

2026 IL App (1st) 261241-U
No. 1-26-1241B
Order filed September 22, 2026

Second Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)	Appeal from the
	)	Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee,	)	Cook County.
	)	
v.	)	No. 26 CR 5595
	)	
DAJUANA SLATTON,	)	Honorable
	)	Margaret M. Ogarek,
Defendant-Appellant.	)	Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice D.B. Walker and Justice Reyes concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

- ¶ 1 *Held:* We dismiss this appeal as moot because the circuit court granted defendant's Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2) motion for relief. We cannot grant any further relief and no exception to mootness applies.
- ¶ 2 Defendant Dajuana Slatton appeals the circuit court's order revoking pretrial release with monitoring even though the circuit court has previously granted her Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024) motion for relief and reinstated pretrial release with monitoring. We

cannot grant any further relief, so this appeal is moot and no exception to mootness applies. We dismiss this appeal.

¶ 3

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The State charged Slatton with two counts of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2024)), four counts of aggravated battery in a public place (*id.* § 12-3.05(c)), and four counts of aggravated battery against a person over 60 years of age (*id.* § 12-3.05(d)(1)). The charges arise out of a March 2026 altercation at a UPS store in which Slatton reportedly attacked the complaining witness and pointed a loaded firearm at him. Police later arrested Slatton following a traffic stop and allegedly recovered a loaded firearm from her car.

¶ 5

A. Initial Pretrial Detention Hearing

¶ 6 The record on appeal does not reflect the initial pretrial detention proceedings in April 2026. We take the following facts from the parties' filings and later parts of the record that reference the initial pretrial detention proceedings.

¶ 7

In late April 2026, Slatton appeared before the circuit court for an initial pretrial detention hearing. The State petitioned to detain Slatton pursuant to section 110-6.1 of the Pretrial Fairness Act. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2024). The judge who presided over the initial pretrial detention hearing denied the State's petition and granted Slatton pretrial release with either electronic or GPS monitoring. In later proceedings, the parties and the court used these terms interchangeably.

¶ 8

Beginning in late April 2026, Slatton had to wear a monitoring band on her lower right leg as a condition of pretrial release.

¶ 9 Following the initial pretrial detention hearing, the case was transferred to the Honorable Margaret M. Ogarek for arraignment on June 2, 2026.

¶ 10 B. Motion to Modify Conditions of Release

¶ 11 The day before her arraignment, Slatton filed a motion to modify conditions of pretrial release, alleging that the monitoring band on her lower right leg was causing pain and skin discoloration. Dr. Steve Elmosa diagnosed Slatton's right leg as showing "signs of erythema, edema, and dermatitis with tenderness." Dr. Elmosa recommended removing the monitoring band because "continued use of the [monitoring] band may lead to persistent neurovascular compromise, infection, impaired circulation, injury, and/or skin breakdown." Slatton's motion requested that the court modify the monitoring band "condition to prevent future medical diagnos[e]s that result from the band," but did not provide any specifics beyond that.

¶ 12 The circuit court heard Slatton's motion at the June 2 arraignment. Slatton's counsel requested that the monitoring band "be removed." The State argued that the court should detain Slatton as it had requested in the initial pretrial detention petition. The State contended that if Slatton could not wear a monitoring band while on pretrial release, then the court should detain her due to the threat she posed to both the complaining witness and the community.

¶ 13 The court construed the State's argument as an oral "motion for reconsideration" of its initial pretrial detention petition. The court stated that it had reviewed the State's initial pretrial detention petition and the factual proffer in support of that petition. The court then analyzed the initial pretrial detention factors. The court found that Slatton committed the detainable offenses of armed violence and aggravated battery against a person over 60 years of age. See *id.* § 110-6.1(a)(1.5) (a defendant qualifies for pretrial detention if she is charged with a forcible felony).

The court further found that Slatton posed a real and present threat to both the complaining witness and the community. See *id.* (a defendant qualifies for pretrial detention if her “pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community”). Finally, the court found that detention was necessary because Slatton was “physically unable” to wear a monitoring band while on pretrial release. The court ordered pretrial detention and denied Slatton’s motion to modify conditions of pretrial release. Slatton entered pretrial detention that day.

¶ 14

C. Motion to Vacate

¶ 15 The next day, Slatton immediately filed a motion to vacate the court’s order revoking pretrial release and imposing pretrial detention. She argued that the court revoked pretrial release even though she had not been charged with a Class A misdemeanor or felony while on pretrial release, which is the only basis for revoking pretrial release under section 110-6(a) of the Pretrial Fairness Act (*id.* § 110-6(a)). Slatton also argued that the court improperly treated her motion to modify as an opportunity to redo the initial pretrial detention hearing.

¶ 16 At a hearing on the motion, the State requested that the court “continue to detain [Slatton] considering that she cannot be placed on [an] electronic monitoring band.” The court agreed, noting that at the hearing on the motion to modify, Slatton’s counsel “represented that she was physically not able to wear the band because it was causing her health issues.”

¶ 17 The court maintained that it could grant “the State’s motion for relief” seeking detention even though the initial pretrial detention judge had granted release. The court explained that it overruled the initial judge’s pretrial release order because the State’s initial petition had, in fact, established all the elements for pretrial detention.

¶ 18 The court asked Slatton if she wanted to characterize her motion to vacate as a Rule 604(h)(2) motion for relief. Slatton declined and stated that she would file a separate motion for relief. The circuit court denied Slatton’s motion to vacate and allowed her to file a motion for relief.

¶ 19 D. Rule 604(h)(2) Motion for Relief

¶ 20 Slatton filed a Rule 604(h)(2) motion for relief from the June 2 order revoking pretrial release and imposing pretrial detention. In addition to reiterating her earlier arguments, Slatton contended that the State never established the elements of pretrial detention under section 110-6.1, either in its initial petition or its oral argument at the hearing on her motion to modify.

¶ 21 At a June 16 hearing on the motion for relief, Slatton’s counsel explained that she was “willing to go back on the GPS band. There was a motion that was filed originally with respect to her [monitoring band]. She does have significant injury on her right leg, but she would be asking that [band] be placed on her left leg.”

¶ 22 The State explained that it had insisted on pretrial detention because Slatton’s filings suggested that she could not wear any form of monitoring band, which meant that the only option left was detention. Nevertheless, the State requested that Slatton remain in pretrial detention based on the alleged facts of the offense and her dangerousness to the complaining witness.

¶ 23 The court reiterated that it had authority to grant the State’s “motion for relief” (which the court had previously called a “motion for reconsideration”) from the denial of the initial pretrial detention petition. The court also maintained that its section 110-6.1 analysis was correct and justified detaining Slatton.

¶ 24 However, the court acknowledged that Slatton had “indicated a willingness to continue to wear the [monitoring] device that would preclude [her] from going anywhere near the [complaining witness in this case].” Therefore, the court granted Slatton’s motion for relief and reinstated pretrial release with monitoring.

¶ 25 Slatton timely appealed.

¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 27 The circuit court has already granted Slatton’s Rule 604(h)(2) motion for relief and reinstated pretrial release with monitoring. Slatton has been out of jail since June 16, 2026.

¶ 28 Nevertheless, Slatton asks us to hold that the circuit court erred because it redid and overruled the initial pretrial detention hearing based on the State’s “oral motion to reconsider,” which the Act does not allow. See *id.* § 110-6.1(i-5) (if the initial hearing results in pretrial detention, at subsequent hearings, the court may decide only whether continued detention is necessary); *People v. Miller*, 2025 IL App (1st) 250438, ¶¶ 37-38. Slatton also contends that the circuit court erred because it revoked pretrial release even though she was never charged with a new felony or Class A misdemeanor while on pretrial release. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6(a) (West 2024) (“When a defendant has previously been granted pretrial release under this Section for a felony or Class A misdemeanor, that pretrial release may be revoked only if the defendant is charged with a felony or Class A misdemeanor that is alleged to have occurred during the defendant’s pretrial release.”); *Miller*, 2025 IL App (1st) 250438, ¶ 35.

¶ 29 The State submits that this appeal is moot. We agree. An appeal is moot when the reviewing court cannot grant any relief. *People v. Marshall*, 2026 IL 132129, ¶ 3. “ ‘As a general rule, courts in Illinois do not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or consider issues where the

result will not be affected regardless of how those issues are decided.’ ” *People v. Vargas*, 2025 IL App (2d) 240609, ¶ 17 (quoting *In re Alfred H.H.*, 233 Ill. 2d 345, 351 (2009)). We review *de novo* whether an appeal is moot. *People v. Cousins*, 2023 IL App (1st) 230234, ¶ 8.

¶ 30 After the circuit court revoked Slatton’s pretrial release, she filed a Rule 604(h)(2) motion for relief. Such a motion “identif[ies] errors in the circuit court’s detention decision” and “give[s] the court the chance to correct any errors and potentially change its ruling in the movant’s favor.” *People v. Patterson*, 2025 IL App (1st) 250510, ¶¶ 18-19; *People v. Cooksey*, 2024 IL App (1st) 240932, ¶ 16. The circuit court then granted Slatton’s Rule 604(h)(2) motion for relief to correct its revocation of pretrial release.

¶ 31 Slatton’s initial motion to modify alleged that the monitoring band caused skin irritation on her right leg, but it did not ask to move the band from her right leg to her left leg. At the June 2 hearing, Slatton’s counsel requested “that the EM band be removed.” The court’s written order reflected that Slatton was “physically unable to wear a GPS monitor per [her] motion” and the court denied Slatton’s motion to modify.

¶ 32 At the hearing on Slatton’s motion to vacate, Slatton’s counsel briefly mentioned that Slatton “was not going to ask the Court to release her from [monitoring] regardless of the issues she’s having with her health,” but did not elaborate.

¶ 33 In her subsequent Rule 604(h)(2) motion for relief, Slatton then stated that “[w]hen she requested a modification of conditions, Ms. Slatton was seeking a more individualized condition rather than eliminating the condition entirely.” But she did not specify what that “more individualized condition” was, nor did she ever suggest moving the monitoring band from Slatton’s right leg to her left leg.

¶ 34 The first time Slatton clearly explained that she *could* wear a monitoring band, just on her left leg instead of her right, was at the June 16, 2026, hearing on her motion for relief. Once the circuit court understood Slatton’s position, it granted her motion for relief and reinstated pretrial release with monitoring. So, the circuit court has granted the relief Slatton requested: reinstatement of pretrial release with the monitoring band on her left leg. There is no further relief we can grant; therefore, this appeal is moot. See *Marshall*, 2026 IL 132129, ¶ 3.

¶ 35 There are three scenarios in which this court will address a moot issue: “(1) when resolution is in the public’s interest, (2) where the issue is capable of repetition yet evading review, and (3) where collateral consequences to the appellant arise from the judgment.” *In re V.S.*, 2025 IL 129755, ¶ 54. Slatton does not argue that any of these scenarios apply. In fact, she does not address the mootness exceptions at all. Slatton has forfeited any argument that we should review this moot appeal under one of the three exceptions. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). This appeal is moot and no exception to mootness applies; therefore, we must dismiss it. See *People v. Dawson*, 2020 IL App (4th) 170872, ¶ 20 (citing *Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n*, 2016 IL 118129, ¶ 21).

¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 37 For these reasons, we dismiss this appeal as moot.

¶ 38 Appeal dismissed.