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No. 3-00-0931WC

IN THE APPELLATE COURT O= F ILLINOIS

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT<= /font>

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DI= VISION

MOBIL OIL CORPORATION,	)	Appeal From The
	)	Circuit Court = of
&n= bsp; = ; Appellant,	)	Will County
	)
&= nbsp; &nbs= p; &= nbsp; v.	)	No. 00 MR 99
	)
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISS= ION, et al.,	)
(DAVID HABERKORN,	)	Honorable
	)	William Penn, =
&n= bsp; = ; Appellee.)	)	Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil) appeals fr= om an order of the circuit court of Will County confirming a decision of the Industrial Commission (Commission) which award= ed the claimant, David Haberkorn, benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 IL= CS 305/1 et seq. (West 1996)). For the reasons which follow, we affirm the circuit court's = order in part and reverse it in part, vacate the Commission's decision in part, and remand this cause= to the Commission.

The claimant filed an application for ad= justment of claim seeking benefits under the Act for injuries he alleged that he received on July 17, 1997, while working for Mo= bil. Thereafter, he filed a petition seeking an emergency hearing pursuant to section 19(b-1) of the = Act (820 ILCS 305/19(b-1) (West 1998)), alleging that Mobil refused to pay = temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and also refused to pay for his medical expenses. The following facts are taken fro= m the evidence presented at the arbitration hearing.

The claimant was a machinist in the empl= oy of Mobil. In 1990, he developed low back and leg pain from causes unrelated to his employment and underwent a laminotomy= at L5-S1. By 1992, his symptoms had subsided, and he returned to unrestricted work.

In January of 1997, the claimant again d= eveloped low back and leg pain and sought treatment with Dr. Karla R. Shively. Dr. Shively prescribed medication and a course = of physical therapy. At the suggestion of Dr. Shively, the claimant underwent an MRI of the lumbar = spine on February 14, 1997. The report of that test states that no evidence suggesting a recurre= nt herniated disc was detected but that contrast enhancement of the soft tissue density at L5-S1 = was consistent with fibrotic changes and associated deformity of the lateral aspect of the thecal sac. = On February 17, 1997, Dr. Shively referred the claimant to Dr. Keith Rezin, an orthopedic surgeon, fo= r evaluation.

The claimant first saw Dr. Rezin on Marc= h 4, 1997. After examining the claimant and reviewing his medical records, Dr. Rezin was of the impression that the cla= imant had S1 radiculopathy. In a report of that visit, Dr. Rezin noted that, although t= he claimant's MRI of February 14 showed soft tissue findings at L5-S1 which the radiologist read as a sca= r, he was not convinced that the condition was all scar.

The claimant continued to treat with Dr.= Rezin, who prescribed medication and a series of epidural injections. Dr. Rezin's notes of the claimant's visit on March 31= , 1997, state that, although he reported some minimal posterior calf pain, the claimant was able to walk= with a good gait. Dr. Rezin's impression on that date was that the claimant had a "[r]esolving S1= radiculopathy." Dr. Rezin released the claimant to return to light-duty work for two to three w= eeks and then to full, unrestricted duty. On April 21, 1997, the claimant returned to full-duty w= ork.

From April 21, 1997, through July 17, 19= 97, the claimant sought no medical treatment but did exercise at Mobil's wellness center in an effort to stay in shape. On = June 12, 1997, the claimant completed a health questionnaire, stating that he had no health concerns at= that time.

On July 17, 1997, the claimant was engag= ed in a fire fighting training exercise at work.=20 According to the claimant, he was holding a water hose under his arm and on= his right hip. As he opened the nozzle, the water pressure caused the hose to break loose. The = claimant testified that, when the hose broke lose, he was jerked backwards and felt a pain or snap i= n his back. The claimant stated that, during his lunch break, he visited Mobil's wellness center but= was unable to do his regular exercises due to the pain in his back.

Friday, July 18, 1997, was the claimant'= s scheduled day off. The claimant testified that he refrained from any physical activity that day due to soreness and stiffness= in his back. He stated that, by July 19, 1997, he felt pain and numbness radiating down his left leg int= o his foot and toes.

The claimant went to work on Monday, Jul= y 21, 1997, and notified George Kraft, a supervisor, that he had been injured while operating a fire hose on July 17= , 1997. He gave a similar account of his injury in an accident report he completed on July 25, 1997, = and in the history that he gave to a plant nurse on that same day.

On July 21, 1997, the claimant went to D= r. Rezin's office, where he was examined by Dr. Stephen H. Treacy. Dr. Treacy's note of that visit states that the claiman= t informed him that he hurt his back at work when he turned on a fire hose and that the pain was gettin= g worse. Dr. Treacy examined the claimant and recorded, inter alia, that he demon= strated no paraspinal spasm, had significant decrease on forward flexation secondary to pain, and experienc= ed pain when attempting straight raises with either leg. Dr. Treacy's impression was that the clai= mant had a "[r]ecurrence of symptoms". He prescribed physical therapy and pain medication.

Dr. Treacy next saw the claimant on Augu= st 4, 1997, at which time the claimant reported that he was feeling better but still experienced pain and stiffness in his left = leg with numbness in his toes.=20 Dr. Treacy's examination of the claimant on that date revealed no paraspina= l spasms and excellent motor strength, but continued back pain when straight leg raises were attem= pted. Dr. Treacy signed a note authorizing the claimant to remain off work.

On August 18, 1997, the claimant returne= d to work duties for the first time since his accident.=20 He performed light-duty and sedentary jobs for Mobil from August 18, 1997, = through April 5, 1998.

The claimant saw Dr. Rezin on August 21,= 1997. Dr. Rezin recorded that the claimant stated that he continued to have some back and leg pain. Dr. Rezin's examination = of the claimant on that date revealed "some pain in the S1 nerve root distribution" and "pain with = straight leg raising." Dr. Rezin recommended an EMG to rule out radiculopathy.

On recommendation from Dr. Rezin, Dr Ste= ven V. Lekah performed EMG/NCV tests upon the claimant on September 10, 1997. In his report of those tests, Dr. Leka= h noted evidence of an "old S1 radiculopathy" and arrived at the following conclusion:

"Normal study. More specifically, ther= e is no evidence of lumbosacral radiculopathy in the left lower extremity and no evidence of neuropathy."

When the claimant next saw Dr. Rezin on = September 23, 1997, he still complained of numbness in his left foot and occasional pain in his left leg. Dr. Rezin r= ecommended that the claimant undergo a myelogram and a post-myelogram CT scan.

On October 14, 1997, Dr. Rezin sent a le= tter to Mobil wherein he opined that the claimant had reached his pre-injury state and would not need surgical intervention. = He also opined that the symptoms that the claimant experienced were causally related to his work in= jury. In that letter, Dr. Rezin stated that, other than a restriction against lifting in excess of 50= pounds, the claimant could return to work in a full duty capacity.

Dr. Rezin next saw the claimant on Octob= er 22, 1997, and recorded that he was still complaining of numbness in his left foot. Dr. Rezin recommended that the c= laimant have an MRI.

At the request of Mobil, the claimant wa= s examined by Dr. Howard Freedberg, an orthopedic surgeon, on October 23, 1997. Dr. Freedberg testified that the claimant re= ported that, in July 1997, he felt pain in his back when a hose he was holding jerked. The claimant s= tated that, after that event, the pain in his back became worse and he also developed pain in his left le= g and numbness in his left foot and toes. According to Dr. Freedberg, the claimant stated that, on th= e date of his examination, his back was better and the pain was "pretty much gone." However, the clai= mant did report hamstring tightness and numbness in his left foot. Dr. Freedberg examined = the claimant and testified that he found the claimant's range of motion to be good for someone who had= previously undergone surgery, that his reflexes were symmetrically equal, and that his motor str= ength was normal. Dr. Freedberg stated that the examination did not reveal any tension signs or d= eficits in any dermatomal distributions. Dr Freedberg also testified that he reviewed the claimant's= radiological reports, which revealed degenerative disc disease at L5-S1, fibrotic changes, a left S1 ne= rve root that was not well visualized, and a decrease in disc height at L5-S1. As a result of his exa= mination of the claimant and a review of his medical records, Dr. Freedberg reported to Mobil that the c= laimant had reached maximum medical improvement and was capable of medium level work, limiting = repeated bending and stooping. It was his opinion at that time that an MRI, a myelogram, or= a post-myelogram CT scan was not warranted. Dr. Freedberg testified that there was no causal c= onnection between the claimant's work-related accident of July 17, 1997, and his back problems. = In Dr. Freedberg's opinion, the mechanism of the accident on July 17, 1997, as described by th= e claimant, is not capable of producing a herniated disc. It was his opinion that the claimant's cond= ition was caused by degenerative disc disease and epidural fibrosis from his 1990 surgery.

Dr. Rezin's note of December 16, 1997, s= tates that Dr. Freedberg's recommendation as to work restrictions for the claimant was "probably indicated." The note also= states that Dr. Rezin did not feel that the claimant was in need of surgery.

The claimant next saw Dr. Rezin on Febru= ary 18, 1998, and complained of worsening back pain, pain in his buttock, pain in his left leg, and numbness in his toes. = Dr. Rezin examined the claimant and concluded that he had recurrent left leg complaints. Dr. Rezi= n again recommended that the claimant have a myelogram and a post-myelogram CT scan and continued to= prescribe pain medication for the claimant.

When the claimant saw Dr. Rezin on March= 31, 1998, he was still complaining of numbness.=20 Dr. Rezin noted the claimant's persistent left leg pain and indicated that = he should go forward with a myelogram and a post-myelogram CT scan.

While working on April 5, 1998, the clai= mant was called into a supervisor's office and informed that Mobil would no longer offer him light-duty work within the re= strictions imposed by Dr. Rezin. The claimant was laid off at that time and had not worked from = that date through the arbitration hearing on October 5, 1999.

On April 10, 1998, the claimant underwen= t a lumbar spine myelogram and post-myelogram CT scan. The myelogram illustrated an abrupt cutoff to the nerve root at L= 5-S1, but no other irregularities were identified. The CT scan revealed a mild concentric dis= c bulging at L5-S1 which, at the central to left lateral recess, becomes a focul bulge and herniation= , causing loss of contrast to pass into the nerve root sleeve at S1. The remainder of the test results we= re unremarkable.=20 According to the report of the tests, the results appear to suggest granula= tion tissue or a scar.

On April 28, 1998, the claimant last saw= Dr. Rezin, and continued to complain of pain in his left leg and numbness. According to Dr. Rezin's notes, he was of the opini= on that the claimant's options were either to live with his discomfort or undergo an exploration o= f his S1 nerve root.=20 Although Dr. Rezin was in favor of the more conservative approach, he recom= mended that the claimant get a second opinion.

On referral from Dr. Rezin, the claimant= saw Dr. Frank Phillips, an orthopedic surgeon, on June 8, 1998. In a report of that visit, Dr. Phillips noted that he examin= ed the claimant and his medical records and concluded that he suffered from a recurrent disc hernia= tion on the left at L5-S1, in addition to scar tissue. He stated that he discussed alternative treatm= ent methods with the claimant and recommended a repeat MRI.

The report of the claimant's repeat MRI,= which was performed on June 16, 1998, states that the findings are most consistent with granulation tissues after disc remova= l. There was also some slight noncontrast enhancing tissue directly adjacent to the posterior aspe= ct of the L5 segment, although it did not appear to impress upon the exiting nerve root. Accordi= ng to the report, the findings are much more prominent on axial examination.

Dr. Phillips next saw the claimant on Ju= ne 29, 1998. In a report of that visit and his review of the repeat MRI, Dr. Phillips noted that the claimant was suffering from = low back pain with left leg sciatic type symptoms which were precipitated by the claimant's July 19= 97 work-related event.=20 He reported that the MRI revealed scar tissue at the site of the claimant's= previous discectomy and also a recurrent disc herniation to the left at L5-S1. As a consequence of= the recurrent disc herniation, Dr. Phillips recommended both a discectomy at L5-S1 and an inte= rbody fusion at the same level.

On September 24, 1998, Dr. Phillips perf= ormed the following surgical procedures upon the claimant: 1) a laminectomy and foraminotomy with discectomy at L5-S1; 2) an= autogenous iliac crest bone graft harvest; and 3) an L5-S1 interbody fusion using allograft bone d= owels. Dr. Phillips reported his surgical finding as a herniated disc on the left at L5-S1 and = his post-operative diagnosis as recurrent disc herniation at L5-S1 with discogenic lower back pain.

Post-operatively, the claimant continued= to treat with Dr. Phillips. Dr. Phillips authored a report on October 12, 1998, stating that the claimant's back and left leg s= ciatic type pain seemed much better, although he continued to complain of paresthesias and dysesthe= tic pain in both feet.=20 Dr. Phillips opined that the claimant probably had an L5 neuropraxia.

In a report dated November 16, 1998, Dr.= Phillips stated that the claimant's back had improved significantly and that he had more feeling in his left foot. Dr. = Phillips reported that the claimant had no signs of nerve root tension, but did have difficulty bendin= g his toes.

The claimant was again examined by Dr. F= reedberg at the request of Mobil on December 14, 1998. At the time of that examination, the claimant reported a slight pain= in his back, a tingling in his right foot and toes, and weakness in his left ankle. Dr. Freedberg not= ed that, subsequent to the claimant's surgery in September of 1998, he could not dorsiflex his left to= es. After examining the claimant and reviewing his medical records, Dr. Freedberg concluded that th= e claimant had degenerative disc disease with multiple operative procedures and a residual= post-operative neuropraxia. According to his report of that examination, Dr. Freedberg fo= und the claimant more disabled then when he examined him in October of 1997. He reported that li= ght duty work with a 15-pound weight restriction was appropriate for the claimant and that his b= ending and twisting should also be limited. Dr. Freedberg reasserted his earlier opinion that = the claimant's condition was not causally related to his July 17, 1997, work accident. He opined that t= he claimant's herniated disc existed prior to July 17, 1997, and that the incident did not change the na= tural progression of the claimant's degenerative disc disease and epidural fibrosis. Dr. Freedberg = testified that the claimant's July 1997 accident produced only a temporary aggravation that dissipated wi= thin several months.

On February 1, 1999, Dr. Phillips author= ed a report stating that the claimant was experiencing little or no back or leg pain, but still had some paresthesias in the L5 di= stribution on the left and some residual weakness of dorsiflexion in the toes on his left foot. As of= that report, Dr. Phillips authorized the claimant to return to work, but restricted him to lifting 25= pounds and no repetitive bending.

On March 12, 1999, Dr. Phillips signed a= work status report which restated his work restrictions of February 1. Dr. Phillips also wrote that the claimant woul= d not reach maximum medical improvement until approximately nine months after his surgery.

When deposed on March 22, 1999, Dr. Phil= lips testified that, in his opinion, the claimant developed "severe acute onset left leg sciatic type pain and numbness" as a= result of his July 17, 1997, work-related accident. Although admitting that the claimant had a de= generative disc that was not directly related to his July 1997 injury, Dr. Phillips explained that t= he July 1997 incident aggravated the claimant's pre-existing condition, precipitated his left leg= sciatic symptoms, and "resulted in part in him needing surgery." However, when asked whether he = anticipated that the claimant would have permanent physical restrictions, Dr. Phillips stated th= at it was too early to predict.

On April 5, 1999, Dr. Phillips reported = that the claimant still had persistent numbness in his feet, some aching in his low back, and intermittent pain in his left leg, "= but nothing that was very disabling." On examination, the claimant had good range of lumbar motion, = his straight leg raises were negative, he had some weakness on his left side, and his sensation to = pinprick was diminished in the L5 distribution.

Dr. Phillips' report of July 9, 1999, st= ates that the claimant was doing reasonably well, with very little back or leg pain. The claimant still reported weakness around = his left foot and ankle, and Dr. Phillips prescribed physical therapy.

When this matter came on for hearing bef= ore the arbitrator on October 5, 1999, Mobil objected to proceeding under section 19 (b-1), contending that the claimant= was capable of working.=20 The objection was overruled and the hearing proceeded.

Among other evidence introduced by the c= laimant during the arbitration hearing was the evidence deposition of his vocational rehabilitation expert, Susan Entenber= g. For our purposes, we need not set forth the substance of Entenberg's testimony in its entirety. = We do, however, note that, although Entenberg recommended a vocational rehabilitation plan for the cla= imant, she admitted that the claimant was capable of finding employment within his physical restrict= ions without additional training.

Following the hearing, the arbitrator fo= und, inter alia, that the claimant sustained an accidental injury on July 17, 1997, arising out of and in the scope of his = employment by Mobil. He awarded the claimant TTD benefits under the Act for a period of 82 4/7 week= s, representing the period from July 17, 1997, through August 17, 1997, and the period from Apr= il 6, 1998, through the date of the arbitration hearing on October 5, 1999. The arbitrator also or= dered Mobil to pay the sum of $8,766.65 for medical expenses. Additionally, finding that the claimant= is unable to return to his job as a machinist, the arbitrator ordered Mobil to pay the costs associate= d with an approved plan of vocational rehabilitation for the claimant and to pay the claimant maint= enance while he is involved in the vocational rehabilitation plan and, thereafter, during his = search for a job.

Mobil sought a review of the arbitrator'= s decision before the Industrial Commission. In a unanimous decision, the Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's de= cision. Thereafter, Mobil filed a petition in the circuit court of Will County seeking judicial= review of the Commission's decision. The circuit court entered an order confirming the decision, and = Mobil instituted this appeal.

We first address Mobil's contention that= the claimant should not have been afforded a section 19(b-1) hearing. Section 19(b-1) of the Act provides a mechanism whereby a= n employee who is not receiving medical services as provided by section 8(a) of the Act or compen= sation as provided by section 8(b) of the Act may petition for an emergency hearing regarding his= entitlement to such services or compensation. 820 ILCS 305/19(b-1) (West 1998). Section 19(b-= 1) provides in pertinent part that:

"Such petition shall contain the follow= ing information and shall be served on the employer at least 15 days before it is filed:

* * *

"(x) a copy of a signed report by a medi= cal practitioner, relating to the employee's current inability to return to work because of the injuries incurred as a r= esult of the accident or such other documents or affidavits which show that the employee= is entitled to receive compensation pursuant to paragraph (b) of Section 8 of = this Act or medical, surgical or hospital services pursuant to paragraph (a) of Sect= ion 8 of this Act." 820 ILCS 305/19(b-1) (West 1998).

Mobil contends that the claimant was not= entitled to a section 19(b-1) hearing because he had been released to work with restrictions and his own vocational expert testi= fied that he was capable of employment without any vocational training. We disagree. As our suprem= e court held in Choi v. Industrial Comm'n, 182 Ill. 2d 387, 695 N.E.2d 656 (1990), a claiman= t is not required to establish a total inability to perform all work in order to be entitled to a section = 19(b-1) hearing. Rather, "the phrase 'inability to return to work,' as used in paragraph (x), should be c= onstrued to equate to the term 'temporarily totally disabled.' " Choi, 182 Ill. 2d at 396.

With her petition for a section 19(b-1) = hearing, the claimant in Choi had provided documentation establishing that she could not perform her full duties as a = nurse, although she could perform sedentary or light-duty work, which her employer had not provided. = Choi, 182 Ill. 2d at 389-90. The court found this sufficient to entitle the claimant to a secti= on 19(b-1) hearing. Choi, 182 Ill. 2d at 397. At the time the claimant in this case filed his petiti= on for a section 19(b-1) hearing, he had been released to work with restrictions on lifting and bend= ing, which restrictions prevented him from performing his full duties, and Mobil was not providing = him with a light-duty position. Under Choi, the claimant was entitled to a section 19(b-1= ) hearing.

Mobil next argues that a number of the C= ommission's findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence, namely its findings that: 1) the claimant sustained= an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment; 2) the claimant's condition of = ill-being is causally connected to that work-related injury; and 3) the claimant is entitled to a= n award of TTD benefits for a period of 82 4/7 weeks. Again, we disagree.

It is the function of the Commission to = decide questions of fact and causation, to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and to resolve conflicting medical evidence. = O'Dette v. Industrial Comm'n, 79 Ill. 2d 249, 253, 403 N.E.2d 221 (1980). Although we might = draw different inferences from the facts, the findings of the Commission will not be reversed unless = they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Orsini v. Industrial Comm'n, 117 I= ll. 2d 38, 44, 509 N.E.2d 1005 (1987).

Mobil does not argue that the Commission= 's finding that the claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment is unsupported by= the evidence. Rather, it argues that the finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence b= ecause the arbitrator erred in sustaining the claimant's motion to bar the testimony of three witnesses= which Mobil failed to disclose in response to the claimant's section 19(b-1) petition.

Evidentiary rulings made during the cour= se of a workers' compensation case will not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of discretion. See Gotter v. Indust= rial Comm'n, 152 Ill. App. 3d 822, 828, 504 N.E.2d 1277 (1987). Section 19(b-1) of the Act provides i= n pertinent part that "[n]o document or other evidence not previously identified by either party = with the petition or written response, or by other means before the hearing, may be introduced into evid= ence without good cause." 820 ILCS 305/19(b-1) (West 1998). In its brief before this court,= Mobil does not even contend that it had good cause for failing to list the three witnesses in r= esponse to the claimant's petition. The history of the incident given by the claimant to Mobil and t= o his physicians was consistent. Mobil always knew that the claimant asserted that he sustained= an injury on July 17, 1997, when a hose he was holding jerked back. Mobil cannot seriously conte= nd that it was surprised by the fact that the claimant was asserting that his injury was sustained o= ut of and in the course of his employment, especially in light of Dr. Phillips' deposition testimony, = which was given in excess of six months prior to the arbitration hearing. When Mobil filed its respo= nse to the claimant's section 19(b-1) petition, it never disclosed the three witnesses it now claims coul= d have offered evidence relevant to the question of whether the claimant sustained an injury which = arose out of and in the course of his employment, nor did it seek to amend that response to make th= e disclosure at any time prior to the arbitration hearing. Further, Mobil has shown no good cause f= or having failed to follow either course of action. As a consequence, there was no abuse of discretio= n in barring the witnesses from testifying. Fermi National Accelerator Lab v. Industrial Comm'n, 224 Ill. App. 3d 899, 911-12, 586 N.E.2d 750 (1992); Connell v. Industrial Comm'n, 170 Ill. App. 3= d 49, 56-57, 523 N.E.2d 1265 (1988).

Mobil's contention that the Commission's= finding on the issue of causation is against the manifest weight of the evidence must also fail. Whether a causal relations= hip exists between a claimant's employment and his condition of ill-being is a question of fact = to be decided by the Commission. Certi-Serve, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 101 Ill. 2d 236= , 244, 461 N.E.2d 954 (1984)).=20 In this case, the Commission accepted the causation opinions of Dr. Phillip= s and rejected those of Dr. Freedberg. In so doing, the Commission resolved a conflict in medical = evidence, as is its function. Dr. Phillips testified to the causal connection between the clai= mant's condition of ill-being and his work-related accident of July 17, 1997. As an opposite conclusion = is not clearly evident, we cannot say that the Commission's determination on the issue of causation is= against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Mobil next argues that the Commission's = finding that the claimant is entitled to TTD benefits for the period of 82 4/7 weeks is against the manifest weight of the eviden= ce. The issues of whether a claimant is temporarily totally disabled and the length of time for which= he is entitled to TTD benefits are questions of fact to be resolved by the Commission. Archer= Daniels Midland Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 138 Ill. 2d 107, 118-19, 561 N.E.2d 623 (1990); S= orenson v. Industrial Comm'n, 281 Ill. App. 3d 373, 385, 666 N.E.2d 713 (1996). An employee is temporari= ly totally disabled from the time that an injury incapacitates him from work until such time as he i= s as far recovered or restored as the permanent character of his injury will permit. Archer D= aniels Midland Co., 138 Ill. 2d at 118. Once an injured employee's physical condition stabilizes, he is = no longer eligible for TTD benefits. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 138 Ill. 2d at 118.

In this case, the Commission awarded the= claimant 82 4/7 weeks of TTD benefits, representing the periods that the claimant was off work from July 17, 1997,= through August 17, 1997, and April 6, 1998, through October 5, 1999. Mobil argues that there = is "no support in the record for a claim of temporary total disability after February 1, 1= 999, when Dr. Phillips released Haberkorn to return to work with a twenty-five pound lifting restriction." = We disagree.

Although Dr. Phillips released the claim= ant to return to light duty work on February 1, 1999, in a work status report dated March 12, 1999, Dr. Phillips wrote that the c= laimant would not reach maximum medical improvement until approximately nine months after his surge= ry, or July of 1999.=20 On March 22, 1999, Dr. Philips testified that it was too early to predict w= hether the claimant would have permanent physical restrictions. On July 9, 1999, Dr. Phillips report= ed that the claimant still had weakness in his left foot and ankle and that he was prescribing additio= nal physical therapy.=20 When the claimant testified on October 5, 1999, he stated that he was still= experiencing low back pain on lifting, numbness in his left foot, weakness in his left ankle, les= s than full extension in the toes on his left foot, and difficulty balancing. The claimant stated that = he finished physical therapy several weeks prior to the arbitration hearing and continued follow-up care= with Dr. Phillips.=20 According to the claimant, he had a repeat CT scan approximately one week p= rior to the arbitration hearing and was scheduled to see Dr. Phillips on October 15, 1999.

The fact that the claimant may have been= able to perform light duty work does not necessarily preclude a finding that he was temporarily totally disabled. Whitney Pr= oductions, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 274 Ill. App. 3d 28, 31, 653 N.E.2d 965 (1995). We believe tha= t the evidence in this record is sufficient to support a finding that, as of the date of the arbit= ration hearing, the claimant's condition had not stabilized, he was still receiving medical treatment, and= he had not reached maximum medical improvement. As a consequence, we do not find the Commissi= on's decision to award 82 4/7 weeks of TTD benefits to be against the manifest weight of the= evidence.

Next, we address the question of the pro= priety of the Commission having ordered vocational rehabilitation benefits and maintenance as part of an award made after a he= aring on a section 19(b-1) petition.

Section 19(b-1) of the Act affords an in= jured employee a means to petition for an emergency hearing. In pertinent part, the statute provides that

"[i]f the employee is not receiving medi= cal, surgical or hospital services as provided in paragraph (a) of Section 8 or compensation as provided in paragraph (b) = of Section 8, the employee, in accordance with Commission Rules, may file a petition f= or an emergency hearing by an Arbitrator on the issue of whether or not he is = entitled to receive payment of such compensation or services as provided therein." = (Emphasis Added.) 820 ILCS 305/19(b-1) (West 1998).

Statutory interpretation is a question o= f law which, on review, we address de novo. Choi v. Industrial Comm'n, 182 Ill. 2d at 392. Our goal is to ascertain and gi= ve effect to the intent of the legislature (Kraft Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189, 561 N.E.2d 6= 56 (1990)), the best indication of which is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning = (Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479, 639 N.E.2d 1282 (1994)).

Two separate sections of the Act provide= the statutory basis for an award of vocational rehabilitation benefits to an injured worker. Section 6(d) provides that "= [e]very employer shall notify each injured employee who has been granted compensation under the provision= s of Section 8 of this Act of his rights to rehabilitation services and advise him of the location= s of available public rehabilitation centers and any other such services of which the employer ha= s knowledge." 820 ILCS 305/6(d) (West 1998). Section 8(a) states that, in addition to providing a= nd paying for all necessary first aid, medical, surgical and hospital services incurred by an injured e= mployee, the employer "shall also pay for treatment, instruction and training necessary for the physical= , mental and vocational rehabilitation of the employee, including all maintenance costs and expense= s incidental thereto." 820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 1998).

By its plain language, section 19(b-1) p= rovides that the issues to be resolved at an emergency hearing are the employee's right to receive payment for TTD under section 8= (b) (see Choi, 182 Ill. 2d at 393) and payment for medical, surgical, or hospital services as provi= ded in section 8(a). The statute does not provide for any resolution of the employee's right to eith= er notice of rehabilitation services under section 6(d) or vocational rehabilitation benefits and maint= enance under section 8(a).=20 Even if one were to assume that the language of the statute is ambiguous on= the point, application of the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio= alterius would support a similar conclusion. Where, as here, a statute specifies the matters to which it applies, there is an i= nference that all omissions should be understood as exclusions. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldr= idge 179 Ill. 2d 141, 151-52, 688 N.E.2d 90 (1997).

We are aware of a number of cases in whi= ch Illinois courts have addressed the question of whether the Commission's award of vocational rehabilitation services after = a section 19(b-1) hearing was against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, those cases did = not address the question of statutory construction presented here. For the reasons stated, we find = that vocational rehabilitation benefits and maintenance may not be awarded as relief in a hearing conducte= d pursuant to section 19(b-1) of the Act and that the Commission's award of such benefits in this= case must be vacated, without prejudice to the claimant's right to seek such benefits on remand.<= /font>

Because of our resolution of the precedi= ng issue, we need not address the question of whether the Commission's award of vocational rehabilitation benefits was against th= e manifest weight of the evidence.

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate tha= t portion of the Commission's decision which awarded the claimant vocational rehabilitation benefits and maintenance, wi= thout prejudice to his right to seek such relief on remand, and reverse that portion of the circui= t court's order which confirmed the Commission's award of vocational rehabilitation benefits and = maintenance. We affirm that portion of the circuit court's order which confirmed the Commission's = award of TTD benefits and $8,766.65 for medical expenses. This cause is remanded to the Commissi= on for further proceedings.

Circuit court order affirmed in part and= reversed in part; Commission decision vacated in part; cause remanded to the Commission.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., and O'MALLEY, HOLDRIDG= E, and RARICK, JJ., concur.

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