2026 IL App (1st) 241770-U
No. 1-24-1770
Order filed November 17, 2026

NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedential except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT, SECOND DIVISION

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CASEY BONDS, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of This County.
Honorable Michael J. Hood, Judge, Presiding.
No. 23-CR-0941201

JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McBride and Reyes concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 *Held*: We affirm defendant's conviction for aggravated battery of a peace officer where (1) a reasonable jury could find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) defendant was not denied a fair trial where police body-worn camera footage was published in its entirety.

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant Casey Bonds was convicted of aggravated battery of a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i) (West 2022)) and sentenced to four years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the evidence did not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) the court erroneously allowed the State to publish police body-worn camera (BWC) footage in its entirety, thereby admitting improper evidence of other crimes, and

trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the admission of such evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 2 Defendant was charged by indictment with one count of aggravated battery of a peace officer following an incident at a Jewel grocery store in Chicago.

¶ 3 Prior to trial, the State filed a motion and supplemental motion *in limine*. Relevant here, the supplemental motion sought to allow statements that defendant made to store manager Yolanda Hranicka and an unknown female customer prior to police arriving at the scene of the incident.

¶ 4 At a hearing on the motions, the court first noted that "the statements *** may be coming through basically body worn camera. I believe this was agreed to." (Taken in context, the court appears to have referred to BWC footage of Hranicka telling a police officer what defendant had said before police arrived.) Defense counsel raised no objection, stating that the footage explained why police arrived on scene. When the court voiced concern regarding hearsay statements in the BWC footage, defense counsel stated that he waived any objection and that "there are things that we want to have the jury hear." The prosecutor then clarified that, "based upon [the State's] conversation with defense counsel," the State struck a request, included in the original motion *in limine*, to prohibit the admission of BWC videos because the audio in those videos contained hearsay. The State specified that it struck that request "[a]s to the relevant portions of the body-worn camera as it pertains to the [aggravated battery]." Defense counsel again raised no objection.

¶ 5 At trial, Hranicka testified that on August 14, 2023, she was working as an assistant store director at a Jewel grocery store in Chicago. A customer complained that defendant made a crude remark. Hranicka then approached defendant and asked him to leave the store. Defendant—who held a half-empty liquor bottle—stated that he would not leave and that he would "F*** [her] up." Hranicka then asked another employee to call the police.

¶ 6 Hranicka identified defendant to the first officer on scene, Sergeant Richard Heger, who asked defendant to leave the store. Defendant refused and yelled. Hranicka turned away, heard an altercation, and turned around to look at defendant and Heger. Defendant "kind of" raised his arm. Based on the way Heger moved, Hranicka thought that defendant's arm made contact with Heger, but she was not certain. Heger and defendant then "tussled." Ultimately, Heger and other officers escorted defendant from the store.

¶ 7 Heger testified that when he arrived on scene, he "heard some yelling and the commotion" and was directed toward defendant. Heger asked defendant to leave the store, but defendant became aggressive. Heger repeated his request, but defendant again refused. Heger attempted to turn defendant around and guide him toward the exit, but defendant "thrust out his hands and struck [Heger's] hands away from [him]." After defendant struck Heger, Heger and other officers "had to take [defendant] down." Eventually, defendant and Heger "fell to the ground." Heger then handcuffed defendant and removed him from the store. Defendant was "very loud and angry," repeatedly threatening Heger.

¶ 8 Heger further testified that his BWC recorded the entire interaction with defendant. When the State sought to introduce Heger's BWC footage into evidence, defense counsel responded, "no objection and consistent with our earlier discussion." The court did not read a limiting instruction to the jury. The State then published nearly the entire video, approximately 12 minutes of footage.

¶ 9 The video, which is included in the record on appeal and has been viewed by this court, shows Heger approach Hranicka, who identifies defendant and states that defendant threatened her. Heger approaches defendant and repeatedly asks him to leave the store. Defendant says that he will leave after he pays, but Heger repeats his orders to leave the store. Heger then puts his hands on defendant's shoulders to direct defendant toward the exit, and defendant pushes Heger's

arms away and grows increasingly agitated. Defendant tells Heger and the other officers to "get the f*** out of here," that he "will knock [his] ass out," and that he will "f*** [him] up." Defendant and Heger then fall to the ground and Heger arrests defendant.

¶ 10 Officer Eric Brown testified that he and his partner responded to the Jewel grocery store and encountered Heger and defendant, who was "yelling and screaming" with his arms "out and about." Heger tried to escort defendant from the store, but defendant refused and pushed Heger. In court, Brown demonstrated the manner in which defendant pushed Heger. The prosecutor stated that Brown lifted both forearms "in an upward motion."

¶ 11 Heger continued trying to remove defendant from the store. Defendant refused, becoming "more agitated," screaming, and threatening Heger. Ultimately, Heger and defendant fell to the ground and the officers detained defendant. Defendant remained agitated as he was put into a police vehicle.

¶ 12 Brown testified that his BWC recorded the entire interaction between defendant and Heger. Without objection, the State published the entire video, approximately nine minutes of footage. The court did not read a limiting instruction to the jury.

¶ 13 The video, which is included in the record on appeal and has been viewed by this court, shows Brown entering the grocery store and approaching Heger and defendant. Heger puts his hands on defendant's shoulders and defendant pushes Heger's arms away. The officers direct defendant toward the exit as he grows increasingly agitated. Defendant tells Heger and the other officers to "get the f*** out of here," that he "will knock [his] ass out," and that he will "f*** [him] up." Heger then pulls defendant's backpack and the two fall to the ground. The officers arrest defendant.

¶ 14 Following closing arguments, the court read instructions aloud to the jury. Among these was Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.14 (approved Oct. 17, 2014) (hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 3.14), which the court read as follows:

> "Evidence has been received, [*sic*] the defendant has been involved in an offense other than that charged in the information. This evidence has been received on the issue of the defendant's intent, motive, preparation, plan, knowledge or absence of mistake of accident, and may be considered by you only for that limited purpose. It is for you to determine whether the defendant was involved in that offense and, if so, what weight should be given to this evidence on the issue of knowledge."

¶ 15 The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated battery of a peace officer.

¶ 16 Defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. Defendant argued, *inter alia*, that the State did not prove he intentionally or knowingly struck Heger in an insulting or provoking manner. The motion did not address whether the court erred when it published BWC footage depicting events after the physical confrontation with Heger, or when it did not read a jury instruction before publishing the BWC footage. The court denied defendant's motion and, following a sentencing hearing, imposed four years' imprisonment.

¶ 17 On appeal, defendant first argues that the video evidence did not establish that he intentionally or knowingly struck Heger in an insulting or provoking manner. Defendant further contends that his contact with Heger was not insulting or provoking because it was incidental to his attempt to remove himself from Heger's hold.

¶ 18 "When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, courts of review must consider whether, when viewing all the evidence adduced at trial in a light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could find proof of the essential elements of the charged offense

beyond a reasonable doubt." *People v. Edward*, 402 Ill. App. 3d 555, 564 (2010). This court will not retry the defendant. *People v. Siguenza-Brito*, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009). Rather, the trier of fact determines the credibility of witnesses, weighs and resolves conflicts in the evidence, and draws reasonable inferences therefrom. *Id*. We "will not reverse a conviction simply because the evidence is contradictory [citation] or because the defendant claims that a witness was not credible [citation]." *Id*.

¶ 19 "A person commits aggravated battery of a peace officer when that person commits a battery, other than by discharge of a firearm, against a victim he knows to be a peace officer performing his or her official duties." *People v. Little*, 2018 IL App (1st) 151954, ¶ 37; 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i) (West 2022). "A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means *** makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual." 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) (West 2022).

¶ 20 To establish battery, the State must prove that a defendant's conduct was intentional, rather than accidental. *Torf v. Chicago Transit Authority*, 405 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 (2010). "A person intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct." 720 ILCS 5/4-4 (West 2022). Intent can be shown with circumstantial evidence and may be inferred from both the defendant's conduct and the act itself. *People v. Phillips*, 392 Ill. App. 3d 243, 259 (2009).

¶ 21 Battery requires a mental state of "knowing." 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) (West 2022). As a result, the State must show that a defendant acted knowing that his actions would result in insulting or provoking contact, not merely that he intended for contact to occur. *People v. Hill*, 2020 IL App (1st) 162119, ¶ 21. Moreover, the contact must be "of an insulting or provoking *nature*." (Emphasis

added.) 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) (West 2022). Thus, we must ask "whether a reasonable person under the circumstances would find the physical contact insulting or provoking in nature." *People v. Davidson*, 2023 IL 127538, ¶ 16.

¶ 22 As with intent, whether a reasonable person would find contact insulting or provoking depends on context. *People v. Peck*, 260 Ill. App. 3d 812, 814 (1994). A reasonable person may find that contact is insulting or provoking although, under other circumstances, such contact would be inoffensive. See *People v. d'Avis*, 250 Ill. App. 3d 649, 651 (1993) (rectal exam by doctor was insulting or provoking because the doctor masturbated while performing the exam); *People v. DeRosario*, 397 Ill. App. 3d 332, 333-34 (2009) (defendant sitting behind victim and touching her back and hips with his knees was insulting or provoking because defendant had been stalking the victim).

¶ 23 Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, defendant's conduct during the confrontation with Heger shows that the contact was intentional. During the confrontation, defendant refused to comply with Heger's repeated orders to leave the store. Defendant acted aggressively and yelled. Heger then put his hands on defendant's shoulders to direct him toward the exit, but defendant immediately pushed Heger's arms away. Defendant told Heger and the other officers to "get the f*** out of here," that he "will knock [his] ass out," and that he will "f*** [him] up." "[A] jury could reasonably infer intent from expressions of anger, made immediately prior to the battery." *Phillips*, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 259. Here, where defendant pushed Heger after ignoring multiple orders to exit the store, a reasonable jury could find that defendant acted intentionally.

¶ 24 Defendant argues that his contact with Heger was unintentional because defendant merely wanted to purchase food before leaving the store and his reaction was incidental to his attempt to

remove himself from Heger's grip. The evidence, however, reflects that defendant ignored multiple orders to exit the store and yelled and swore at Heger. Thus, a reasonable jury could find that defendant's conduct was not incidental, but rather, part of intentionally rebuffing Heger's orders. See *People v. Ellison*, 100 Ill. App. 3d 282, 289 (1981) (The trier of fact "is not required to raise every potential explanation compatible with innocence to the status of reasonable doubt.").

¶ 25 The evidence also shows that the contact was insulting or provoking. Defendant ignored multiple orders from Heger to leave the store. Heger put his hand on defendant's shoulder to direct him out of the store, and he immediately pushed Heger's arms away. Defendant then continued yelling until Heger arrested him. Viewing the evidence in context, a reasonable jury could find that defendant's contact with Heger was insulting or provoking in nature. See *Davidson*, 2023 IL 127538, ¶ 16. Consequently, defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.

¶ 26 Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial because the court published BWC footage depicting events following the physical confrontation with Heger. Defendant contends that this portion of the footage contained prejudicial evidence of other crimes. Defendant seeks review under a theory of ineffective assistance of counsel or, alternatively, plain error.

¶ 27 Initially, we note that defendant waived review of this issue by failing to raise it in a contemporaneous objection and in a posttrial motion. *People v. Fuller*, 205 Ill. 2d 308, 343 (2002).

¶ 28 The record also shows that defendant agreed to the admission of the BWC footage. Prior to trial, defense counsel not only stated that he had no objection to the evidence, but also that "there are things that we want the jury to hear." Where a party does not challenge an evidentiary issue at trial, it is reasonable to assume that there was no dispute as to the admissibility of such evidence. *People v. Woods*, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 475 (2005). Thus, "[a] defendant forfeits any issue as to the

impropriety of the evidence if he procures, invites, or acquiesces in the admission of that evidence." *Id*. (quoting *People v. Caffey*, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 114 (2001)).

¶ 29 Defendant contends, however, that the State's motion, along with the parties' conversation in court, establish that the parties only agreed to enter into evidence the portions of the BWC footage that contain a female customer's hearsay statements directed at witness Yolanda Hranicka.

¶ 30 To be sure, the State's supplemental motion *in limine* only referenced statements that defendant directed at Hranicka and a customer, and not BWC footage. When addressing the supplemental motion *in limine*, however, the court stated, and the parties agreed, that those statements would be introduced through BWC footage. The prosecutor then clarified that the State struck a request from its original motion *in limine* to prohibit the admission of BWC videos. The prosecutor stated this was done "based on [the State's] conversation with defense counsel" as to "the relevant portions of the [BWC]." Defense counsel raised no objection. Later, when the State sought to introduce Sergeant Heger's BWC footage into evidence, defense counsel responded, "no objection and consistent with our earlier discussion."

¶ 31 This colloquy establishes that defense counsel agreed to the admission of the BWC footage and did not object to that portion of the BWC footage beyond the physical confrontation with Heger, which "placed the State in a position of believing that" the admission of the BWC footage "was not at issue in this case." *Woods*, 214 Ill. 2d at 475. As a result, defendant waived review of this issue. *Id.*

¶ 32 As defendant waived review of this issue, and because acquiescence estops plain-error review (*People v. Quezada*, 2024 IL 128805, ¶ 59), we next address defendant's claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the BWC footage depicting events following the aggravated battery.

¶ 33 To establish that trial counsel was ineffective, a defendant must show that (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant such that he was deprived of a fair trial. *People v. Cross*, 2022 IL 127907, ¶ 19; see also *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To show deficient performance, a defendant must establish that counsel made errors so serious as to deprive the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. *People v. Campos*, 2019 IL App (1st) 152613, ¶ 46. To show prejudice, a defendant must establish "a 'reasonable probability' that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different." *Id*. (quoting *People v. Griffin*, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 74 (1997)). Because both prongs are required to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, we may first consider whether defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to object to the admission of the BWC footage depicting events following the aggravated battery. See *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 697.

¶ 34 Evidence of a defendant's other crimes or bad acts is inadmissible to show the defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime. *People v. Donoho*, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 170 (2003). Such evidence is admissible, however, for any relevant purpose other than propensity. *Id*. Relevant here, the State may introduce evidence of other crimes that form a "continuing narrative" with the charged offense. *People v. Hale*, 2012 IL App (1st) 103537, ¶ 14. Crimes forming a continuing narrative are those that are intrinsic to the charged offense and are "admissible under the ordinary rules of relevance." *People v. Morales*, 2012 IL App (1st) 101911, ¶ 24. A defendant's conduct following an offense is relevant and may be considered a part of the continuing narrative of that offense if those actions do not constitute separate, distinct, and unconnected crimes. *People v. Carter*, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1180, 1190 (2005) (citing *People v. Thompson*, 359 Ill. App. 3d 947, 951 (2005)); see also *People v. Brown*, 83 Ill. App. 3d 741, 744-45 (1980).

¶ 35 Admission of other-crimes evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. *People v. Dabbs*, 239 Ill. 2d 277, 284 (2010). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court." *People v. Nixon*, 2015 IL App (1st) 130132, ¶ 101.

¶ 36 The record reflects that before pushing away Heger, defendant ignored Heger's orders to exit the store and grew increasingly agitated. After pushing away Heger, defendant continued shouting obscenities and threatened to physically assault Heger. Defendant continued to shout obscenities and physically struggle with officers as he was escorted from the store and taken into custody. Defendant's yelling and resistance are not separate, distinct, or unconnected to the charged offense, but are intrinsic to his defiance of Heger's orders to exit the grocery store. The BWC footage thus forms a "continuing narrative" with the charged offense and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting its entirety into evidence. *Brown*, 83 Ill. App. 3d at 745.

¶ 37 Defendant argues, however, that the video evidence was unduly prejudicial compared to the testimony of Sergeant Heger and Officer Brown, who summarized the events following the aggravated battery.

¶ 38 Defendant relies on *People v. Collins*, 2020 IL App (1st) 181746, ¶¶ 36-37, where this court held that admission of BWC footage depicting a police foot chase and arrest was unduly prejudicial. In that case, however, we examined whether the BWC footage should have been admitted because it exposed the jury to inadmissible hearsay. *Id*. ¶ 20. We held that "[b]ecause there was no nonhearsay purpose to admitting the [BWC footage] ***, the nature of the video [was] more prejudicial than probative." *Id*. ¶ 37.

¶ 39 Here, unlike in *Collins*, the BWC footage was admissible for a nonhearsay purpose. Generally, evidence of other crimes is admissible for any relevant purpose other than propensity.

Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 170. Defendant's conduct after pushing Heger was relevant to his state of mind, which the State bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt. See *Phillips*, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 258. The BWC footage was thus admissible as part of a continuing narrative with the charged offense and trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the footage in its entirety. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 697.

¶ 40 To the extent that defendant argues that the court erred in failing to read the appropriate jury instruction when the BWC footage was introduced, defendant forfeited review of this issue because he did not raise it contemporaneously or in his posttrial motion. *People v. Hale*, 2025 IL App (3d) 220510, ¶ 93. Forfeiture notwithstanding, our supreme court has held that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury when that evidence was introduced does not mandate reversal. *People v. Heard*, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 60-61 (1999); see also *Carter*, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1193. Moreover, at the close of evidence, the trial court admonished the jurors regarding evidence of other crimes and bad acts and instructed them that they may only consider it on the issue of defendant's knowledge, and not for any other purpose.

¶ 41 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

¶ 42 Affirmed.