THIS APPEAL INVOLVES A MATTER SUBJECT TO EXPEDITED DISPOSITION UNDER RULE 604(h)

No. 130693

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)	On Appeal from the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third Judicial District, No. 3-23-0791
Plaintiff-Appellee,	)	
	)	There on Appeal from the Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, Will County, Illinois, No. 23-CF-2213
v.	)	
	)	
CHRISTIAN MIKOLAITIS,	)	The Honorable Donald DeWilkins, Judge Presiding.
Defendant-Appellant.	)	

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

KWAME RAOUL
Attorney General of Illinois

JANE ELINOR NOTZ
Solicitor General

KATHERINE M. DOERSCH
Criminal Appeals Division Chief

MITCHELL NESS
Assistant Attorney General
115 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
(773) 590-6934
eserve.criminalappeals@ilag.gov

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee People of the State of Illinois

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CYNTHIA A. GRANT
SUPREME COURT CLERK

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NATURE OF THE ACTION

The trial court granted the People's petition seeking defendant's pretrial detention, *see* 725 ILCS 5/110-1 *et seq.*[1] C14-15; R13.[2] The appellate court affirmed. A2-8. Defendant appeals from the appellate court's judgment. No question is raised on the pleadings.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the trial court's finding that no condition or combination of conditions of release could ensure the safety of defendant's victim and others in the community was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction lies under Supreme Court Rules 315(a), 604(h), and 612(b). On June 12, 2024, this Court allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In December 2023, defendant was charged with attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery. C3-4. The People timely petitioned to deny pretrial release under § 110-6.1(a) of the Act, asserting that defendant was

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[1] In 2021 and 2022, the General Assembly revised the statutory provisions governing pretrial release of criminal defendants found in article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *See Rowe v. Raoul*, 2023 IL 129248, ¶¶ 4, 10. This brief refers to the revised statutory framework as "the Act."

[2] Citations to the common law record, the report of proceedings, and the impounded record appear as "C__," "R__," and "CI__," respectively. Citations to defendant's brief and its appendix appear as "Def. Br.__" and "A__," respectively.

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charged with the qualifying offense of attempted first degree murder and that his pretrial release posed a real and present threat to the safety of a person or persons in the community. C6-13.

In the petition and at the subsequent hearing, the People presented an evidentiary proffer to support defendant's pretrial detention. C12; R8-9. The People's proffer established that the evidence would show that on December 10, 2023, defendant stabbed Alec Geibel multiple times at a gym in Lockport, Illinois, then fled in a gray Hyundai Elantra. C12. A few hours later, defendant confessed to his mother that he had stabbed Geibel. *Id.* Defendant's mother called 911, reported defendant's confession, and informed dispatchers that defendant would be driving the gray Elantra. *Id*. About two hours later, defendant's girlfriend called 911 and reported that she had just met defendant at a gas station and that he had confessed to stabbing Geibel. *Id*.

Defendant's girlfriend explained that defendant had told her that he agreed to sell Percocet to Geibel and then picked Geibel up and drove to the parking lot of a gym. *Id.* After parking his car, defendant climbed into the backseat under the guise of "look[ing] for his cell phone," then ambushed Geibel in the front passenger seat and stabbed him multiple times. *Id.* Geibel was bleeding but managed to get out of the car; defendant drove away. *Id*. Defendant told his girlfriend that he "hated" Geibel. *Id*. State Police and Grundy County deputies eventually apprehended defendant as he was

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driving west on I-80 in a gray Elantra; his car's front passenger seat had knife punctures. *Id.*

The trial court received a pretrial services investigation report. CI4-5. The report noted that defendant had a pending misdemeanor case and no prior convictions. CI5. It contained no further information about defendant — such as his residential status and employment, educational, medical, and behavioral history — because defendant had refused to participate in the pretrial investigation. CI4-5.

Before ruling on the petition, the trial court asked the prosecutor whether she "wish[ed] to argue anything else." R8. In response, the prosecutor highlighted the violent nature and circumstances of the charged offense, as well as that defendant had confessed to multiple people that he had stabbed Geibel with a knife and then left him, continued to have access to knives, and posed a real and present safety risk to Geibel. R9-10.

Defense counsel argued for defendant's release with electronic monitoring. R10. Counsel noted that defendant was 19 years old, had no criminal history, lived with his mother and her husband, and could secure transportation to court when necessary. *Id.* But counsel recognized that defendant was unemployed and suffered from mental health issues; specifically, defendant had been prescribed antipsychotic medication for depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder. *Id.* When the trial court asked, defendant acknowledged that he was not currently taking his prescribed

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medication and that the last time he had taken it was in September 2023, when he was admitted to the hospital for mental health issues. R10-11.

The trial court ordered that defendant be detained pending trial. C14-15; R11-13. It found by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the proof was evident and the presumption great that defendant committed the qualifying offense of attempted murder, C14; R11-12; (2) defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of Geibel and the community, C14; R12-13; and (3) no condition or conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the real and present safety threat defendant posed, C14; R13. On the last point, the court found that defendant likely would be unable to comply with any condition of pretrial release, including home detention, because defendant was not taking his prescribed medication "to combat his antipsychotic behavior along with his bipolar." R13. In its written order, the court added that it had relied on the following factors when concluding that there was no condition or conditions of pretrial release that could mitigate the real and present threat that defendant posed to Geibel and the community: (1) the nature and circumstances of the charged offense; (2) the person whose safety defendant threatened and nature of the threat; (3) defendant's statements and the circumstances surrounding them; and (4) that defendant was known to possess or have access to weapons. C14-15.

On appeal, defendant argued that the People failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions could

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mitigate the safety threat he posed. A5, ¶ 9. The appellate court affirmed. It held that the trial court did not err in finding that defendant's failure to abide by his doctor's directives showed that he would be unlikely to follow any conditions placed on him by the court, and that the trial court therefore did not err in denying pretrial release. A6, ¶¶ 11, 13. Justice Brennan, specially concurring, added that "the trial court's detention decision was based upon a sufficient quantum of information," including that defendant "blindsided the victim with a horrific knife attack because . . . he 'hated' the victim," "refused to cooperate with his pretrial risk assessment," and failed to comply "with his psychotropic medication regimen." A8, ¶ 19 (Brennan, J., specially concurring). Justice McDade dissented; she would have found the evidence insufficient to support the trial court's detention order because the People did not "present evidence and argument on" each of the conditions stated in § 110-10(b). A10-11, ¶¶ 26-27 (McDade, J., dissenting).

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The trial court's decision to deny pretrial release is reviewed under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. *See* A4, ¶ 8 (citing cases); *Best v. Best*, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 349 (2006) (manifest-weight standard applies to review of trial court's factual findings). Any underlying issues of statutory construction are reviewed de novo. *See People v. Sroga*, 2022 IL 126978, ¶ 9.

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ARGUMENT

The Trial Court's Pretrial Detention Order Was Not Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence.

The trial court's order denying pretrial release was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant concedes that clear and convincing evidence established that: (1) the proof was evident or the presumption great that he committed the qualifying offense of attempted murder; and (2) he posed a real and present threat to the safety of Geibel and the community. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1)-(2); *see also Rowe v. Raoul*, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 5. And the trial court's finding that no condition or combination of conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the safety threat that defendant posed, *see* 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3), was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, which showed that it was highly probable that defendant would not abide by any conditions of release. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied pretrial release.

I. The circuit court's finding that no conditions could mitigate the safety threat that defendant posed to the victim and the community was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The Act places the burden on the People to establish by clear and convincing evidence that "no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section 110-10 of this Article can mitigate . . . the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case." 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3). Clear and convincing evidence is "more than a preponderance of the evidence and

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not quite approaching the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard necessary to convict a person of a criminal offense." *People v. Horne*, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 22 n.3 (quotation omitted). It is "[e]vidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain." Evidence, *Black's Law Dictionary* (12th ed. 2024) (defining "clear and convincing evidence"); *see also Florida v. Georgia*, 592 U.S. 433, 438-39 (2021) (factfinder must be convinced that "the truth of [a party's] factual contentions are 'highly probable'") (quoting *Colorado v. New Mexico*, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984)).

Based on the evidence, the trial court must determine whether any condition or conditions would "reasonably ensure . . . the safety of any other person or the community and the likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release." 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a). In making this determination, the court, "on the basis of available information, take[s] into account" matters such as: (1) the nature and circumstances of the charged offense; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant, including his mental condition; (4) the nature and seriousness of the specific, real, and present threat to the safety of any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant's release; and (5) the nature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process that would be posed by the defendant's release. *Id.*

Accounting for these matters, the court must also consider whether

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there are conditions of release that would mitigate any threat the defendant would pose, *id.*, including requiring the defendant to remain in Illinois, to report to any agency or person, to refrain from possessing weapons, to refrain from contact with certain individuals, to refrain from going to certain locations, and to participate in electronic monitoring and/or home supervision, as well as "[s]uch other reasonable conditions as the court may impose," *id.* § 5/110-10(b). Ultimately, the court considers "the specific articulable facts of the case," in conjunction with any potential release conditions, and makes an "individualized" determination as to whether the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that "no condition or combination of conditions . . . can mitigate . . . the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community." *Id.* § 5/110-6.1(e)(3).

The Act provides both parties the right to appeal a trial court's order on a petition to deny pretrial release. *Id.* § 5/110-6.1(j)-(k). On appeal, the trial court's decision to deny or grant pretrial release is reviewed under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard because each of the criteria that must be established to support detention presents a factual question that the trial court must resolve based on its assessment of the evidence presented at the detention hearing. *See* A4, ¶ 8; *Best*, 223 Ill. 2d at 349 (application of manifest-weight standard is "self-evident" when reviewing "an issue of fact").[3]

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[3] Defendant correctly states that questions of statutory construction are reviewed de novo but fails to provide the standard of review that applies to the trial court's detention order. *See* Def. Br. 8; *cf. Redmond v. Socha*, 216 Ill.

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A factual finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where, upon review of all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or the finding is palpably erroneous, arbitrary, unreasonable, or unsubstantiated by the evidence. *See People v. Chatman*, 2024 IL 129133, ¶ 34; *Melamed v. Melamed*, 2016 IL App (1st) 141153, ¶ 37; *U.S. Steel Corp. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd. Ill. EPA*, 384 Ill. App. 3d 457, 461 (5th Dist. 2008).

Here, the trial court's finding that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the risk of harm to defendant's victim or others in the community was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court reasonably found, based on the evidence presented, that even the most stringent condition of release — home confinement — would not mitigate the safety threat defendant posed. R13.

2d 622, 633 (2005) ("standard of review applies to an individual issue, not to an entire appeal"). The appellate court applied a bifurcated standard of review under which it reviewed the trial court's factual findings under the manifest-weight-of-the evidence standard and the court's ultimate decision to deny pretrial release for an abuse of discretion. A4, ¶ 8. But the appellate court correctly observed that under either the manifest-weight or abuse-of-discretion standard, the question is whether the trial court's determination was arbitrary or unreasonable. *Id.*; *see People v. Bush*, 2023 IL 128747, ¶ 57 (describing abuse-of-discretion standard). The question as to the proper standard that applies to review of a trial court's order granting or denying pretrial release is pending in *People v. Morgan*, No. 130626 (Ill.). Because defendant does not dispute the appellate court's application of the manifest-weight standard and that standard is no more deferential to the trial court's findings than the abuse-of-discretion standard, *see In re D.T.*, 212 Ill. 2d 346, 356 (2004) (describing abuse-of-discretion standard as "the most deferential standard of review"), this brief applies the manifest-weight standard.

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First, the trial court reasonably found that defendant's charged offense was violent, the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming, and that he posed a serious threat to Geibel's safety. R11-12; *see* 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(1)-(5); *People v. O'Connor*, 2024 IL App (1st) 240432-U, ¶ 16 (trial court properly relied on nature of charged offense, weight of evidence of guilt, and nature and seriousness of defendant's threat to a witness's safety in determining that detention was warranted); *People v. Trottier*, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 18 (same); *People v. Wiggins*, 2024 IL App (4th) 240015-U, ¶ 16 (same).[4] Defendant picked up Geibel under the pretense of selling him Percocet, drove him to a parking lot, stabbed him several times with a knife, and left him in the parking lot bleeding. Geibel identified defendant as his attacker, and defendant confessed to his mother and girlfriend. The front passenger seat of defendant's car had puncture marks that showed the intensity of defendant's assault, which defendant admitted was motivated by his hatred for Geibel. And defendant used a weapon that was readily accessible in any home.

In addition, the court reasonably found that defendant's untreated mental health condition made him an ongoing risk to Geibel and others, and that his failure to take his prescribed antipsychotic medication also made it highly unlikely that defendant would comply with any release conditions. R13; *see* 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a); *People v. Atterberry*, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028,

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[4] The nonprecedential appellate court decisions cited in this brief as persuasive authority under Rule 23(e) are available on this Court's website. *See* https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/top-level-opinions/.

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¶ 18 ("one relevant consideration is whether there is reason to believe the defendant is likely to violate the conditions the court might impose"); *People v. Borgert*, 2023 IL App (2d) 230371-U, ¶ 28 (trial court properly denied release where evidence suggested that defendant may not comply with any release conditions). Defendant was suffering from depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder, but the last time he took his prescribed medication was three months before the charged offense, when defendant was admitted for mental health treatment. R13. As the appellate court observed, the evidence thus showed that defendant needed his medication to control his behavior, that defendant's refusal to take the medication made him dangerous to Geibel and others, and that he was highly unlikely to abide by any conditions of release the court might impose. A6, ¶ 11 ("defendant's failure to abide by his doctor's directives indicated that he would not follow the conditions placed on him by the court"); *accord People v. Sims*, 2024 IL App (4th) 231501-U, ¶ 18 (where it was "clear defendant suffered from mental illness" at the time of alleged crime, trial court properly found that defendant's "threat to the community would not be mitigated if she returned to the community" without taking medication); *People v. Brewer*, 2024 IL App (2d) 230449-U, ¶ 36 (detention warranted where defendant's mental health conditions contributed to commission of alleged offense and "no conditions of release would ensure that defendant would remain medication compliant"); *People v. Kurzeja*, 2023 IL App (3d) 230434, ¶ 19 (similar).

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Finally, not only did the trial court reasonably find that no conditions could mitigate the threat that defendant posed based on the evidence the People presented, defendant also presented no evidence to undermine that finding. He simply asserted that he would comply with home confinement. R10. But the evidence showed that, in addition to not following with his medical providers' directives, defendant had refused to participate in the pretrial investigation, thus depriving the trial court of basic information — such as information about defendant's residential status and employment, educational, and medical history, CI4-5 — and showing a disregard for compliance with the judicial process. It was not unreasonable for the trial court to decline to conclude that, contrary to his assertion, defendant was unlikely to comply with home confinement.

Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, the trial court's finding that no condition or combination of conditions of pretrial release would ensure the safety of Geibel and the community was not palpably erroneous, arbitrary, or unreasonable.

II. Defendant's position is inconsistent with the Act, the evidence, and the standards of proof and review.

Defendant's arguments otherwise are unpersuasive. To start, defendant is incorrect that the People needed to present different evidence on the third criterion that the Act instructs courts to assess when deciding whether to release a defendant pretrial than on the first and second criteria. *See* Def. Br. 7 (arguing that the People "presented on only the first two

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elements"); *id*. at 10 ("Instead, the trial court used the State's argument and evidence on the first two elements to make a determination on release conditions."). The Act requires the trial court — "[i]n determining which conditions of pretrial release, if any, will reasonably ensure . . . the safety of any other person or the community" (that is, when assessing the third criterion) — to consider evidence about the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against the defendant, the defendant's mental condition, and the seriousness of the specific safety threat to any person. 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(1)-(4). Similarly, in determining whether the defendant poses a safety threat (the second criterion), the court must consider, among other factors, the nature and circumstances of the charged offense, the defendant's behavioral and medical history, the defendant's characteristics, whether the defendant has access to weapons, and the nature of the threat the defendant poses. *Id.* § 5/110-6.1(e)(2), (g). And evidence about the nature and circumstances of the charged offense is relevant to whether there is sufficient proof that the defendant has committed a qualifying offense (the first criterion). *See id.* § 5/110-6/1(e)(1). Thus, evidence relevant to the first two criteria is also relevant to the third criterion, and nothing in the Act required the People to present different evidence to support each, or the trial court to consider certain evidence as relevant to one rather than another.

Defendant's argument that the People did not sustain their burden

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with respect to the third criterion because they did not specifically argue that no pretrial release conditions could mitigate the threat defendant posed is likewise incorrect. *See* Def. Br. 9-10. Defendant erroneously conflates the presentation of evidence with argument about that evidence. *See id.* at 9 (arguing that the Act "requires the State to present both evidence and argument as to why the conditions of release in section 10(b) cannot mitigate" the threat defendant posed); *id.* at 12 ("State must present evidence and argue why conditions" are insufficient). The Act says nothing about argument; to the contrary, it requires the People to "prov[e] by clear and convincing evidence that . . . no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section 110-10 of this Article can mitigate" the safety threat "based on the specific articulable facts of the case." 725 ILCS § 5/110-6.1(e)(3). The Act thus requires only that the evidence clearly and convincingly establish that no conditions can mitigate the safety threat and does not, as defendant suggests, require any argument. *See Kunkel v. Walton*, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 534 (1997) ("court is not at liberty to depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express"). Indeed, it is axiomatic that "arguments are not evidence." *People v. Williams*, 2022 IL 126918, ¶ 44.

Further, defendant's contention that the People must present argument connecting the dots between the evidence presented and why potential conditions of release would be insufficient because the People have

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a "burden of persuasion" misstates both the People's burden of proof in the trial court and the standard of review on appeal. *See* Def. Br. 9. Under the Act, the People carried the burden of proving the three criteria "by clear and convincing evidence." 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3). But that "burden is discharged when the tribunal responsible for determining the existence or nonexistence of a fact has been persuaded by sufficient evidence to find that the fact exists." Burden of Persuasion, *Black's Law Dictionary* (12th ed. 2024). Then, on appeal, the question is whether any of the trial court's factual findings was against the manifest weight of the evidence. *See supra*, p. 5. Under this standard, the Court reviews the evidence in the record to determine whether it sufficiently supports the trial court's findings, *see Melamed*, 2016 IL App (1st) 141453, ¶ 37, not whether any party argued a particular point. Defendant's reliance on the "burden of persuasion" thus misses the mark.

In addition to conflicting with the Act's plain language, defendant's position (which the dissenting justice embraced, A9-10, ¶ 25 (McDade, J., dissenting)) that the People were required to present argument with respect to the conditions set forth in § 110-10(b) would give rise to unworkable results. *See Dawkins v. Fitness Int'l*, LLC, 2022 IL 127561, ¶ 27 ("statutes must be construed to avoid absurd results"). As the concurring justice explained, the conditions in § 110-10(b) "are not even an exhaustive list of possible conditions." A6-7, ¶ 16 (Brennan, J., concurring). It is therefore

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unclear when a prosecutor's argument about potential release conditions would be sufficient, even if "not every conceivable condition" needs to be addressed. Def. Br. 13. And where, as here, the trial court considers the most restrictive condition available — home confinement — and reasonably finds that it would not mitigate the safety threat, it would waste time and resources to require the prosecutor to make an argument with respect to other, less restrictive conditions.

Finally, defendant's reliance on *People v. White*, 2024 IL App (1st) 232245, *People v. Stock*, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, *People v. Carter*, 2024 IL App (1st) 240259, and *People v. McGee*, 2024 IL App (2d) 240057-U, ¶ 19, is misplaced because those cases are distinguishable. *See* Def. Br. 10-11. In *White*, the trial court "ignore[d] swaths of the record" that showed that the defendant could abide by conditions of release and denied pretrial release based solely on "the nature of this case." 2024 IL App (1st) 232245 ¶¶ 13, 23. Likewise, in *Stock*, the trial court provided no explanation for denying release other than "[t]he defendant shot a firearm at the complaining witness." 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 20. And the same was true in *Carter* and *McGee,* where the trial court relied only on "the alleged offenses," failed to consider "all of the evidence before it," *Carter*, 2024 IL App (1st) 240259, ¶ 18, and "did not explain why," in light of other evidence presented, "none of defendant's proffered conditions would suffice," *McGee*, 2024 IL App (2d) 240057-U, ¶ 19.

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Here, by contrast, the circuit court did not rely exclusively on the nature of the offense charged or otherwise ignore relevant evidence when determining that no release conditions could mitigate the threat that defendant posed to his victim and the community. Instead, the court heard evidence that defendant had an ongoing motive to harm Geibel, that defendant was suffering from mental health conditions that made him prone to violence, and that those conditions were untreated because defendant was not taking his prescribed medication. Faced with this evidence, the court considered possible release conditions including home confinement — the most restrictive condition available — and found that it would not mitigate the safety threat, explicitly noting that defendant had not taken his prescribed medication for months and was not "in a position where he could abide by" any conditions of pretrial release. R13. In so doing, the court sufficiently considered potential conditions of release, weighed them against the evidence presented, and found that no conditions would ensure the safety of Geibel and others. *See*, *e.g.*, *People v. Lee*, 2024 IL App (1st) 232137, ¶ 33 (affirming trial court's finding that no conditions would mitigate threat when considering the nature of the offense charged alongside defendant's history of noncompliance with parole); *People v. Myers*, 2024 IL App (1st) 240307-U, ¶ 48 (same where trial court explained that electronic monitoring could not mitigate the safety threat to the community); *People v. Montano*, 2024 IL App (1st) 232481-U, ¶ 25 (similar).

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Defendant's arguments thus do not show that the trial court's finding that no conditions could mitigate the threat he posed to the community was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the appellate court correctly affirmed the trial court's decision to deny pretrial release.

CONCLUSION

The People of the State of Illinois respectfully request that this Court affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

August 13, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

KWAME RAOUL
Attorney General of Illinois

JANE ELINOR NOTZ
Solicitor General

KATHERINE M. DOERSCH
Criminal Appeals Division Chief

MITCHELL NESS
Assistant Attorney General
115 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
(773) 590-6934
eserve.criminalappeals@ilag.gov

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee
People of the State of Illinois

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RULE 341(c) CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this brief conforms to the requirements of Rules 341(a) and (b). The length of this brief, excluding the pages containing the Rule 341(d) cover, the Rule 341(h)(1) table of contents and statement of points and authorities, the Rule 341(c) certificate of compliance, the certificate of service, and those matters to be appended to the brief under Rule 342(a), is 18 pages.

/s/ Mitchell Ness
MITCHELL NESS
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE

Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct. On August 13, 2024, the foregoing **Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee People of the State of Illinois** was filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Illinois, using the Court's electronic filing system, which provided service to the following:

Carolyn R. Klarquist
Christina M. O'Connor
Office of the State Appellate Defender
203 N. LaSalle Street, 24th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601
PFA.eserve@osad.state.il.us

Counsel for Defendant-Appellant

/s/ Mitchell Ness
Mitchell Ness
Assistant Attorney General