2026 IL 132265

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 132265)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
RANDALL M. STAFFORD II, Appellant.

Opinion filed November 19, 2026.

JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Neville and Justices Overstreet, Cunningham, Rochford, O'Brien, and Tailor concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Following an April 2022 bench trial, the Kendall County circuit court found defendant, Randall M. Stafford II, guilty of aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (West 2020)). The court sentenced defendant to six years in prison, with credit for 131 days spent in jail before sentencing. However, the court declined to award defendant sentencing credit for the time he spent on electronic home

monitoring (EHM) while out on bond.[1] Following an unsuccessful motion to reconsider sentence, defendant filed a *pro se* "motion to correct mittimus" pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472(a)(3) (eff. May 17, 2019), seeking sentencing credit for 629 days he spent on EHM, which the trial court denied. Subsequently, defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which was also denied. Thereafter, defendant filed a notice of appeal.

¶ 2 The appellate court affirmed, holding that defendant was not entitled to presentence credit under the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. 2025 IL App (2d) 240250, ¶ 48. The appellate court found that, where section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code of Corrections) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b) (West 2020)) does not define "home detention," it looks to the plain language of section 5-8A-2 of the Code of Corrections (see *id.* § 5-8A-2(C)), part of the Electronic Monitoring and Home Detention Law (Home Detention Law), which excludes from "home detention" any home confinement, with or without EHM, where the terms and conditions are established by the trial court, which is not a supervising authority. 2025 IL App (2d) 240250 ¶¶ 45, 47-48. Thus, the court determined that defendant was not entitled to presentence credit for the time he spent on EHM prior to sentencing because the trial court established the terms and conditions of his bond. *Id.* ¶¶ 47-48. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand with directions.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In May 2020, defendant was charged by information with aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (West 2020)) for strangling his "family or household member by wrapping his hands around her neck and restricting her

[1]Public Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act) abolished monetary bail in Illinois. See 725 ILCS 5/110-1.5 (West 2022) ("the requirement of posting monetary bail is abolished"). Enforcement of the Act took effect on September 18, 2023. See *Rowe v. Raoul*, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52. Accordingly, as defendant's release on bond and his subsequent sentence occurred prior to the Act's effective date, the Act does not apply.

breathing."

¶ 5 A. Trial Court Proceedings

¶ 6 Following the May 2020 aggravated domestic battery charge, the trial court set defendant's bond and ordered him placed on EHM via GPS as a condition of bond. An accompanying GPS order stated, "The defendant shall *remain within the structure* of his *** place of residence *** except as provided in this order with prior permission from the probation department." (Emphasis in original.) The order allowed defendant to "leave his *** residence and travel directly to and from on the pre-approved route" for attorney appointments, court dates, and probation appointments. Further, the order required that defendant comply with GPS monitoring through Kendall County Court Services. Following two failed attempts to reduce his bond, defendant posted bond and was released from custody on GPS monitoring in July 2020.

¶ 7 In August 2020, defendant moved to modify his bond, stating he was "in need of movement in order to seek employment, attend treatment, pick up his prescriptions, and assist his mother with grocery shopping." In a written order, the trial court modified the bond, stating:

> "[Defendant] is given permission to leave [his] residence for the purposes of doctor's appointments, counseling, and picking up prescribed medications at the pharmacy provided [he] obtains approval for movement prior to leaving his residence.
>
> [Defendant] is given permission to leave the residence for the purpose of taking his mother grocery shopping (limited to 1x per week) provided [he] obtains approval prior to any such movement. Should [he] have an in[-]person interview for employment, he may leave the residence provided he receives prior approval for such movement."

¶ 8 In February 2021, the trial court switched defendant's GPS provider to the Kendall County Sheriff's Office but made no other changes to the GPS arrangement.

¶ 9 In September 2021, the State filed a motion to revoke or increase bond seeking a finding of violation of GPS/pretrial services. The trial court found defendant violated his bond, stating: "It appears that the pattern of notifying the monitoring providers that he's going to move without obtaining permission to do so has become the standard." The court granted the State's motion and increased defendant's bond. After one day in the Kendall County jail in October 2021, defendant posted the increased bond and was released.

¶ 10 Following an April 2022 bench trial, the trial court found defendant guilty of aggravated domestic battery involving strangulation. The court revoked his bond and ordered that he "shall not be released."

¶ 11 At the June 2022 sentencing hearing, the parties agreed that defendant was entitled to 131 days' credit for the time he spent in jail before sentencing. Defendant also sought credit for the time he spent on EHM. The trial court sentenced defendant to six years in prison, with credit for 131 days spent in jail before sentencing but denied him sentencing credit for the time he spent on EHM while he was released on bond.

¶ 12 In July 2022, defendant moved to reconsider his sentence, arguing that he was entitled to credit for the time he spent on EHM pursuant to section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b) (West 2020)). After a November 2022 hearing, the trial court denied the motion.

¶ 13 In June 2023, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal to raise the sentencing credit issue. The appellate court denied the motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal and instead directed defendant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472 (eff. May 17, 2019), noting that it "permits the circuit court to hear at any time a claim of error with regard to presentence custody credit."

¶ 14 In August 2023, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472(a)(3) (eff. May 17, 2019), defendant filed a *pro se* "motion to correct mittimus" seeking sentencing credit for 629 days he spent on EHM. In February 2024, the trial court denied the motion. The following month, defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied in April 2024. Defendant then filed a notice of appeal.

¶ 15 B. Appellate Court Proceedings

¶ 16 On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying him sentencing credit for the time he spent on EHM while on bond. 2025 IL App (2d) 240250, ¶ 11. Defendant claimed he was entitled to credit for that period because he was in "custody" per section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b) (West 2020)). 2025 IL App (2d) 240250, ¶ 11. Defendant acknowledged that the appellate court previously denied sentencing credit in cases involving the legal basis under which he sought credit. See *People v. Currey*, 2024 IL App (2d) 230099, ¶¶ 21-22; *People v. Donahue*, 2022 IL App (5th) 200274, ¶¶ 10-24. However, defendant disputed the reasoning applied in those opinions. 2025 IL App (2d) 240250, ¶ 11.

¶ 17 The Second District affirmed the trial court's judgment. *Id.* ¶ 61. After reviewing the case law and relevant statutory amendments, the court held that defendant was not entitled to presentence credit under the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. *Id.* ¶ 54. The court found, where section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b) (West 2020)) does not define "home detention," it looks to the plain language of section 5-8A-2 of the Home Detention Law (*id.* § 5-8A-2(C)), which excludes from "home detention" any home confinement, with or without EHM, where the terms and conditions are established by the trial court, which is not a supervising authority. 2025 IL App (2d) 240250, ¶¶ 45, 47-48. Thus, the court determined that defendant was not entitled to presentence credit for the time he was on EHM while he was released on bond because the trial court established the terms and conditions of his bond. *Id.* ¶¶ 47-48.

¶ 18 The appellate court went on to state:

> "[I]t is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a defendant is not on 'home detention' but is in 'custody' under section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections. Even with the amendments to that provision over several decades, it does not appear that the supreme court has retreated from its statements in *Ramos* and *Beachem* that confinement on bond with conditions set by the trial court can never be 'custody' under section 5-4.5-100(b). Only if we view the amendments since *Ramos* as implicitly limiting that opinion can we escape its implications. However, such a reading would be dubious at best, given the

continuing use in section 5-4.5-100(b) of the term 'home detention' and the lack of any direct statement in the amendments that the term as employed there does not carry the same meaning it is given in the Home Detention Law." *Id.* ¶ 52 (discussing *People v. Ramos*, 138 Ill. 2d 152, 162 (1990), and *People v. Beachem*, 229 Ill. 2d 237, 254-55 (2008)).

The court noted that defendant made no argument that the amendments were intended to create a separate definition of "home detention" for section 5-4.5-100(b). *Id.*

¶ 19 We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315(a) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023).

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 21 The sole issue before this court is whether defendant is entitled to presentence credit against his prison sentence for the time he spent on EHM while he was released on bond. The calculation of presentence credit for time spent on home detention is governed by section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b) (West 2020)). The resolution of this issue turns on statutory construction, which we review *de novo*. *Bank of New York Mellon v. Laskowski*, 2018 IL 121995, ¶ 12.

¶ 22 "The primary objective when construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and give effect to that intent." *People v. Clark*, 2024 IL 130364, ¶ 15. The best indication of the legislature's intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. *Id.* "When interpreting a statute, a court must 'view all provisions of an enactment as a whole,' taking care not to isolate words and phrases but reading them 'in light of other relevant provisions of the statute.' " *Id.* (quoting *Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook*, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000)). Where a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we must effectuate the statute's meaning without consulting other aids of statutory construction. *People v. Hoffman*, 2025 IL 130344, ¶ 16. With these principles in mind, we begin by reviewing section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b) (West 2020)).

¶ 23 Section 5-4.5-100(b), in relevant part, sets forth when a trial court shall give credit to a defendant for time spent in home detention, which may include electronic monitoring. Relevant here, the legislature amended section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections, effective July 1, 2021. See Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-281 (eff. July 1, 2021) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b)). As amended, the section reads, in pertinent part, as follows, with the relevant new text emphasized:

> "[T]he offender shall be given credit on the determinate sentence or maximum term and the minimum period of imprisonment for the number of days spent in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed. The Department [of Corrections] shall calculate the credit at the rate specified in Section 3-6-3 (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3). The trial court shall give credit to the defendant for time spent in home detention on the same sentencing terms as incarceration as provided in Section 5-8A-3 (730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3). *Home detention for purposes of credit includes restrictions on liberty such as curfews restricting movement for 12 hours or more per day and electronic monitoring that restricts travel or movement. Electronic monitoring is not required for home detention to be considered custodial for purposes of sentencing credit.*" (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b) (West 2020).

¶ 24 Section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections provides that a trial court shall give credit to a defendant for time spent in home detention on the same sentencing terms as incarceration as provided in section 5-8A-3. Section 5-8A-3 of the Home Detention Law (*id.* § 5-8A-3) outlines when a person charged with or convicted of certain offenses may be eligible for electronic monitoring or home detention. The Home Detention Law defines "home detention" in section 5-8A-2(C), which was also amended by the legislature, effective July 1, 2021. See Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-281 (eff. July 1, 2021) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-2). As amended, "home detention" in the Home Detention Law is defined as follows, with the relevant new text emphasized:

> " 'Home detention' means the confinement of a person convicted or charged with an offense to his or her place of residence under the terms and conditions established by the supervising authority. *Confinement need not be 24 hours per day to qualify as home detention, and significant restrictions on liberty such as 7pm to 7am curfew shall qualify. Home confinement may or may not be*

accompanied by electronic monitoring, and electronic monitoring is not required for purposes of sentencing credit." (Emphasis added.) Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-281 (eff. July 1, 2021) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-2(C)).

¶ 25 Section 5-8A-2(E) of the Home Detention Law (730 ILCS 5/5-8A-2(E) (West 2020)) in turn defines "supervising authority" as follows, with the relevant new text emphasized:

> " 'Supervising authority' means the Department of Corrections, the Department of Juvenile Justice, probation department, *a Chief Judge's office, pretrial services division or department*, sheriff, superintendent of municipal house of corrections or any other officer or agency charged with authorizing and supervising electronic monitoring and home detention." (Emphasis added.) Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-281 (eff. July 1, 2021) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-2(E)).

¶ 26 Defendant argues the plain language of section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections in effect at the time he was sentenced expressly provides a definition of "[h]ome detention for purposes of credit" as including "restrictions on liberty such as curfews restricting movement for 12 hours or more per day and electronic monitoring that restricts travel or movement." See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b) (West 2020). Defendant asserts that he "was subject to electronic monitoring and a curfew restricting his travel or movement for 24 hours per day. [Thus] [t]his indisputably satisfies the clear and unambiguous definition of 'home detention for purpose of credit' in the applicable amended section 5-4.5-100(b)." As such, defendant contends that there is no need to look beyond the plain language of section 5-4.5-100(b), where it defines home detention for purposes of credit.

¶ 27 According to defendant, even if our court considers the definition of home detention in section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections (*id.*) along with the amendments to the definition of "home detention" in section 5-8A-2(C) of the Home Detention Law (*id.* § 5-8A-2(C)), the result is the same. Considering both statutes together, he asserts that it follows that a defendant is entitled to presentence credit for the number of days during which he was on pretrial release and subject to a condition that constituted a "significant restriction[ ] on [his] liberty." See *id.* §§ 5-4.5-100(b), 5-8A-2(C).

¶ 28 Defendant points out that, as part of his bond, he was required, with certain exceptions, to stay within his home 24 hours per day, more than satisfying the 12-hour curfew example provided in both section 5-4.5-100(b) and section 5-8A-2(C). Moreover, while neither section requires electronic monitoring for a defendant's presentence home confinement to count for purposes of sentencing credit, defendant provides that he was electronically monitored via GPS with conditions restricting his travel or movement. Thus, defendant argues he was undeniably on "home detention for purposes of credit" and the trial court was required to give him credit against his prison sentence for that time.

¶ 29 The State argues that, under the plain and ordinary meaning of the applicable statutory language, a defendant is not entitled to presentence credit when a trial court releases a defendant pretrial and imposes home detention as a condition of bond under terms and conditions imposed by the trial court. Specifically, the State asserts that "custody" includes "time spent in home detention on the same sentencing terms as incarceration as provided in Section 5-8A-3." See *id.* § 5-4.5-100(b). Accordingly, the State maintains that section 5-4.5-100(b) limits presentence credit for home detention to defendants who are in home detention in accordance with section 5-8A-3, a provision of the Home Detention Law (*id.* § 5-8A-3). Thus, the State contends that, while section 5-8A-3 does not define what constitutes home detention, section 5-8A-2(C) of the Home Detention Law (*id.* § 5-5-8A-2(C)), states that " '[h]ome detention' means the confinement of a person convicted or charged with an offense to his or her place of residence under the terms and conditions established by the supervising authority." The State asserts a "supervising authority" does not include a trial court judge. See *id.* § 5-8A-2(E). Thus, the State posits that, because a trial court judge is not a supervising authority, the statutory language does not authorize presentence credit when the trial court imposes home detention as a condition of bond.

¶ 30 The State further argues that our court's precedent and the history of the amendments to the statutory provisions establishing a right to presentence credit confirm the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. The State asserts that historically a "defendant's period of home confinement was not 'time spent in custody' within the meaning of the [presentence credit] statute" (*Ramos*, 138 Ill. 2d at 159), unless the defendant was placed in a home detention program by a supervising authority (*Beachem*, 229 Ill. 2d at 249-51). The State contends that,

following *Ramos* and *Beachem*, Public Act 101-652, § 10-281 (eff. July 1, 2021) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b)) left intact the limitation that credit is authorized only if a supervising authority establishes the terms of home detention, as the appellate court has consistently held. See *Currey*, 2024 IL App (2d) 230099, ¶ 23; *Donahue*, 2022 IL App (5th) 200274, ¶¶ 9, 32. Ultimately, the State argues that, because here the trial court set the terms and conditions of defendant's bond, including the conditions of home confinement and GPS monitoring, defendant was not entitled to presentence credit for the time he spent on EHM.

¶ 31 Defendant contends that *Ramos* and *Beachem* are no longer good law and should not be followed where, in both cases, our court analyzed prior versions of the relevant statutes that did not contain the language at issue here. Following *Ramos* and *Beachem*, the legislature amended section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections, effective June 22, 2012. See Pub. Act 97-697, § 5 (eff. June 22, 2012) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b)). In amending section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections, the statutory language changed from "the trial court *may* give credit to the defendant for time spent in home detention" to "the trial court *shall* give credit to the defendant for time spent in home detention on the same sentencing terms as incarceration as provided in Section 5-8A-3." (Emphases added.) See *id.*

¶ 32 Moreover, defendant suggests that reviewing the 2021 amendments to section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections (see Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-281 (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b)) reveals that the definition of "home detention for purposes of credit," does not mention a "supervising authority." Instead, the definition focuses on the actual terms and conditions imposed, rather than who sets them, evincing the legislature's intent that, "for purposes of credit," it does not matter who sets the conditions but, rather, what those conditions are.

¶ 33 Following review of the parties' arguments and the relevant statutory language, we find the plain language of section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b) (West 2020)) is clear and unambiguous. Where section 5-4.5-100(b) references section 5-8A-3 of the Home Detention Law (*id.* § 5-8A-3), we must look at the statutes as a whole, construing words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions rather than in isolation. See *Clark*, 2024 IL 130364, ¶ 15. We need not look beyond the plain statutory language, where section 5-4.5-100(b) and section 5-8A-3 work in harmony. In analyzing both statutes, we also

review the definitions in section 5-8A-2(C), (E) of the Home Detention Law (730 ILCS 5/5-8A-2(C), (E) (West 2020)), because section 5-8A-3 of the Home Detention Law does not define "home detention" or "supervising authority."

¶ 34 The statutory language in sections 5-4.5-100(b) and 5-8A-3, as well as the relevant amendments to the statutory language in both section 5-4.5-100(b) and section 5-8A-2, make clear that the legislature has expanded who is entitled to presentence credit for time spent in home detention. This is evidenced by the language in section 5-4.5-100(b) where the legislature states, "[t]he trial court *shall* give credit to the defendant for time spent in home detention on the same sentencing terms as incarceration as provided in Section 5-8A-3." (Emphasis added.) See *id.* § 5-4.5-100(b). The use of "shall" is an unequivocal statement by the legislature that a person who is in home detention on the same sentencing terms as a person who is incarcerated is entitled to presentence credit.

¶ 35 We further find the definition of "home detention" in the Home Detention Law can be reconciled with the definition in section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections. The 2021 amendments to both section 5-4.5-100(b) and section 5-8A-2 demonstrate that the legislature expanded what it means to be on home detention for purposes of credit. See Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-281 (eff. July 1, 2021) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b), 5-8A-2). In section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections, the legislature added that "[h]ome detention for purposes of credit includes restrictions on liberty such as curfews restricting movement for 12 hours or more per day and electronic monitoring that restricts travel or movement." 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b) (West 2020). Section 5-8A-2(C) of the Home Detention Law added, "[c]onfinement need not be 24 hours per day to qualify as home detention, and significant restrictions on liberty such as 7pm to 7am curfew shall qualify." *Id.* § 5-8A-2(C). Under both statutes, the definition of home detention includes any significant restriction on a person's liberty. Accordingly, we find a person is on home detention and entitled to presentence credit if confinement significantly restricts their liberty.

¶ 36 To the extent the State argues that, under the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language, presentence credit is available only when a "supervising authority" establishes the terms and conditions of home detention and a trial judge is not a qualifying supervising authority, we do not think this accurately reflects

that intent of the legislature following the 2021 amendments to section 5-4.5-100(b) and section 5-8A-2. While section 5-8A-2(C) defines "home detention" as the "confinement of a person convicted or charged with an offense to his or her place of residence under the terms and conditions established by the supervising authority," with the 2021 amendments, the legislature added additional language to clarify what it means to be on home detention for purposes of credit. See Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-281 (eff. July 1, 2021) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-2(C)). Moreover, the additional language in section 5-8A-2(C) establishing what qualifies as home detention for purposes of credit aligns with the definition of "home detention for purposes of credit" added in section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections.

¶ 37 We recognize that the legislature, in amending the definition of "home detention" in section 5-8A-2(C), did not remove the language "under the terms and conditions established by the supervising authority." However, we find when reviewing the statutory language as a whole, including the old and new language in sections 5-4.5-100(b) and 5-8A-2, that the State's and the appellate court's interpretation of "supervising authority" is no longer persuasive where, under such a reading, a person would rarely be considered in home detention for purposes of presentence credit because a trial court routinely orders release with conditions.

¶ 38 Both the State and the appellate court focus solely on the word "established" in section 5-8A-2(C) and fail to look at the full definition of "supervisory authority" in section 5-8A-2(E), where the legislature identifies examples of officers and agencies who qualify as the "supervising authority" as those that are "charged with authorizing and supervising electronic monitoring and home detention." 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-2(E) (West 2020). Moreover, the State and the appellate court fail to take into consideration the additional language added to section 5-4.5-100(b) and section 5-8A-2 by the 2021 amendments where the legislature clearly expanded what it means to be on home detention for purposes of credit.

¶ 39 Based on the statutory language it chose, the legislature did not intend for the trial court to be tasked with authorizing and supervising electronic monitoring and home detention. Rather, the trial court orders release with conditions. In turn, an agency manages and establishes the day-to-day terms and conditions of release where such agency authorizes and supervises a person on home detention, such as

where they can go, when they can go, and how they get there. By definition, such agency is the "supervising authority," imposing the terms and conditions.

¶ 40 In assessing the plain language, we decline to pick out single words and phrases in the statutes that fail to support the overall intent, which, following the 2021 amendments, reflects a shift toward awarding presentence credit to persons if their time spent in home detention is on the same sentencing terms as a person who is incarcerated. See *id.* § 5-4.5-100(b). When determining whether a person is on home detention for purposes of presentence credit, the trial court's release of a defendant with conditions is not a barrier to concluding defendant is on home detention. Most importantly, we must ask whether the terms and conditions of home confinement significantly restrict one's liberty. Accordingly, we agree with defendant and find that, following the 2021 amendments to section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections and section 5-8A-2 of the Home Detention Law, *Ramos* and *Beachem* are no longer relevant in determining whether a person is on home detention for purposes of presentence credit. To the extent that appellate court decisions such as *Donahue* and *Currey* rely on the reasoning in *Ramos* and *Beachem*, those decisions are also no longer relevant in assessing presentence credit for home detention.

¶ 41 Here, the trial court set bond and ordered defendant released on EHM with GPS to be authorized and supervised by Kendall County Court Services. Specifically, the GPS order read, "[t]he defendant shall *remain within the structure* of his *** place of residence *** except as provided in this order with prior permission from the probation department." (Emphasis in original.) As stated in the order of release, defendant was to remain within the structure of his residence unless he was given prior permission by his supervising authority to travel directly to and from on a preapproved route for attorney appointments, court dates, and probation appointments and later to seek "employment, attend treatment, pick up his prescriptions, and assist his mother with grocery shopping." Later, the trial court changed the GPS provider to the Kendall County Sheriff's Office.

¶ 42 As shown by the record, defendant was confined to his residence on electronic monitoring that restricted his travel and movements. Specifically, defendant was confined to his residence 24 hours per day unless he received approval prior to leaving his residence for one of a few authorized places. Under section 5-4.5-100(b)

of the Code of Corrections and section 5-8A-2(C) of the Home Detention Law, defendant was in home detention where his confinement significantly restricted his liberty. Moreover, the Kendall County Sheriff's Office met the statutory definition of a supervising authority where it authorized and supervised defendant's EHM while he was in home detention.

¶ 43 Accordingly, we find that defendant is entitled to presentence credit for the time he spent on EHM where it qualifies as home detention for purposes of credit under section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections.

¶ 44 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 45 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgments of both the appellate and trial courts denying defendant presentence credit for the time he spent on EHM. We remand the matter to the trial court to calculate and award defendant presentence credit for the time he spent on EHM while he was released on bond because it qualifies as home detention for purposes of credit pursuant to section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Code of Corrections.

¶ 46 Judgments reversed.

¶ 47 Cause remanded with directions.