

NOTICE

This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2026 IL App (4th) 260087-U

NO. 4-26-0087

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

FILED

August 28, 2026

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)	Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee,	)	Circuit Court of
v.	)	Knox County
RACHELE A. TEAGUE,	)	No. 24MX109
Defendant-Appellant.	)	
	)	Honorable
	)	Rachel B. Mast,
	)	Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices DeArmond and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 *Held:* Because the appellate court concluded that the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to expunge was not an abuse of discretion, the appellate court affirmed.

¶ 2 In October 2024, defendant, Rachele A. Teague, filed a motion requesting the trial court to expunge and seal three counts of an indictment against her in Knox County case No. 06-CF-219, which were dismissed as part of an agreement in which Teague had pleaded guilty to another count in that indictment. In January 2026, the court conducted a hearing on that motion and granted the request to seal but denied the request to expunge.

¶ 3 Teague appeals, but we affirm.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Because the State's brief correctly describes the background of this case, we quote a portion of that brief, as follows:

“In this case, [Teague] filed a request to expunge and impound and/or seal criminal records under case number 2006-CF-219. Under case number 2006-CF-219, [Teague] was charged with Count I of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance for unlawful delivery of less than 1 gram of substance containing cocaine, Count II of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance for delivery of more than 1 gram but less than 15 gram of a substance container [sic] cocaine, Count III unlawful possession of a controlled substance for possession of less than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine, and Count IV of obstruction of justice. [Teague] pled guilty to Count I of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, and Counts II, III, and IV were dismissed via *nolle prosequi*. [Teague] was sentenced to three years at the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) on August 31, 2006.”

¶ 6 In January 2026, the trial court conducted a hearing on Teague’s motion. At the beginning of the hearing, the court asked for the State’s position on the motion, and the prosecutor objected. The court then gave Teague an opportunity to speak in support of her motion. After doing so, the court granted Teague’s request to seal but denied her request to expunge, explaining as follows:

“[I]n [Knox County case No.] 1996-CF-161, [Teague] was placed on 48 months of probation on December 19th of 1996, in Count 1, unlawful delivery of a controlled substance being a Class 1 felony, and Count 3, unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Count 2 was dismissed.

Then in [Knox County case No.] 2006-CF-219, [Teague] was sentenced to three years in the Department of Corrections, Count 1 unlawful delivery of a

controlled substance, a Class 2 felony. That was on August 31st of 2006. Counts 2, 3, and 4 were ultimately dismissed in light of the plea to Count 1.

[Teague] asked to expunge or seal in 2006-CF-219. These cases or counts resulted in convictions, so you cannot expunge any records that resulted in a conviction unless the conviction was reversed, vacated, pardoned by the governor, or approved for expungement by the prisoner review board, so your request to expunge is denied.

I understand that you're taking issue with this Court's denial of your request to expunge other counts that were involved in a plea of guilty, but given that those counts were dismissed as a result of a plea to a count and this Court can only imagine arise out of the same facts and circumstances to the counts pled, this Court does not see that it is in the best interest of the public to have a police report essentially expunged and erased in relation to a prior conviction count that arose out of the same facts and circumstances.

It certainly does not make sense that that information would no longer be publicly available as it pertains to an expungement, so your request to expunge is denied.

However, if you are wanting this Court to seal your records, your request to seal would be granted as your completion of these sentences is nearly 20 years ago or more. So if you are still wanting this Court to seal, because I don't believe your petition actually asked for sealing—oh, no, you did—so if you are wanting me to seal, the only one that you have requested to have sealed is the 2006-CF-19, I would grant that request.

MS. TEAGUE: Okay. I will agree to the sealing, and I will look further into what I was—the information I was given on to be able to expunge within.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So at this point then the Court is going to enter an order which grants your request to seal and denies your request to expunge and then you'll be able to get a copy of that at the Circuit Clerk's Office, okay?

MS. TEAGUE: Okay. Thank you.”

¶ 7 This appeal followed.

¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 9 Teague appeals, but we affirm.

¶ 10 The statute concerning expungement (20 ILCS 2630/5.2(b)(1) (West 2024)) provides that a person may petition the trial court to expunge the records of charges against her under certain circumstances, such as if the person had been acquitted or a conviction had been vacated or reversed. That section also provides that when a petitioner seeks to have a record of arrest expunged and has been convicted of a criminal offense, the state's attorney may object to the expungement on the grounds that the records contain specific relevant information aside from the mere fact of the arrest. *Id.* § 5.2(b)(1.5).

¶ 11 In *People v. Dunigan*, 2022 IL App (4th) 210514-U, ¶ 24, another case involving an appeal from a denial of a petition for expungement, this court wrote the following:

“ ‘We review the denial of a petition to expunge for an abuse of discretion.’ *People v. Laguna*, 2014 IL App (2d) 131145, ¶ 14, 16 N.E.3d 925. Only where the trial court's decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would adopt the trial court's view will we find an

abuse of discretion. *Id.* In relation to an expungement petition, the trial court should consider several factors: ‘the strength of the State’s case against the defendant petitioner; the State’s reasons for wishing to retain the records; the petitioner’s age, criminal record, and employment history; the length of time that has elapsed between the arrest and the petition to expunge; and the specific adverse consequences that the petitioner may endure should expungement be denied.’ ”

¶ 12 In Teague’s *pro se* appeal, she essentially argues that the trial court could have granted her motion for expungement and abused its discretion by not doing so. Teague notes that the court denied expungement “based on the fact that the dismissed charges arose from the same facts and circumstances as the conviction,” and Teague claims that “[t]hose are not proper considerations.” Teague adds that because the trial court relied on improper factors, its decision denying expungement constituted an abuse of discretion.

¶ 13 In response, the State argues that “given that the three charges were dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement in the same case in which [Teague] pled guilty to unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, it was not [an] abuse of discretion to deny the request to expunge the three charges under the same case number 2006-CF-219.”

¶ 14 We agree with the State and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Teague’s petition.

¶ 15 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 16 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 17 Affirmed.