

NOTICE

Decision filed 08/24/26. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of the same.

2026 IL App (5th) 250647-U

NO. 5-25-0647

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

MICHAEL ANDREW PERKINS,	)	Appeal from the
	)	Circuit Court of
Petitioner-Appellant,	)	Franklin County.
	)	
v.	)	No. 25-OP-264
	)	
RICHARD GLODICH,	)	Honorable
	)	Tara R. Cook,
Respondent-Appellee.	)	Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE SHOLAR delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Barberis and Clarke concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 *Held:* The circuit court’s denial of a petition for a plenary stalking no contact order was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and is affirmed.

¶ 2 Petitioner, Michael Andrew Perkins, appeals from the Franklin County circuit court’s August 7, 2025, denial of a plenary stalking no contact order against respondent, Richard Glodich. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On July 14, 2025, Perkins filed a *pro se* verified petition for stalking no contact order against Glodich. According to the petition, on June 26, 2025, while Perkins “was conducting a peaceful petition signing at the West Frankfort Post Office,” he was “approached by a Glodich family member then threatened by Richard Glodich the alleged victim in my ongoing criminal

case drove by on a moped, pointed at me and said ‘You’ve got something coming for you.’ ” Additionally, the “[Glodich] family member had earlier approached [Perkins’s] petition table, referenced confidential discovery information about [Perkins’s] case, and videotaped [Perkins] without [his] consent.”

¶ 5 A hearing on the emergency petition for stalking no contact order was conducted on July 16, 2025. Perkins appeared *pro se* and provided sworn testimony.¹ The circuit court made a docket entry which denied the request for an emergency order. A plenary hearing was scheduled for August 7, 2025.

¶ 6 On July 18, 2025, counsel for Glodich entered an appearance in the matter. On July 23, 2025, Glodich filed a response to the petition for stalking no contact order which denied all allegations that he committed “any act of threats, physical abuse, or violence as alleged in the attachment” of Perkins’s petition.

¶ 7 The circuit court conducted the plenary hearing on the petition on August 7, 2025. Perkins appeared *pro se*, and Glodich was present with counsel. The circuit court’s docket entry from this date indicates that testimony was heard. Additionally, Perkins filed two affidavits on August 7, 2025, in support of his petition. Each affidavit recounts the same event on June 26, 2025, that was previously set forth in the petition. The affidavits also make allegations against the state’s attorney, law enforcement, and public officials for allegedly unlawfully targeting Perkins.

¶ 8 After hearing testimony, the circuit court made a docket entry which contains the following summary of the testimony and the court’s ruling:

¹The record on appeal does not contain a report of proceedings or a bystander’s report for any hearings.

“[Petitioner] states [respondent] drove by [petitioner] and threatened he had something coming for him, no other incidents testified to. [Petitioner] calls [respondent] as an adverse witness. Again only 1 incident was referred to. Court denies [stalking no contact order].”

Perkins filed a timely notice of appeal on August 11, 2025.

¶ 9

II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Perkins is *pro se* on appeal. His brief contends the following are issues for review:

“1. Whether the denial of the order of protection is against the manifest weight of the evidence where Appellant presented two or more acts constituting a course of conduct causing reasonable apprehension of harm (June 26 and coordinated interference), corroborated by City Council public record and WFPD FOIA materials.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by discounting or failing to consider public-record corroboration (City Council agenda/minutes/audio; FOIA CAD logs; Officer Yonker’s initial and amended reports) documenting non-response and report softening.

3. Whether the court failed to account for on-record acknowledged connections relevant to the protective-order context, undermining confidence that the proper statutory standards for protection were neutrally applied.”

¶ 11 Before turning to the merits, we note that Perkins’s brief fails to conform to the supreme court rules governing briefs. Those rules require that an appellant’s brief contain a fact statement, “which shall contain the facts necessary to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment, and with appropriate reference to the pages of the record on appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). The appellant’s brief does not contain a single citation to the appellate record. The failure to provide proper citations to the record results in the forfeiture of the argument. *Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality LLC*, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 12.

Forfeiture, however, “is a limitation on the parties and not on the appellate court.” *Village of New Athens v. Smith*, 2021 IL App (5th) 200257, ¶ 22. When it is necessary to obtain a just result or to maintain a sound body of precedent, we may overlook forfeiture. *Id.* As such, we choose, in the interest of a just result, to evaluate the claims on their merits, where possible.

¶ 12 While Perkins frames the appeal as presenting three issues, there is only a single order that was appealed from, the denial of a plenary stalking no contact order. The issues that Perkins framed as 2 and 3 are related to the denial of the emergency stalking no contact order; however, the alleged additional information was not presented to the circuit court below. Accordingly, we will limit our review to the circuit court’s denial of the plenary stalking no contact order.

¶ 13 Pursuant to the Stalking No Contact Order Act (Act), a victim of stalking may seek a civil remedy requiring the stalker to stay away from him or her. 740 ILCS 21/5 (West 2024). The Act defines stalking as “engaging in a course of conduct directed at a specific person,” when the respondent “knows or should know that this course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety, the safety of a workplace, school, or place of worship, or the safety of a third person or suffer emotional distress.” *Id.* § 10. A course of conduct means two or more acts “including but not limited to acts in which a respondent directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means follows, monitors, observes, surveils, or threatens a person, workplace, school, or place of worship.” *Id.* Contact is defined to include, in part,

“any contact with the victim, that is initiated or continued without the victim’s consent, or that is in disregard of the victim’s expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued, including but not limited to being in the physical presence of the victim; appearing within the sight of the victim; approaching or confronting the victim in a public place or on private property; appearing at the workplace or residence of the victim; *** and appearing at the prohibited workplace, school, or place of worship.” *Id.*

¶ 14 The stalker’s conduct must be nonconsensual, but the victim need not contact the stalker to inform him that the contact is unwanted. *Piester v. Escobar*, 2015 IL App (3d) 140457, ¶ 12.

The Act focuses on whether the stalker's behavior would cause a reasonable person to be fearful for his safety or to suffer emotional distress. *Id.*; *McNally v. Bredemann*, 2015 IL App (1st) 134048, ¶ 14. A reasonable person is "a person in the petitioner's circumstances with the petitioner's knowledge of the respondent and the respondent's prior acts," while emotional distress is defined as "significant mental suffering, anxiety or alarm." 740 ILCS 21/10 (West 2024).

¶ 15 A petitioner seeking a stalking no contact order is required to prove stalking by a preponderance of the evidence. *Piester*, 2015 IL App (3d) 140457, ¶ 12; 740 ILCS 21/30(a) (West 2024). We will not reverse a circuit court's decision to issue a stalking no contact order unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. *Piester*, 2015 IL App (3d) 140457, ¶ 12. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence if it is clearly apparent that the opposite conclusion should have been reached or the finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based upon the evidence presented. *McNally*, 2015 IL App (1st) 134048, ¶ 12.

¶ 16 As set forth above, there is no report of proceedings from the August 7, 2025, hearing, nor was a bystander's report submitted to this court. The appellant bears the burden of presenting an adequate record to support any claimed errors and any doubts arising from an inadequate record will be construed against the appellant. *People v. Hunt*, 234 Ill. 2d 49, 58 (2009). Where, as here, the record on appeal is incomplete and fails to demonstrate the error alleged, we will not speculate as to what, if any, errors the circuit court may have committed. *Smolinski v. Vojta*, 363 Ill. App. 3d 752, 757 (2006). Instead, we " 'indulge in every reasonable presumption favorable to the judgment from which the appeal is taken, including that the [circuit] court ruled or acted correctly.' " *Id.* at 757-58 (quoting *People v. Majer*, 131 Ill. App. 3d 80, 84 (1985)).

¶ 17 In this case, we do have the circuit court's docket entry which indicates the plenary stalking no contact order was denied because there was only testimony presented about a single event.

Pursuant to the Act, two or more incidents are required before a stalking no contact order may be entered. Accordingly, it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the circuit court to deny Perkins's petition when he presented evidence of a single incident.

¶ 18

III. CONCLUSION

¶ 19 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the August 7, 2025, order of the circuit court of Franklin County.

¶ 20 Affirmed.