60.01 Violation of Statute, Ordinance, or Administrative Regulation

There was in force in the [State of Illinois] [City of _____] at the time of the
e.g., Peoria
occurrence in question a certain [statute] [ordinance] [administrative (regulation) (rule) (order)] which provided that:

> [*Quote or paraphrase applicable part of statute, ordinance or regulation as construed by the courts.*]

If you decide that [a party] [the parties] violated the [statute] [ordinance] [regulation] [rule] [order] on the occasion in question, then you may consider that fact together with all the other facts and circumstances in evidence in determining whether and to what extent, if any, [a party] [the parties] [was] [were] negligent before and at the time of the occurrence.

Instruction revised November 2026 and December 2011; Notes on Use revised November 2026 and 2002.

Notes on Use

This instruction should be given only where the evidence would support a finding that the injury complained of was proximately caused by a violation of a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation, rule, or order intended to protect against such an injury, and that the injured party is within the class intended to be protected by the statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation. This instruction should be given provided that the statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation has the force of law. *Davis v. Marathon Oil Co.*, 64 Ill.2d 380 (1976). If the subject standard does not have the force of law, this instruction should not be given. *Poelker v. Warrensburg-Latham Sch. Dist.*, 251 Ill. App. 3d 270 (4th Dist.1993) (rules and recommendations of the National Federation of High School Associations at issue). When IPI 60.01 has been given for standards that do not have the force of law, the appellate court has noted the holding in *Davis* and affirmed this practice only when waiver or other factors are present. *See, e.g.*, *Am. State Bank v. Cnty. of Woodford*, 55 Ill. App. 3d 123 (4th Dist.1978) (precise objection not made at jury instruction conference); *Carlson v. City Constr. Co.*, 239 Ill. App. 3d 211 (1st Dist.1992) (compliance with standards required in contract between the parties). In at least one instance, however, the appellate court has affirmed, without reservation and without citation to *Davis*, a trial court's usage of IPI 60.01 where the standard did not have the force of law. *King v. Am. Food Equip. Co.*, 160 Ill. App. 3d 898 (1st Dist.1987) (ANSI standard at issue).

A party is not entitled to multiple instructions containing the same legal principle. Thus, a party may properly be required to choose between several tendered instructions that embody the same or similar statutory violations. *Bernardoni v. Hebel*, 101 Ill. App. 3d 172, 176-177 (3d Dist.1981).

Evidence that a party *complied* with a relevant statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation, rule, or order, intended to protect against the injury complained of, may be admissible as evidence that the party was *not* negligent, or that a product was not defective or unreasonably dangerous. *Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.*, 77 Ill. 2d 434 (1979). Just as in the case of other such legislation, compliance with applicable statutes and safety regulations is not conclusive evidence on the question of negligence, but it is relevant to that issue. *Moehle v. Chrysler Motors Corp*., 93 Ill. 2d 299, 305 (1982); *Christou v. Arlington Park-Washington Park Race Tracks Corp.*, 104 Ill. App. 3d 257, 261 (1st Dist.1982). If the court rules that such a statute or other enactment is admissible for this purpose, and that an instruction is appropriate, this instruction may be modified and used.

Comment

Ordinarily the language of the statute, ordinance, or regulation may be used in the instruction. *Davis v. Marathon Oil Co.*, 64 Ill. 2d 380 (1976) (regulation pertaining to tank trucks); *Tenenbaum v. City of Chi.*, 60 Ill. 2d 363 (1975); *Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp.*, 33 Ill. 2d 326 (1965) (hospital regulations of State Department of Public Health); *Bertrand v. Adams*, 344 Ill. App. 559, 562 (4th Dist.1951) (statute prohibiting overtaking and passing near intersections); *Hann v. Brooks*, 331 Ill. App. 535, 551 (2d Dist.1947) (statute providing for driving on the right side of the road). But if a judicial interpretation has modified the language, the change must be reflected in the instruction. *McElligott v. Ill. Cent. R. Co.*, 37 Ill. 2d 459 (1967) (maintenance of railroad crossing); *De Legge v. Karlsen*, 17 Ill. App. 2d 69, 79, 81 (1st Dist.1958) (peremptory instruction in language of right-of-way statute held error); *Anderson v. Steinle*, 289 Ill. App. 167, 171 (4th Dist.1937) (same ruling as to "flare statute").

If the statute, ordinance, or regulation is not intended to protect against the type of injury in question, *Ney v. Yellow Cab Co.*, 2 Ill. 2d 74 (1954), or if the injured party is not within the protected class, *Brunnworth v. Kerens-Donnewald Coal Co.*, 260 Ill. 202, 216-217 (1913), *Bitner v. Lester B. Knight & Associates, Inc.*, 16 Ill. App. 3d 857 (3d Dist.1974), the statute, ordinance, or regulation should not be called to the jury's attention. In addition, there must be evidence from which the jury can find that the violation was a proximate cause of the injury. *French v. City of Springfield*, 65 Ill. 2d 74, 79-80 (1976).

Violation of a statute, ordinance or regulation is not negligence *per se*, but only *prima facie* evidence of negligence. Such *prima facie* evidence may be rebutted by a showing that, under all the facts and circumstances of the case, the party who violated the statute acted reasonably. *See* IPI 60.00. Accordingly, violation of a statute, ordinance or regulation is but one fact to be taken into consideration by the jury along with all of the other facts and circumstances in determining the issue of negligence. *Davis v. Marathon Oil Co.*, 64 Ill. 2d 380 (1976).

It can be reversible error to use the phrase "*prima facie* evidence" in an instruction (*Hicks v. Hendricks*, 33 Ill. App. 3d 486 (5th Dist.1975) ("yield right-of-way" statute; not error on facts of this case); *Klinkenberg v. Horton*, 81 Ill. App. 2d 152 (3d Dist.1967) ("yield right-of-way" statute; reversible error)), and, in any event, it would not be understood by a jury. *See Johnson v. Pendergast*, 308 Ill. 255, 264 (1923); *Harris v. Piggly Wiggly Stores, Inc*., 236 Ill. App. 392 (1st Dist.1925).

This instruction may not be modified so that it names one party only. An instruction on statutory violation which singles out one party is slanted, partial, and argumentative and constitutes reversible error. *Macak v. Cont'l Baking Co.*, 92 Ill. App. 2d 63 (1st Dist.1968). Nor may it be used without the second paragraph. *Ryan v. Fleischman*, 64 Ill. App. 3d 75, 79 (2d Dist.1978); *Fornoff v. Parke Davis & Co.*, 105 Ill. App. 3d 681, 688 (4th Dist.1982).