2026 IL App (1st) 250946-U
No. 1-25-0946
Order filed November 19, 2026

NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedential except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

FOURTH DIVISION

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARKUS ALLEN, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Criminal Division.
Honorable Neera L. Walsh, Judge, Presiding.
No. 24 CR 0219801

JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Lyle and Justice Ocasio concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 *Held*: The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed where (1) the circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress where probable cause supported defendant's arrest and a search of his vehicle, and (2) the repeat felony offender statute is facially constitutional, and the record is insufficient to review defendant's as-applied challenge.

¶ 2 Defendant Markus Allen appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(1.5)(A) (West 2022)) and unlawful possession of a firearm by a repeat felony offender (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2022)). Following a jury trial, he argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that the repeat felony

offender statute violates the second amendment of the United States Constitution, both on its face and as applied to him. For the following reasons, the judgment is affirmed.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver 15 grams or more but less than 100 grams of a substance containing fentanyl (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(1.5)(A) (West 2022)) and armed habitual criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2022)), among other charges. Before trial, with defendant's agreement, the State amended his armed habitual criminal count to unlawful possession of a firearm by a repeat felony offender, reflecting the offense's current title. See Pub. Act 103-822, § 20 (eff. Jan. 1, 2025) (renaming the offense). Defendant stipulated to two qualifying predicate offenses. The State proceeded to a jury trial on the controlled substance and repeat felony offender counts and dismissed the remaining charges.

¶ 5 Motion to Suppress

¶ 6 Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the firearm and narcotics recovered from his car, along with any resulting statements. He argued that officers arrested him and searched his car without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, in violation of the fourth amendment. U.S. Const., amend. IV.

¶ 7 Defendant was the only witness at the hearing on the motion to suppress. He testified that he was standing on a corner in Chicago when two uniformed officers approached him, handcuffed him, patted him down, and removed money and his car key from his jacket pocket. They placed him in their squad car and told him he could not leave. Without a warrant or defendant's consent, an officer used the car key to unlock defendant's car, which was parked down the block, and recovered a gun and narcotics.

¶ 8 On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that he spoke with two people on the corner that morning. After speaking with each, he went to his car, reached into the gas cap area, and returned to speak with that person again. He denied entering an alley with either person. He testified that he owned the car and that, after the search, officers asked whether he had a Firearm Owner's Identification (FOID) card or concealed carry license (CCL). He told them he did not and that he did not have a gun. At the hearing, he denied that the gun belonged to him.

¶ 9 The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, explaining that defendant lacked standing because he did not claim ownership of the items.

¶ 10 Trial

¶ 11 At trial, Chicago police officers Alain Aporongao and Enzo Cabrera testified that on the day of the arrest, they and Cabrera's partner, Officer Michael Carrasco, were monitoring a live feed from a police observation device camera at the corner where defendant was standing. Aporongao testified that in his twelve years as an officer he had observed suspected narcotics transactions numerous times. Cabrera testified that he had observed between 50 and 100 and that the corner where defendant was standing was in an area known for narcotics sales.

¶ 12 According to Aporongao, a man approached defendant on the corner, and the two walked down the street together. The man entered an alley. Defendant continued farther down the block to a black Ford sedan, retrieved an "item or items" from the gas cap area, and walked back to the alley. Aporongao briefly lost sight of both men. When they emerged from the alley, the man walked away and defendant remained in the area. Aporongao then sent Cabrera and Carrasco to the scene and relayed what he saw to them in real time.

¶ 13 Aporongao next saw a woman hand defendant suspected paper money. After a brief conversation, the two followed the same sequence. The woman waited near the alley while defendant went to the Ford's gas cap, appeared to retrieve items, and returned to the alley.

¶ 14 The State played two clips of the camera footage at trial, one of each interaction, and both depicted the interactions Aporongao described. On cross-examination, Aporongao acknowledged that he did not see defendant with a gun or inside the Ford. He also did not know what defendant retrieved, and he did not see the exchanges, which occurred outside the camera's view.

¶ 15 Cabrera testified similarly. He testified that he and Carrasco remained in constant radio contact with Aporongao after leaving to approach defendant. When they arrived at the scene, Cabrera saw defendant finishing a "hand-to-hand transaction" with a woman. He described it as an exchange of paper consistent with United States currency for "small items consistent with narcotics packaging." Cabrera acknowledged that he did not see what occurred in the alley and that, although he saw the items defendant gave the woman, he did not know what they contained.

¶ 16 According to Cabrera, when defendant returned to the corner, the officers pulled up in a marked squad car and approached him. Carrasco immediately handcuffed defendant. Cabrera patted defendant down for weapons and recovered money and a car key from his jacket pocket. With his body-worn camera activated, Cabrera went to the black Ford and examined the gas cap area. He found no narcotics there. He testified that as he continued to examine the car, he saw a firearm with a tan handle on the driver's side floorboard. He unlocked the driver's door with defendant's key and recovered a handgun with an attached magazine containing one live round.

¶ 17 Cabrera drove the car to where Carrasco was holding defendant and asked defendant whether he had a FOID card or CCL. Defendant answered that he did not. After confirming that the car was registered to defendant, Cabrera searched the rest of the car. In an open black bag on

the front passenger seat, he found money and a black plastic bag. Inside was a clear plastic bag holding 43 small bags of suspected crack cocaine and 29 small bags of suspected heroin. The State introduced three clips from Cabrera's body-worn camera depicting the recovery of the firearm and narcotics.

¶ 18 Officer Magdalena Kornacki, a Chicago Police Department latent print examiner, testified that a fingerprint on the attached magazine matched defendant's left middle finger. The parties stipulated to the following facts: (1) the 43 bags of suspected crack cocaine weighed 13.862 grams but were not analyzed; (2) 24 of the 29 bags of suspected heroin weighed 15.7 grams and tested positive for fentanyl; (3) defendant had two prior qualifying felony convictions; and (4) defendant was one of the registered owners of the Ford.

¶ 19 The jury found defendant guilty of both counts.

¶ 20 Posttrial Proceedings

¶ 21 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial. He argued in relevant part that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress on standing grounds. Defendant argued that the circuit court should have considered whether the officers had probable cause to arrest him, given that they did not know whether he could lawfully possess a handgun when they took him into custody. He asserted that a favorable ruling would have rendered the gun inadmissible and precluded his conviction on the firearm count. The court denied the motion, again determining that defendant lacked standing, and sentenced him to concurrent terms of 10 years' imprisonment.

¶ 22 The Illinois Supreme Court granted defendant's motion for a supervisory order directing this court to allow him to amend his notice of appeal. This appeal followed. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6; Ill. S. Ct. R. 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013); R. 606 (eff. Apr. 15, 2024).

¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 24 A. Fourth Amendment Challenge

¶ 25 Defendant first contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress the gun and narcotics recovered from his vehicle. He argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that he lacked standing, and that suppression was required because the officers (1) exceeded the scope of a *Terry* stop by frisking him and seizing his car key without a reasonable belief that he was armed and dangerous, and (2) searched his vehicle without probable cause. Alternatively, he requests remand for a new suppression hearing. The State argues that the officers had probable cause both to arrest defendant and to search his vehicle.

¶ 26 A ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed under a two-part standard: the circuit court's factual findings are upheld unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, but its ultimate legal conclusion is reviewed *de novo*. *People v. Sanders*, 2013 IL App (1st) 102696, ¶ 12. *De novo* review is also appropriate where the facts and witness credibility are not in dispute. *Id.* Defendant's only credibility challenge concerns Cabrera's testimony which bears on an irrelevant exception this court does not reach. See *infra* ¶ 40. Therefore, review is *de novo*.

¶ 27 Defendant's *Terry* and probable cause arguments rely on evidence introduced at trial, namely the video evidence and the testimony of Aporongao and Cabrera, none of which was presented at the suppression hearing. A reviewing court may rely on trial evidence to *affirm* the denial of a motion to suppress because doing so "is akin to a harmless error analysis." *People v. Brooks*, 187 Ill. 2d 91, 127-28 (1999). That reasoning does not apply when a defendant relies on trial evidence to seek reversal. *Id.* Instead, defense counsel "should have asked the court to reconsider its decision on the motion to suppress," and a defendant who does not do so "has waived his right to argue it on appeal." *Id.* Defendant never asked the circuit court to reconsider its ruling

when the new evidence was introduced at trial. And even assuming a posttrial motion could preserve the argument, see *People v. Horton*, 2019 IL App (1st) 142019-B, ¶ 60, defendant's motion argued only that the court should have decided the motion on probable cause rather than standing, not that the trial evidence undermined the ruling. Because defendant did not preserve a challenge based on trial evidence, this court may consider that evidence only to affirm. Further, because this court reviews the circuit court's judgment rather than its reasoning, it may affirm on any basis the record supports. *People v. Johnson*, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 128 (2003); *People v. Jackson*, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 280 (2009).

¶ 28 The fourth amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const., amend. IV; accord Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6; *People v. Anthony*, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 201 (2001) (construing Illinois's constitution consistently with the fourth amendment). Reasonableness "generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause." *People v. Love*, 199 Ill. 2d 269, 275 (2002). In *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), however, the Supreme Court held that an officer may detain a person briefly to make reasonable inquiries if the officer has "knowledge of sufficient articulable facts at the time of the encounter to create a reasonable suspicion that the person in question has committed, or is about to commit, a crime." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Love*, 199 Ill. 2d at 275. If the officer reasonably believes that person may be armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct "a limited search for weapons, commonly referred to as a 'frisk' ". *People v. Flowers*, 179 Ill. 2d 257, 262 (1997). Defendant acknowledges that he was seized when the officers approached and immediately handcuffed him. The question is whether that seizure was a *Terry* stop or an arrest. Although both are seizures, they require different levels of justification, so the distinction between them is significant. *People v. Dorsey*, 2025 IL App (1st) 240933, ¶ 20.

¶ 29 An arrest occurs when a person's freedom of movement has been restrained by physical force or a show of authority. *People v. Melock*, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 436-37 (1992). The test is whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would conclude that he was not free to leave. *Id.* at 437; *People v. Soto*, 2017 IL App (1st) 140893, ¶ 49. Handcuffing may convert an investigatory stop into an arrest (*People v. Delaware*, 314 Ill. App. 3d 363, 370 (2000); *People v. Tortorici*, 205 Ill. App. 3d 625, 628 (1990)), but it does not do so when the restraint is necessary to effectuate the stop and protect the officers' safety. *People v. Starks*, 190 Ill. App. 3d 503, 509 (1989).

¶ 30 Two uniformed officers in a marked police car approached defendant and immediately handcuffed him. A reasonable person in defendant's position would have concluded that he was not free to leave. Nothing in the record indicates that the officers had reason to believe at that time that defendant was armed and dangerous. Compare *Delaware*, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 369-71 (handcuffs were part of an arrest where police had no indication that the defendant was armed or dangerous), with *Starks*, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 509 (handcuffing was within the bounds of a lawful *Terry* stop where the defendants matched the description of armed robbers). The handcuffing therefore cannot be justified as a safety measure during a *Terry* stop.

¶ 31 Defendant argues that officers exceeded the scope of a *Terry* stop, but the encounter was an arrest, and since officers had no warrant, the arrest was lawful only if supported by probable cause. *Love*, 199 Ill. 2d at 278-79; see *Beck v. Ohio*, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). If there was probable cause to arrest, the *Terry* analysis is irrelevant. *Horton*, 2019 IL App (1st) 142019-B, ¶ 75.

¶ 32 1. Probable Cause to Arrest

¶ 33 "Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest are sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that the arrestee has committed a

crime." *People v. Grant*, 2013 IL 112734, ¶ 11. The determination is based on the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest. *People v. Sims*, 192 Ill. 2d 592, 615 (2000). It is governed by commonsense considerations and concerns the probability of criminal activity, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. *People v. Hopkins*, 235 Ill. 2d 453, 472 (2009).

¶ 34 Before the arrest, Aporongao watched defendant meet a man on the corner, walk with him toward an alley, retrieve something from the gas cap area of a parked car, and go to the alley the man had entered. Aporongao then watched defendant repeat that sequence with a woman who had handed him what appeared to be money. See *People v. Taylor*, 165 Ill. App. 3d 64, 67 (1987) (a series of similar transactions, by virtue of repetition, may be sufficient to support an arrest). Based on his law enforcement experience, Aporongao believed that these were narcotics transactions. See *People v. Harris*, 352 Ill. App. 3d 63, 67 (2004) (an officer's factual knowledge based on prior law enforcement experience is relevant to probable cause). He relayed his observations to Cabrera and Carrasco in real time. See *People v. Krogh*, 123 Ill. App. 3d 220, 223-24 (1984) (when officers work in concert, probable cause may rest on the information they collectively possess). Cabrera also personally observed the end of the exchange, in which defendant received paper that appeared to be currency for small items resembling narcotics packaging. And this activity occurred in an area known for narcotics sales. See *Grant*, 2013 IL 112734, ¶ 18 (a defendant's presence in a known high-crime area may contribute to probable cause).

¶ 35 These facts were sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that defendant was selling narcotics. See *Krogh*, 123 Ill. App. 3d at 224 (probable cause existed where the defendant's actions were suspicious based on the agents' experience with identifying drug transactions). The officers therefore had probable cause to arrest defendant.

¶ 36 2. Probable Cause to Search the Vehicle

¶ 37 Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, officers may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if they have probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity. *People v. Molina*, 2024 IL 129237, ¶ 20; see *United States v. Ross*, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982). In assessing probable cause, courts recognize that officers must often act quickly on the information before them. *People v. Robinson*, 62 Ill. 2d 273, 277 (1976). Probable cause to search a vehicle exists when "the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the search, in light of the officer's experience, would cause a reasonably prudent person to believe that a crime occurred and that evidence of the crime is contained in the automobile." *People v. Stroud*, 392 Ill. App. 3d 776, 803 (2009). Such a belief may rest on evidence that the vehicle was used as an instrumentality of the crime and that contraband was concealed within it. See *People v. Morales*, 109 Ill. App. 3d 183, 188 (1982). The scope of the search is "defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found." *Ross*, 456 U.S. at 824.

¶ 38 The same facts that supported the arrest gave the officers probable cause to search defendant's car. During each transaction, defendant went to the car, manipulated the gas cap area, and returned to the alley. Aporongao testified that each time, defendant retrieved an "item or items" from the gas cap area. Both Aporongao and Cabrera have experience with narcotics transactions, and they were entitled to view defendant's conduct in light of that experience. *Stroud*, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 803. That conduct supported a reasonable belief that defendant was using the car as an instrumentality of the narcotics sales and storing narcotics in it. See *Morales*, 109 Ill. App. 3d at 186-88 (probable cause existed to search a parked vehicle's undercarriage and containers found there where the officers saw defendant repeatedly reach underneath it and then exchange hands

with another individual). Because the probable cause attached to the car itself, rather than to a particular container or compartment, the officers could search every part of the car that could conceal narcotics, including the bag on the front passenger seat. See *Ross*, 456 U.S. at 825 (when probable cause attaches to a vehicle, "it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search").

¶ 39 Neither the pat-down nor the empty gas cap area dissipated probable cause. Probable cause arose from the officers' observations before the arrest. Defendant returned to the car for the second transaction instead of keeping his supply on his person, which supported a reasonable belief that he was storing narcotics in the car. The empty gas cap area did not undermine the officers' belief; it was consistent with it. Having twice watched defendant remove items from that location, officers could reasonably expect it to be empty by the time of the arrest. The pat-down and the empty gas cap therefore showed only that any remaining narcotics were not in those two places, leaving the rest of the car as the likely location. The officers' basis for probable cause here was also far stronger than in *People v. Randall*, and their check of a single small compartment was nothing like the thorough search conducted there. *Cf.* 2022 IL App (1st) 210846, ¶¶ 41-43 (probable cause resting only on furtive movements and nervousness dissipated after a thorough search of the passenger area uncovered no contraband). Nor was it necessary that the officers see defendant enter the car. His repeated trips during the transactions were sufficient, and his possession of its key further pointed to the car as the place he kept his supply. Applying the commonsense considerations that govern probable cause (*Hopkins*, 235 Ill. 2d at 472), the circumstances pointed to one place: the car that defendant returned to during each sale and for which he held the key.

¶ 40 Because the search did not exceed the scope of the automobile exception, this court need not address whether it was justified under the plain-view or inventory-search exceptions.

¶ 41 Finally, defendant contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress on the ground that he lacked standing. Courts no longer analyze fourth amendment claims under a separate rubric of "standing"; the inquiry is instead whether the challenged search or seizure infringed an interest that the fourth amendment was designed to protect. *Rakas v. Illinois*, 439 U.S. 128, 138-40 (1978); *People v. Johnson*, 237 Ill. 2d 81, 89-90 (2010). The circuit court's reliance on standing does not, however, require reversal or remand. See *Johnson*, 208 Ill. 2d at 128; *Jackson*, 232 Ill. 2d at 280. As explained above, the arrest and search were supported by probable cause, so the denial of the motion stands regardless of whether defendant had a protected privacy interest in the vehicle.

¶ 42 Because the officers had probable cause, whether the initial encounter was a valid *Terry* stop is irrelevant, as is the State's contention that estoppel, forfeiture, and waiver bar defendant's *Terry* argument. The record is sufficient to resolve the issue, so remand for a new suppression hearing is unnecessary. Thus, the circuit court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.

¶ 43 B. Second Amendment Challenge

¶ 44 Defendant argues that the repeat felony offender statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7) (West 2022)) is facially unconstitutional under the second amendment of the United States Constitution, as interpreted in *New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen*, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). He contends that the State cannot show a historical analogue for permanently banning felons from possessing firearms. He further argues that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him because his prior felonies were nonviolent. The State contends the statute is consistent with the nation's historical

tradition of firearm regulation. Further, the State argues defendant forfeited his as-applied challenge, and that, in any event, *Bruen* does not require the qualifying felonies to be violent.

¶ 45 The constitutionality of a statute is reviewed *de novo*. *Walker v. Chasteen*, 2021 IL 126086, ¶ 30.

¶ 46 1. Facial Challenge

¶ 47 Statutes are presumed constitutional, and the party challenging a statute bears the burden of establishing its invalidity. *People v. Jones*, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 595-96 (2006). To prevail on a facial challenge, the challenger must show "that the statute is unconstitutional under any set of facts, *i.e.*, the specific facts related to the challenging party are irrelevant." *People v. Thompson*, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 36.

¶ 48 Under *Bruen*, when the second amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the conduct is presumptively protected, and the government must "justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation." 597 U.S. at 24. The government need not identify a "historical *twin*"; a "well-established and representative historical *analogue*" suffices. (Emphasis in original.) *Id.* at 30; *United States v. Rahimi*, 602 U.S. 680, 691-92 (2024).

¶ 49 Illinois courts have repeatedly upheld laws disarming felons under *Bruen*'s second step, including this statute under its former title, armed habitual criminal. See, *e.g.*, *People v. Macias*, 2025 IL App (1st) 230678, ¶ 34; *People v. Brooks*, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶¶ 90-105 (collecting legal and scholarly sources supporting a tradition of disarming felons); *People v. Travis*, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶ 33 (finding a "history and tradition dating back to the founding era of identifying dangerous individuals and disarming them"); see also *People v. Lopez*, 2025 IL App (1st) 232120, ¶ 23 (collecting cases).

¶ 50 Defendant argues that the historical laws discussed in *Brooks* and *Travis* do not support permanently disarming individuals based on criminal history or punishing violations of that ban as severely as the statute does. See *Brooks*, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶¶ 93-96; *Travis*, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶¶ 29-31. That argument seeks the kind of precise historical match that *Bruen* and *Rahimi* reject. *Macias* rejected a substantially similar argument, holding that founding-era laws authorizing capital punishment and estate forfeiture for felonies are sufficiently analogous even though those penalties were imposed as part of a criminal sentence. *Macias*, 2025 IL App (1st) 230678, ¶ 33. Defendant offers no persuasive reason to depart from these decisions, so his facial challenge fails.

¶ 51 2. As-Applied Challenge

¶ 52 A defendant raising an as-applied challenge must show "that the statute violates the constitution as it applies to the facts and circumstances [of the defendant's case]." *Thompson*, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 36. "Therefore, it is paramount that the record be sufficiently developed in terms of those facts and circumstances for purposes of appellate review." *Id.* ¶ 37. This requirement "is particularly relevant to as-applied second amendment claims, which are inherently fact-dependent." *People v. Benson*, 2026 IL 131191, ¶ 38.

¶ 53 Defendant concedes that he did not raise this challenge in the circuit court. He argues that it may nonetheless be reviewed because it rests on facts already in the record, namely the nature of his conduct and his criminal history. Our supreme court recently addressed this question in the context of the unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon statute. *Benson*, 2026 IL 131191. It held that review of an as-applied second amendment challenge is speculative and improper where the record lacks individualized evidence about the facts and circumstances of the defendant's prior convictions and their bearing on the statute's constitutionality as applied to him. *Id.* ¶¶ 31, 37-38

(record insufficient even though the State introduced a certified copy of the defendant's prior conviction and the defendant admitted the conviction in his testimony, because nothing in the record addressed the circumstances surrounding that conviction or the defendant's dangerousness); see also *People v. Johnson*, 2024 IL App (1st) 231155, ¶¶ 27-28 (without the circumstances of the prior conviction, a court cannot assess what danger the defendant may pose and is in no position to rule on an as-applied challenge). The record here contains no such evidence. Trial counsel's single, generalized statement that the predicate felonies were nonviolent is argument, not evidence, and does not meet this standard. Review of the as-applied challenge would therefore be speculative and premature.

¶ 54 Even if the challenge were reviewable, it would fail on the merits. This court has held that the repeat felony offender statute, including under its former title, is constitutional as applied to nonviolent felons. See, *e.g.*, *Brooks*, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶¶ 100-05; *Lopez*, 2025 IL App (1st) 232120, ¶¶ 26-27; see also *Travis*, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶¶ 36-37; *People v. Jackson*, 2025 IL App (1st) 231200-U, ¶¶ 37-41.

¶ 55 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 56 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

¶ 57 Affirmed.