November 8, 2023

Filed Via Email (RulesCommittee@illinoiscourts.gov)
Committee Secretary
Supreme Court Rules Committee
222 N. LaSalle Street, 13th Floor
Chicago, IL 60601

Re: Proposed Revision to Rule 8.4(j), Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct

Dear Committee Members:

The New Civil Liberties Alliance (NCLA) is pleased to submit these comments in connection with the Rules Committee's consideration of a proposal (Proposal 22-06, offered by the Illinois State Bar Association) to, among other things, amend Rule 8.4(j) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and associated Comments. The proposed amended Rule 8.4(j), which largely mirrors Rule 8.4(g) of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, would subject attorneys to discipline for uttering words deemed harassing or discriminatory. NCLA strongly urges the Committee not to adopt the Proposed Rule. There is no need for an additional rule governing discrimination-based misconduct by Illinois attorneys; such misconduct is already adequately addressed by Rules 8.4(d) and 8.4(f) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.

More importantly, the Proposed Rule raises significant constitutional concerns. It authorizes Illinois to discipline lawyers (including imposing sanctions that deprive lawyers of the ability to earn a livelihood) based on overly vague standards. Recent history demonstrates widespread disagreement over what conduct/speech one "reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, color, ancestry, sex [etc.]." Moreover, imposing content- and viewpoint-based restrictions on attorney speech (by declaring that speech expressing certain viewpoints constitutes "harassment" or "discrimination") violates clearly established First Amendment norms. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that attorneys are entitled to the same free-speech protections enjoyed by all other citizens.

ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) has been widely criticized by leading constitutional scholars as an unwarranted speech code for lawyers. As UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh has explained, adoption of rules substantially similar to ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) (such as the Proposed Rule) is likely to deter lawyers from speaking out on important legal issues, for fear that they will face severe sanctions if someone later concludes that their speech constitutes harassment or discrimination on the

basis of one of the 16 listed characteristics.[1] Such chilling of speech is intolerable; our free society cannot function effectively unless attorneys can speak their minds openly without fear of losing their law licenses.

Supporters of the Proposed Rule argue that such free-speech concerns are overblown. They contend that bar officials can be trusted to confine enforcement of the proposal to cases of egregious attorney misconduct. But attorneys should not be required to entrust their livelihoods to the self-restraint of bar authorities who, under the Proposed Rule, would be afforded broad discretion to determine what constitutes sanctionable "harassment" or "discrimination." And recent history indicates that they would be pressured to define those terms expansively.

I. Interests of NCLA

The New Civil Liberties Alliance is a nonpartisan, nonprofit civil rights group devoted to defending civil liberties. The "civil liberties" of the organization's name include rights at least as old as the U.S. Constitution itself, such as freedom of speech, due process of law, the right to be tried by an impartial and independent judge, and the right to live under laws made by the nation's elected lawmakers through constitutionally prescribed channels (*i.e.*, the right to self-government). Yet these selfsame rights are also very contemporary—and in dire need of renewed vindication—precisely because legislatures, administrative agencies, and even sometimes the courts have neglected them for so long.

NCLA aims to defend civil liberties—primarily by asserting constitutional constraints on the administrative state. Although Americans still enjoy the shell of their Republic, a very different sort of government has developed within it—a type, in fact, that our Constitution was designed to prevent. This unconstitutional administrative state within the Constitution's United States is the focus of NCLA's concern.

Illinois promulgates Rules of Professional Conduct that govern the practice of law by attorneys within the State. Those rules are administered by the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC), which is authorized to investigate alleged rule violations; when deemed appropriate, ARDC assigns matters to its Inquiry Board for further investigation and possible formal disciplinary proceedings. NCLA is concerned that the Proposed Rule, by delegating to ARDC broad authority to define sanctionable misconduct, will inappropriately transform ARDC into an unelected policymaking body.

II. Proposed Rule 8.4(j)

Under Proposed Rule 8.4(j), a lawyer shall not:

> [E]ngage in conduct in the practice of law that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, color, ancestry, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender

[1] Eugene Volokh, *A Nationwide Speech Code for Lawyers?*, The Federalist Society (May 2, 2017) (available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AfpdWmlOXba).

> expression, marital status, military or veteran status, pregnancy, or socioeconomic status. This paragraph does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline, or, in accordance with Rule 1.16, withdraw from a representation. This paragraph does not preclude or limit the giving of advice, assistance, or advocacy consistent with these Rules.

One striking feature of Proposed Rule 8.4(j) is that it does not require a showing that the lawyer *intended* to discriminate against or harass anyone; it is enough that the lawyer "reasonably should know" that (s)he has engaged in harassment or discrimination. The conduct at issue must be "in the practice of law," but the official Comments accompanying the Proposed Rule confirm that the drafters intend that phrase to be construed quite broadly:

> Conduct in the practice of law includes representing clients; interacting with witnesses, co-workers, court personnel, lawyers, and others when representing clients; operating or managing a law firm or law practice; and participating in law-related professional activities or events, including law firm or bar association educational or social events.

RPC 8.4, Comment 3.

The Comments provide similarly broad definitions of "harassment" and "discrimination." Harassment is defined as including:

> [C]onduct directed at another person or group that is invasive, pressuring, or intimidating in relation to any characteristic identified in paragraph (j). It includes sexual harassment and derogatory or demeaning verbal or physical conduct.

Id., Comment 3A. Discrimination is defined as "harmful verbal or physical conduct directed at another person or group that manifests bias or prejudice on the basis of any characteristics identified in paragraph (j)." *Ibid.*

III. <u>The Proposed Rule Violates First Amendment Rights</u>

The Proposed Rule exposes attorneys to discipline for harassing another—for example, subjecting another to "derogatory or demeaning verbal … conduct"—on the basis of one of the protected categories. That rule runs headlong into numerous U.S. Supreme Court decisions that grant First Amendment protection to "disparaging" speech. *See, e.g., Matal v. Tam*, 582 U.S. 218 (2017) (unanimously declaring unconstitutional federal statute that permitted government officials to penalize "disparaging" speech); *id.* at 249 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that First Amendment does not permit suppression of speech that "demeans or offends"). Individuals may feel demeaned if a lawyer, speaking at a bar-sanctioned forum, tells them that homosexual conduct is immoral or that employers should ask prospective employees about their salary histories (despite claims by some that such questions tend to perpetuate sex-based salary disparities). But the First Amendment prohibits States from sanctioning lawyers for expressing such views.

That the lawyer utters the "derogatory" or "demeaning" words "in the practice of law" (as broadly defined by the Proposed Rule) does not diminish the First Amendment protections to which the speaker is entitled. The Supreme Court held in *Nat'l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra*

["*NIFLA*"], 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018), that the First Amendment protects "professional speech" just as fully as other forms of speech. When (as here) the government is proposing to restrict speech based on its content, the restriction is subject to strict constitutional scrutiny—meaning that the restriction will be found unconstitutional unless the government demonstrates that it is "narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests." *Id.* at 2371. Proponents of the Proposed Rule have not attempted to make such a showing.

Other features of the Proposed Rule are even more disturbing. Attorneys can be sanctioned even when they lack any intent to discriminate against or harass others. It is sufficient to show that the attorney "reasonably should know" that his or her conduct constitutes discrimination or harassment. The problem is compounded by the inherent vagueness of the terms "discrimination" and "harassment." Because "harassment" has no clearly defined meaning—it includes any "derogatory or demeaning" words—bar officials are free to declare that virtually any speech they find distasteful constitutes "harassment," rule that the speaker "reasonably" should have been aware of that definition, and impose career-ending sanctions on the speaker. A law that deprives someone of life, liberty, or property is constitutionally problematic when "it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or [is] so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement." *Johnson v. United States*, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015).

Illinois must be particularly vigilant in guarding against infringement of First Amendment rights in the attorney-discipline context because the consequences of an ethics violation finding can be so severe, including the loss of the right to earn a livelihood in one's chosen profession. As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized:

> Without doubt, [the Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, *to engage in any of the common occupations of life*, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (emphasis added). While Illinois is entitled to impose reasonable licensing requirements on the practice of law, it may not rescind or impair the licenses of those whose speech it finds objectionable.

IV. <u>The Proposed Rule Will Chill Speech</u>

Adoption of the Proposed Rule will inevitably lead to the chilling of attorney speech. Few attorneys will be willing to speak out on topics related to the 16 protected categories if they know that doing so could jeopardize their careers. Society as a whole will suffer from such self-censorship; we depend on lawyers to play a leading role in airing views on both sides of controversial issues.

There can be little doubt, moreover, that the Proposed Rule takes sides on at least some of those issues. For example, the official Comments accompanying the Proposed Rule state, "Lawyers may engage in conduct undertaken to promote diversity and inclusion without violating paragraph (j) by, for example, implementing initiatives to encourage recruiting, hiring, retaining, and advancing diverse employees or sponsoring diverse law student organizations." Comment 3B. No similar

exemption is provided to lawyers who publicly oppose explicit efforts to "promote diversity" and who instead advocate hiring the employees deemed most qualified—without regard to their race, sex, religion, or sexual orientation.

Assurances from bar officials that they will adopt "reasonable" enforcement policies are unlikely to reduce the Proposed Rule's chilling effect on attorney speech. Those officials may insist that they will proceed only against the most egregious violators, but attorneys who read the Proposed Rule's broad language are unlikely to rely on vague and unenforceable promises of that nature.

Moreover, if bar officials are really interested in disciplining only the most egregious offenders (and are not seeking to establish a "speech code" for the legal profession), then existing rules suffice for that purpose. The current version of Rule 8.4(j) states that lawyers have engaged in "professional misconduct" if they "violate a federal, state or local statute or ordinance including, but not limited to, the Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq.) that prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status by conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness as a lawyer."

Some supporters of the Proposed Rule assert that an amendment is necessary because the existing Rule 8.4(j) fails to address "harassment." That assertion is false. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held, for example, that the discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes harassment. *See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.*, 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). Others fault existing Rule 8.4(j) for limiting the prohibition to unlawful discrimination; they would prefer a rule that would permit attorney speech to be sanctioned as "discrimination" or "harassment" even if it does not violate any existing legal standard. On the contrary, NCLA views the current Rule's limitation to "unlawful" discrimination as an essential bulwark against speech control of the sort antithetical to our free society. The chill on free speech will become a deep freeze if bar authorities are authorized to expand the definition of "harassment" to include speech not sanctionable under existing law.

V. <u>Federal Court Strikes Down Pennsylvania's Version of Rule 8.4(g)</u>

A federal district court in Pennsylvania has issued two opinions striking down Pennsylvania's version of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), holding that the rule violated attorneys' First Amendment rights. *Greenberg v. Haggerty*, 491 F. Supp. 3d 12, 27 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (granting preliminary injunction against Pennsylvania's initial version of Rule 8.4(g)); *Greenberg v. Goodrich*, 593 F. Supp. 3d 174, 224 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (permanently enjoining enforcement of a revised version of the rule). The Third Circuit later overturned the latter decision, concluding that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing to mount a pre-enforcement facial challenge to the revised rule, 81 F.4th 376 (3d Cir. 2023); but the appeals court never questioned the district court's cogent constitutional analysis. The Rules Committee ought to carefully reflect on that constitutional analysis before recommending adoption of a similar bar rule in Illinois, a rule that is certain to spawn judicial challenges. Particularly striking is that the district court ruled that the Pennsylvania rule could not survive First Amendment scrutiny despite having a narrower scope than both ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) and the Proposed Rule. Unlike the latter two rules, Pennsylvania Rule 8.4(g) limits its reach to attorneys who "*knowingly* engage in conduct constituting harassment or discrimination." (Emphasis added.) If a rule limited to "knowing" harassment or discrimination violates the First Amendment, it is highly unlikely that federal courts would uphold the broader version of the rule proposed by the ABA and the Illinois Bar.

The first *Greenberg* decision (never appealed by Pennsylvania) explicitly rejected Pennsylvania's claim that its rule was entitled to deference because attorneys, as professionals engaged in the administration of justice, are subject to heightened regulation. 491 F. Supp. 3d at 27-28. While acknowledging that the First Amendment does not proscribe closer regulation of attorneys when (1) their speech is "commercial" in nature or (2) a State is "regulat[ing] professional conduct, even though that conduct incidentally involves speech," the court determined that "Rule 8.4(g) does not fall into either of those categories." *Id.* at 27. The court held that "the drafters of Rule 8.4(g) intended to explicitly restrict offensive words," an intent anathema to the First Amendment. *Id.* at 28. It explained,

> The dangers associated with content-based regulations of speech are also present in the context of professional speech. … As with other kinds of speech, regulating the content of professionals' speech poses the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information. … States cannot choose the protection that speech receives under the First Amendment [by imposing a licensing requirement], as that would give them a powerful tool to impose invidious discrimination of disfavored subjects.

Id. at 29 (quoting *NIFLA*, 138 S. Ct. at 2374).

CONCLUSION

In light of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)'s infringement on free-speech rights, it is unsurprising that the rule has been rejected by virtually all the States that have considered its adoption. Only a small number of States have fully adopted ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). Nearly 20 States have either completely or largely rejected the Model Rule. Most recently, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected a proposal that it adopt Model Rule 8.4(g), finding that the rule violates attorneys' First Amendment rights. *In re Idaho State Bar Resolution* (Idaho, Jan. 20, 2023), available at https://isc.idaho.gov/opinions/50356.pdf. At the very least, Illinois should defer consideration of the Proposed Rule until after those States that have adopted the Model Rule have had enough experience with their new rules to see what effect they have on attorney conduct and speech.

NCLA respectfully requests that the Supreme Court Rules Committee decline to adopt Proposed Rule 8.4(j) as an amendment to the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard A. Samp

Richard A. Samp, Senior Litigation Counsel
Margaret A. Little, Senior Litigation Counsel

Rich.Samp@NCLA.legal