

2026 IL App (1st) 252118
No. 1-25-2118
Order filed September 25, 2026

Fifth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT

<i>In re</i> D.D., a Minor,	)	Appeal from the Circuit Court
	)	of Cook County.
(The People of the State of Illinois,	)	
	)	
Petitioner-Appellee,	)	
	)	
v.	)	No. 19 JA 1373
	)	
A.C.,	)	The Honorable
	)	Patrick Murphy,
Respondent-Appellant.)	)	Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Mikva and C. A. Walker concurred in the judgment and opinion.

ORDER

Held: We affirm and find no violation of due process or Juvenile Court Act of 1987 where the trial court continued the matter solely to allow the minor to speak with the judge, and neither the mother nor her attorney appeared.

¶ 1 Respondent, A.C., the mother of D.D., appeals the trial court’s order to appoint the father’s parents as guardians. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 I. Parties and Past Proceedings

¶ 4 D.D.. was born on February 24, 2012, and is presently 14 years old. D.D.’s mother is A.C., the appellant in this case, and D.D.’s father is deceased. In November 2019, when D.D. was seven years old, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship. On March 11, 2020, a few weeks after D.D. turned eight years old, the trial court found that he was neglected due to a lack of care and an injurious environment, and he was adjudged a ward of the court. When D.D. was nine years old, the State moved to permanently terminate A.C.’s parental rights and to appoint a guardian with the right to consent to adoption. D.D.’s foster parents, who were also his paternal grandparents, wanted to adopt him but stated that they would not permit D.D. contact with his mother.

¶ 5 In a prior opinion, we described in detail the testimony at the fitness hearing, and we incorporate that opinion by reference. *In re D.D.*, 2022 IL App (1st) 220410, ¶ 12. We described “the testimony in detail *** because it show[ed] an almost bewildering array of recommendations [to A.C.], sometimes contradictory, by a shifting assembly of providers and caseworkers.” *D.D.*, 2022 IL App (1st) 220410, ¶ 12.

¶ 6 After the evidentiary phase of the fitness hearing was complete, the trial court found A.C. unfit, stating:

“In this case, the child was found, not only in a filthy, garbage strewn place with drugs lying around, he didn’t know how to brush his teeth. He wasn’t potty trained. And

within a week or two of being sent to live with his uncle, he accomplished these matters.”

As we noted in our prior opinion, this finding contradicted the testimony of Shannon Dolan, the caseworkers’ supervisor, who testified at the fitness hearing that a report from D.D.’s therapist indicated that, in November 2020, or almost a year after the case came to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), D.D. continued to wear Pull-Ups and sometimes wet himself during the night. *D.D.*, 2022 IL App (1st) 220410, ¶ 7.

¶ 7 After finding unfitness, the trial court proceeded to a best interest hearing. At the best interests hearing, held on March 9, 2022, two witnesses testified: Deja Smith, D.D.’s case worker, and D.D.’s paternal grandmother. Smith testified that the paternal grandparents did not want to have any contact with A.C. and had told Smith that they would not allow D.D. to have contact with his mother. Smith testified that, since December 2020 when she became the case worker, A.C. had repeated contact with D.D., but that those visits would entirely come to an end if A.C.’s rights were terminated. Smith testified that sometimes D.D. asked to end the virtual visits early, but that he never said to Smith that he did not want to see his mother and he participated in the visits. The paternal grandmother testified that they had moved back to Illinois from Florida in order to care for D.D. and that they wanted to adopt him. At the conclusion of the best interests hearing, the trial court terminated the mother’s rights, appointed a guardian with a right to place, and entered a goal of adoption.

¶ 8 In our prior opinion, we observed:

“The evidence cited by the trial court was substantially drawn from the initial reasons for the child’s removal from the home, which was principally the unkempt condition of the home itself. In fact, the court stated that this was the “whole” case.

However, if this was the whole case, then there would have been no reason for all the proceedings and services that subsequently occurred in the following two years: after all, courts presume that judicial proceedings and required services are not a meaningless exercise.” *D.D.*, 2022 IL App (1st) 220410, ¶70.

We found that one cannot “say that someone is an unfit parent for failing to progress if the recommendations and referrals are confusing, contradictory, and at times unavailable, and the staff in charge of the case cannot agree on the order in which the services should proceed.” *D.D.*, 2022 IL App (1st) 220410, ¶ 71.

¶ 9 With respect to the mother’s efforts, we concluded: “There is no question that A.C. completely turned her life around after her son was removed: she obtained a court order against her brother; she kept her home clean as certified by her town; she found and kept a job; and she located therapy on her own, even after services were cut off, and attended therapy, at least until the day of her testimony.” *D.D.*, 2022 IL App (1st) 220410, ¶ 70. On December 9, 2022, this court reversed the trial court’s finding of unfitness and remanded for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. *D.D.*, 2022 IL App (1st) 220410, ¶ 109. The mandate issued on March 10, 2023.

¶ 10 II. On Remand

¶ 11 On March 27, 2023, shortly after the mandate issued, the trial court ordered DCFS, over DCFS’s objection, to retain a psychiatrist to review the relevant records and interview A.C. and D.D.. The order specified that, after completing a thorough review, the psychiatrist should determine whether A.C. “can get [D.D.] back in her care.” If the answer to that question was yes, then the psychiatrist was directed to propose “a plan for return home.”

¶ 12 Also on March 27, 2023, the trial court ordered supervised visits between D.D. and A.C. but provided that the “agency shall seek [D.D.’s] therapist’s input before starting visits.” Prior to the March 27, 2023, order, the last in-person contact allowed between A.C. and D.D. occurred at a local library almost three years before, on May 19, 2020, and their last virtual contact occurred on May 9, 2021, almost two years before.

¶ 13 On July 14, 2023, A.C. was permitted a virtual visit. Only one virtual visit occurred before visits were terminated. D.D.’s therapist, who had been his therapist since 2019, later testified that eleven-year old D.D. was “ a little bit upset” when the Zoom visit ended. Later, it was reported to her that he wet the bed that night. Asha Jenkins, the therapist, testified that, after the visit, D.D. expressed frustration, stating that his mom “just kept asking the same questions,” and Jenkins opined that it would have been better if they had played a game. After that one visit, D.D. declined visits and none were held.

¶ 14 The trial court formally questioned D.D. three times. Although the minor was not sworn, the examinations were held in the courtroom, with a court reporter, and with at least one attorney present. At the first examination, the mother’s attorney was present; at the next two examinations, she was not. The scheduling order for the first examination said, “in court - minor to speak with judge.” At the first examination, on September 21, 2023, mom’s attorney was present, as were the assistant State’s attorney (ASA), the assistant Public Guardian (APG), and D.D.’s therapist.

¶ 15 The trial court added the word “only” to the next two scheduling orders, and the mother’s attorney was not present. The scheduling order for the second in-court examination stated, “in person[,] only, for minor to speak with judge.” The third scheduling order, dated May 19, 2025, had “IN PERSON” in all caps, followed by the directive “only for minor to

speak with Judge Murphy.” The APG and the therapist were at the second examination, held on June 5, 2024. As for the third examination held on August 13, 2025, both the ASA and the APG were present, as well as the therapist.

¶ 16 During the first examination, at which the mother’s attorney was present, the court asked D.D. if he wanted to visit his mom, and he said “[n]ot really.” When asked why, he said he was busy with school work. When asked if there were any other reasons, he said “[n]ot really.” When asked if he wanted to live with his mom, he replied: “I don’t know.” When the court asked who the court should listen to, his mom or his grandparents, he said: “I don’t know.” When asked if he would rather live with his mom or his grandparents, he said his grandparents. When asked why, he said: “I don’t know.”

¶ 17 At the second examination, almost a year later, when asked how he liked living with his grandparents, he replied it was “fun” and he “get[s] to play video games.” The court stated to D.D. “you know why you’re here, I’ve got to make a final decision.” The court told him to state who he wanted to live with and why. D.D. stated: “I want to live with my grandparents, because they’re loving and caring, and they give me the food I need, and ...” (Ellipsis in original.) When asked if he wanted to visit his mom, he said no. When asked why, he said: “I don’t know.” At the end of the examination, the court asked D.D. if he was going to get his “usual reward for coming in,” and D.D. said yes and that his grandparents brought him.

¶ 18 Another year later, the third examination was held on August 13, 2025, as part of the guardianship hearing that is the subject of this appeal. Both the ASA and the APG attended. The APG, the therapist and the court all examined the minor. When asked why he did not want to see his mom, D.D. replied, “No reason.” When asked if he wanted to stay with his grandparents, he said yes.

¶ 19 During this time, the goal entered by the trial court changed, and then changed back again. On October 20, 2023, the trial court entered a goal of private guardianship. On November 15, 2023, A.C. filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied on December 19, 2023. On January 2, 2024, A.C. filed a petition for leave to appeal in this court. On January 5, 2024, the trial court entered a new goal of return home within 12 months. The order stated that the “Court decided to change the guardianship to return home to give the mother time to work on services.” In a subsequent order entered on January 8, 2024, the trial court explained that, while it still believed that the grandparents should become D.D.’s guardians, it had reread our prior opinion in the case and it “believe[d] [it] must give the mother at least some additional time to show that she regains [D.D.’s] trust.” The trial court “recommend[ed] supervised virtual or in person visits but defer[ed] ultimate decisions with respect to those issues to [D.D.] and his therapist.” On July 9, 2024, the trial court changed the goal back to private guardianship. No visits had been held. On July 9, 2024, the trial court also ordered the grandparents and mother into mediation to work on a number of issues, including visitation, communication, and relationships.

¶ 20 On September 17, 2025, the trial court held the guardianship hearing that is the subject of this appeal. The court incorporated by reference the August 13, 2025, proceeding by stating at the start of the guardianship hearing that “the record should reflect I interviewed [D.D.] with respect to this hearing today.” The witnesses were Jenkins, D.D.’s therapist; Julisa Buford, his case worker for the last 18 months; and his grandmother. Jenkins testified that, while D.D. declined to have contact with his mom, he took pictures to send to her. For example, he took pictures of himself playing soccer. Jenkins testified that D.D. worries that, if he had contact with his mother, she would put him in diapers or lock up food. The mother’s attorney asked if

Jenkins had addressed with D.D. that these were unrealistic worries during a supervised visit with a 13-year old. Jenkins agreed that there was no risk of food insecurity. Before a further answer, the APG interjected that she would argue that diapers were a possibility. After an exchange between the attorneys, when asked again if she had explained that these worries were unrealistic, Jenkins responded that his worries “were real to him.” Jenkins acknowledged that D.D. expressed the possibility that, when he’s older, he might want to resume contact with his mother.

¶ 21 The mother’s attorney paused her questioning of Jenkins to explain that she would be asking for a final mediation to put in place a plan for resuming communication. In response to questions, Jenkins confirmed that the mother did not have D.D.’s email address, that D.D. did not have a phone, and that D.D. did not have the mother’s email address or phone number. On redirect, Jenkins testified that if D.D. wanted to visit his mother he could tell her or his grandparents.

¶ 22 Buford, the case worker, testified that, as a result of the court-ordered mediation, there was now an agreement in place by which the mother could email the grandparents and they had to respond by the end of the week. The grandparents also had to send two or three photos a week. Occasionally, the grandparents failed to respond. When that happened, A.C. would contact Buford, and Buford would contact the grandmother, and the grandmother would respond immediately to Buford. The grandparents did not speak to A.C. by phone.

¶ 23 Buford testified that on January 31, 2024, during a visit with Buford in his room at his grandparents’ home, D.D. told her that he wanted to see his mom. However, he changed his mind before the end of the visit, and he turned his head and “got quiet.” Buford agreed that

the mediation was effective in establishing communication. When asked if she thought a second mediation would be constructive, she replied: “Yes, yes, yes.”

¶ 24 The grandmother testified that she was open to ongoing contact with the mother and that she would never cut him off from his mother. The grandmother testified that “I told him, I says, Your mother is fighting, you know, your mother is fighting for this, she wants you, she wants you back, and stuff.” The grandmother said that, if D.D. wanted a visit with his mom, she would work it out with her “and see how it goes.” On cross, the grandmother agreed that mediation had been beneficial. The grandmother acknowledged that she had not had any direct communications with A.C. and that there were no procedures in place, if this case closes, to resume visitation.

¶ 25 At the close of evidence, the mother’s attorney asked the court not to decide anything that day and to order a second mediation. The APG argued that mediation was not needed. In response, the mother’s attorney argued that they had heard testimony that D.D. may want to resume contact with his mother in the future. The mother’s attorney argued that D.D. may have unrealistic views or anxieties that had not been addressed, that it was not realistic that a 13-year old would be diapered at a supervised visit, and that, instead of these fears being assuaged, they had grown.

¶ 26 The court noted that it had heard the witnesses, read the reports, and had spoken to D.D. on several occasions. The court observed that, when D.D. first came into the system, D.D. suffered “horrible abuse,” because the home was filthy and there was no food. The court stated that the grandparents “have always, always put themselves out to tell the mother, we

will work with you.¹ Based on this evidence, the court found that it was in D.D.’s best interests to close the case to guardianship of the grandparents.

¶ 27 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered a “Private Guardianship Order” appointing the grandparents as the minor’s guardians. The September 17, 2025, order provided:

“The private guardian shall permit reasonable visitation of the child by the natural parents, with a minimum of one visit a month. Visits shall be unsupervised unless the private guardian determines that the supervision is necessary for the safety or protection of the child. Individual visitations can be canceled, if appropriate[.]”

The order further provided: “The private guardian may **not** change the conditions of custody or otherwise alter this order[.]” (Bold and underline in original.)

¶ 28 On October 17, 2025, the mother filed a timely notice of appeal, and this case followed.

¶ 29 ANALYSIS

¶ 30 Now, four years after our initial reversal and remand, we are presented with a vastly different landscape of issues for review. On appeal, the mother argues that her attorney’s effective preclusion from the August 13, 2025, proceeding violated her constitutional and statutory due process rights to be present. The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) explicitly guarantees the right of the minor’s parents “to be present” and “to be heard” at proceedings under the Act. 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2024). Section 1-5(1) provides, as part of this guarantee, that “[c]ounsel appointed for the minor and any indigent party shall appear at *all* stages of the trial court proceeding.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2024). The counsel appointed for the minor, namely, the Public Guardian, was present

¹ This finding contradicts the testimony of caseworker Deja Smith at the prior best interests hearing on March 9, 2022, that the grandparents told her that they would not allow D.D. to have any contact. *D.D.*, 2022 IL App (1st) 220410, ¶ 59.

at the August 13, 2025, proceeding and participated in the proceedings. the ASA was also present, but did not make any argument or ask questions of the minor. However, the counsel appointed for the indigent mother, namely, the Public Defender, was not present..

¶ 31 In response, the State² argues, among other things, that this court lacks jurisdiction over the August 13, 2025, proceeding because it was an interim proceeding, that the mother forfeited her argument by not raising it below, and that she was not prejudiced by the violation. For reasons explained below, we find no statutory violation and thus affirm the trial court.

¶ 32 I. Jurisdiction

¶ 33 We examine the State’s jurisdiction argument first because, without jurisdiction, we must dismiss an appeal. *People v. Van Dyke*, 2020 IL App (1st) 191384, ¶ 41 (we consider issues of jurisdiction first). As noted above, the State argues that we lack jurisdiction over the August 13, 2025, proceeding because it was an interim proceeding.

¶ 34 Whether or not we have appellate jurisdiction is a question of law that we consider *de novo*. *Van Dyke*, 2020 IL App (1st) 191384, ¶ 41. Usually, *de novo* review means that the reviewing court performs the same analysis that a trial court would perform. *Van Dyke*, 2020 IL App (1st) 191384, ¶ 41. However, when there is no ruling below for us to review, *de novo* review means that “ ‘our legal consideration is made on a blank slate.’ ” *Van Dyke*, 2020 IL App (1st) 191384, ¶ 41 (quoting *People v. Kirklin*, 2015 IL App (1st) 131420, ¶ 104).

¶ 35 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 provides us with jurisdiction if the notice of appeal was filed “within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from.” Ill. S. Ct. R.

² Since the State’s Attorney’s, the Public Guardian, and the Attorney General are all on the same side, we refer to them collectively as the State when discussing their collective arguments, as we did in our last opinion. *D.D.*, 2022 IL App (1st) 220410, ¶ 61, n. 1.

303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017). The State concedes, as it must, that the mother’s notice was timely filed on October 17, 2025, within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment on September 17, 2025. However, it claims that we lack jurisdiction over the August 13, 2025, proceeding or the May 19, 2025, order which provided for that proceeding.

¶ 36 First, the August 13, 2025, proceeding was not an interim proceeding, but part of the proceeding appealed from. The trial court incorporated the proceeding by reference at the start of the September 17, 2025, guardianship hearing, which is the subject of this appeal.

¶ 37 Second, even if it was an interim proceeding, an appeal is deemed to include an interlocutory order or interim proceeding if it was a necessary step in the procedural progression to the order before us. *Direct Auto v. Bahena*, 2019 IL App (1st) 172918, ¶ 43; *Filliung v. Adams*, 387 Ill. App. 3d 40, 49-50 (2008). In the case at bar, we know that the August 13, 2025, proceeding was a necessary step to the trial court’s judgment, because the trial court said it was. First, as we already noted, the trial court incorporated the proceeding by reference at the start of the September 17, 2025, guardianship hearing when he stated, “and the record should reflect I interviewed D. D. with respect to this hearing today.” Second, the trial court stated during pronouncement of its final judgment “...I’m very intimately familiar with this case. I have spoken to D. D. on several occasions . . .” Thus, we do not find the State’s jurisdictional argument persuasive.

¶ 38 The State argues that the mother forfeited a necessary-step argument by not making it in her opening brief. First, the mother asserted jurisdiction under Rule 303, which we have found proper. The State then argued against this ground in its responsive brief, and the mother responded to the State’s argument in her reply brief. There was no forfeiture, but rather an orderly progression of argument. Second, whether or not a party failed to make a

jurisdictional argument, the appellate court has an independent duty to determine its own jurisdiction. *Van Dyke*, 2020 IL App (1st) 191384, ¶ 45. Thus, a party's concession or omission regarding a jurisdictional issue can neither bestow nor remove jurisdiction. *Id.*

¶ 39 Since we find that we have appellate jurisdiction, we proceed to consider the issues raised by the appeal.

¶ 40 II. Forfeiture

¶ 41 Aside from jurisdictional forfeiture, the State argues that forfeiture of issue is also why we should not consider the mother's appeal. The state points to the mother's lack of objection to 1) the May 19, 2025 continuance order, 2) the courts August 13, 2025 questioning of D. D., the courts statements about the meeting with D.D. made during the September 17, 2025 hearing, and 3) the trial court's finding that it was in D.D.'s best interest to close the case and have the grandparent's appointed guardians.

¶ 42 First, as the State acknowledges, forfeiture is a limitation on the parties not the court. *People v. Castellano*, 2020 IL App (1st) 170543, ¶ 78; *Direct Auto*, 2019 IL App (1st) 172918, ¶ 54 n.8. "[T]he doctrine of *waiver* serves as a warning to the parties rather than a limitation on the appellate court's jurisdiction." *Skidmore v. Throgmorton*, 323 Ill. App. 3d 417, 420 (2001). Second, in its claim of forfeiture, the State fails to grasp the nature of the mother's claim. The mother claims that the problem was that she and her attorney were not put on notice that the August 13, 2025, proceeding was a proceeding at which attorneys could and should attend. The scheduling order for it stated, "*only* for minor to speak with Judge Murphy." (Emphasis added.) She argues that she could not have objected at the August

hearing if she was not present and similarly, by not having the details of who was present³ and what occurred at that August court date, she would not have known what to object to when the trial court mentioned it at the September 17, 2025 hearing. Herein lies the crux of her argument which is that the trial courts violation of her due process rights prohibited her from being able to preserve the issue on appeal. Thus, we do not find the State’s argument for forfeiture persuasive.

¶ 43 III. Statutory Violation

¶ 44 The mother argues both a constitutional and a statutory violation of her due process rights. Since we must always consider nonconstitutional issues first, we turn to her statutory argument. *In re E.H.*, 224 Ill. 2d 172, 181-82 (2006) (a court should “first consider the nonconstitutional issues raised, reach the constitutional issues only if necessary”). However, we observe that, “in our state, [the] statute dictates what due process requires.” *In re M.M.*, 2022 IL App (1st) 211505, ¶ 24.

¶ 45 “With statutory interpretation, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the statute’s drafters.” *People v. McCain*, 2025 IL App (1st) 240873, ¶ 22. “The most reliable indicator of the drafters’ intent is the language they chose to use in the statute itself.” *McCain*, 2025 IL App (1st) 240873, ¶ 22. “When reading the language of the statute, we give the words their plain and ordinary meaning.” *McCain*, 2025 IL App (1st) 240873, ¶ 22. An

³ The State makes a couple of factual claims about the examinations that are inaccurate. First, the State argues that the mother’s attorney was not present at the first examination by the court of D.D., despite the fact that the court reporter clearly wrote down on the fact sheet of the transcript that all three attorneys were “present”: the ASA, the APG, and the mother’s attorney. Nonetheless, the State argues that the court reporter must have been mistaken because, in a subsequent order, when the trial court was attempting to demonstrate that it had complied with a statutory provision requiring it to consult with D.D. “in an age-appropriate manner” 705 ILCS 405/2-28 (2.4) (West 2024), the court noted that it had examined D.D. “in the presence of his attorney, therapist, and, of course, the court reporter,” noticeably omitting the mothers attorney. Further, the State argues that the transcript does not indicate that the ASA was physically present in the courtroom for the third examination, although the court reporter noted on the fact sheet that both the ASA and the APG were “present.” The State bases its argument on the fact that the ASA did not address the court or ask questions

issue of statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. *In re Christopher K.*, 217 Ill. 2d 348, 364 (2005).

¶ 46 The mother claims that subsection (1) of section 405/1-5 of the Act was violated. This subsection states, in relevant part, that “the minor’s parents *** have the right to be present, to be heard, to present evidence material to the proceedings, to cross-examine witnesses, *** and also, although proceedings under this Act are not intended to be adversary in character, the right to be represented by counsel.” 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2024). This subsection further provides: “Counsel appointed for the minor and any indigent party shall appear at all stages of the trial court proceeding ***.” 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2024). Mother argues that she was prohibited from attending the August 13, 2025 proceeding because the scheduling order stated, “*only* for minor to speak with Judge Murphy.” (Emphasis added.) However, we don’t find that the word “only” precluded attendance but instead specified the sole reason for the court date: speaking with the minor. Thus, we do not agree that Mother’s statutory due process was violated.

¶ 47 It is undisputed that counsel appointed for the indigent mother did not appear at the August 13, 2025, proceeding, wherein the trial court examined D.D. and then incorporated it by reference into the guardianship hearing. However, the parameters of due process are not an absolute right to be present at a termination proceeding. Here, the proceeding in question was not a termination hearing, but an examination of the child, which is within the courts discretion to do. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(d) specifically authorizes the court to allow a minor to testify in chambers with only the court, the court reporter, and attorneys for the parties present, reflecting the legislature's recognition that the right to be present during a child's testimony may be appropriately curtailed. Here, while mother and or her counsel were present for prior

examinations of the child, for some reason they presumed that since the court indicated that this court date would be limited to the examination of the child, they could not attend. The only persons taking part in the examination were the judge, the Assistant Public Guardian (representing D.D's interests), and the child's therapist. A court reporter made a record of the proceedings, and the record reflects that the ASA was present but took no part in the examination. As the ASA took no part, and the record was made, we can see no advantage to the ASA's mere presence. Further, mother does not indicate that she or her counsel made any attempts or were denied requests to review the transcript of the August 13, 2025, proceeding, even though they knew it had been scheduled and taken place more than 30 days before the September 17, 2025, hearing. Mother and her counsel's choice not to attend the August 13, 2025 court date and failure to request a copy of the transcript is an error in judgment that does not belong to the trial court.

¶ 48 Thus, we find no statutory violation of due process.

¶ 49 CONCLUSION

¶ 50 For the foregoing reasons, we find no forfeiture and no violation of 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1). .

¶ 51 Affirmed.

¶ 52