did not recognize these individuals. According to Barry, the men said that location was no longer Thigpen's and now belonged to Lloyd. The two men then proceeded to sell drugs at that location. Thigpen drove by the location and then returned approximately 10 minutes later with two men in the vehicle. Several other men approached the intersection at that time, including defendant. The men were armed with handguns. They surrounded the two men selling drugs and forced them into Thigpen's vehicle. Thigpen drove away, and the other men returned the way they came.

¶ 13 Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) Solita Pandit testified at trial that she took defendant's handwritten statement on October 28, 1993. The statement was offered into evidence which the trial court admitted and published the statement to the jury. Defendant stated that he was a member of the UVL gang. He worked for Thigpen selling drugs at the corner of Springfield Avenue and Fillmore Street. Defendant said that Lloyd was formerly the "head boss" of the UVL, but there was fighting regarding that position. He had heard that one of Thigpen's workers had been robbed by Lloyd and his men on September 12, 1993. On September 13, 1993,

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defendant was on Springfield Avenue between Arthington Street and Fillmore Street when he saw Clark. Clark told defendant that Lloyd had dropped off two of his workers at the spot and the police had picked them up. Clark then said that Thigpen told her to say this but that Thigpen “had got them, put them into his car and drove them away.” Defendant then saw Fred Weatherspoon and another UVL member. Weatherspoon told defendant to get his car and pick them up because they needed to go meet Thigpen at the railroad tracks at California Avenue and Roosevelt Road. Weatherspoon told defendant that Thigpen had two of Lloyd’s men and they were going to be “violated,” meaning “physically punished, ranging from being hit with hands, boards or being shot.” Defendant drove them to where Thigpen was with Lloyd’s men.

¶ 14 At that location, defendant saw another UVL member, Derrick Harvey. He said two vehicles were parked with the hoods up to appear as though a car battery needed to be jumped. Harvey said he was acting as a lookout for the police for Thigpen, who was violating Lloyd’s men by the railroad tracks. Defendant parked his car and also acted as a lookout. He heard approximately eight gunshots from the railroad tracks and then observed several UVL members. He was told by Williams that “they got Willie’s boys,” which defendant knew meant the men had been killed.

¶ 15 Defendant stated that he had a gun when he was arrested, but it was not the gun used in the shootings. He also said he received a phone call from Williams in jail on October 11, 1993. Williams told defendant to tell Clark not to come to court to testify against him. The next day, defendant saw Clark and told her not to testify.

¶ 16 Defendant stated that he was treated well by the police and that he was not made any promises for his statement nor was he threatened in any way.

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¶ 17 Defendant testified at trial on his own behalf. He stated that he was a member of the UVL and he was 19 years old on September 13, 1993. On that date, he drove to the vicinity of Springfield Avenue and Fillmore Street to sell drugs for Thigpen. He observed Clark, Barry, and other people in the area. Defendant testified he asked Clark where everyone was, meaning the people who issued the drugs to the sellers. Clark initially told him that the police came and everyone was gone. Shortly thereafter, Clark said that Thigpen, Weatherspoon, and others took someone to be violated. Defendant then walked to the corner and saw Weatherspoon and another person. They told defendant that two men had been violated and needed a ride. Defendant drove the two men west on Roosevelt Road until Weatherspoon told him to pull over near Campbell Avenue. Two cars were parked under the railroad tracks viaduct with their hoods up. He recognized other UVL members, including Harvey. He dropped off Weatherspoon and the other man, then he made a U-turn and left that location. As he was leaving, he heard approximately eight gunshots and observed several people coming from the railroad tracks.

¶ 18 Defendant then testified he was brought into a room where ASA Pandit was already sitting. He stated that ASA Pandit did not write the statement in his presence, but he admitted that he signed it. He denied reading the statement before signing it. Defendant said that he believed that he would be a witness for the State against Thigpen and Williams. He denied that he acted as a lookout near the railroad tracks or that he was present when the men were forced into Thigpen's car. He denied that he was treated well by the police and that Detective Chambers brought him food.

¶ 19 Following deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree murder and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court subsequently sentenced

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defendant to two consecutive life sentences for the murder convictions and received two consecutive 60-year sentences for the aggravated kidnapping convictions.¹

¶ 20 On direct appeal, defendant raised several issues, including the argument that defendant's consecutive and extended term sentences violate *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Another panel of this court affirmed defendant's convictions, vacated his aggravated kidnapping sentences, and remanded the matter for resentencing. *People v. House*, No. 1-98-4324 (2001) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).²

¶ 21 While his direct appeal was pending, defendant filed his *pro se* petition for postconviction relief in September 2001, alleging that (1) he was denied a fair trial through the knowing use of perjured testimony and fabricated evidence by the police officers and ASAs, (2) Clark's initial testimony before the grand jury only named Thigpen and Weatherspoon as being involved in the kidnapping of Burch and Purham, and (3) Clark has recanted her trial testimony identifying defendant as participating in the kidnapping. In December 2001, the trial court dismissed defendant's postconviction petition, finding that it lacked jurisdiction while defendant's direct appeal remained pending.

¶ 22 Defendant appealed the dismissal. In January 2003, the State filed a confession of error in the appeal. The State "concluded that error was committed in the circuit court because the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not bar a circuit court from considering a post-conviction petition while a direct appeal of the defendant's criminal conviction is pending." The State asked that the trial court's order be reversed and remanded to the trial court with directions to proceed to the second stage of the postconviction process. The reviewing court allowed the State's confession

¹ Defendant originally received consecutive 60-year sentences for the aggravated kidnapping convictions, which was reduced to consecutive 30-year terms on remand.

² This Rule 23 order was subsequently vacated and withdrawn pursuant to a supervisory order from the Illinois Supreme Court.

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of error in February 2003, vacated the dismissal, and remanded the case for second stage review under the postconviction process.

¶ 23 Upon remand, defendant's postconviction petition was assigned to an assistant public defender for further review. In April 2010, defendant, through his attorney, filed his amended postconviction petition. The amended petition raised 15 issues in 43 pages, with approximately 300 pages of exhibits. The petition raised numerous claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, claims of a denial of due process, newly discovered evidence of actual innocence based on Clark's affidavit, newly discovered evidence of police misconduct, and the imposition of a mandatory life sentence as applied in defendant's case was unconstitutional. The State filed a motion to dismiss defendant's amended postconviction petition, arguing that everything raised in the petition was either raised on direct appeal or could have been raised on direct appeal. The State asserted that defendant attempted to bypass waiver and *res judicata* by alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel or newly discovered evidence, but defendant could not establish ineffectiveness under *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), nor did the alleged newly discovered evidence satisfy the requirements of *People v. Washington*, 171 Ill. 2d 475 (1996). In February 2011, the trial court granted the State's motion and dismissed defendant's amended postconviction petition.

¶ 24 This appeal followed.

¶ 25 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Post-Conviction Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 to 122-8 (West 2008)) provides a tool by which those under criminal sentence in this state can assert that their convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their rights under the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution or both. *Id.* § 122-1(a)(1); *People v. Coleman*, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378-79 (1998). Postconviction relief is limited to constitutional deprivations that occurred at

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the original trial. *Coleman*, 183 Ill. 2d at 380. “A proceeding brought under the [Post-Conviction Act] is not an appeal of a defendant’s underlying judgment. Rather, it is a collateral attack on the judgment.” *People v. Evans*, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 89 (1999). “The purpose of [a postconviction] proceeding is to allow inquiry into constitutional issues relating to the conviction or sentence that were not, and could not have been, determined on direct appeal.” *People v. Barrow*, 195 Ill. 2d 506, 519 (2001).

¶ 26 Defendant raised five issues on appeal: (1) actual innocence based on Clark’s recantation of her trial testimony; (2) he made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated based on newly discovered evidence related to police misconduct, including abuse, intimidation, and a coerced confession; (3) the trial court erred in denying his postconviction counsel’s request to obtain Office of Professional Standards files on the detectives involved in his interrogation; (4) he made a substantial showing of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; and (5) his mandatory sentence of natural life violates the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.I, § 11). As previously observed, the first four issues have been fully adjudicated and their dismissal was proper. As a result, we will not consider those issues and turn only to the final issue and the basis for the supervisory order from the Illinois Supreme Court.

¶ 27 The supreme court’s supervisory order directed this court to reconsider defendant’s proportionate penalties challenge in light of the recent decision of *People v. Harris*, 2018 IL 121932. Prior to the supervisory order entered in this appeal, defendant argued that his mandatory natural life sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution because the sentence is mandated for all offenders convicted of murder of more than

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one decedent without consideration of age or level of culpability. Defendant also asserted that the sentence is invalid as applied to him because of his age and minimal involvement in the commission of the crimes. The State countered that defendant's mandatory natural life sentence was constitutional, both facially and as applied. In our original opinion, we concluded defendant's sentence of mandatory natural life violated the proportionate penalties clause as applied to him.

¶ 28 Defendant based his constitutional challenge on several recent United States Supreme Court decisions. See *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), *Graham v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and *Miller v. Alabama*, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

“In *Roper*, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment prohibits the death penalty for juvenile offenders. *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 568. The Court reasoned that the ‘death penalty is reserved for a narrow category of crimes and offenders,’ and that ‘juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.’ *Id.* at 569. In *Graham*, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment forbids a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for juveniles who did not commit homicide. *Graham*, 560 U.S. at 74 ***. The Court said that, although the state is not required to release a juvenile during his natural life, the state is forbidden ‘from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.’ *Id.* at 75 ***. *** In *Miller*, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment prohibits a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without

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the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders, including those convicted of homicide. *Miller*, 567 U.S. at [479] ***. The Court stated that a judge must have the opportunity to look at all of the circumstances involved before determining that life without the possibility of parole is the appropriate penalty. See *id.* ***.”

People v. Harmon, 2013 IL App (2d) 120439, ¶ 48.

¶ 29 Because defendant acted as a lookout during the commission of the murders, he was found guilty under a theory of accountability, which mandates that all participants of a common design are considered equally responsible. See 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 1998). Defendant was sentenced to mandatory natural life under section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of Corrections. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1998). At the time of defendant’s sentencing, section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) mandated a term of natural life for all persons, regardless of their age at the time of the commission of the murder, who were found guilty of murdering more than one victim. *Id.*³

¶ 30 In *Harris*, the Illinois Supreme Court considered a defendant’s claim that the mandatory minimum sentence of 76 years for first degree murder, attempted murder, and aggravated battery committed when he was 18 years old violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. *Harris*, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 1. There, the defendant was found guilty as the perpetrator in the shooting death of one victim and the attempted murder of a second gunshot victim at a Chicago gas station. *Id.* ¶¶ 1, 3. The defendant raised his proportionate penalties challenge for the first time in his direct appeal. The reviewing court vacated the defendant’s sentences, holding that “ ‘[w]hile we do not minimize the seriousness of [defendant’s] crimes,

³ Public Act 99-69 amended section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) to provide for a mandatory life sentence for a person who has attained the age of 18 and was found guilty of murdering more than one victim. Pub. Act 99-69 § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii)).

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we believe that it shocks the moral sense of the community to send this young adult to prison for the remainder of his life, with no chance to rehabilitate himself into a useful member of society.’ ” *Id.* ¶ 18 (quoting *People v. Harris*, 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶ 69).

¶ 31 On appeal, the supreme court reversed that finding, holding that because the defendant did not raise his as-applied constitutional challenge in the trial court, the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing or make any findings of fact on his specific circumstances. *Id.* ¶¶ 40, 63. The court concluded that the defendant’s challenge was premature. *Id.* ¶ 46. The court observed that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in *Miller* did not apply directly to his circumstances because he was 18 years old at the time of the offense. *Id.* ¶ 45. The supreme court rejected the defendant’s contention that the record on appeal contained sufficient information about how the evolving science on juvenile and brain development applied to him. *Id.* ¶ 46. Rather, the court observed that the record on appeal included only basic information about him, mostly from the presentence investigation report. *Id.* “An evidentiary hearing was not held, and the trial court did not make any findings on the critical facts needed to determine whether *Miller* applies to defendant as an adult.” *Id.* The supreme court found that the record on appeal did not contain evidence “about how the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development that helped form the basis for the *Miller* decision applies to defendant’s specific facts and circumstances.” *Id.* The court did not consider the merits of the defendant’s challenge and concluded that his claim was more appropriate for another proceeding, such as a postconviction proceeding or raised in a petition seeking relief from a final judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2016)). *Harris*, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48.

¶ 32 After considering the supreme court’s decision in *Harris*, we again conclude defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. Significantly, the defendant in *Harris* was the actual

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shooter, unlike defendant in the present case who was convicted under an accountability theory. As discussed throughout our previous analysis, defendant's conviction under the theory of accountability weighed heavily in our conclusion that his mandatory natural life sentence shocked the moral conscience of the community. We also note that the supreme court in *Harris* considered that the defendant had raised his proportionate penalties challenge for the first time on appeal and observed that his challenge was premature and more appropriately raised in postconviction proceedings. See *id.* Here, defendant has consistently challenged his mandatory natural life sentence in both his direct appeal and his present postconviction petition. At defendant's original sentencing hearing, immediately after the trial court imposed defendant's sentence, defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider defendant's mandatory life sentence as unconstitutional. His claim is before us in the forum suggested by the supreme court in *Harris*. Accordingly, we do not believe defendant's challenge is premature, as it was in *Harris*.

¶ 33 We turn to defendant's contention that his sentence is unconstitutional as applied to his case. Defendant points out that he had just turned 19 years old at the time of commission of the murders, was minimally culpable, and had no prior violent criminal history, but he received a mandatory natural life sentence without the consideration of these mitigating factors.

¶ 34 According to eyewitnesses, defendant was present when the victims were surrounded and forced into a vehicle at gunpoint. The eyewitnesses also testified that defendant was armed at this time. In his statement to ASA Pandit, defendant admitted that he acted as a lookout when the victims were shot. Defendant's role made him accountable for the murders and cannot be discounted.

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¶ 35 However, we find it significant to note the following. The evidence against defendant's codefendants and the sentences that were imposed in their cases shows the following.⁴ At Weatherspoon's trial, as at defendant's trial, Clark and Barry testified about the factions within the UVL gang over selling drugs at the corner of Springfield Avenue and Fillmore Street. *People v. Weatherspoon*, 327 Ill. App. 3d 1126 (2002) (table) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). On the day of crimes, Clark observed Weatherspoon with Thigpen in Thigpen's vehicle. Clark identified Weatherspoon as one of the men who surrounded the victims and forced them into the vehicle. Clark testified that Weatherspoon pointed a gun at the victims and either fired the gun at the victims or struck them with the gun. *Weatherspoon*, slip order at 3-4. Weatherspoon gave a statement admitting to being present during the kidnapping and possessing a gun. Weatherspoon acted as lookout for police during the homicides. *Id.* at 9-10.

¶ 36 At the time of the offenses in September 1993, Weatherspoon was 17 years old. Weatherspoon initially received a natural life sentence. *Id.* at 1. We take judicial notice of the circuit court docket sheet from Weatherspoon's case. See *People v. Davis*, 65 Ill. 2d 157, 164-65 (1976) (a reviewing court may take judicial notice of public records and other judicial proceedings). According to the docket sheet, Weatherspoon was resentenced in December 2016 to a total term of 44 years. Under the sentencing laws in place at the time of the offenses, Weatherspoon was eligible to receive day-for-day good conduct credit on his sentence and was released from prison to begin serving his term of mandatory supervised release in 2018. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2) (West 1992). According to the Illinois Department of Corrections website, Fred Weatherspoon was released from incarceration on April 13, 2018, and is projected to be discharged from mandatory supervised release on April 13, 2021. See Ill. Dept. of Corrections,

⁴ We note that Artez Thigpen, the apparent shooter in this crime, was convicted of the unrelated first degree murder of Clifton Burks, which occurred on September 12, 1993, and he was sentenced to a term of 75 years in prison. See *People v. Thigpen*, 306 Ill. App. 3d 29 (1999).

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Offender Search, <https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/Offender/Pages/InmateSearch.aspx> (last visited May 9, 2019) (search by offender's last name). This court may take judicial notice of the public records of the Illinois Department of Corrections. *People v. Sanchez*, 404 Ill. App. 3d 15, 17 (2010).

¶ 37 Hulon Verser was also prosecuted for his participation in the kidnapping and murders of Burch and Purham. *People v. Verser*, 328 Ill. App. 3d 1093 (2002) (table) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). At Verser's jury trial, an ASA testified that Verser gave a statement that was handwritten by the ASA and Verser signed it. In the statement, Verser admitted to being a member of the UVL and that he sold drugs for Thigpen at the location in dispute. After a man selling drugs for Thigpen was robbed by Lloyd, Verser was instructed by Thigpen to get a gun. Verser then accompanied Thigpen and other men to look for Lloyd and his followers. Verser stated that Thigpen had promised Verser his own spot to sell drugs if he helped defend that location. The next day, Verser ran over to the location when two of Lloyd's men began selling drugs. When he arrived, the men were already in the car. The men were taken to a spot between the railroad tracks on Roosevelt Street. Verser stated that Thigpen shot one of the men in the head and then he and the other men present began shooting at the other victim. *Verser*, slip order at 6-8.

¶ 38 Barry also testified at Verser's trial, but he testified that he did not remember Verser being present at the scene. Barry's prior statement to the ASA and his grand jury testimony were introduced at the time. In his prior statements, Barry stated that Verser was among the group that came to the corner with Thigpen when the victims were kidnapped. *Id.* at 8. At the time of his arrest, Verser possessed a 9-millimeter handgun. A stipulation from a firearm expert was

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admitted in which the expert would state that the 9-millimeter handgun found on Verser could have fired the 9-millimeter bullet recovered from Burch's clothing. *Id.* at 9-10.

¶ 39 Verser testified that he was friends with Thigpen and a member of the UVL. *Id.* at 10. He denied giving a statement to police or the ASA but admitted to signing and initialing the statement prepared by the ASA. He testified that he signed the statement because the ASA told him he could leave if he signed it. *Id.* at 11.

¶ 40 Following the trial, the jury found Verser guilty of two counts of first degree murder and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. He was sentenced to a term of natural life for the murder convictions. *Id.* at 12.

¶ 41 The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. “A defendant can raise a proportionate penalties challenge on the basis that the penalty for a particular offense is too severe under the ‘cruel or degrading’ standard or that the penalty is harsher than the penalty for a different offense that contains identical elements.” *People v. Williams*, 2015 IL 117470, ¶ 9 (citing *People v. Sharpe*, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 521 (2005)).

¶ 42 “While courts of review are generally reluctant to override the judgment of the General Assembly with respect to criminal penalties [citation], it is also true that when defining crimes and their penalties, the legislature must consider the constitutional goals of restoring an offender to useful citizenship and of providing a penalty according to the seriousness of the offense [citation].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *People v. Miller*, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002) (*Leon Miller*). “With regard to the statute at issue, we have recognized that the legislature considered the possible rehabilitation of an offender who commits multiple murder[s], and the

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seriousness of that offense, in determining that a mandatory minimum sentence of natural life imprisonment is appropriate for the offense of multiple murders.” *Id.*

¶ 43 In *Leon Miller*, the supreme court considered whether a mandatory sentence of natural life violated the proportionate penalties clause when applied to a juvenile found guilty under an accountability theory. *Id.* at 337. The *Leon Miller* court reviewed the question under the first theory, whether the sentence shocked the moral sense of the community. *Id.* at 338-39. The court noted that the sentence was imposed based on the convergence of three statutes, the automatic transfer of juveniles 15 or 16 years old charged with murder to criminal court (705 ILCS 405/5-4(6)(a) (West 1996)), the accountability statute (720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 1996)), and the mandatory natural life sentencing statute (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1996)). *Leon Miller*, 202 Ill. 2d at 340.

¶ 44 The *Leon Miller* court held that the defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional as applied to him.

“Accordingly, we hold that the penalty mandated by the multiple-murder sentencing statute as applied to this defendant is particularly harsh and unconstitutionally disproportionate. We agree with defendant that a mandatory sentence of natural life in prison with no possibility of parole grossly distorts the factual realities of the case and does not accurately represent defendant’s personal culpability such that it shocks the moral sense of the community. This moral sense is particularly true, as in the case before us, where a 15-year-old with one minute to contemplate his decision to participate in the incident and stood as a lookout during

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the shooting, but never handled a gun, is subject to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole—the same sentence applicable to the actual shooter. Our decision does not imply that a sentence of life imprisonment for a juvenile offender convicted under a theory of accountability is never appropriate. It is certainly possible to contemplate a situation where a juvenile offender actively participated in the planning of a crime resulting in the death of two or more individuals, such that a sentence of natural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is appropriate.” *Id.* at 341.

¶ 45 The supreme court further reasoned:

“However, the convergence of the Illinois transfer statute, the accountability statute, and the multiple-murder sentencing statute eliminates the court’s ability to consider any mitigating factors such as age or degree of participation. A life sentence without the possibility of parole implies that under any circumstances a juvenile defendant convicted solely by accountability is incorrigible and incapable of rehabilitation for the rest of his life. The trial judge in this case did not agree with such a blanket proposition. We also decline to find that the sentence mandated by the multiple-murder sentencing statute in this case satisfies the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.” *Id.* at 342-43.

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¶ 46 While defendant was not a juvenile at the time of the offense, his young age of 19 is relevant under the circumstances of this case. As in *Leon Miller*, defendant's sentence involved the convergence of the accountability statute and the mandatory natural life sentence. We acknowledge that the offender in *Leon Miller* was 15, never handled a firearm, and had less than a minute to consider the implications of his participation. In the present case, the State's evidence at trial established that defendant was not present at the scene of the murder but merely acted as a lookout near the railroad tracks. There was no evidence that defendant helped to plan the commission but instead took orders from higher ranking UVL members. While defendant had a greater involvement in the commission of the offenses than the defendant in *Leon Miller*, after considering the evidence and defendant's relevant culpability, we question the propriety of a mandatory natural life sentence for a 19-year-old defendant convicted under a theory of accountability. Although defendant acted as a lookout during the commission of the crime and was not the actual shooter, he received a mandatory natural life sentence, the same sentence applicable to the person who pulled the trigger. Defendant is serving the same mandatory sentence of natural life as Verser, a codefendant who participated in the shooting of the victims, while Weatherspoon, a codefendant with the similar culpability as defendant has been released from the penitentiary following resentencing because Weatherspoon was 17 years old during the commission of the murders.

¶ 47 We also observe that the Supreme Court in *Miller*, *Graham*, and *Roper* considered the continuing brain development in adolescents.

“Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, we explained, ‘they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.’ *Graham*, 560 U.S., at 68. Those cases

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relied on three significant gaps between juveniles and adults. First, children have a ‘ “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” ’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. *Roper*, 543 U.S., at 569. Second, children ‘are more vulnerable ... to negative influences and outside pressures,’ including from their family and peers; they have limited ‘contro[l] over their own environment’ and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. *Ibid.* And third, a child’s character is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s; his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’ *Id.*, at 570.

Our decisions rested not only on common sense—on what ‘any parent knows’—but on science and social science as well. *Id.*, at 569. In *Roper*, we cited studies showing that ‘ “[o]nly a relatively small proportion of adolescents” ’ who engage in illegal activity ‘ “develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior.” ’ *Id.*, at 570 (quoting Steinberg & Scott, *Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty*, 58 *Am. Psychologist* 1009, 1014 (2003)). And in *Graham*, we noted that ‘developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds’—for example, in ‘parts of the brain involved in behavior control.’ 560

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U.S., at 68. We reasoned that those findings—of transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences—both lessened a child’s ‘moral culpability’ and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and neurological development occurs, his ‘“deficiencies will be reformed.”’ *Ibid.* (quoting *Roper*, 543 U.S., at 570).” *Miller*, 567 U.S. at 471-72.

¶ 48 As the *Graham* Court noted, “[e]ven if the punishment has some connection to a valid penological goal, it must be shown that the punishment is not grossly disproportionate in light of the justification offered.” *Graham*, 560 U.S. at 72. The *Roper* Court stated, “[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 573 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, *Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty*, 58 *Am. Psychologist* 1009, 1014-16 (2003)).

¶ 49 “It is widely recognized by many legal scholars that the United States Supreme Court is moving rather quickly towards abolishing life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders entirely.” Maureen Dowling, Note, *Juvenile Sentencing in Illinois: Addressing the Supreme Court Trend Away From Harsh Punishments for Juvenile Offenders*, 35 *N. Ill. U. L. Rev.* 611, 619 (2015).

“There are several parts of the analyses of each case that point to this inevitable shift. First, each case acknowledges that the decisions are directly contrary to our historical understanding of juvenile sentencing. The Court rejects the notion of looking at

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sentencing ‘through a historical prism’ in favor of the evolving moral and ethical standards of society. This opens up the Court to abolish life without parole sentences for juveniles, even though traditionally it is a widely practiced and accepted sentence. Second, each opinion makes it clear that simply because a majority of state sentencing statutes do not currently agree with the decisions, this will not affect the outcome. This argument goes hand-in-hand with the Court’s rejection of historical sentencing standards. Again, the Court has left open the possibility of abolishing the harshest sentence available to juveniles. Finally, the Court repeatedly emphasizes the differences between juveniles and adults as an explanation for why each should be sentenced differently. The continued focus on these differences further bolsters the argument for abolishing life sentences without the possibility of parole for juveniles.” *Id.* at 619-20.

¶ 50 “The Supreme Court has followed a clear path away from life without parole sentences. Following the reasoning laid out by the Court in these three cases, it can easily be seen how the Court would deal with abolishing the sentence entirely.” *Id.* at 627. As this note observes, several states have responded to *Miller* by imposing “*de facto*” life sentences through lengthy term-of-years sentences. *Id.* at 620. However,

“These de-facto life sentences are not consistent with the language or analysis found in both *Miller* and *Graham*. A prison sentence that will last sixty or more years does not allow courts to show juvenile offenders any clemency.

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Furthermore, despite the lengthy discussion about the differences between adults and juveniles, de-facto life sentences do not give courts any opportunity to take the differences into account when determining a sentence.” *Id.* at 621.

The question of considering *Miller* when a juvenile receives a long prison term, in essence a *de facto* life sentence, has been reviewed recently by the Illinois Supreme Court.

¶ 51 In *People v. Buffer*, 2019 IL 122327, the Illinois Supreme Court considered what term of years imposed on a juvenile defendant constitutes a *de facto* natural life sentence. There, the juvenile defendant received a 50-year sentence for a first degree murder committed when he was 16 years old. *Id.* ¶ 1. In his postconviction petition, the defendant argued that the sentence was unconstitutional as applied to him. The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit. *Id.* ¶ 7. The appellate court reversed the dismissal and found that the 50-year sentence was a mandatory *de facto* natural life sentence and the circuit court failed to consider the defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics in imposing the sentence. The reviewing court remanded the case for resentencing. *Id.* ¶ 9.

¶ 52 The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence related to minors, including *Miller*. The supreme court held that for a defendant to succeed on a *Miller* claim for an offense committed while a juvenile, the defendant must show “(1) the defendant was subject to a life sentence, mandatory or discretionary, natural or *de facto*, and (2) the sentencing court failed to consider youth and its attendant characteristics in imposing the sentence.” *Id.* ¶ 27.

¶ 53 The *Buffer* court then turned to the question of what specific term of years amounts to a *de facto* natural life sentence. *Id.* ¶ 29. After reviewing recent enactments by the General Assembly, the supreme court concluded that a prison term of 40 years is long enough to be

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considered a *de facto* natural life sentence. *Id.* ¶ 40. Based on this conclusion, the court found that the defendant’s 50-year sentence was a *de facto* natural life sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. *Id.* ¶¶ 42, 44. The supreme court held that in the interests of judicial economy and the issue on appeal, the proper remedy was a new sentencing hearing. *Id.* ¶ 47. In remanding for a sentencing hearing, the supreme court determined that the record did not “require factual development.” *Id.* ¶ 46. “All of the facts and circumstances to decide defendant’s claim are already in the record.” *Id.* The supreme court observed that the record did not indicate that the circuit court considered the defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics in imposing the sentence. *Id.*

¶ 54 Although the Court in *Roper* delineated the division between juvenile and adult at 18, we do not believe that this demarcation has created a bright line rule. See *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 574 (“Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach. For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line must be drawn. *** The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.”).

¶ 55 Rather, as we found in our earlier opinion, the designation that after age 18 an individual is a mature adult appears to be somewhat arbitrary, especially in the case at bar. Recent research and articles have discussed the differences between young adults, like defendant, and a fully mature adult. “Research in neurobiology and developmental psychology has shown that the brain doesn’t finish developing until the mid-20s, far later than was previously thought. Young adults

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are more similar to adolescents than fully mature adults in important ways. They are more susceptible to peer pressure, less future-oriented and more volatile in emotionally charged settings.” Vincent Schiraldi & Bruce Western, *Why 21 Year-Old Offenders Should be Tried in Family Court*, Wash. Post (Oct. 2, 2015), www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/time-to-raise-the-juvenile-age-limit/2015/10/02/948e317c-6862-11e5-9ef3-fde182507eac_story.html [https://perma.cc/FV36-XURC].

“The young adult brain is still developing, and young adults are in transition from adolescence to adulthood. Further, the ongoing development of their brains means they have a high capacity for reform and rehabilitation. Young adults are, neurologically and developmentally, closer to adolescents than they are to adults. Prosecuting and sentencing young adults in the adult criminal justice system deprives them of their chance to become productive members of society, leads to high recidivism rates, and high jail and prison populations, and increased costs to society through subsequent incarceration and unemployment.” Kanako Ishida, *Young Adults in Conflict with the Law: Opportunities for Diversion*, Juvenile Justice Initiative, at 1 (Feb. 2015), <https://jjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/Young-Adults-in-Conflict-with-the-Law-Opportunities-for-Diversion.pdf> [https://perma.cc/69CY-SGF9].

¶ 56 These articles illustrate the need to expand juvenile sentencing provisions for young adult offenders. Both articles noted that several European countries have already extended juvenile

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justice to include young adults. In Germany, all young adults ages 18 to 21 are tried in juvenile court and the judges have an option to sentence them as a juvenile, if a consideration of the offender's personality and environment indicate that his psychological development was as a juvenile. *Id.* at 2. Sweden allows for young adults to be tried in juvenile court until their twenty-fifth birthday, and young adults 18 to 24 receive different treatment than adults. "For instance, statutory minimum sentences cannot be applied for young people age 20 or under." *Id.* at 3. The Netherlands has extended juvenile alternatives for young adults ages 18 to 21. *Id.*

¶ 57 Additionally, Illinois raised the age for a delinquent minor. Prior to January 1, 2014, a person who committed a felony prior to his or her seventeenth birthday was considered a delinquent minor. See 705 ILCS 405/5-105(3) (West 2012). However, Public Act 98-61 changed the definition of a delinquent minor to be, "any minor who prior to his or her 18th birthday has violated or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred, any federal, State, county or municipal law or ordinance." Pub. Act 98-61, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-105(3)).

¶ 58 When we originally issued our opinion, we noted that in the Northern Illinois University Law Review note, the Supreme Court of Wyoming compiled a list of factors taken from *Miller* to consider in sentencing juveniles.

"During a postconviction sentencing hearing, a trial court should scrutinize the following factors before sentencing a juvenile offender: (a) the character and history of the juvenile offender and the specific circumstances of the crime; (b) the background and emotional and mental development of the juvenile offender; (c) the offender's age and characteristics that go along with it including

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immaturity and ability to appreciate risks; (d) the juvenile’s family and home environment; (e) the circumstances of the crime, the extent to which the juvenile was involved, and the extent to which peer or familial pressure may have factored into the juvenile’s participation; (f) ‘the juvenile’s relative inability to deal with police and prosecutors or to assist his own attorney’; and (g) the offender’s potential for rehabilitation.” Dowling, *supra* at 634 (quoting *Bear Cloud v. State*, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 42, 294 P.3d 36 (2013), citing *Miller*, 567 U.S. at 475-78).

¶ 59 “ [J]ust as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant be duly considered’ in assessing his culpability.” *Miller*, 567 U.S. at 476 (quoting *Eddings v. Oklahoma*, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982)). As the Supreme Court observed in *Graham*, “Life without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile. Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender. A 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in name only.” *Graham*, 560 U.S. at 70.

¶ 60 “By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” *Miller*, 567 U.S. at 479. Under Illinois law, the harshest form of punishment is a mandatory life sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a) (West 2014). The trial court is not afforded any discretion if an offender is found guilty of triggering offenses, such as, the death of more than one person. See *id.* § 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii). However, when the death penalty still existed in Illinois, there were

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several statutory guidelines that had to be met before such a sentence could be imposed. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2010). The lack of discretion afforded the trial court for the imposition of a mandatory life sentence is especially relevant when the defendant is a young adult, over 18, but still not considered a fully mature adult.

¶ 61 Further, since our initial opinion was filed, the Illinois legislature enacted a statute codifying the *Miller* factors, similar to what the Supreme Court of Wyoming had done in *Bear Cloud*. Section 5-4.5-105(a) provides that when a person under 18 years of age commits an offense, the trial court at the sentencing hearing shall consider the following factors in mitigation: (a) the person's age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the offense, including the ability to consider risks and consequences of behavior, and the presence of cognitive or developmental disability, or both, if any; (b) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including peer pressure, familial pressure, or negative influences; (c) the person's family, home environment, educational and social background, including any history of parental neglect, physical abuse, or other childhood trauma; (d) the person's potential for rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or both; (e) the circumstances of the offense; (f) the person's degree of participation and specific role in the offense, including the level of planning by the defendant before the offense; (g) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate in his or her defense; (h) the person's prior juvenile or criminal history; and (i) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable, including an expression of remorse, if appropriate. However, if the person, on advice of counsel chooses not to make a statement, the court shall not consider a lack of an expression of remorse as an aggravating factor. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a)(9) (West 2016). Further, under section 5-4.5-105(c), the trial court has the

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discretion to decline the imposition of sentencing enhancements based upon the possession or use of a firearm during the commission of the offense. *Id.* § 5-4.5-105(c).

¶ 62 Additionally since we vacated our previous decision, the Illinois General Assembly recently passed Public Act 100-1182 , which established a parole review for persons under the age of 21 at the time of the commission of an offense in section 5-4.5-110 of the Unified Code of Corrections. Pub. Act 100-1182 (eff. June 1, 2019) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-110). Under the new statute, a person under 21 years of age at the time of commission of first degree murder and is sentenced on or after the effective date of the act shall be eligible for parole review after serving 20 or more years of his or her sentence, excluding those subject to a sentence of natural life. *Id.* Although the murder of two individuals is not included in the new legislation, this public act supports our reasoning and follows the recent trends discussed in our analysis that an individual under 21 years of age should receive consideration for their age and maturity level when receiving harsh sentences.

¶ 63 These considerations are significant in the instant case and support defendant's argument that the mandatory natural life sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. Turning to the case at bar, while clearly no longer a juvenile, defendant, at age 19 years and 2 months, was barely a legal adult and still a teenager when he committed these offenses. His youthfulness is relevant when considered alongside his participation in the actual shootings. Defendant's presentence investigation report showed that his only prior offenses were possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Defendant did not have a criminal history of committing violent crimes. The sentencing hearing also disclosed that defendant never knew his father, he was raised by his maternal grandmother, and that his mother died when he was 18. Defendant attended high school through the twelfth grade, however, he never graduated.

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¶ 64 At the time defendant was sentenced, the death penalty was still in place in Illinois. Although the trial judge found defendant eligible for the death penalty, he concluded that there were “sufficient mitigating factors to preclude the imposition of the death penalty.” While some of these mitigating factors were before the trial court when it declined to impose the death penalty, they were not available to be considered before imposing a mandatory natural life sentence. The court’s ability to take any factors into consideration was negated by the mandatory nature of defendant’s sentence. The trial court was also precluded from considering the goal of rehabilitation in imposing the life sentence, which is especially relevant in defendant’s case. Given defendant’s age, his family background, his actions as a lookout as opposed to being the actual shooter, and lack of any prior violent convictions, we find that defendant’s mandatory sentence of natural life shocks the moral sense of the community.

¶ 65 Our conclusion is not meant to diminish in any way the seriousness of the crimes, specifically two convictions for murder and two convictions for aggravated kidnapping. We recognize defendant remains culpable for his participation. However, we believe that defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing in which the trial court has the ability to consider the relevant mitigating factors prior to imposing a sentence of such magnitude. Accordingly, we hold that defendant’s sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the constitution as applied to him. We vacate defendant’s sentence of natural life and remand for a new sentencing hearing. Further, at defendant’s sentencing hearing, he will be given the opportunity to present evidence to support his claim that he does not deserve a mandatory sentence of natural life, as suggested in *Harris*. See *Harris*, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 46.

¶ 66 Since we have held that defendant’s sentence is unconstitutional as applied under the proportionate penalties clause, we need not address defendant’s original arguments that the

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imposition of a mandatory life sentence was facially unconstitutional under the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause. Although, we do not generally make a specific recommendation to the trial court on remand as to an appropriate sentence, in this particular case, as pointed out above, we question the statutory requirement to impose a mandatory life sentence on a culpable lookout compared to the perpetrator who pulled the trigger and where a codefendant, although 17 years old, has been released from the penitentiary. The statute in its current form takes away the trial court's discretion and ability to consider any mitigating factors in this case.

¶ 67 We now return to the parties' agreed motion for summary disposition requesting a remand for second stage postconviction proceedings and which we deny for the reasons that follow.

¶ 68 First, we deny the remand request because the parties are asking this court to duplicate second stage proceedings that have already occurred. Notably, in postconviction review, if the circuit court does not dismiss the postconviction petition at the first stage as frivolous or patently without merit, then the petition advances to the second stage. Counsel is appointed to represent the defendant, if necessary (725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2008)), and the State is allowed to file responsive pleadings (725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2008)). At this stage, the circuit court determines whether the petition and any accompanying documentation make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. See *Coleman*, 183 Ill. 2d at 381. If no such showing is made, the petition is dismissed. If, however, a substantial showing of a constitutional violation is set forth, then the petition is advanced to the third stage, where the circuit court conducts an evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2008). Since second stage proceedings have already taken place, we will not duplicate them now.

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¶ 69 Second, to proceed in this proposed piecemeal fashion is contrary to the Post-Conviction Act. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that a postconviction petition may not be dismissed piecemeal. *People v. Rivera*, 198 Ill. 2d 364, 370-71 (2001). The supervisory order from the Illinois Supreme Court mandated this court to reconsider only defendant's proportionate penalties argument. However, as noted previously, defendant raised several issues on appeal, and the Post-Conviction Act does not provide for proceeding in the manner suggested by the parties. Moreover, there is no statutory or case law authority to provide for a remand of a single claim for second stage proceedings after a second stage review has already occurred.

¶ 70 Third, the parties' position appears contrary to both of their earlier positions taken in this appeal. Defendant did not seek rehearing on this court's order to remand for a new sentencing hearing while the State opposed the relief we granted to defendant. Their seemingly contrary positions and concession to remand are not binding on this court. See *People v. Horrell*, 235 Ill. 2d 235, 241 (2009) (citing *Beacham v. Walker*, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 60 (2008) (A court of review is not bound by a party's concession.)). The only mandate issued to this court was to consider defendant's proportionate penalties argument in light of *People v. Harris*, 2018 IL 121932. We have a duty to adhere to the directives in the Illinois Supreme Court's mandate, and we have no authority to go beyond that mandate. See *Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Mobay Chemical Corp.*, 252 Ill. App. 3d 992, 997 (1992).

¶ 71 Fourth, defendant's postconviction petition was initially filed *pro se* in 2001. He was appointed counsel in 2003, and the amended postconviction petition was filed in 2010. Briefing was completed on appeal in March 2015, with our initial opinion filed in December 2015. Both parties filed petitions for rehearing, and this court ordered briefing on the State's petition with oral argument. Following our denial of the petitions for rehearing, the parties each filed their

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respective petitions for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court in April and June 2017. The petitions were pending before the supreme court until November 2018. Given the passage of nearly two decades in the review of defendant's initial postconviction, the interests of judicial economy support remanding the case directly for a new sentencing hearing for the relief to which defendant is entitled. See *Buffer*, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 47.

¶ 72 Based upon all of the above, we conclude that a new sentencing hearing is the appropriate relief for defendant's proportionate penalties argument. As in *Buffer*, we find that the record does not need further development before advancing to a hearing. At that hearing, both defendant and the State will have the opportunity to fully explore defendant's argument and the evolving science on juvenile brain development. The trial court will have the opportunity to evaluate the evidence presented to determine if defendant is entitled to a sentence of less than natural life imprisonment. The trial court can then also consider that Weatherspoon, who was a codefendant lookout, age 17 at the time of the offenses, and as culpable as defendant, if not more, has been resentenced and has now been released from the penitentiary.

¶ 73 At the new sentencing hearing, defendant could be sentenced to a term of years and based on the sentencing statutes in effect at the time of the offense, may be eligible for immediate release.

¶ 74 In a petition for rehearing, the State asserts that the proper result in this case is to remand for further second stage proceedings, as requested in the motion for summary remand. We point out that this position is contrary to what the State argued in its petition for rehearing following the initial opinion. In the petition, the State contended that "at best, this case should be remanded for a third stage evidentiary hearing where defendant could establish his constitutional violation by a preponderance of the evidence and where the People would be able to introduce evidence

No. 1-11-0580

proving otherwise.” Whether the relief ordered by this court is a sentencing hearing or a third stage evidentiary hearing, the function remains the same. The only issue to be considered is whether defendant is entitled to a new sentence after both sides have had the opportunity to introduce evidence.

¶ 75 The State has also conceded in their petition for rehearing that there could be young offenders whose mandatory sentences are unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause. The State maintains that, under *Harris* and *People v. Thompson*, 2015 IL 118151, defendant has not sufficiently established his as-applied challenge to the proportionate penalties clause. We note that in *Thompson*, the defendant forfeited his as-applied challenge by raising it for the first time on appeal from the dismissal of petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)). Similar to the holding in *Harris*, the supreme court observed that the trial court was “the most appropriate tribunal for the type of factual development necessary to adequately address defendant’s as-applied challenge in this case.” *Thompson*, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 38. We have already distinguished this case from *Harris* and find the same reasoning applies to *Thompson*. In this case, defendant raised this claim in his amended postconviction petition in 2010, relying on *Leon Miller*, and before *Miller* had been decided. Defendant argued that the mandatory life sentence statute did not allow for “consideration of personal circumstances of the offender or the degree of his participation in the offense.” Defendant contended that the distinction between the 15-year-old defendant in *Leon Miller* and other defendants was not substantial where “along the continuum of culpability, such that the discrepancy between a 15-year sentence for Miller and natural life for others, fairly similarly situated, is grossly excessive, so as to offend the conscience.”

No. 1-11-0580

¶ 76 Finally, the State does not even discuss the fact that the 17-year-old codefendant Weatherspoon, who was similarly situated to defendant in terms of culpability, if not more, was automatically entitled to a new sentencing hearing and has since been released from the penitentiary while defendant, who was 19 years old and still a teenager, is serving a mandatory life in prison sentence. Given the facts of codefendant Weatherspoon's case, it is clear that the sentencing for young adults has evolved considerably over the last 20 years.

¶ 77 We affirm the dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition, vacate defendant's sentence, and remand for a new sentencing hearing in accordance with this decision. Mandate to issue *instanter*.

¶ 78 Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

No. 1-11-0580

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,)	Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois
)	
Respondent-Appellee,)	
)	No. 93 CR 26477 (04)
-vs-)	
)	
ANTONIO HOUSE,)	Honorable
)	Kenneth J. Wadas,
Petitioner-Appellant.)	Judge Presiding.

AGREED MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Appellant, Antonio House, by Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defender, and Lauren A. Bauser, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, respectfully moves for summary disposition and asks this Court to remand his case for further second-stage post-conviction proceedings.

In support of this motion counsel states:

1. Antonio House and three co-defendants were charged with the September 13, 1993, murder and kidnapping of Stanton Burch and Michael Purham. (No. 98-4324 C. 26). House, who was 19-years-old at the time of the offense, was tried separately and found guilty by a jury. At sentencing, the trial court found that House was "not the shooter in this case," but was subject to a mandatory natural life sentence for the two murders. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii). (No. 98-4324 R. H14). On direct appeal, this Court affirmed House's convictions and remanded for resentencing on the aggravated kidnapping convictions. *People v. House*, Rule 23 Order, No. 98-4324 (December 21,

2001).

2. On September 13, 2001, while his direct appeal was pending, House filed a *pro se* petition for post-conviction relief. (No. 02-0346 C. 46-59). On December 18, 2001, the circuit court dismissed the petition as premature because the direct appeal was pending. (No. 02-0346 R. A1-3; C. 62). House appealed and the State conceded that the case had to proceed to the second stage of the post-conviction process. (No. 05-0994 C. 60). The public defender was appointed to the post-conviction case on August 7, 2003 (No. 05-0994 C. 6), and filed an amended petition on April 22, 2010. (No. 11-0580 C. 70-113).

3. House's amended petition argued, *inter alia*, that "[t]he mandatory natural life sentence, imposed because two persons were killed, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii), is unconstitutional as applied to petitioner under the proportionate penalties clause of the state constitution, as well as the federal constitution." (No. 11-0580 C. 95), citing Ill. Const., art. I, sec. 11 (1970); U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV. Where House was only 19 years old and was prosecuted on an accountability, felony-murder theory, he argued that his sentence of life without parole with no consideration of his personal circumstances or the degree of his participation was unjust. (No. 11-0580 C. 95-96). The State's motion to dismiss House's petition for post-conviction relief was granted on February 17, 2011, by the Honorable Kenneth J. Wadas. (No. 11-0580 R. V27-28).

4. On appeal from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, House argued that the United States Supreme Court's decision in *Miller v. Alabama*, 567 US. 460 (2012) supported his claim that the mandatory life sentence was unconstitutional as applied to him, because the relevant statute precluded the sentencing court from considering the transient signature qualities of his youthful age of 19 before imposing

the sentence. This Court agreed, finding that the scientific evidence on the continuing brain development in adolescents relied on by the Supreme Court in *Miller* applied with equal force to House who, at 19 years and 2 months old, was barely a legal adult and still a teenager. *People v. House*, 2015 IL App 1st 110580, ¶¶90-100. This Court concluded that House's youthfulness was relevant when considered alongside his participation in the actual shooting, and that the court's inability to consider these factors before imposing a mandatory natural life sentence shocks the moral sense of the community and violated Illinois' proportionate penalties clause as applied to him. *House*, at ¶101-102. This Court remanded for a new sentencing hearing. *Id.*

5. On November 28, 2018, the Illinois Supreme Court vacated this Court's decision, and directed this Court to consider the effect of the opinion in *People v. Harris*, 2018 IL 121932, on the issue of whether House's sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.

6. In *Harris*, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶45-48 the Supreme court concluded that an as-applied *Miller* challenge for those 18 and older must be made in the trial court, so that the record contains "evidence about how the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development that helped form the basis for the *Miller* decision applies to defendant's specific facts and circumstances." In this case, House's post-conviction proportionate penalties challenge to his sentence pre-dated the *Miller* decision. Accordingly, House's case should be remanded for further second-stage post-conviction proceedings, including compliance with Rule 651(c). This will give him the opportunity to consult with counsel about his constitutional claims and develop and present evidence to the trial court, with the assistance of counsel, demonstrating how the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development relied on by the court in

Miller applies to an emerging adult and to his specific circumstances. *Harris*, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶45-48; see also *People v. Thompson*, 2015 IL 118151, ¶44 (where record is insufficient to review as-applied challenge, claim can be raised in post-conviction proceedings).


7. On January 22, 2019, this Court granted House's motion for supplemental briefing. The parties agree, however, that under the authority of *Harris* and *Thompson*, this matter should be remanded for further post-conviction proceedings and that, as such, summary disposition is warranted.

8. Assistant State's Attorney Douglas Harvath has reviewed the record and this motion and agrees to a summary disposition of the case as specified herein.

9. This is a final and complete disposition of appeal number 1-11-0580 and the mandate of this Court should issue forthwith.

WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully requests that the Court grant this motion.

Respectfully submitted,




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COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT

STATE OF ILLINOIS)
) SS
COUNTY OF COOK)

VERIFICATION

Under the penalties provided in law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this motion are true and accurate.



LAUREN A. BAUSER
Assistant Appellate Defender

No. 1-11-0580

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,)	Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois
)	
Respondent-Appellee,)	
)	No. 93 CR 26477 (04)
-vs-)	
)	
ANTONIO HOUSE,)	Honorable
)	Kenneth J. Wadas,
Petitioner-Appellant.)	Judge Presiding.

AGREED ORDER

This matter coming to be heard on Appellant's motion, all parties having been duly notified, the State's Attorney's Office agrees to the disposition and the Court being advised in the premises,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

That Appellant's Agreed Motion for Summary Disposition remanding his case for further second-stage post-conviction proceedings, including the appointment of counsel and compliance with Rule 651(c) is allowed/denied.

This is a final and complete disposition of appeal number 1-11-0580 and the mandate of this Court shall issue forthwith.

PRESIDING JUSTICE

JUSTICE

JUSTICE

DATE: _____
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November 28, 2018

In re: People State of Illinois, petitioner, v. Antonio House, respondent.
Leave to appeal; Appellate Court, First District.
122134

The Supreme Court today DENIED the Petition for Appeal as a Matter of Right or, in the alternative, Petition for Leave to Appeal in the above entitled cause and entered the following supervisory order:

In the exercise of this Court's supervisory authority, the Appellate Court, First District, is directed to vacate its judgment in People v. House, case No. 1-11-0580 (12/24/15). The appellate court is directed to consider the effect of this court's opinion in People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, on the issue of whether defendant's sentence violates the Proportionate Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution.

The mandate of this Court will issue to the Appellate Court on 01/02/2019.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Carolyn Taft Gosbell".

Clerk of the Supreme Court

Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court



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People v. House, 2015 IL App (1st) 110580

Appellate Court Caption	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTONIO HOUSE, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No.	First District, Fourth Division Docket No. 1-11-0580
Filed	December 24, 2015
Rehearing denied	March 27, 2017
Decision Under Review	Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 93-CR-26477; the Hon. Kenneth J. Wadas, Judge, presiding.
Judgment	Affirmed in part, vacated in part, remanded.
Counsel on Appeal	Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Jessica D. Fortier, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Christine Cook, Annette Collins, and Michele Grimaldi Stein, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Panel	PRESIDING JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice Reyes concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Gordon concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant Antonio House appeals the trial court’s second stage dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief. Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his postconviction petition because (1) he made a substantial showing of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence of the recantation of a prosecution witness’s trial testimony; (2) he made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated based on (a) newly discovered evidence of a pattern of abuse by a police detective, (b) newly discovered evidence corroborating his allegation that police used a rival gang leader to intimidate defendant during an interrogation, and (c) defendant’s consistent claim that his confession was coerced; (3) the trial court erred in denying postconviction counsel’s request to obtain the Office of Professional Standards (OPS) files on the detectives involved in his interrogation; (4) defendant made a substantial showing that (a) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on direct appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash arrest, and (b) his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to ensure all OPS files were reviewed; and (5) the statute mandating a sentence of natural life for offenders who kill more than one victim without considering mitigating factors, such as the offender’s age and level of culpability, violates the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11).

¶ 2 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the postconviction petition and vacate the mandatory sentence of natural life without parole and order a new sentencing hearing.

¶ 3 Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder and two counts of aggravated kidnapping in the September 1993 deaths of Stanton Burch and Michael Purham. The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to two consecutive life sentences for the murder convictions and two terms of 30 years for the aggravating kidnapping convictions to run consecutive to the life sentences.

¶ 4 We review only those facts relevant to the issues raised on appeal. We previously described the general circumstances of this case as follows:

“The facts of this case arise out of an intra-gang conflict regarding the right to sell drugs on a street corner. In 1993, there was a split in the Unknown Vice Lords (UVL) street gang. The two warring factions were led by Tyrone ‘Baby Tye’ Williams and Willie Lloyd. Artez ‘Ted’ Thigpen, a UVL member who remained loyal to Williams, controlled drug sales at the corner of Springfield Avenue and Fillmore Street in Chicago, Illinois. The victims in this case, Stanton Burch and Michael Purnham, were UVL members who were loyal to Lloyd. The day before the victim[s]’ deaths, Lloyd and some of his men went to the corner, where they beat up and robbed one of Thigpen’s drug sellers. The following day, Burch and Purham were dropped off at the corner, where they announced to Thigpen’s drug sellers that the corner now belonged to Lloyd. Burch and Purham then began to sell drugs. Soon thereafter, Thigpen and an armed group of his men arrived at the corner. Defendant allegedly was a member of this group. The group forced Burch and Purham into a car at gun point. Burch and Purham were then taken to a vacant field where they were shot and killed. Defendant was arrested on October 27, 1993, and on the following day gave a handwritten

statement regarding his involvement in the kidnapping and murder of the victims.” *People v. House*, No. 1-05-0994, slip op. at 2 (2007) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 5 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and a motion to suppress statements. In his motion to quash arrest, defendant argued that the arrest was made without an arrest warrant and not part of a lawful search. At the hearing on the motion, Detective Luis Munoz testified that he interviewed Eunice Clark, a witness to the homicide, and she mentioned defendant’s name as a person involved in the crimes. Sergeant Harvey Rubin testified that in October 1993, he was a tactical police officer and was investigating the homicides of Burch and Purham. Sergeant Rubin was looking for defendant based on information he received as part of the homicide investigation. He received a tip that defendant was on the northwest corner of Springfield and Arthington and wearing a black jacket with white stripes. He requested an additional police unit to go to that location with him and his partner. The other unit arrived first and he heard another officer call out a chase on the police radio, but he did not participate in the chase. He learned that defendant had been arrested. He admitted that he did not have a stop order or an arrest warrant for defendant. Officer Dana Alexander testified that on October 27, 1993, he received information from Sergeant Rubin regarding defendant’s location at Springfield and Arthington and what he was wearing. He proceeded to that location and saw a subject fitting the description with other individuals. As he approached and announced his office, defendant ran from the scene. Officer Alexander gave chase and apprehended defendant, placing him under arrest. At the time of his arrest, defendant was in possession of a handgun in his waistband. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to quash arrest.

¶ 6 In his motion to suppress statements, defendant asserted that his statement was not voluntary because he never received his *Miranda* rights (*Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), and the detectives refused to honor his right to remain silent, and subjected him to coercion and intimidation. At the hearing, defendant did not testify, but was sworn to the facts in the motion. Defendant alleged in the motion that he was handcuffed to a wall and left for long periods of time and he was denied food. He stated that the detectives brought rival gang leader Lloyd into his interview room and Lloyd threatened to harm defendant and his family if he did not give a statement. He also said that Detective Perez struck him in the forehead. He gave a statement as a result of this intimidation.

¶ 7 Detectives Ann Chambers and Alfred Perez each testified regarding defendant’s interview. Detective Chambers stated that she first met with defendant around 9 a.m. on October 28, 1993. Defendant was in an interview room and was not in handcuffs. She read defendant his *Miranda* rights and offered him a snack. The first interview lasted approximately 30 minutes. Detective Chambers returned around 1 p.m. and gave defendant lunch from McDonald’s. Later that afternoon, at around 4:30 p.m., Detective Kriston Kato came on duty for the next shift and her partner Detective Perez went home. She interviewed defendant with Detective Kato at approximately 5:30 p.m. for about an hour. They contacted the felony review unit of the State’s Attorney’s office around 8:30 p.m. and an assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) arrived around 9:30 p.m. Detective Chambers was present when defendant gave a handwritten statement to the ASA. Detective Chambers denied all the allegations in defendant’s motion, including that defendant was never placed in handcuffs, that defendant was threatened to give a statement, that defendant requested an attorney, that Detective Perez and Detective Kato were present at

the same time for an interview, that Lloyd was ever brought into the interview room and allowed to threaten defendant, and that Detective Perez struck defendant. Detective Perez testified that he was only present for the interview with defendant at 9:30 a.m. He denied striking defendant in the forehead. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements.

¶ 8 Prior to trial, defendant caused a subpoena *duces tecum* to be issued and served on the Chicago police department for the OPS records on Detectives Kriston Kato, Alfred Perez, Ann Chambers, and Officer Michael Cronin. In February 1998, the trial court granted the City of Chicago's motion to quash the subpoena.

¶ 9 At trial, the State presented the testimony of Eunice Clark and her boyfriend Barry "Smurf" Williams (Barry). Clark admitted that at the time of trial, she was serving an 11-year sentence for two attempted murder convictions. Clark testified that in September 1993, she was 16 years old and a member of the Traveling Vice Lords gang. At around 10 a.m. on September 12, 1993, Clark was at the corner of South Springfield Avenue and West Fillmore Street in Chicago. She was at that location to sell drugs for Thigpen and Williams with several other drug dealers, including "Smurf." That day, Clark saw Lloyd and his bodyguards call over one of the drug dealers, "Larry." Lloyd and his bodyguards beat up Larry and took Larry's drugs and money.

¶ 10 The next day, on September 13, 1993, Clark was on the same corner with other dealers waiting to sell drugs. Lloyd then drove up and dropped off Burch and Purham. Burch and Purham began selling drugs. Later, Thigpen and Williams drove by the corner. They returned a short time later with two additional men in the car. Clark testified that several other men ran over from nearby railroad tracks. She stated that all of the men were armed with a handgun. Clark identified defendant as one of those men. Thigpen and the men surrounded Burch and Purham and forced them into Thigpen's vehicle at gunpoint. Clark heard a loud noise inside the car, but was not positive if it was a gunshot.

¶ 11 Clark testified that Thigpen told her that if anyone asked where Burch and Purham were, that she was to say that the police picked them up. Thigpen got into his car and drove off. The rest of the men returned to the area near the railroad tracks on foot. Later that day, Clark told Burch's girlfriend what happened. That evening, Clark was approached by Burch's mother and the police. Clark was taken to the Area 4 police station and spoke with detectives. She returned and gave a signed statement on September 16, 1993.

¶ 12 Clark also testified that on October 12, 1993, she was walking near 18th Street and St. Louis Avenue when she saw defendant and another individual in a gray vehicle. They pulled the car over and asked Clark to get into the car. Clark refused, and the men tried to force her into the car with one man striking her in the back of the neck. When the men let go, defendant told her that he did not want her to testify. Clark said she told them that she had to testify.

¶ 13 Clark admitted that she received a total of \$1,200 in relocation expenses from the State, but she used the majority of the money on clothes and personal items.

¶ 14 Barry testified at trial that he also went by the name Aaron Lamar. At the time of trial, he was serving a six year sentence for a narcotics conviction. In September 1993, he was 23 years old and was in a relationship with Clark. Barry was a member of the UVL gang. Barry was unable to recall most of his prior statements and testimony, but his handwritten statement and grand jury testimony were introduced at trial. His prior statements corroborate Clark's testimony regarding the events of September 13, 1993, including defendant's involvement.

¶ 15 Barry stated that on the morning of September 13, 1993, he was waiting for Thigpen to bring drugs for him to sell on the corner of Springfield and Fillmore with Clark and two other individuals. Another car approached the intersection and two men got out of the vehicle. He did not recognize these individuals. According to Barry, the men said that location was no longer Thigpen's, and now belonged to Lloyd. The two men then proceeded to sell drugs at that location. Thigpen drove by the location and then returned approximately 10 minutes later with two men in the car. Several other men approached the intersection at that time, including defendant. The men were armed with handguns. They surrounded the two men selling drugs and forced them into Thigpen's car. Thigpen drove away and the other men returned the way they came.

¶ 16 ASA Solita Pandit testified at trial that she took defendant's handwritten statement on October 28, 1993, and published the statement to the jury. Defendant stated that he was a member of the UVL gang. He worked for Thigpen to sell drugs at the corner of Springfield and Fillmore. Defendant said that Lloyd used to be the "head boss" of the UVL, but there was fighting regarding that position. He had heard that one of Thigpen's workers had been robbed by Lloyd and his men on September 12, 1993. On September 13, 1993, defendant was on Springfield between Arthington and Fillmore when he saw Clark. Clark told defendant that Lloyd had dropped off two of his workers at the spot and the police had picked them up. Clark then said that Thigpen told her to say this, but that Thigpen "had got them, put them into his car and drove them away." Defendant then saw Weatherspoon and another UVL. Weatherspoon told defendant to get his car and pick them up because they needed to go meet Thigpen at the railroad tracks at California and Roosevelt. Weatherspoon told defendant that Thigpen had two of Lloyd's men and they were going to be "violated," meaning "physically punished, ranging from being hit with hands, boards or being shot." Defendant drove them to where Thigpen was with Lloyd's men.

¶ 17 At that location, defendant saw another UVL member, Derrick Harvey. He said two cars were parked with the hoods up to appear as though a car battery needed to be jumped. Harvey said he was acting as a lookout for the police for Thigpen who was violating Lloyd's men by the railroad tracks. Defendant parked his car and also acted as a lookout. He heard approximately eight gunshots from the railroad tracks and then saw several UVL members. He was told by Williams that "they got Willie's boys," which defendant knew meant the men had been killed.

¶ 18 Defendant stated that he had a gun when he was arrested, but it was not the gun used in the shootings. He also said he received a phone call from Williams in jail on October 11, 1993. Williams told defendant to tell Clark not to come to court to testify against him. The next day, defendant saw Clark and told her not to testify.

¶ 19 Defendant stated that he was treated well by the police and he was not made any promises for his statement nor was he threatened in any way.

¶ 20 Defendant testified at trial on his own behalf. He stated that he was a member of the UVL and he was 19 years old on September 13, 1993. On that date, he drove to the vicinity of Springfield and Fillmore to sell drugs for Thigpen. He saw Clark, Barry, and other people in the area. Defendant said he asked Clark where everyone was, meaning the people who issued the drugs to the sellers. Clark initially told him that the police came and everyone was gone. Shortly thereafter, Clark said that Thigpen, Weatherspoon, and others took someone to be violated. Defendant then walked to the corner and saw Weatherspoon and another person.

They told defendant that two men had been violated and needed a ride. Defendant drove the two men west on Roosevelt until Weatherspoon told him to pull over near Campbell. Two cars were parked under the railroad tracks viaduct with their hoods up. He recognized other UVL members, including Harvey. He dropped off Weatherspoon and the other man, then he made a U-turn and left that location. As he was leaving, he heard approximately eight gunshots and saw several people coming from the railroad tracks.

¶ 21 Defendant testified that after he was arrested, he remained in lockup for 10 to 12 hours. He was taken to an interview room by Detectives Chambers and Perez, where he was handcuffed to a wall. Detectives Chambers and Perez left him there for a period of time and when they returned, they told defendant they knew he had nothing to do with the shooting, but needed him to make a statement. He stated that he told them to leave him alone and he had no knowledge of the shooting.

¶ 22 Defendant testified that he was next interviewed by Detective Kato. According to defendant, Detective Kato said, "I know that you didn't shoot those boys, but I know that you have some type of knowledge about it. And that if you don't make a statement about Baby Tye and Ted, then you'll go down for this." Defendant stated he did not give a statement at that time. Defendant testified that he feared for his life and his family. Detective Kato left the room. Later, Detective Kato returned with Detectives Chambers and Perez, Officer Cronin, and Lloyd. Defendant stated that Detective Kato told him that they have Lloyd in the room and to tell them the truth or he would be hurt. Defendant testified that Lloyd then threatened to hurt him and his family. Everyone except Detective Kato left the room. Defendant said that Detective Kato told him that now they have Lloyd on their side and defendant was going to cooperate. Defendant said he agreed to give a statement shortly thereafter. Defendant further stated that Detective Kato promised to protect defendant and his family if he gave a statement.

¶ 23 Defendant then testified he was brought into a room where ASA Pandit was already sitting. He stated that ASA Pandit did not write the statement in his presence, but he admitted that he signed it. He denied reading the statement before signing it. Defendant said that he believed that he would be a witness for the State against Thigpen and Williams. He denied that he acted as a lookout near the railroad tracks or that he was present when the men were forced into Thigpen's car. He denied that he was treated well by the police and that Detective Chambers brought him food.

¶ 24 Following deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree murder and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to two consecutive life sentences for the murder convictions and received two consecutive 60-year sentences for the aggravated kidnapping convictions.¹

¶ 25 On direct appeal, defendant argued that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in quashing defendant's subpoena seeking access to the OPS files for Detectives Kato, Chambers and Perez, and Officer Cronin; (2) the State failed to rebut defendant's assertion that Detective Kato threatened defendant's safety and his family if defendant did not give a statement against Thigpen and Williams; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present evidence that two codefendants were seen at a gang funeral, ran from police, and possessed

¹Defendant originally received consecutive 60-year sentences for the aggravated kidnapping convictions, which was reduced to consecutive 30-year terms on remand.

guns when they were arrested; and (4) defendant's consecutive and extended-term sentences violated *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

¶ 26 On December 21, 2001, another panel of this court affirmed defendant's convictions, vacated his aggravated kidnapping sentences, and remanded the matter for resentencing. *People v. House*, No. 1-98-4324 (2001) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The reviewing court found that defendant had waived his claim regarding the subpoena for OPS complaints because he did not include the subpoena in the record on appeal. *Id.* at 17. The reviewing court subsequently vacated that order and, on May 10, 2002, issued a modified order upon denial of rehearing. *People v. House*, No. 1-98-4324 (2002) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). In that order, the court again found that defendant had waived his claim regarding the subpoena for OPS complaints. *Id.* at 17.

¶ 27 On May 30, 2002, the Supreme Court of Illinois issued a supervisory order wherein it directed this court to vacate the judgment of December 21, 2001, to reconsider that decision in light of new authority, and to consider defendant's appeal from the trial court's order granting the motion to quash his subpoena to the OPS. *People v. House*, No. 93470 (Ill. May 30, 2002). On August 16, 2002, another panel of this court found that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an *in camera* inspection of the OPS files requested by defendant and, accordingly, the court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded the matter for a new trial. *People v. House*, No. 1-98-4324 (2002) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 28 On December 5, 2002, the supreme court issued a supervisory order directing this court to vacate the order dated August 16, 2002, and remanding the case to the circuit court "for an *in camera* inspection of the records of the Office of Professional Standards requested by defendant." *People v. House*, No. 94670 (Ill Dec. 5, 2002). The supervisory order directed the circuit court "to determine what, if any, material should be disclosed to defendant," and further stated that, "[i]n the event new evidence is disclosed, defendant shall be allowed to file a motion for [a] new trial if indicated." *Id.*

¶ 29 In February 2005, the trial court issued its ruling on the OPS files. The court observed that it received 50 files, 32 of the files related to Detective Kato, but 18 did not. Of the 32 files related to Detective Kato, the trial court noted that, under the appropriate standard of review, prior allegations of abuse are admissible when they are not unduly remote in time from the occurrence before the court, when they involve the same officer and similar allegations of misconduct, and when, in both the prior allegations and the case before the court, there is some evidence of injury consistent with the police brutality allegations, though this criteria was not relevant to the current inquiry. The court found 22 complaints to be too remote in time from the interrogation in 1993. However, the court still reviewed these complaints under the second criteria and determined that none involved similar factual allegations. The trial court reviewed the remaining 10 complaints and concluded that none raised similar factual allegations. The court then held that since none of the OPS files contained similar factual allegations, there was no basis to release them to defendant. The trial court also imposed 30-year terms for the aggravated kidnapping convictions, consecutive to the sentences for natural life.

¶ 30 On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him access to the OPS files pertaining to Detective Kato. This court found that "the OPS files produced in response to defendant's subpoena are not relevant to his claim that Detective Kato coerced him into signing a false confession" and the trial court did not abuse its discretion. *House*, No.

1-05-0994, slip op. at 14. We did find that one OPS file contained “an allegation that could be characterized as somewhat similar to the allegation made by defendant,” but concluded that one OPS file did not show a pattern and practice by Detective Kato and held that it was not relevant to defendant’s claim. *Id.* at 13-14.

¶ 31 While his direct appeal was pending, defendant filed a *pro se* petition for postconviction relief in September 2001, alleging that (1) he was denied a fair trial through the knowing use of perjured testimony and fabricated evidence by the police officers and assistant State’s Attorneys, (2) Clark’s initial testimony before the grand jury only named Thigpen and Weatherspoon as involved in the kidnapping of Burch and Purham, and (3) Clark has recanted her trial testimony identifying defendant as participating in the kidnapping. In December 2001, the trial court dismissed defendant’s postconviction petition, finding that it lacked jurisdiction while defendant’s direct appeal remained pending.

¶ 32 Defendant appealed the dismissal. In January 2003, the State filed a confession of error in the appeal. The State “concluded that error was committed in the circuit court because the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not bar a circuit court from considering a post-conviction petition while a direct appeal of the defendant’s criminal conviction is pending.” The State asked that the case be reversed and remanded to the trial court with directions to proceed to the second stage of the postconviction process. The reviewing court allowed the State’s confession of error in February 2003, vacated the dismissal, and remanded the case for second stage review under the postconviction process.

¶ 33 Upon remand, defendant’s postconviction petition was assigned to an assistant public defender for further review. In October 2009, defendant filed a motion for discovery of the OPS file on Detective Kato as well as files on Detectives Chambers and Perez and Officer Cronin. In November 2009, defendant filed a supplemental motion for discovery and requested access to the internal affairs department reports for the officers, which had not previously been requested. In January 2010, the trial court denied defendant’s motion, finding the requests “speculative in nature” and that it was “not really anything more than a fishing expedition to try to find out if they can develop good cause.”

¶ 34 In April 2010, defendant filed his amended postconviction petition. The amended petition raised 15 issues in 43 pages, with approximately 300 pages of exhibits. The petition raised numerous claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, claims of a denial of due process, newly discovered evidence of actual innocence based on Clark’s affidavit, newly discovered evidence of police misconduct by Detective Kato, and the imposition of a mandatory life sentence as applied in defendant’s case was unconstitutional. The State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s amended postconviction petition, arguing that everything raised in the petition was either raised on direct appeal or could have been raised on direct appeal. The State asserted that defendant attempted to bypass waiver and *res judicata* by alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel or newly discovered evidence, but defendant cannot establish ineffectiveness under *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), nor does the alleged newly discovered evidence satisfy the requirements of *People v. Washington*, 171 Ill. 2d 475 (1996). In February 2011, the trial court granted the State’s motion and dismissed defendant’s amended postconviction petition.

¶ 35 This appeal followed.

¶ 36 The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Post-Conviction Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 to 122-8 (West 2008)) provides a tool by which those under criminal sentence in this state can

assert that their convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their rights under the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution or both. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 2008); *People v. Coleman*, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378-79 (1998). Postconviction relief is limited to constitutional deprivations that occurred at the original trial. *Coleman*, 183 Ill. 2d at 380. “A proceeding brought under the [Post-Conviction Act] is not an appeal of a defendant’s underlying judgment. Rather, it is a collateral attack on the judgment.” *People v. Evans*, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 89 (1999). “The purpose of [a postconviction] proceeding is to allow inquiry into constitutional issues relating to the conviction or sentence that were not, and could not have been, determined on direct appeal.” *People v. Barrow*, 195 Ill. 2d 506, 519 (2001). Thus, *res judicata* bars consideration of issues that were raised and decided on direct appeal, and issues that could have been presented on direct appeal, but were not, are considered forfeited. *People v. Blair*, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 443-47 (2005).

¶ 37 At the first stage, the circuit court must independently review the postconviction petition within 90 days of its filing and determine whether “the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2008). If the circuit court does not dismiss the postconviction petition as frivolous or patently without merit, then the petition advances to the second stage. Counsel is appointed to represent the defendant, if necessary (725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2008)), and the State is allowed to file responsive pleadings (725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2008)). At this stage, the circuit court must determine whether the petition and any accompanying documentation make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. See *Coleman*, 183 Ill. 2d at 381. If no such showing is made, the petition is dismissed. “At the second stage of proceedings, all well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the trial record are to be taken as true, and, in the event the circuit court dismisses the petition at that stage, we generally review the circuit court’s decision using a *de novo* standard.” *People v. Pendleton*, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006). If, however, a substantial showing of a constitutional violation is set forth, then the petition is advanced to the third stage, where the circuit court conducts an evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2008).

¶ 38 Defendant first argues that he made a substantial showing of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. Specifically, he contends that Clark’s affidavit recanting her trial testimony showed that he did not participate in the crimes at issue.

¶ 39 As an exhibit to his petition, defendant included an affidavit, dated June 12, 2001, from Clark. Clark stated that she was a witness to the kidnapping of Burch and Purham on September 13, 1993, and that she “never saw Antonio House kidnap or conspire to kidnap Stan Burch and Michael Purham nor did [she] see Antonio House with a weapon.” Clark also said that “On October 12th 1993, I was never confronted by Antonio House neither has Mr. House threaten me [*sic*] or cause me bodily harm. To my personal knowledge Antonio House name was only mention [*sic*] because he was a worker for Ted.”

¶ 40 In *People v. Washington*, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996), the supreme court held that a postconviction petitioner may pursue a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. To succeed under that theory, the supporting evidence must be new, material, and noncumulative, and it must be of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial. *Id.* Newly discovered evidence must be evidence that was not available at defendant’s trial and that the defendant could not have discovered sooner through diligence. *Barrow*, 195 Ill. 2d at 541. “Generally, evidence is not ‘newly discovered’ when it presents facts already known to the defendant at or prior to trial, though the source of those facts may

have been unknown, unavailable, or uncooperative.” *People v. Barnslater*, 373 Ill. App. 3d 512, 523-24 (2007).

“Substantively, in order to succeed on a claim of actual innocence, the defendant must present new, material, noncumulative evidence that is so conclusive it would probably change the result on retrial. [Citation.] New means the evidence was discovered after trial and could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence. [Citation.] Material means the evidence is relevant and probative of the petitioner’s innocence. [Citation.] Noncumulative means the evidence adds to what the jury heard. [Citation.] And conclusive means the evidence, when considered along with the trial evidence, would probably lead to a different result. [Citation.]” *People v. Coleman*, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 96.

¶ 41 As the Illinois Supreme Court observed, “[w]e deem it appropriate to note here that the United States Supreme Court has emphasized that such claims must be supported ‘with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.’ ” *People v. Edwards*, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 32 (quoting *Schlup v. Delo*, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995)). “ ‘Because such evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast majority of cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.’ ” *Id.* (quoting *Schlup*, 513 U.S. at 324). A claim of actual innocence is not a challenge to whether the defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather an assertion of total vindication or exoneration. *Barnslater*, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 520.

¶ 42 Here, defendant has failed to provide “reliable evidence.” Clark’s affidavit is neither exculpatory scientific evidence, a trustworthy eyewitness account, nor critical physical evidence. Rather, Clark’s affidavit contains conclusory statements that fail to exonerate defendant. We point out that “the recantation of testimony is regarded as inherently unreliable, and a court will not grant a new trial on that basis except in extraordinary circumstances.” *People v. Steidl*, 177 Ill. 2d 239, 260 (1997). Clark offered no explanation regarding why she changed her statement eight years after the crimes were committed. She simply stated without any explanation that she did not see defendant kidnap or conspire to kidnap the victims. We also point out that Clark’s trial testimony never indicated that she was present for any planning or conspiracy to commit the crimes, and her statement in the affidavit on this point fails to offer any proof of actual innocence. Further, the affidavit offers no facts to support her change in testimony.

¶ 43 Additionally, we observe that portions of Clark’s trial testimony were corroborated by other facts in the case. “At the second stage of proceedings, all well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the trial record are to be taken as true ***.” *People v. Pendleton*, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006). The record rebuts Clark’s statements in the affidavit and supports her trial testimony. Clark admitted telling Burch’s girlfriend what happened on the day it occurred, and later she voluntarily spoke with the police, which significantly helped the police investigation of several individuals. She named several participants other than defendant, including Derrick Harvey, who later led the police to where the bodies were found. Clark’s testimony was also consistent with the ongoing rivalry between factions of the UVL.

¶ 44 Moreover, even if we presume that Clark’s affidavit constitutes new, material, and noncumulative evidence, defendant has not set forth a substantial showing that this evidence is of such a conclusive character that it would probably lead to a different result.

¶ 45 Defendant asserts that without Clark's identification of defendant "there is very little evidence on which a trier of fact could base a conviction," noting his allegations of coercion in regard to his statement as well as characterizing Barry's testimony as "unreliable and impeached testimony and repudiated statements." We disagree with defendant's characterization of Barry's trial testimony. While Barry did not recall much of his prior statement or grand jury testimony at trial, both were published to the jury through the testimony of the respective assistant State's Attorneys. Barry's prior statement and grand jury testimony placed defendant at the scene of the kidnapping.

¶ 46 Further, Clark's affidavit does not exonerate defendant for his participation in the murders. Her affidavit does not state that defendant was not present as a lookout near the scene of the murders. Even if we assume Clark's statements in the affidavit are true, the affidavit does not mean that defendant did not participate in the crimes. We also note that Clark's prior testimony would be admissible as substantive evidence on retrial. See 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 (West 2014). Newly discovered evidence which merely impeaches a witness will typically not be of such conclusive character as to justify postconviction relief. *Barnslater*, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 523. Clark's affidavit fails to exonerate defendant, and is not so conclusive such that it would probably change the result on retrial. Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly dismissed this claim of actual innocence.

¶ 47 Defendant next contends that he has made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated because he has submitted newly discovered evidence of a pattern of abuse and misconduct by Detective Kato as well as newly discovered evidence to corroborate defendant's allegation that police used Lloyd to intimidate defendant during an interrogation. In the alternative, defendant asserts that if this court finds that the evidence is not newly discovered, then he has set forth a substantial showing of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The State maintains that this claim is barred under the doctrine of *res judicata*.

¶ 48 As previously observed, *res judicata* bars consideration of issues that were raised and decided on direct appeal. *Blair*, 215 Ill. 2d at 443. The supreme court has "recognized, however, that, in the interests of fundamental fairness, the doctrine of *res judicata* can be relaxed if the defendant presents substantial new evidence." *People v. Patterson*, 192 Ill. 2d 93, 139 (2000). "The standards addressing when new evidence is sufficiently substantial so as to relax *res judicata* are the same standards used to determine whether newly discovered evidence should result in a new trial." *Barnslater*, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 530.

¶ 49 Defendant's first piece of newly discovered evidence is an affidavit from Casey Dunbar. Dunbar averred that he was arrested on October 27, 1993. He was placed in a lineup with defendant and others that evening at Area 4 which was viewed by Lloyd, the complaining witness in Dunbar's case. According to defendant, this affidavit established that Lloyd was at the police station at the time of defendant's interrogation and lends support to his allegation that the police allowed Lloyd to threaten defendant. Defendant also included his own affidavit stating that he was arrested on October 27, 1993, and placed in a lineup with Dunbar, but at the time he did not know what case the lineup was for. He stated that this occurred prior to Lloyd being brought into defendant's interrogation. Defendant asserts that he has made a substantial showing that if the trial court heard this independent evidence corroborating Lloyd's presence at Area 4, then the outcome would have been different.

¶ 50 As we have previously stated, evidence is not newly discovered when it presents facts already known to the defendant at or prior to trial, though the source of those facts may have

been unknown, unavailable, or uncooperative. *Id.* at 523-24. Here, defendant knew he appeared in a lineup with Dunbar from the date of his arrest. Defendant could have discovered this evidence earlier through due diligence. Defendant offers no explanation as to why he could not have discovered this evidence earlier. Because defendant knew of these facts prior to trial, the affidavit cannot constitute newly discovered evidence for defendant's postconviction petition.

¶ 51 However, even if we accepted this evidence as new, which we do not, Dunbar's affidavit is not of such a conclusive nature that the result of the proceeding would likely be different. Dunbar's affidavit places Lloyd at the police station the day defendant was arrested. Transcripts attached to defendant's postconviction petition show that postconviction counsel requested to see lineup reports in Dunbar's case, but the trial court, after reviewing the reports, denied the request. The court noted that Lloyd was surrendered to view the lineup by his private attorney, who was present at the police station as well. The court found it implausible that Lloyd would have been involved with the detectives in defendant's case while Lloyd's attorney was present.

¶ 52 Further, we point out that defendant's allegations in his motion to suppress do not indicate that he was removed from the interrogation room to participate in a lineup on another case. Rather, defendant stated that he was left alone in the room between questioning. Given the contradictory evidence in the record, defendant cannot show how Dunbar's affidavit advances his claim that his confession was involuntary. Accordingly, defendant's claim of newly discovered evidence is without merit.

¶ 53 Defendant also contends that he has presented newly discovered evidence in the form of cases, articles, and affidavits of other criminal cases in which allegations of coercion and physical abuse were made against Detective Kato. In his brief, defendant specifically highlights two cases, *People v. McDaniel*, 326 Ill. App. 3d 771 (2001), and *People v. Wallace*, 299 Ill. App. 3d 9 (1998).

¶ 54 Even if we presume that defendant could not have found this evidence earlier through due diligence, these allegations are not material to his allegations of police misconduct. While there were allegations against Detective Kato in these two cases, neither case involved a defendant's statement being suppressed because of police coercion or misconduct. In *McDaniel*, the reviewing court found the defendant's confession to be involuntary because he was 14 years old, the police frustrated his mother's attempts to confer with the defendant prior to interrogation, the youth officer showed no interest in protecting the defendant's welfare; and the timing and circumstances, the defendant being woken up and taken from his mother's home at 2 a.m., contributed to the coercive nature of the interrogation. *McDaniel*, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 787. While the defendant did testify at his suppression hearing regarding comments by Detective Kato stating that the defendant would go to jail if he did not give a statement, these statements were not the basis of the suppression of the defendant's confession. Nor did the court express any opinion as to whether these statements were improper. *Id.* at 777-78.

¶ 55 Although defendant cites to a sworn declaration by Andre Wallace filed in his federal case against Detective Kato, another detective, and the City of Chicago attached to his postconviction petition, we observe that Wallace's conviction was reversed because the court on appeal found that the police lacked probable cause to arrest defendant. *Wallace*, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 21. The reviewing court remanded for an attenuation hearing to determine if Wallace's confession was sufficiently attenuated from his illegal arrest. *Id.* On remand, the

trial court found that the confession was sufficiently attenuated, but the reviewing court disagreed and suppressed the confession on appeal. Wallace's case was later nol-prossed by the State. *Wallace v. City of Chicago*, 440 F.3d 421, 423-24 (7th Cir. 2006). Wallace later filed the federal case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting that Detective Kato and another detective as well as the City of Chicago had violated his fourth amendment rights and that they had also committed the state torts of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants because the suit was time barred, which the Seventh Circuit affirmed. *Wallace*, 440 F.3d at 423. The Supreme Court also found that Wallace's suit was untimely and affirmed the dismissal. *Wallace v. Kato*, 549 U.S. 384 (2007).

¶ 56 Further, even if we consider Wallace's statements in his sworn declaration, the bulk of the statements regarding Detective Kato involve allegations of physical abuse. The only allegation of physical abuse by defendant was made against Detective Perez. Defendant alleged that Detective Perez struck him in the forehead, but the detective testified at the suppression hearing that he never struck defendant. As this court has already determined, "the essence of defendant's claim is that he was coerced into signing a confession when Detective Kato brought a rival gang member into the interview room and allowed him to threaten defendant and his family." *House*, No. 1-05-0994, slip op. at 12. Neither of these cases involved any similar conduct by Detective Kato.

¶ 57 Defendant also refers to the unnamed 1993 case that this court discussed in his prior appeal as being similar to defendant's case as support and also asks this court to disclose that case. However, the OPS files previously reviewed by this court were not included in the record on appeal and, therefore, this court will not consider any claims related to the substance of the OPS files. Defendant, as appellant, bears the burden of providing a sufficiently complete record to support a claim of error. In the absence of a complete record on appeal, we will presume that the order entered by the circuit court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis and any doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant. *People v. Fair*, 193 Ill. 2d 256, 264 (2000) (citing *Foutch v. O'Bryant*, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984)).

¶ 58 Defendant also attached 140 pages of exhibits consisting of motions, portions of trial transcripts, portions of briefs, unpublished orders, copies of opinions, and a list of additional sources to his postconviction petition to support his claim of newly discovered evidence of similar claims of police misconduct directed at Detective Kato. Defendant contends that these six cases, including *McDaniel* and *Wallace*, show that Detective Kato had a pattern of offering false promises of leniency to overbear a defendant's or witness's will. After our review of these exhibits, we observe that all of these cases involved claims of physical abuse by Detective Kato, consisting of hitting, punching, kicking, and slapping the defendants. Three of these four cases cited by defendant were affirmed on direct appeal and the defendants did not raise a claim of error based on any police misconduct. See *People v. Murray*, 254 Ill. App. 3d 538 (1993), *People v. Prince*, 288 Ill. App. 3d 265 (1997), and *People v. Lucas*, No. 1-92-0372 (1994) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). In the fourth case, the defendant was acquitted in the state court, but subsequently filed a federal lawsuit against Detective Kato. Defendant has included portions of the trial transcript, but it is unclear whether a motion to suppress was granted in the criminal case and if so, whether it was based on Detective Kato's alleged misconduct, including instances of physical abuse. See also *Waslewski v. Kato*, No. 96 C 6940, 1993 WL 8761 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 1993).

¶ 59 Defendant has failed to show how the presentation of these cases in the trial court would probably lead to a different result. While the cases included brief statements attributed to Detective Kato that the defendants would receive a lesser charge or would be released if they gave a statement, the crux of the allegations against Detective Kato in these cases involved physical abuse, which defendant has not alleged. Any references to promises of leniency were *de minimis* in light of the detailed allegations of physical abuse. Defendant has failed to present substantial evidence to warrant the relaxation of the doctrine of *res judicata*. Accordingly, the trial court properly found that defendant's claim of newly discovered evidence regarding his allegations against Detective Kato are barred by *res judicata*.

¶ 60 In the alternative, defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present this evidence in support of his claim that his statement was coerced. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are resolved under the standard set forth in *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In *Strickland*, the Supreme Court delineated a two-part test to use when evaluating whether a defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment. Under *Strickland*, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that such deficient performance substantially prejudiced defendant. *Id.* at 687. To demonstrate performance deficiency, a defendant must establish that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. *People v. Edwards*, 195 Ill. 2d 142, 162-63 (2001). In evaluating sufficient prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 694. If a case may be disposed of on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be taken, and the court need not ever consider the quality of the attorney's performance. *Id.* at 697.

¶ 61 Since we have already found that the allegations in this newly discovered evidence involved claims of physical abuse, which was not alleged by defendant, and defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that the result would have been different, defendant cannot make a substantial showing that he was prejudiced by any alleged error. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

¶ 62 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to reopen discovery when his postconviction counsel requested to obtain the OPS reports previously reviewed by the trial court. Specifically, defendant asks (1) this court to remand to the trial court to allow counsel to review all 50 OPS files, (2) this court to review the 18 OPS files that did not involve Detective Kato or remand to the trial court for review, and (3) this court to reveal the case we previously found similar to defendant's case in a prior appeal. Additionally, defendant asserts that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to ensure that all of the OPS files were reviewed by the trial court for complaints against all four detectives.

¶ 63 However, as we previously observed, the OPS files at issue were not included in the record on appeal and, therefore, this court is unable to consider any claims related to the substance of the OPS files. As pointed out above, it is defendant's burden to provide a sufficiently complete record to support his claim of error, and any doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant. *Fair*, 193 Ill. 2d at 264 (citing *Foutch*, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92). Therefore, without the OPS files, we cannot consider defendant's requests for this

court to review these files or to release the name of the previously reviewed file which are not part of the record on appeal.

¶ 64 “The discovery rules for neither civil nor criminal cases apply to proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.” *Id.* “Nonetheless, the circuit court has inherent discretionary authority to order discovery in post-conviction proceedings.” *Id.* “Circuit courts, however, must exercise this authority with caution because post-conviction proceedings afford only limited review of constitutional claims not presented at trial, and there is a potential for abuse of the discovery process in post-conviction proceedings.” *Id.* Accordingly, a trial court will only allow a discovery request on postconviction when the moving party has shown good cause. *Id.* at 264-65. We review the trial court’s denial of a discovery request in postconviction proceedings for an abuse of discretion. *Id.* at 265.

¶ 65 The request to review OPS files has been raised multiple times before the trial court and on appeal. Any request to review Detective Kato’s OPS files has been completely litigated in the trial court and by this court. We have already reviewed the OPS files and concluded that the cases were not relevant and a pattern and practice was not established. See *House*, No. 1-05-0994. We find any consideration of OPS files related to Detective Kato to be *res judicata* and decline to review the issue again.

¶ 66 We next turn to defendant’s request for discovery related to Detectives Chambers and Perez and Officer Cronin. On direct appeal, the supreme court entered a supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate its Rule 23 order, filed August 16, 2002, and remanding the case to the trial court for an “in camera inspection of the records of the [OPS] requested by defendant.” *People v. House*, No. 94670 (Ill. Dec. 5, 2002) (supervisory order). On January 29, 2003, defendant’s trial counsel appeared before the trial court on remand and stated that he “issued a subpoena for those records” and that time was needed to compile the requested documents. However, this subpoena is not contained in the record. Without the subpoena filed on remand, we do not know if defendant specifically requested a review of OPS files for only Detective Kato or for all four officers. The record following remand indicates that the request was only for OPS files related to Detective Kato. At no point before the trial court nor on appeal was an objection raised that the subpoena filed on remand was not properly followed in that it required a review of Detectives Chambers and Perez and Officer Cronin in addition to Detective Kato. Neither the trial court nor the parties referenced any other police officer other than Detective Kato at any time until postconviction counsel filed her discovery motion.

¶ 67 When the trial court entered its findings on the OPS files in February 2005, the court summarized defendant’s request as follows.

“The case is here for me to review 50 OPS complaints, complaints register numbers purportedly relating to Detective Kato and make an analysis to see if any of those are somehow relevant to the case at hand, which would trigger the release of those documents to the defense and possibly new discovery and things like that, a new hearing potentially on the issue of his voluntariness of his statement.

Is that about what both sides believe we’re here for?”

¶ 68 In response, defense counsel stated, “That’s my understanding,” and the prosecutor answered, “Yes, Judge.” The trial court then proceeded with its findings. The court noted that it “thought that the 50 complaint files related to Detective Kato. But in reality, a number of the files did not relate to Detective Kato at all.” The court found that “18 files within the box of 50 wherein Detective Kato was not named in any of the complaints, leaving 32 complaints to

review.” The court then outlined the basis for its conclusions that none of the 32 complaints merited disclosure to defendant.

¶ 69 Further, in July 2006, defense counsel filed a motion to amend the record on appeal, requesting the trial court to seal the OPS complaints “pertaining to Chicago Police Detective Christian Kato and append them to the Common Law Record in appellant’s appeal No. 05-0994.” On appeal, defendant specifically argued that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that, based on its review of the OPS files against Detective Kato, none of the files were relevant to defendant’s claim of coercion by Detective Kato.

¶ 70 During postconviction proceedings, postconviction counsel filed a motion for discovery seeking the OPS records for Detective Kato, as well as Detectives Chambers and Perez and Officer Cronin. At the hearing on this motion, postconviction counsel stated that after the remand in 2003, the prior counsel “filed another subpoena that was the same for all the four officers.” Counsel stated she had copies of the subpoena, but a copy was not attached to her discovery motion nor does it appear in the record on appeal. Defense counsel stated that defendant’s request “started out with a subpoena with everyone acknowledging it was going to be for the four officers, and somehow it ended with only an *in camera* review of one of the officers.”

¶ 71 The trial court then responded, “That’s what I was ordered to do by the Appellate Court. Review all the OPS records from Detective Cato [*sic*]. That’s what I did. And that issue went up on appeal and was affirmed.” Later, the trial court stated, “I was never told to go beyond Cato [*sic*]. I was told to review, read every single one of Cato’s [*sic*] OPS complaints. And look for a pattern. That’s what I was basically instructed to do by the Appellate Court, not other detectives.” Following arguments, the trial court denied defendant’s motion, finding the request for OPS records to be “speculative in nature. Is not really anything more than a fishing expedition to try to find out if they can develop good cause.” “At this point, they have not established a requisite good cause for the records.” We note that despite filing a discovery motion requesting these files, no claim was raised in defendant’s amended postconviction petition regarding misconduct by Detectives Chambers and Perez and Officer Cronin or the denial of the motion.

¶ 72 Without the subpoena filed after remand, we have no way to determine what precisely was requested by defendant for the trial court’s *in camera* review. As we have stated, it was defendant’s burden to provide a sufficiently complete record to support his claim of error, and we will presume that the order entered by the circuit court was in conformity with law and any doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant. *Fair*, 193 Ill. 2d at 264 (citing *Foutch*, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92). Based on the record after the remand, the parties and the trial court appeared to proceed with a request limited to Detective Kato, which was the substance of the prior appeal. It would be speculation to presume that the request was broader than both the parties and the trial court agreed. Rather, we presume that the trial court properly reviewed the OPS files as requested for Detective Kato. Accordingly, we review defendant’s request for the OPS files of the three other officers as a new request.

¶ 73 Defendant has not offered any evidence or suggestion that the review of OPS files would yield any results. Defendant’s request to engage in discovery is premised on his allegation of a false promise of leniency made by Detectives Chambers and Perez and the presence of all the officers in the interview room when Lloyd was allowed to threaten defendant. Both detectives testified at defendant’s suppression hearing and denied defendant’s allegations. The trial court

found their testimony to be more credible than defendant's testimony. Defendant has failed to offer anything to dispute the detectives' testimony and provide good cause to allow a review of any OPS complaints filed against the detectives. Further, as to Officer Cronin, defendant offers no allegation of misconduct other than his mere presence in the interrogation room while Lloyd threatened defendant, and Detective Chambers denied that Officer Cronin ever participated in any questioning of defendant. Defendant has not offered a single case or affidavit to support a finding of good cause to allow this request. As the trial court held, defendant's request is speculative and a fishing expedition. Absent any basis to show good cause for the discovery request, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's discovery request.

¶ 74 In a related argument, defendant argues that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to ensure that the trial court reviewed OPS files for all four officers. However, defendant cannot make a substantial showing of ineffective assistance under *Strickland*. The basis of defendant's ineffectiveness claims is that his prior attorneys did not make sure that the trial court reviewed OPS files regarding the police officers other than Detective Kato. As we have already discussed, the record does not definitively disclose what was requested by defendant on remand, and the parties and the trial court proceeded with requests to view OPS files regarding Detective Kato. Defendant fails to show how the decision to proceed in this manner prejudiced him, nor does defendant specifically argue how he was prejudiced. Instead, defendant essentially restates his argument that the trial court erred in not reviewing OPS files for the other officers with the additional note that his attorneys should have ensured that review. Defendant has not asserted how any perceived failure to ensure review caused him prejudice such that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance cannot stand without a substantial showing that counsel's actions prejudiced defendant. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing this claim.

¶ 75 Defendant next contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the denial of his motion to quash arrest on direct appeal. According to defendant, the State failed to independently establish probable cause to arrest defendant based on the statement from Clark, because Clark was unreliable, gave inconsistent statements, and was part of the "criminal milieu." The State maintains that there was probable cause for defendant's arrest and appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.

¶ 76 The *Strickland* test also applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. *People v. Rogers*, 197 Ill. 2d 216, 223 (2001). A defendant who claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an issue on appeal must allege facts demonstrating such failure was objectively unreasonable and that counsel's decision prejudiced defendant. *Id.* Appellate counsel is not obligated to brief every conceivable issue on appeal, and it is not incompetence of counsel to refrain from raising issues which, in his or her judgment, are without merit, unless counsel's appraisal of the merits is patently wrong. *People v. Simms*, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 362 (2000). Thus, the inquiry as to prejudice requires that the reviewing court examine the merits of the underlying issue, for a defendant does not suffer prejudice from appellate counsel's failure to raise a nonmeritorious claim on appeal. *Id.* Appellate counsel's choices concerning which issues to pursue are entitled to substantial deference. *Rogers*, 197 Ill. 2d at 223.

¶ 77 "When reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, we apply a two-part standard of review." *People v. Almond*, 2015 IL 113817, ¶ 55. We afford

great deference to the trial court's findings of fact and will reverse those factual findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, but review the ultimate legal ruling as to whether the evidence should be suppressed *de novo*. *Id.*

¶ 78 “If a trial court finds that a warrantless arrest was based on probable cause, then the arrest is deemed lawful.” *People v. Arnold*, 349 Ill. App. 3d 668, 671 (2004). “Probable cause does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt but does require more than mere suspicion.” *Id.* at 671-72. “Probable cause exists if the totality of the circumstances known to the police at the time of a suspect's arrest is sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent person to believe the suspect has committed a crime.” *Id.* at 672. “Probable cause for a warrantless arrest can be based on information provided by an informant.” *Id.* “Third-party information, whether the source of the information is identified or unidentified, an ordinary citizen or a paid informant, a victim, an eyewitness or other witness, is reliable if it bears some indicia of reliability.” *Id.* “An indicia of reliability exists when the facts learned through a police investigation independently verify a substantial part of the information learned from the informant.” *Id.*

¶ 79 Defendant asserts that at the time of his arrest, the police only had Clark's statement, which was unreliable, and uncorroborated by additional evidence. However, as the State points out, we may consider evidence presented at defendant's trial as well as at the suppression hearing. *Almond*, 2015 IL 113817, ¶ 55. The State maintains that Clark's statement was corroborated. In addition to defendant, Clark identified several other men as participants in the abduction of Burch and Purham. One of those identified, Derrick Harvey, was arrested the day after the murders and took police officers to where the bodies were located near the railroad tracks near Roosevelt. This evidence was presented at defendant's trial and is consistent with Clark's statement that Burch and Purham were abducted and taken to the railroad tracks, and that Harvey had been a participant in the crimes. Further, Barry Williams, Clark's boyfriend, also gave a statement to an ASA and testified at the grand jury that was consistent with Clark's statement to police involving defendant. We also observe that Clark spoke with the police voluntarily after she informed Burch's girlfriend about his death. Clark admitted her involvement in a gang and her involvement in selling drugs. The trial court was aware of Clark's criminal history and considered it when reaching its decision as to probable cause, and we find no error. Based on this information and evidence, we find the police had probable cause to arrest defendant. Since the police had probable cause to arrest defendant, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a nonmeritorious issue on direct appeal.

¶ 80 Finally, defendant argues that his mandatory natural life sentence violates the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution because the sentence is mandated for all offenders convicted of murder of more than one decedent without consideration of age or level of culpability. Defendant also asserts that the sentence is invalid as applied to him because of his age and minimal involvement in the commission of the crimes. The State maintains that defendant's mandatory natural life sentence is constitutional, both facially and as applied.

¶ 81 Defendant bases his constitutional challenge on several recent United States Supreme Court decisions. See *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), *Graham v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and *Miller v. Alabama*, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).

“In *Roper*, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment prohibits the death penalty for juvenile offenders. *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 568. The Court reasoned that the ‘death penalty is reserved for a narrow category of crimes and offenders,’ and that

‘juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.’ *Id.* at 569. In *Graham*, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment forbids a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for juveniles who did not commit homicide. *Graham*, 560 U.S. at 74 ***. The Court said that, although the state is not required to release a juvenile during his natural life, the state is forbidden ‘from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.’ *Id.* at 75 ***. *** In *Miller*, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment prohibits a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders, including those convicted of homicide. *Miller*, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The Court stated that a judge must have the opportunity to look at all of the circumstances involved before determining that life without the possibility of parole is the appropriate penalty. See *id.* at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.” *People v. Harmon*, 2013 IL App (2d) 120439, ¶ 48.

¶ 82 Because defendant acted as a lookout during the commission of the murders, he was found guilty under a theory of accountability, which mandates that all participants of common design are considered equally responsible. See 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 1998). Defendant was sentenced to mandatory natural life under section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of Corrections. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1998). Section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) mandates a term of natural life for persons 17 years or older at the time of the commission of the murder and are found guilty of murdering more than one victim. *Id.*²

¶ 83 We first consider defendant’s contention that his sentence is unconstitutional as applied to his case. Defendant points out that he was 19 years old at the time of commission of the murders, was minimally culpable, and had no prior violent criminal history, but he received a mandatory natural life sentence without the consideration of these mitigating factors.

¶ 84 We preface our consideration of this issue by acknowledging that according to eyewitnesses, defendant was present when the victims were surrounded and forced into a vehicle at gunpoint. The eyewitnesses also testified that defendant was armed at this time. In his statement to ASA Pandit, defendant admitted that he acted as a lookout when the victims were shot. Defendant’s role made him accountable for the murders and cannot be discounted.

¶ 85 The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. “While courts of review are generally reluctant to override the judgment of the General Assembly with respect to criminal penalties [citation], it is also true that when defining crimes and their penalties, the legislature must consider the constitutional goals of restoring an offender to useful citizenship and of providing a penalty according to the seriousness of the offense [citation].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *People v. Miller*, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002). “With regard to the statute at issue, we have recognized that the legislature considered the possible rehabilitation of an offender who commits multiple murder[s], and the seriousness of that offense, in determining that a mandatory minimum sentence of natural life imprisonment is appropriate for the offense of multiple murders.” *Id.*

²Public Act 99-69 recently amended section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) to provide for a mandatory life sentence for a person who has attained the age of 18 and was found guilty of murdering more than one victim. Pub. Act 99-69, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2014)).

“We have recognized three different forms of proportionality review. A statute may be deemed unconstitutionally disproportionate if (1) the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community; (2) similar offenses are compared and the conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety is punished more harshly; or (3) identical offenses are given different sentences.” *Id.*

¶ 86 In *Miller*, the supreme court considered whether a mandatory sentence of natural life violated the proportionate penalties clause when applied to a juvenile found guilty under an accountability theory. *Id.* at 337. The *Miller* court reviewed the question under the first theory, whether the sentence shocked the moral sense of the community. *Id.* at 338-39. The court noted that the sentence was imposed based on the convergence of three statutes, the automatic transfer of juveniles 15 or 16 years old charged with murder to criminal court (705 ILCS 405/5-4(6)(a) (West 1996)), the accountability statute (720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 1996)), and the mandatory natural life sentencing statute (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1996)). *Miller*, 202 Ill. 2d at 340.

¶ 87 The *Miller* court held that the defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional as applied to him. “Accordingly, we hold that the penalty mandated by the multiple-murder sentencing statute as applied to this defendant is particularly harsh and unconstitutionally disproportionate. We agree with defendant that a mandatory sentence of natural life in prison with no possibility of parole grossly distorts the factual realities of the case and does not accurately represent defendant’s personal culpability such that it shocks the moral sense of the community. This moral sense is particularly true, as in the case before us, where a 15-year-old with one minute to contemplate his decision to participate in the incident and stood as a lookout during the shooting, but never handled a gun, is subject to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole—the same sentence applicable to the actual shooter. Our decision does not imply that a sentence of life imprisonment for a juvenile offender convicted under a theory of accountability is never appropriate. It is certainly possible to contemplate a situation where a juvenile offender actively participated in the planning of a crime resulting in the death of two or more individuals, such that a sentence of natural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is appropriate.” *Id.* at 341.

¶ 88 The supreme court further reasoned: “However, the convergence of the Illinois transfer statute, the accountability statute, and the multiple-murder sentencing statute eliminates the court’s ability to consider any mitigating factors such as age or degree of participation. A life sentence without the possibility of parole implies that under any circumstances a juvenile defendant convicted solely by accountability is incorrigible and incapable of rehabilitation for the rest of his life. The trial judge in this case did not agree with such a blanket proposition. We also decline to find that the sentence mandated by the multiple-murder sentencing statute in this case satisfies the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.” *Id.* at 342-43.

¶ 89 While defendant was not a juvenile at the time of the offense, his young age of 19 is relevant in consideration under the circumstances of this case. As in *Miller*, defendant’s sentence involved the convergence of the accountability statute and the mandatory natural life sentence. We acknowledge that the offender in *Miller* was 15, never handled a firearm, and had

less than a minute to consider the implications of his participation. In the present case, the State's evidence at trial established that defendant was not present at the scene of the murder, but merely acted as a lookout near the railroad tracks. There was no evidence that defendant helped to plan the commission, but instead took orders from higher ranking UVL members. While defendant had a greater involvement in the commission of the offenses than the defendant in *Miller*, after considering the evidence and defendant's relevant culpability, we question the propriety of mandatory natural life for a 19 year old defendant convicted under a theory of accountability. Although defendant acted as a lookout during the commission of the crime and was not the actual shooter, he received a mandatory natural life sentence, the same sentence applicable to the person who pulled the trigger.

¶ 90

We also observe that the Supreme Court in *Miller*, *Graham* and *Roper* considered the continuing brain development in adolescents.

“Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, we explained, ‘they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.’ *Graham*, 560 U.S., at [68] ***. Those cases relied on three significant gaps between juveniles and adults. First, children have a ‘“lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” ’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. *Roper*, 543 U.S., at 569 ***. Second, children ‘are more vulnerable ... to negative influences and outside pressures,’ including from their family and peers; they have limited ‘contro[l] over their own environment’ and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. *Ibid*. And third, a child’s character is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s; his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’ *Id.*, at 570 ***.

Our decisions rested not only on common sense—on what ‘any parent knows’—but on science and social science as well. *Id.*, at 569 ***. In *Roper*, we cited studies showing that ‘ “[o]nly a relatively small proportion of adolescents” ’ who engage in illegal activity ‘ “develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior.” ’ *Id.*, at 570 *** (quoting Steinberg & Scott, *Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty*, 58 *Am. Psychologist* 1009, 1014 (2003)). And in *Graham*, we noted that ‘developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds’—for example, in ‘parts of the brain involved in behavior control.’ 560 U.S., at [68] ***. We reasoned that those findings—of transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences—both lessened a child’s ‘moral culpability’ and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and neurological development occurs, his ‘ “deficiencies will be reformed.” ’ *Id.*, at [68] *** (quoting *Roper*, 543 U.S., at 570 ***).” *Miller*, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-65.

¶ 91

As the *Graham* Court noted, “[e]ven if the punishment has some connection to a valid penological goal, it must be shown that the punishment is not grossly disproportionate in light of the justification offered.” *Graham*, 560 U.S. at 72. The *Roper* Court stated, “[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 573 (citing Lawrence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, *Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity*,

Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009, 1014-16 (2003)).

¶ 92

“It is widely recognized by many legal scholars that the United States Supreme Court is moving rather quickly towards abolishing life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders entirely.” Maureen Dowling, Note, *Juvenile Sentencing in Illinois: Addressing the Supreme Court Trend Away From Harsh Punishments for Juvenile Offenders*, 35 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 611, 619 (2015).

“There are several parts of the analyses of each case that point to this inevitable shift. First, each case acknowledges that the decisions are directly contrary to our historical understanding of juvenile sentencing. The Court rejects the notion of looking at sentencing ‘through a historical prism’ in favor of the evolving moral and ethical standards of society. This opens up the Court to abolish life without parole sentences for juveniles, even though traditionally it is a widely practiced and accepted sentence. Second, each opinion makes it clear that simply because a majority of state sentencing statutes do not currently agree with the decisions, this will not affect the outcome. This argument goes hand-in-hand with the Court’s rejection of historical sentencing standards. Again, the Court has left open the possibility of abolishing the harshest sentence available to juveniles. Finally, the Court repeatedly emphasizes the differences between juveniles and adults as an explanation for why each should be sentenced differently. The continued focus on these differences further bolsters the argument for abolishing life sentences without the possibility of parole for juveniles.” *Id.* at 619-20.

¶ 93

“The Supreme Court has followed a clear path away from life without parole sentences. Following the reasoning laid out by the Court in these three cases, it can easily be seen how the Court would deal with abolishing the sentence entirely.” *Id.* at 627. As this note observes, several states have responded to *Miller* by imposing “*de facto*” life sentences through lengthy term-of-years sentences. *Id.* at 620. However, “These de-facto life sentences are not consistent with the language or analysis found in both *Miller* and *Graham*. A prison sentence that will last sixty or more years does not allow courts to show juvenile offenders any clemency. Furthermore, despite the lengthy discussion about the differences between adults and juveniles, de-facto life sentences do not give courts any opportunity to take the differences into account when determining a sentence.” *Id.* at 621. We also observe that the Iowa Supreme Court in *State v. Null*, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013) expanded the principles of *Miller* to hold mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile offenders to be unconstitutional. The *Null* court believed that

“while a minimum of 52.5 years imprisonment is not technically a life-without-parole sentence, such a lengthy sentence imposed on a juvenile is sufficient to trigger *Miller*-type protections. Even if lesser sentences than life without parole might be less problematic, we do not regard the juvenile’s potential future release in his or her late sixties after a half century of incarceration sufficient to escape the rationales of *Graham* or *Miller*. The prospect of geriatric release, if one is to be afforded the opportunity for release at all, does not provide a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to demonstrate the ‘maturity and rehabilitation’ required to obtain release and reenter society as required by *Graham*, 560 U.S. at ___ ***.” *Id.* at 71.

¶ 94 Although the Court in *Roper* delineated the division between juvenile and adult at 18, we do not believe that this demarcation has created a bright line rule. See *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 574 (“Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach. For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line must be drawn. *** The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.”).

¶ 95 Rather, we find the designation that after age 18 an individual is a mature adult appears to be somewhat arbitrary, especially in the case at bar. Recent research and articles have discussed the differences between young adults, like defendant, and a fully mature adult. “Research in neurobiology and developmental psychology has shown that the brain doesn’t finish developing until the mid-20s, far later than was previously thought. Young adults are more similar to adolescents than fully mature adults in important ways. They are more susceptible to peer pressure, less future-oriented and more volatile in emotionally charged settings.” Vincent Schiraldi & Bruce Western, *Why 21 year-old offenders should be tried in family court*, Wash. Post (Oct. 2, 2015), www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/time-to-raise-the-juvenile-age-limit/2015/10/02/948e317c-6862-11e5-9ef3-fde182507eac_story.html.

“The young adult brain is still developing, and young adults are in transition from adolescence to adulthood. Further, the ongoing development of their brains means they have a high capacity for reform and rehabilitation. Young adults are, neurologically and developmentally, closer to adolescents than they are to adults. Prosecuting and sentencing young adults in the adult criminal justice system deprives them of their chance to become productive members of society, leads to high recidivism rates, and high jail and prison populations, and increased costs to society through subsequent incarceration and unemployment.” Kanako Ishida, *Young Adults in Conflict with the Law: Opportunities for Diversion*, Juvenile Justice Initiative, at 1 (Feb. 2015), available at jjustice.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Young-Adults-in-Conflict-with-the-Law-Opportunities-for-Diversion.pdf.

¶ 96 The thesis of these articles is to illustrate the need to expand juvenile sentencing provisions for young adult offenders. Both articles noted that several European countries have already extended juvenile justice to include young adults. In Germany, all young adults ages 18 to 21 have been tried in juvenile court and the judges have an option to sentence them as a juvenile, if a consideration of the offender’s personality and environment indicate that his psychological development was as a juvenile. *Id.* at 2. Sweden allows for young adults to be tried in juvenile court until their 25th birthday, and young adults 18 to 24 receive different treatment than adults. “For instance, statutory minimum sentences cannot be applied for young people age 20 or under.” *Id.* at 3. The Netherlands has extended juvenile alternatives for young adults ages 18 to 21. *Id.*

¶ 97 We also point out that Illinois raised the age for a delinquent minor. Prior to January 1, 2014, a person who committed a felony prior to his or her 17th birthday was considered a delinquent minor. See 705 ILCS 405/5-105(3) (West 2012). However, Public Act 98-61 changed the definition of a delinquent minor to be, “any minor who prior to his or her 18th

birthday has violated or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred, any federal, State, county or municipal law or ordinance.” Pub. Act 98-61, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-105(3) (West 2012)).

¶ 98 As discussed in the Northern Illinois University Law Review note, the Supreme Court of Wyoming compiled a list of factors taken from *Miller* to consider in sentencing juveniles.

“During a postconviction sentencing hearing, a trial court should scrutinize the following factors before sentencing a juvenile offender: (a) the character and history of the juvenile offender and the specific circumstances of the crime; (b) the background and emotional and mental development of the juvenile offender; (c) the offender’s age and characteristics that go along with it including immaturity and ability to appreciate risks; (d) the juvenile’s family and home environment; (e) the circumstances of the crime, the extent to which the juvenile was involved, and the extent to which peer or familial pressure may have factored into the juvenile’s participation; (f) ‘the juvenile’s relative inability to deal with police and prosecutors or to assist his own attorney’; and (g) the offender’s potential for rehabilitation.” Dowling, *supra*, at 634 (citing *Bear Cloud v. State*, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 42, 294 P.3d 36 (Wyo. 2013), quoting *Miller*, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2467-68).

¶ 99 “‘[J]ust as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant be duly considered’ in assessing his culpability.” *Miller*, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (quoting *Eddings v. Oklahoma*, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982)). As the Supreme Court observed in *Graham*, “Life without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile. Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender. A 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in name only.” *Graham*, 560 U.S. at 70.

¶ 100 “By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” *Miller*, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. Under Illinois law, the harshest form of punishment is a mandatory life sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a) (West 2014). The trial court is not afforded any discretion if an offender is found guilty of triggering offenses, such as, the death of more than one person. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2014). However, when the death penalty still existed in Illinois, there were several statutory guidelines that had to be met before such a sentence could be imposed. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2010). The lack of discretion afforded the trial court for the imposition of a mandatory life sentence is especially relevant when the defendant is a young adult, over 18, but still not considered a fully mature adult.

¶ 101 These considerations are significant in the instant case and support defendant’s argument that the mandatory natural life sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. Turning to the case at bar, while clearly no longer a juvenile, defendant, at age 19 years and 2 months, was barely a legal adult and still a teenager. His youthfulness is relevant when considered alongside his participation in the actual shootings. Defendant’s presentence investigation report showed that his only prior offenses were possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Defendant did not have a criminal history of violent crimes. The sentencing hearing also disclosed that defendant never knew his father, he was raised by his maternal grandmother, and that his mother died when he was 18. Defendant attended high school

through the twelfth grade, however, he never graduated. At the time defendant was sentenced, the death penalty was still in place in Illinois. Although the trial judge found defendant eligible for the death penalty, he concluded that there were “sufficient mitigating factors to preclude the imposition of the death penalty.” While some of these mitigating factors were before the trial court when it declined to impose the death penalty, they were not available to be considered before imposing a mandatory natural life sentence. The court’s ability to take any factors into consideration was negated by the mandatory nature of defendant’s sentence. The trial court was also precluded from considering the goal of rehabilitation in imposing the life sentence, which is especially relevant in defendant’s case. Given defendant’s age, his family background, his actions as a lookout as opposed to being the actual shooter, and lack of any prior violent convictions, we find that defendant’s mandatory sentence of natural life shocks the moral sense of the community.

¶ 102 Our conclusion is not meant to diminish in any way of the seriousness of the crimes, specifically two convictions for murder and two convictions for aggravated kidnapping. We recognize defendant remains culpable for his participation. However, we believe that defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing in which the trial court has the ability to consider the relevant mitigating factors prior to imposing a sentence of such magnitude. Accordingly, we hold that defendant’s sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the constitution as applied to him. We vacate defendant’s sentence of natural life and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

¶ 103 Since we have held that the proportionate penalties clause is unconstitutional as applied to defendant, we need not address defendant’s arguments that the impositions of a mandatory life sentence was facially unconstitutional under the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause. We do not make a recommendation to the trial court on remand as to the appropriate sentence. That determination is best left to the trial court who presided over defendant’s trial proceedings. However, as pointed out above, we question the statutory requirement to impose a mandatory life sentence on a culpable lookout compared to the perpetrator who pulled the trigger and took more than one life without any consideration of any mitigating factors. The statute in its current form takes away the trial court’s discretion and ability to consider any mitigating factors in this case.

¶ 104 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition, vacate defendant’s sentence, and remand for a new sentencing hearing in accordance with this decision.

¶ 105 Affirmed in part, vacated in part, remanded.

¶ 106 JUSTICE GORDON, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

¶ 107 I concur with the majority that we must vacate defendant’s mandatory sentence of natural life without parole. However, for the reasons explained below, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s second-stage dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition.

¶ 108 I would remand for a third-stage evidentiary hearing on defendant’s claim of actual innocence. Defendant argues that he has made a substantial showing of actual innocence based on the newly discovered evidence of a key State witness’s recantation of her trial testimony

and her swearing that she was present at the time of the kidnapping and that she never saw defendant there.

¶ 109 I quote Clark's affidavit in full:

"I, Eunice Clark, having first been duly sworn, depose and state as follows:

1. This affidavit is made of my own personal knowledge. If I were called to testify, I would be competent to do so and would testify to the facts set forth herein.

I, Eunice Clark, as a witness to the kidnapping of Stan Burch and Michael Purham on the date of September 13th 1993, in the late morning hours in the vicinity of Springfield St. and Fillmore St. located in Chicago, Illinois.

Further states that I never saw Antonio House kidnap or conspire to kidnap Stan Burch and Michael Purham nor did I see Antonio House with a weapon.

On October 12th 1993, I was never confronted by Antonio House neither has Mr. House threaten me or cause me bodily harm. To my personal knowledge Antonio House[']s name was only mention[ed] because he was a worker for Ted.^{3]}

Further affiant sayeth not."

¶ 110 Defendant was convicted of the aggravated kidnappings and first degree murders of Stanton Burch and Michael Purham based primarily on the testimony of Eunice Clark. Clark testified at trial that defendant was with a group of Unknown Vice Lord gang members who kidnapped Burch and Purham. She testified that this group encircled Burch and Purham on the street and forced them at gunpoint into the back of Ted's vehicle. While Barry Williams placed defendant at the scene of the kidnapping in a prior statement and in grand jury testimony, at trial Williams could not recall much of his prior statement or grand jury testimony. *Supra* ¶ 45.

¶ 111 Now, Clark swears in her affidavit that she never saw defendant. I believe this affidavit makes the substantial showing needed to proceed to a third-stage evidentiary hearing. Our supreme court has observed, "[w]e deem it appropriate to note here that the United States Supreme Court has emphasized that such claims must be supported 'with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.'" *People v. Edwards*, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 32 (quoting *Schlup v. Delo*, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995)). Here we have an eyewitness account that was not presented at trial, by an eyewitness whom the State deemed trustworthy enough to call as a witness. Whether her current statement is sufficiently trustworthy is a credibility determination that is best resolved in the first instance by the trial court at an evidentiary hearing. *In re Julian K.*, 2012 IL App (1st) 112841, ¶ 66 (the trial court is in the best position to make credibility determinations); *People v. Davis*, 378 Ill. App. 3d 1, 13 (2007) (while the trial judge is able to hear a witness's "tone of voice and pauses, and observe his body language as he delivered his answer, that information is obviously missing from the dry transcript before this reviewing court"). Thus, I believe we must remand for a third-stage evidentiary hearing.

¶ 112 For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent.

³"Ted" was one of the leaders of the sects of the Unknown Vice Lords.

TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY
CRIMINAL DIVISION

FILED
FEB 17 2011
DOROTHY BROWN
CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT

ANTONIO HOUSE, Petitioner,)
)
vs.) No. 93 CR 26477 04
) Honorable Kenneth Wadas,
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.) Judge Presiding.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

An appeal is taken from the order or judgment described below:

Appellant's Name: Antonio House
Appellant's Address: K69345, Stateville Correctional Center,
Route 53, P.O. Box 112, Joliet IL 60434
Appellant's Attorney: Office of the State Appellate Defender
203 N. LaSalle St., Chicago IL 60601
Offense: Murder
Judgment: Denial of Post-Conviction Relief - ALL ISSUES RAISED
Including but not limited to denials of discovery
Date of Judgment: February 17, 2011 (State's motion to dismiss granted) ✓
January 21, 2010 (denial of discovery)

Imputed Reason for Antonio House

**VERIFIED PETITION FOR REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS, COMMON LAW RECORD, AND
FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANT**

Under Supreme Court Rules 605-608, Appellant asks the Court to order the Official Court Reporter to transcribe an original and copy of the proceedings, file the original with the Clerk and deliver a copy to Appellant; order the Clerk to prepare the record on appeal; and to appoint counsel on appeal. Appellant (or attorney) certifies that, on information and belief, at the time of this filing Appellant is unable to pay for the record or to retain counsel for appeal.

Imputed Reason for Antonio House

ORDER

IT IS ORDERED THAT the State Appellate Defender is appointed as counsel on appeal and that the common law record and report of proceedings be furnished to appellant without cost within 45 days of receipt of this order. Dates to be transcribed: January 21, 2010; February 17, 2011

JUDGE
FEB 17 2011
DOROTHY BROWN
CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF COOK COUNTY, IL
DEPUTY CLERK

Entered
Date: February 17, 2011

[Handwritten Signature]
1700

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PROOF OF FILING AND SERVICE

Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct. On June 29, 2020, the **Brief and Appendix of Respondent-Appellant People of the State of Illinois** was filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Illinois, using the court's electronic filing system, which provided notice to the following registered email addresses:

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