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2026 IL App (3d) 250098-U

Order filed October 20, 2026

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT

2026

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)	Appeal from the Circuit Court
	)	of the 13th Judicial Circuit,
	)	La Salle County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee,	)	
	)	Appeal No. 3-25-0098
v.	)	Circuit No. 22-CF-385
	)	
	)	Honorable
DEZZAN D. PHILLIPS,	)	Cynthia M. Raccuglia and
	)	Michael C. Jansz,
Defendant-Appellant.	)	Judges, Presiding.

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Peterson and Bertani concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

- ¶ 1 *Held:* The trial court did not improperly deprive defendant of his right to counsel. Affirmed.
- ¶ 2 Defendant, Dezzan D. Phillips, appeals from his conviction for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, arguing the La Salle County circuit court abused its discretion when it allowed appointed counsel to withdraw, causing defendant to be unrepresented during the hearings on his petition to revoke probation, resentencing, and motion to reconsider. We affirm.

¶ 3

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4

On March 23, 2023, defendant pled guilty to unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d)(i) (West 2022)). Pursuant to his negotiated plea, defendant was sentenced to 48 months' probation and was required, *inter alia*, not to commit any new offenses. Defendant was represented by the public defender's office. On November 30, 2023, the State filed a petition to revoke defendant's probation, alleging in part that he violated the terms by committing the offenses of robbery and domestic battery, for which he was later convicted. On December 15, 2023, the court appointed the public defender's office to represent defendant, and public defender Ryan Hamer was assigned to defendant's case. Defendant immediately informed the court that he did not want Hamer's representation, asserting that Hamer was ineffective based on defendant's past interactions with him.

¶ 5

On January 16, 2024, defense counsel addressed defendant's ineffective assistance claims and suggested the court conduct a *Krankel* inquiry. Following questioning, the court rejected defendant's claims, finding that he failed to present any specific allegation of ineffectiveness. On February 14, 2024, defendant filed a motion alleging various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and counsel's conflict of interest. On March 20, 2024, the State filed a motion for physical restraints, setting forth defendant's history of outbursts in the courtroom toward the court, counsel, and the State. On a recent occasion, deputies had heard defendant screaming at counsel and his investigator during a visit, threatening that "when [defendant] sees them in court he will get them and that's a promise."

¶ 6

On March 21, 2024, the court granted the State's motion for physical restraints over defense counsel's objection. The court addressed defendant's ineffectiveness claims, stating it found no conflict of interest preventing Hamer's representation, and that defendant would not

receive a different appointed attorney. The court asked defendant whether he would allow Hamer's continued representation or wished to hire a private attorney. The court also told defendant that he would not be able to appeal any errors based on his *pro se* mistakes, then directed defendant's attention to the State's motion to revoke probation and asked, "what you want to do about [counsel's] representation." Defendant responded, "I do not want [counsel] as a *** court-appointed attorney." Defendant continued,

"I don't want him. I'm indigent. *** I can't afford—and if I have to sit and stall just to be able to wait to get a private attorney, I will keep stalling it out to get a private attorney because I don't want no one in [this] courthouse to be my public defender."

Defendant concluded that he planned to hire a private attorney and asked for a continuance. The court continued the case for one month and did not discharge Hamer.

¶ 7 On May 2, 2024, defendant told the court that he had not obtained private counsel and he wanted to "fire" Hamer, asserting there was a conflict of interest. Defendant requested a "penal attorney," and stated, "[u]ntil one is appointed to represent me, I will be filing *pro se* to launch my own investigation due to the ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecuting misconduct and a bias prejudice of the whole *** Court." The following colloquy occurred:

"THE COURT: All right. So you want to proceed *pro se*?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

* * *

THE COURT: All right. Well, we're going to go through it again and make it very clear.

First of all, I have to make it clear that I am not finding [appointed counsel] ineffective or have any conflict, as I told you before, that would prevent him from representing you, and I would prefer that he stay representing you. But you need to understand the following.”

The court’s continued admonishments included informing defendant of the criminal offense for which he was sentenced to probation and the robbery and domestic battery offenses alleged to have violated his probation. The court told defendant the sentencing ranges for all the offenses as well as his extended-term eligibility. The court continued by stating:

“You have the right to a lawyer who I encourage that you continue with [the counsel] who I have appointed you. You have a right to a trial by court and by jury. You have a right to confront the witnesses against you and present a defense.

*** [Y]ou have told me that you are not happy with your lawyer and there’s a conflict. I have ruled otherwise. And it is the opinion of the court that you continue with [appointed counsel].

Now, the question becomes whether you have the requ[isite] capacity to make an intelligent and knowing waiver of your right to counsel; not whether you are capable of doing your own defense. I’m aware of your age through the years. We’ve been through this. Your level of education, your mental capacity, and any prior involvement in legal proceedings. I’m aware that you can write and read because we’ve communicated that way.

But you need to understand that presenting a defense is not a simple matter of telling one’s story but requires adherence to various technical rules governing the conduct of a trial. A lawyer has substantial experience and training and trial

procedure, and the prosecution will be represented by an experienced attorney. ***

A person unfamiliar with legal procedures may allow the prosecutor an advantage by failing to make objections to inadmissible evidence, may not make effective usage of such rights *** and may make tactical decisions that produce unintended consequences.

Now, the key to all of this is that proceeding *pro se* you will not be allowed to complain that your representation was not competent. Any errors you make because you do not know the law you can't appeal. The only errors that you can appeal are my errors at the trial, and, of course, your pretrial motions you can appeal those where you want an appointed lawyer that is not from the public defender's office. That's what you want, and I will not give you that for the reasons I've said.

So the question here is do you truly want to waive, under the circumstances that I presented and I know that's how you're doing it, I'm aware of that, proceeding *pro se* yourself as your own lawyer?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: You do?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. ma'am."

The court accepted defendant's "knowing and voluntary" waiver of counsel and discharged Hamer. Prior to concluding the matter, defendant asked if he could hire private counsel before the next court date, and the court responded he could hire counsel at any time. The court entered an order indicating that defendant had the capacity to represent himself, his waiver of counsel was "freely and voluntarily" made, and Hamer was discharged as appointed counsel.

¶ 8 On June 27, 2024, defendant again requested appointed counsel stating, “only if he follow in on all the standards that I already presented in front of you” and “[a]nything else I object to.” Hamer addressed the court stating, “If I’m being reappointed, that’s fine; but there are certain decisions that I’m going to make, certain decisions that [defendant] will make. I’m going to file the motions that I feel have merit and the ones that I can, and it’s as simple as that.” Defendant responded, “[I]f you’re not gonna participate in *** the motions that I’ve *** put in” then stated, “I will only ask you to be an advisor, not—not to represent me then.” The court denied his request for appointed standby counsel. Defendant inquired further about the nature of appointed counsel and the following conversation occurred:

“THE DEFENDANT: You’re not allowing me to get another representation.

THE COURT: No.

THE DEFENDANT: So my only representation is [Hamer]. I have no other representation.

So if [Hamer] is presiding back on my case, I’m asking *** [him] to follow up on the motions that I’ve already presented.

* * *

THE COURT: No. *** [I]t’s not going to work. *** [Y]ou will not get along. You are combative, and if you—

THE DEFENDANT: Then I would like for an attorney to be presented for my sentencing, ma’am.

If [Hamer] is compatible with [myself], then I will ask that the *** Court assist me into a public defender upon sentencing ***.

THE COURT: You will have [appointed counsel] under my terms and his terms.

* * *

THE COURT: *** [H]e's not going to look over what you've already presented.

So if you want him to represent you just for sentencing, I will give him to you for that purpose.

* * *

THE DEFENDANT: This here is complicated, bro.

So is he my lawyer?

THE COURT: No. Not until you accept his terms.

THE DEFENDANT: I accept the terms of an effective assistance of counsel.

[THE COURT]: *** [I]f you're going to continue to argue generalities, I can't work under those terms.

He will represent you in the sentencing. You've already argued your motions."

* * *

[THE COURT]: All right. Here's what we're going to do.

I am going to appoint [the public defender] for only purposes of sentencing and other motions that you feel appropriate to file, all right?

[THE DEFENDANT]: I have no problem with that, your Honor.”

The court then appointed counsel and set the matter for July 9, 2024, for status and to determine if defendant and counsel could work together. On June 28, 2024, Hamer filed an appearance.

¶ 9 On July 9, 2024, Hamer informed the court that defendant was not satisfied with his representation, and he believed defendant wished to proceed *pro se*. Defendant renewed his complaints regarding Hamer, and the court reiterated that it did not have the authority to appoint a different public defender. The court commented that the relationship with defendant and Hamer was irretrievable, stating, “[t]here is no way that you will allow him to represent you without being quarrelsome. You go back to the same [ineffective assistance and conflict of interest] issue that I have ruled on previously.” The court permitted Hamer to withdraw and continued the matter for a hearing on the State’s petition to revoke probation. The court told defendant, “We’re going to hear all remaining issues and unfortunately you have to go *pro se* because you cannot get along with [appointed counsel]. And it’s because of your conduct and your insistence that I hear issues that I’ve already heard.” The court deemed the matter concluded and asked that defendant be removed from the courtroom, and defendant stated, “I’m going to get you all. The whole La Salle County Jail.”

¶ 10 On August 29, 2024, the court held a second *Krankel* inquiry and found no reliable claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and therefore there would be no reason to discharge appointed counsel and appoint a different attorney. Defendant did not renew his request for appointed counsel. Defendant represented himself during the revocation proceeding and the resentencing hearing that immediately followed. The court resentenced defendant to seven years’ imprisonment.

¶ 11 On September 11, 2024, defendant was brought into court to complete the appeal admonishments. Again, the court told defendant that he was entitled to appointed counsel on his

motion to reconsider his sentence or he could hire private counsel. The court stated, “So my question to you is first of all, if you want [appointed counsel] to file a motion to reconsider your sentence ***.” The court then asked, “[D]o you want [appointed counsel]?” and defendant stated, “No, ma’am.” On September 27, 2024, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which raised allegations of the court’s error in finding counsel effective and denying defendant an adequate *Krankel* inquiry and a new attorney.

¶ 12 On December 27, 2024, the case was reassigned to a new judge. The court set the motion to reconsider sentence for February 21, 2025. On January 27, 2025, the court addressed defendant’s *pro se* status, saying,

“So you’re representing yourself, and one of the things people are always made aware of when they’re representing themselves is that it’s more difficult to do things when you don’t have an attorney. You had a Public Defender. You obviously discharged your Public Defender because all the orders do indicate that you’re continuing to want to represent yourself.”

Later, defendant asked, “[s]o I’m not entitled to an affordable court-appointed attorney?” and the court responded, “[y]ou have had them, and you have discharged them.” Defendant complained that each time he was appointed counsel, it was the same attorney. The court admonished that he had the right to appointed counsel but did not have the right to choose his appointed attorney and the court had no authority to determine which attorney represents an individual. The court stated, “that doesn’t mean that if you ask for an appointed attorney you won’t get [the same appointed counsel]. That’s up to [the public defender’s] office to decide, not the Court.”

¶ 13 Defendant accepted appointment of the public defender, upon which the court stated,

“I have every intention of having this hearing on the 21st of February, and I don’t want this [to] be an opportunity to delay the case because I don’t want you to discharge the Public Defender and then say I need more time so I have no problem giving you your right to counsel. *** I have a sense that there’s been times where [counsel has] been appointed, fired, appointed and fired—.”

Defendant responded, “[I]f [Hamer] is going to be my court-appointed attorney I will be *** firing him, and I will be going back [to] representing myself, and that’s not—that’s not nothing that I’m not gonna do if I come up here *** and I see that he’s sitting in this chair.” The court set an interim status date to determine whether Hamer would again be assigned to represent defendant and, if so, whether defendant would continue with counsel’s representation.

¶ 14 On January 31, 2025, Hamer appeared as defendant’s attorney, and defendant immediately “fired” him. The court stated, “So you’re indicating to the Court that at this point you wish to discharge the [appointed counsel] ***?” The court further asked if defendant made that decision “freely and voluntarily?” Defendant responded affirmatively to both questions. The court stated, “I know that this has been something that happened before.” Defendant responded that “[i]t’s happened over several times.” The court indicated, “I’ll take your representation. Well, then at your request, *** the Court will allow you to discharge [appointed counsel] from this case, and you’ll be allowed to represent yourself ***.” Defendant said that he was in contact with a private attorney, whom he named, but asked for a continuance to a date between March 2 and March 7, 2025, to obtain the funds. The court gave an interim status date of February 7, 2025, for defendant to hire an attorney and indicated the February 21 hearing date would stand.

¶ 15 On February 7, 2025, defendant advised that he had not been able to obtain the funds to retain private counsel and asked to continue the upcoming February 21, 2025, hearing date. The

court denied defendant's continuance request but stated that if private counsel filed an appearance by the hearing date, the court would consider a motion to continue. On February 10, defendant filed an "appearance" as a *pro se* litigant. On February 18, defendant filed another "appearance" as a *pro se* litigant.

¶ 16 On February 21, 2025, the court acknowledged defendant's *pro se* appearance filings. No private counsel appeared. Prior to the proceeding, defendant addressed his right to the counsel of his choice and asked for a continuance to obtain private counsel. In subsequently denying defendant's request, the court noted that defendant's convictions for the offenses underlying the petition to revoke occurred over a year prior to the current proceedings and defendant had previously requested private counsel, been given an opportunity to retain private counsel, and there was "no indication that could happen." The court proceeded to a hearing on defendant's motion to reconsider sentence. Defendant argued, *inter alia*, that the court erred by denying him "ineffective [*sic*] assistance of counsel without a proper *Krankel* inquiry, *** without affording [him] a court-appointed attorney that was not [in]effective." Defendant asserted that appointed counsel "failed to enlighten the court that Supreme Court Rule 402(a) states that the defendant has a right to a hearing with defense counsel present" where the State "must prove the alleged violations by a preponderance of evidence." Defendant contended that the State failed to prove each alleged violation. The court denied defendant's motion to reconsider his sentence, and defendant appealed.

¶ 17

II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18

On appeal, defendant argues that the court abused its discretion when it allowed appointed counsel to withdraw, causing defendant to be unrepresented during the hearings on his petition to revoke probation, resentencing, and motion to reconsider. He contends that the court failed to

ensure that he knowingly and understandingly waived his right to counsel and requests that we reverse and remand on the State’s petition to revoke probation and vacate his sentence.

¶ 19 A. Petition to Revoke and Resentencing

¶ 20 We first address defendant’s contention that he did not waive his right to counsel on July 9, 2024. Defendant argues that the court “may have misinterpreted [defendant]’s remarks as requests to proceed *pro se*, but the court’s discussions with [him] demonstrated that he did not wish to be his own counsel—instead, he desired counsel that would address his arguments.”

¶ 21 Section 5-6-4(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(c) (West 2024)) provides that a defendant has a right to representation by counsel during probation revocation proceedings. A court is required to appoint the public defender to represent a defendant “if the court determines that the defendant is indigent and desires counsel.” 725 ILCS 5/113-3(b) (West 2024).

¶ 22 A defendant’s conduct may be construed as a waiver of counsel. *People v. Lesley*, 2018 IL 122100, ¶ 36. In *Lesley*, the court explained that “[w]aiver by conduct requires that a defendant receive a warning about the consequences of his conduct, including the risks of proceeding *pro se*. [Citation.] The key to waiver by conduct is misconduct occurring after an express warning has been given to the defendant about the defendant’s behavior and the consequences of proceeding without counsel. [Citations.]” *Id.* ¶ 42. In *Lesley*, our supreme court concluded that the defendant had waived his right to counsel for his postconviction petition by conduct and that his waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. *Id.* ¶¶ 45-47, 58. Whether a defendant was deprived of his right to counsel is reviewed *de novo*. *Id.* ¶ 30.

¶ 23 Here, defendant was made aware that the consequence of his conduct would be self-representation. Despite his argument that he merely desired alternative appointed counsel rather

than to proceed *pro se*, “the absence of an explicit request does not prove the absence of an implied decision.” *Id.* ¶ 46. Defendant was offered Hamer’s representation as appointed counsel, which he repeatedly rejected. The court correctly explained to defendant on several occasions that it could not dictate who the public defender’s office assigned to his case. *People v. Baez*, 241 Ill. 2d 44, 138 n.5 (2011). Notwithstanding, defendant maintained his position that he was entitled to different appointed counsel and refused to work with Hamer. Defendant was also given the opportunity to retain private counsel and was informed that he could do so at any time; however, he never took this step. “[I]f a person is offered a choice between three things—an appointed attorney, hired counsel, or self-representation—and says ‘no’ to the first and second, he’s chosen the third ***.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Lesley*, 2018 IL 122100, ¶ 46 (quoting *United States v. Pittman*, 816 F.3d 419, 422 (6th Cir. 2016)).

¶ 24 We further observe that the court informed defendant of the risks of proceeding *pro se* on May 2, 2024. Specifically, the court advised defendant that proceeding *pro se* was “not a simple matter of telling one’s story but requires adherence to various technical rules governing the conduct of a trial.” The court continued that defendant’s self-representation “may allow the prosecutor an advantage by failing to make objections to inadmissible evidence, may not make effective usage of such rights as the *voir dire* of jurors and may make tactical decisions that produce unintended consequences.” Defendant was warned that he could not appeal based on errors he made as a result of his legal inexperience. Defendant was also informed of the applicable sentencing range.

¶ 25 Defendant argues that, pursuant to *People v. Ames*, 2012 IL App (4th) 110513, the court was required to again admonish defendant pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984) when it allowed counsel to withdraw on July 9, 2024. However, our supreme court

set forth the rules pertaining to waiver by conduct in *Lesley*, and it did not express such a requirement. Moreover, and as discussed in further detail below, the supreme court has previously held that Rule 401(a) admonishments are not required in probation revocation proceedings. *People v. Barker*, 62 Ill. 2d 57, 59 (1975); *People v. Baker*, 94 Ill. 2d 129, 133 (1983).

¶ 26 Simply put, the record demonstrates that defendant was aware that his choices were to proceed with Hamer’s representation, retain private counsel, or represent himself, and his conduct reflected his decision to represent himself. Defendant also received sufficient warning of the risks associated with self-representation. We therefore conclude that defendant waived his right to counsel by conduct and need not address defendant’s arguments related to whether he expressly waived or forfeited counsel.

¶ 27 Having determined that defendant’s conduct communicated a waiver of counsel to the court, we now turn to whether this waiver was valid. “[U]nlike a guilty plea, a probation revocation occurs only after there has already been a conviction. [Citation]. Thus, probationers are entitled to fewer procedural safeguards than defendants who have not been convicted at all. [Citation.] Therefore, at probation revocation proceedings, *** the court need not comply with all the procedural safeguards” of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984) to effectuate a valid waiver of counsel. *People v. Marion*, 275 Ill. App. 3d 494, 495 (1995); *Barker*, 62 Ill. 2d at 59; *Baker*, 94 Ill. 2d at 133. Instead, our supreme court has held that the relevant question in a revocation proceeding is “whether, *considering the entire record*, the defendant was shown to have knowingly and understandingly rejected the offer of appointed counsel.” (Emphasis added.) *People v. Barker*, 62 Ill. 2d at 59; *Baker*, 94 Ill. 2d at 133. The supreme court further established the “definitive standard by which a knowing and understanding waiver of counsel *** may be determined”:

“The circuit court should not permit the offender to waive counsel unless it determines, by addressing him in open court, that the offender understands: (1) the purpose of the revocation proceeding and the nature of the violation of the condition of probation upon which it is based; (2) that he has the right of confrontation, cross-examination and representation by counsel and that if he is indigent he has the right to appointed counsel; [and] (3) the minimum and maximum sentence which may be imposed if the probation is revoked.” *Barker*, 62 Ill. 2d at 59.

A court’s finding regarding whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. *Baez*, 241 Ill. 2d at 116.

¶ 28 The rule set forth in *Barker* requires us to review the entire record to determine whether defendant knowingly and understandingly waived counsel at the hearing on the State’s petition to revoke probation and sentencing. Approximately two months prior to defense counsel’s July 9, 2024, withdrawal, the court admonished defendant regarding self-representation following his request to proceed *pro se*. While these admonishments may not have been repeated immediately prior to counsel’s withdrawal on July 9, 2024, we must consider the entire record, including the May 2, 2024, admonishments, to determine whether defendant’s subsequent waiver by conduct was knowing and voluntary. *Barker*, 62 Ill. 2d at 59; *Baker*, 94 Ill. 2d at 133. Defendant does not challenge the content or sufficiency of his original admonishments on appeal, instead relying primarily on the court’s apparent misunderstanding that he wished to proceed *pro se*. He also does not deny having the requisite knowledge or understanding to waive his right to counsel. Therefore, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in accepting defendant’s waiver.

¶ 29

B. Motion to Reconsider Resentence

¶ 30 Turning to defendant’s *pro se* motion to reconsider sentence, he challenges the court’s failure to admonish him pursuant to Rule 401(a) regarding his right to counsel at post-sentencing proceedings and argues that his receipt of the “harshes allowable punishment” is a “direct result” of his self-representation. He contends that he had a sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because the hearing on his motion to reconsider his resentence was a critical stage of proceedings that impacted his substantial rights. He states that “the court’s denials of [his] requests for brief continuances thwarted his effort to hire private counsel.”

¶ 31 When presented with the question of whether a defendant has an absolute sixth amendment right to counsel during proceedings on a motion to reconsider sentence in the probation revocation context, the Fourth District held:

“We find the motion to reconsider a sentence imposed after revocation of probation does not in every case require the assistance of counsel. Due process may warrant the appointment of counsel to assist in the preparation of such motions in circumstances where fundamental fairness may so dictate. A blanket right to counsel, though, when the rules do not even require that the trial court advise a defendant of such a right, would be inappropriate.” *People v. Allison*, 356 Ill. App. 3d 248, 253 (2005).

In so holding, the court noted, “Under Rule 605(a)(2), which applies when Rule 604(b) [defendant may appeal order revoking probation] applies, the trial court must advise the defendant of the right to have counsel appointed *on appeal*.” (Emphasis in original.) *Id.* at 251-52. The rules do not extend this requirement to the preparation of motions. *Id.* at 252.

¶ 32 We therefore reject defendant’s contention that he had a constitutional right to counsel during the proceedings on his motion to reconsider and, for the same reasons discussed above, *supra* ¶ 27, that the court was required to admonish him pursuant to Rule 401(a). Aside from his

statement that he received the “harshesht allowable punishment,” he fails to set forth any argument that fundamental fairness required the appointment of counsel in this case, nor do we find any evidence to support such an assertion in the record. See *id.* at 253 (declining to hold that fundamental fairness required the appointment of counsel for proceedings on the defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence following revocation of probation where the defendant merely alleged that her sentence was harsh and the record did not indicate the denial of due process).

¶ 33 To the extent defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in denying his continuance motion to allow him to retain private counsel before proceeding on his motion to reconsider sentence, we disagree. As the court noted in denying the request for a continuance to obtain private counsel, the verdicts for the offenses underlying the petition to revoke occurred “over a year ago.” Defendant had indicated that he wanted to hire private counsel multiple times over the course of the case. However, throughout the case, defendant had stated that he was indigent, could not afford private counsel, had been appointed the public defender, and discharged the public defender, proceeding *pro se*. The court identified defendant’s pattern with appointed counsel and implicitly determined it was a delay tactic where it stated, “the court is not going to continue the case again for that same thing to happen.” See *People v. Cummings*, 2023 IL App (1st) 220520, ¶ 54. As the court noted in denying the continuance, “there is no indication” defendant would ever be able to hire private counsel. Given the record before us, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s request to continue the hearing date. See *People v. Little*, 207 Ill. App. 3d 720, 724 (1990).

¶ 34 In sum, the court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed appointed counsel to withdraw, causing defendant to be unrepresented during the hearings on his petition to revoke probation, resentencing, and motion to reconsider.

¶ 35

III. CONCLUSION

¶ 36

The judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is affirmed.

¶ 37

Affirmed.