

1973
ANNUAL REPORT
to the
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

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A
DECADE
OF
PROGRESS

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE

OF THE

ILLINOIS COURTS

1973

ANNUAL REPORT

to the

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS



The Supreme Court Building Springfield, Illinois



JUSTICES OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

Walter V. Schaefer 1951

The Chief Justice Robert C. Underwood 1962

Thomas E. Kluczynski 1966

1966 ivis

Charles H. Davis 1970 (1955-1960)

avis ()

Howard C. Ryan 1970

Joseph H. Goldenhersh 1970

Daniel P. Ward 1966



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ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS

ROY O. GULLEY
DIRECTOR
SUPREME COURT BUILDING
SPRINGFIELD 62706

30 North Michigan Avenue Chicago 60602

To The Honorable Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme Court

I tender herewith the annual report of the Administrative Office for calendar year 1973.

It has been a year of many accomplishments for the entire State judicial system and for the Administrative Office. The Supreme Court, through the Chief Justice, continues to delegate its administrative authority to enable us to assist the Chief Justice in his administrative responsibilities.

Our completely unified court system has permitted us to be truly flexible in order to avert a crisis in the disposition of cases. The circuit courts continue to dispose of large numbers of cases because our judges have resolved to attain a fair degree of currency, and they are putting forth the necessary additional effort and sacrifice by working more diligently and by accepting assignments to high volume circuits. The Appellate Court continues to make substantial progress in the timely disposition of appeals, and based on this year's statistical data, it would appear that the Appellate Court is achieving the desired goal of currency.

I would be remiss if I failed to recognize the staff of the Administrative Office. While it would be inappropriate to single out any one individual for recognition since each and every employee is a dedicated public servant who serves the Supreme Court and the Administrative Office with sincere devotion and fidelity, events occurred during 1973 which urge commendation of staff. In selecting personnel to manage the newly created Attorney Registration and Disciplinary System, the Supreme Court appointed three employees from the Administrative Office: Carl H. Bolewick, deputy director of the Administrative Office, was appointed administrator of the system; John M. Oswald, assistant director, was appointed as assistant administrator; and Mary Skaljak, administrative assistant, was selected to fill a similar position in the system.

To fill the vacancies created by the appointments, I elevated William M. Madden to deputy director in charge of the Chicago office and

Karen Reynertson to administrative assistant. In addition, two attorneys were employed in Chicago as assistant directors: Lester A. Bonaguro and David F. Rolewick. For the Springfield office I employed W. Stephen Swinney to assist in the installation of the recordkeeping system in the various clerks' offices.

During 1973, the Chicago office was remodeled and expanded to accommodate the new personnel and to provide the necessary space for executing the additional duties which the Court has assigned to the office. In spite of the period of employee transition and remodeling of quarters, the Administrative Office continued to perform its responsibilities with a minimum of disruption. Acknowledgment of the staff of the Administrative Office is in order for carrying out their duties during 1973 in the highly professional manner which the Supreme Court expects from its personnel.

This report is a factual representation of the operation of the Illinois judicial system during 1973, and it is an indicator of the future requirements of our judicial system.

Respectfully,

oy O. Gulley

IN MEMORIAM

Supreme Court Justices

Ray I. Klingbiel (retired)
Jesse L. Simpson (retired)

January 18, 1973 May 7, 1973

Appellate Court Judges

Arthur J. Murphy (retired), First District Ulysses S. Schwartz (retired), First District

March 9, 1973 December 3, 1973

Circuit Court Judges

Stephen B. Adsit (retired), 11th Circuit Arthur V. Essington (retired), 17th Circuit Henry Ferguson (retired), Cook County Harry I. Hannah, 5th Circuit Samuel Heller (retired), Cook County Warren J. Hickey, Cook County Francis T. McCurrie (retired), Cook County James O. Monroe, Jr., 3rd Circuit William B. Phillips, 15th Circuit Charles G. Seidel, 16th Circuit Walter A. Yoder (retired), 11th Circuit

September 14, 1973
August 4, 1973
February 20, 1973
May 20, 1973
November 20, 1973
May 12, 1973
May 21, 1973
June 7, 1973
February 27, 1973
February 22, 1973
September 24, 1973

Associate Judges

Maurice W. Lee, Cook County Burton H. Palmer, Cook County Chester P. Winsor (retired), 13th Circuit August 28, 1973 September 17, 1973 November 14, 1973

REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR HON. ROY O. GULLEY

TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

This is the sixth annual report of your Administrative Office which I have had the honor of presenting to you. The report is a narrative and statistical recordation of the significant historical and recent developments which affect the courts and judges of the State of Illinois. Particular emphasis has been placed on evolvements occurring in calendar year 1973.

In the 1973 report, we have retained the section on the Judicial Article of the 1970 Constitution, and we have devoted particular attention to the new Supreme Court rules governing attorney registration and discipline. We have also augmented the narrative portion of the report with graphs which should increase the understanding of those readers who are not intimately familiar with the Illinois court system.

This report to you is a permanent record of the events which have transpired this year in the State courts and in the Administrative Office. Because the Illinois court structure is an acknowledged model system, distribution of the report extends beyond the boundaries of Illinois. Thousands of copies are requested and sent outside of this State: court administrators in all states; most law schools in the nation; constitutional conventions and citizens' groups studying court reform in other states; judges, lawyers and other court-related personnel in Illinois and elsewhere; and others, including students, legislators and researchers. The news media and libraries also maintain files of the reports for study and research projects.

The report for 1973 encompasses a description of the courts' activities, the roster of the State's judicial personnel and statistical data on all courts; and in addition, the report records the following significant developments:

Deaths and retirements of judges

Summary of the Judicial Article of the 1970 Constitution

Synopsis of legislation affecting the courts

Description of the attorney registration and disciplinary system

Activities of the judiciary

The Administrative Office—Duties and Accomplishments

JUDICIAL RETIREMENTS

A total of fifteen Illinois judges retired during 1973. Several judges retired due to age and failing health, yet others left the bench to pursue other vocational and avocational endeavors, including returning to the more lucrative practice of law.

Appellate Court Judge

Mel Abrahamson, 2nd District September 30, 1973

Circuit Court Judges

Stephen B. Adsit, 11th Circuit September 1, 1973 William M. Barth, Cook County August 31, 1973

Paul R. Durr, 8th Circuit August 31, 1973

Wesley A. Eberle, 15th Circuit December 4, 1973

Francis T. McCurrie, Cook County March 19, 1973

Albert S. O'Sullivan, 17th Circuit December 31, 1973

Daniel A. Roberts, Cook County July 31, 1973

Sigmund J. Stefanowicz, Cook County December 16, 1973

Associate Judges

Robert W. Boyd, 12th Circuit December 31, 1973

Paul G. Ceaser, Cook County December 31, 1973

Eugene T. Daly, 19th Circuit August 31, 1973

Lester Jankowski, Cook County October 1, 1973

Roy W. Strawn, 3rd Circuit August 31, 1973

John F. Twomey, 5th Circuit December 31, 1973

THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION OF 1970

The Illinois court system underwent extensive and revolutionary change on January 1, 1964 when the amended Judicial Article of the 1870 Constitution became effective. With the adoption of the 1970 Constitution, the judicial structure and court operation were refined, but the basic salutary changes brought about by the 1964 Judicial Article were retained virtually intact in Article VI of the new Constitution.

The traumatic and dynamic transformation from a complex judicial system of yesteryear to a simple. modern and efficient court organization of today, objectively viewed, was the most far-reaching and constructive reform in the history of state constitutional efforts to establish an up-to-date and productive system for the administration of justice. Illinois pioneered the unified trial court structure, and because of its highly successful implementation, the Illinois court system is a model which every state in the Union is attempting to emulate. In describing the Illinois unified court system as compared to other court systems, the American Judicature Society matter of factly stated in its March 1973 journal, Judicature (Vol. 56, No. 8, at page 323), that "Illinois, of course, has the model [court] system admired by most court experts."

The 1964 Judicial Article and the 1970 Constitution turned the judicial system around, making it possible for the judicial branch of government to more efficiently and justly serve the people. Illinois innovated the unified trial court system; and the people, lawyers and judges made it work beyond their expectations. The State became a judicial laboratory, and the great experiment proved beyond a doubt that the concept of a unified trial court was workable. The outstanding reputation of the Illinois court system and its judges was reaffirmed by the electorate when the 1964 Judicial Article was almost totally retained in the 1970 Constitution. The minor refinements in the present Judicial Article will provide Illinois with an even more sound judicial system than in previous years.

In our reports of 1970 and 1971, the saga of the Illinois court system was told in detail. What is presented below will highlight the significant provisions of the present Judicial Article. The chart on channel of appeal and the Judicial Article of the 1970 Constitution, which immediately follow, will be helpful in understanding the Illinois court structure.

In summary form, the 1970 Judicial Article provides:

Section 1. The judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court, the Appellate Court and the circuit courts. This grant of power has its greatest impact in the simplicity of the constitutional judicial structure and the firm establishment of a three-level court structure.

Section 2. The State is divided in five judicial districts for the selection of Supreme and Appellate Court judges.

Section 3. The Supreme Court consists of seven judges, four of whom are necessary for a decision, and one of whom is selected by his fellow judges as the Chief Justice.

Section 4. The Supreme Court's discretionary and mandatory original and appellate jurisdiction is set out

Section 5. The organization of the Appellate Court is explained.

Section 6. The Appellate Court's jurisdiction is established. All final judgments of the circuit court are appealable as a matter of right.

Section 7. The State is divided into judicial circuits. Each county must have at least one circuit judge unless changed by law. The circuit judges select one from their number to be chief judge who shall have general administrative authority over his court, subject to the authority of the Supreme Court.

Section 8. The circuit court judges appoint associate judges as provided by Supreme Court rule.

Section 9. The jurisdiction of the circuit court extends to all justiciable matters. All cases are filed in the circuit court, and every judge of that court possesses the full jurisdiction of the circuit court. This is the heart of the unified trial court system. Section 10. The terms of office for all judges are stated.

Section 11. Every judge must be a U.S. citizen, licensed attorney and a resident of the unit which selects him.

Section 12. Supreme, Appellate and circuit court judges are initially selected in partisan elections; thereafter, each judge is retained in office if he receives a 60% favorable vote in an uncontested retention election. The Supreme Court may appoint lawyers to fill judicial vacancies occurring between elections.


Section 13. The Supreme Court must adopt rules of conduct for judges. Supreme Court Rules 61 through 71 establish standards of judicial conduct. Section 14. Judges are paid a salary by the State, and fee officers are not allowed in the judicial system.

Section 15. The General Assembly is empowered to provide for the retirement of judges at a prescribed age. Retired judges may be recalled to judicial service. The Judicial Inquiry Board is authorized to investigate and file complaints against judges. The Courts Commission adjudicates charges filed against judges by the Board. Section 16. The Supreme Court is vested with general administrative and supervisory authority over all courts, and appoints the administrative director to assist the Chief Justice in his duties. The Supreme Court may assign judges temporarily to any court.


Section 17. An annual judicial conference is created to consider the work of the courts and to suggest improvements in the administration of justice

Section 18. The Supreme and Appellate Courts appoint the clerks of their respective courts. Circuit court clerks are selected as provided by law.

Section 19. The state's attorneys are elected in each county; however, one state's attorney may be elected to serve more than one county.



CHANNEL OF APPEALS PRIOR TO 1964



CHANNEL OF APPEAL TODAY

CONSTITUTION OF 1970 ARTICLE VI—THE JUDICIARY

Section 1. Courts

The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, an Appellate Court and Circuit Courts.

Section 2. Judicial Districts

The State is divided into five Judicial Districts for the selection of Supreme and Appellate Court Judges. The First Judicial District consists of Cook County. The remainder of the State shall be divided by law into four Judicial Districts of substantially equal population, each of which shall be compact and composed of contiguous counties.

Section 3. Supreme Court— Organization

The Supreme Court shall consist of seven judges. Three shall be selected from the First Judicial District and one from each of the other Judicial Districts. Four Judges constitute a quorum and the concurrence of four is necessary for a decision. Supreme Court Judges shall select a Chief Justice from their number to serve for a term of three years.

Section 4. Supreme Court— Jurisdiction

- (a) The Supreme Court may exercise original jurisdiction in cases relating to revenue, mandamus, prohibition or habeas corpus and as may be necessary to the complete determination of any case on review.
- (b) Appeals from judgments of Circuit Courts imposing a sentence of death shall be directly to the Supreme Court as a matter of right. The Supreme Court shall provide by rule for direct appeal in other cases.
- (c) Appeals from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court are a matter of right if a question under the Constitution of the United States or of this State arises for the first time in and as a result of the action of the Appellate Court, or if a division of the Appellate Court certifies that a case decided by it involves a question of such importance that the case should be decided by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals from the Appellate Court in other cases.

Section 5. Appellate Court— Organization

The number of Appellate Judges to be selected from each Judicial District shall be provided by law. The Supreme Court shall prescribe by rule the number of Appellate divisions in each Judicial District. Each Appellate division shall have at least three judges. Assignments to divisions shall be made by the Supreme Court. A majority of a division consti-

tutes a quorum and the concurrence of a majority of the division is necessary for a decision. There shall be at least one division in each Judicial District and each division shall sit at times and places prescribed by rules of the Supreme Court.

Section 6. Appellate Court— Jurisdiction

Appeals from final judgments of a Circuit Court are a matter of right to the Appellate Court in the Judicial District in which the Circuit Court is located except in cases appealable directly to the Supreme Court and except that after a trial on the merits in a criminal case, there shall be no appeal from a judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court from other than final judgments of Circuit Courts. The Appellate Court may exercise original jurisdiction when necessary to the complete determination of any case on review. The Appellate Court shall have such powers of direct review of administrative action as provided by law.

Section 7. Judicial Circuits

- (a) The State shall be divided into Judicial Circuits consisting of one or more counties. The First Judicial District shall constitute a Judicial Circuit. The Judicial Circuits within the other Judicial Districts shall be as provided by law. Circuits composed of more than one county shall be compact and of contiguous counties. The General Assembly by law may provide for the division of a circuit for the purpose of selection of Circuit Judges and for the selection of Circuit Judges from the circuit at large.
- (b) Each Judicial Circuit shall have one Circuit Court with such number of Circuit Judges as provided by law. Unless otherwise provided by law, there shall be at least one Circuit Judge from each county. In the First Judicial District, unless otherwise provided by law, Cook County, Chicago, and the area outside Chicago shall be separate units for the selection of Circuit Judges, with at least twelve chosen at large from the area outside Chicago and at least thirty-six chosen at large from Chicago.
- (c) Circuit Judges in each circuit shall select by secret ballot a Chief Judge from their number to serve at their pleasure. Subject to the authority of the Supreme Court, the Chief Judge shall have general administrative authority over his court, including authority to provide for divisions, general or specialized, and for appropriate times and places of holding court.

Section 8. Associate Judges

Each Circuit Court shall have such number of Associate Judges as provided by law. Associate Judges shall be appointed by the Circuit Judges in each cir-

cuit as the Supreme Court shall provide by rule. In the First Judicial District, unless otherwise provided by law, at least one-fourth of the Associate Judges shall be appointed from, and reside, outside Chicago. The Supreme Court shall provide by rule for matters to be assigned to Associate Judges.

Section 9. Circuit Courts— Jurisdiction

Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction relating to redistricting of the General Assembly and to the ability of the Governor to serve or resume office. Circuit Courts shall have such power to review administrative action as provided by law.

Section 10. Terms Of Office

The terms of office of Supreme and Appellate Court Judges shall be ten years; of Circuit Judges, six years; and of Associate Judges, four years.

Section 11. Eligibility For Office

No person shall be eligible to be a Judge or Associate Judge unless he is a United States citizen; a licensed attorney-at-law of this State, and a resident of the unit which selects him. No change in the boundaries of a unit shall affect the tenure in office of a Judge or Associate Judge incumbent at the time of such change.

Section 12. Election And Retention

- (a) Supreme, Appellate and Circuit Judges shall be nominated at primary elections or by petition. Judges shall be elected at general or judicial elections as the General Assembly shall provide by law. A person eligible for the office of Judge may cause his name to appear on the ballot as a candidate for Judge at the primary and at the general or judicial elections by submitting petitions. The General Assembly shall prescribe by law the requirements for petitions.
- (b) The office of a Judge shall be vacant upon his death, resignation, retirement, removal, or upon the conclusion of his term without retention in office. Whenever an additional Appellate or Circuit Judge is authorized by law, the office shall be filled in the manner provided for filling a vacancy in that office.
- (c) A vacancy occurring in the office of Supreme, Appellate or Circuit Judge shall be filled as the General Assembly may provide by law. In the absence of a law, vacancies may be filled by appointment by the Supreme Court. A person appointed to fill a vacancy 60 or more days prior to the next primary election to nominate Judges shall serve until the vacancy is filled for a term at the next general or judicial election. A person appointed to fill a vacancy less than 60 days prior to the next primary election to nomi-

nate Judges shall serve until the vacancy is filled at the second general or judicial election following such appointment.

- (d) Not less than six months before the general election preceding the expiration of his term of office. a Supreme, Appellate or Circuit Judge who has been elected to that office may file in the office of the Secretary of State a declaration of candidacy to succeed himself. The Secretary of State, not less than 63 days before the election, shall certify the Judge's candidacy to the proper election officials. The names of Judges seeking retention shall be submitted to the electors, separately and without party designation, on the sole question whether each Judge shall be retained in office for another term. The retention elections shall be conducted at general elections in the appropriate Judicial District, for Supreme and Appellate Judges, and in the circuit for Circuit Judges. The affirmative vote of three-fifths of the electors voting on the question shall elect the Judge to the office for a term commencing on the first Monday in December following his election.
- (e) A law reducing the number of Appellate or Circuit Judges shall be without prejudice to the right of the Judges affected to seek retention in office. A reduction shall become effective when a vacancy occurs in the affected unit.

Section 13. Prohibited Activities

- (a) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of conduct for Judges and Associate Judges.
- (b) Judges and Associate Judges shall devote full time to judicial duties. They shall not practice law, hold a position of profit, hold office under the United States or this State or unit of local government or school district or in a political party. Service in the State militia or armed forces of the United States for periods of time permitted by rule of the Supreme Court shall not disqualify a person from serving as a Judge or Associate Judge.

Section 14. Judicial Salaries And Expenses—Fee Officers Eliminated

Judges shall receive salaries provided by law which shall not be diminished to take effect during their terms of office. All salaries and such expenses as may be provided by law shall be paid by the State, except that Appellate, Circuit and Associate Judges shall receive such additional compensation from counties within their district or circuit as may be provided by law. There shall be no fee officers in the judicial system.

Section 15. Retirement—Discipline

(a) The General Assembly may provide by law for the retirement of Judges and Associate Judges at a prescribed age. Any retired Judge or Associate Judge, with his consent, may be assigned by the Supreme Court to judicial service for which he shall receive the applicable compensation in lieu of retirement benefits. A retired Associate Judge may be assigned only as an Associate Judge.

- (b) A Judicial Inquiry Board is created. The Supreme Court shall select two Circuit Judges as members and the Governor shall appoint four persons who are not lawyers and three lawyers as members of the Board. No more than two of the lawyers and two of the non-lawyers appointed by the Governor shall be members of the same political party. The terms of Board members shall be four years. A vacancy on the Board shall be filled for a full term in the manner the original appointment was made. No member may serve on the Board more than eight years.
- (c) The Board shall be convened permanently, with authority to conduct investigations, receive or initiate complaints concerning a Judge or Associate Judge, and file complaints with the Courts Commission. The Board shall not file a complaint unless five members believe that a reasonable basis exists (1) to charge the Judge or Associate Judge with willful misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform his duties, or other conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or that brings the judicial office into disrepute, or (2) to charge that the Judge or Associate Judge is physically or mentally unable to perform his duties. All proceedings of the Board shall be confidential except the filing of a complaint with the Courts Commission. The Board shall prosecute the complaint.
- (d) The Board shall adopt rules governing its procedures. It shall have subpoena power and authority to appoint and direct its staff. Members of the Board who are not Judges shall receive per diem compensation and necessary expenses; members who are Judges shall receive necessary expenses only. The General Assembly by law shall appropriate funds for the operation of the Board.
- (e) A Courts Commission is created consisting of one Supreme Court Judge selected by that Court, who shall be its chairman, two Appellate Court Judges selected by that Court, and two Circuit Judges selected by the Supreme Court. The Commission shall be convened permanently to hear complaints filed by the Judicial Inquiry Board. The Commission shall have authority after notice and public hearing (1) to remove from office, suspend without pay, censure or reprimand a Judge or Associate Judge for willful misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform his duties, or other conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or that brings the judicial office into disrepute, or (2) to suspend, with or without pay, or retire a Judge or Associate Judge who is physically or mentally unable to perform his duties.

- (f) The concurrence of three members of the Commission shall be necessary for a decision. The decision of the Commission shall be final.
- (g) The Commission shall adopt rules governing its procedures and shall have power to issue subpoenas. The General Assembly shall provide by law for the expenses of the Commission.

Section 16. Administration

General administrative and supervisory authority over all courts is vested in the Supreme Court and shall be exercised by the Chief Justice in accordance with its rules. The Supreme Court shall appoint an administrative director and staff, who shall serve at its pleasure, to assist the Chief Justice in his duties. The Supreme Court may assign a Judge temporarily to any court and an Associate Judge to serve temporarily as an Associate Judge on any Circuit Court. The Supreme Court shall provide by rule for expeditious and inexpensive appeals.

Section 17. Judicial Conference

The Supreme Court shall provide by rule for an annual judicial conference to consider the work of the courts and to suggest improvements in the administration of justice and shall report thereon annually in writing to the General Assembly not later than January 31.

Section 18. Clerks Of Courts

- (a) The Supreme Court and the Appellate Court Judges of each Judicial District, respectively, shall appoint a clerk and other non-judicial officers for their Court or District.
- (b) The General Assembly shall provide by law for the election, or for the appointment by Circuit Judges, of clerks and other non-judicial officers of the Circuit Courts and for their terms of office and removal for cause.
- (c) The salaries of clerks and other non-judicial officers shall be as provided by law.

Section 19. State's Attorneys— Selection, Salary

A State's Attorney shall be elected in each county in 1972 and every fourth year thereafter for a four year term. One State's Attorney may be elected to serve two or more counties if the governing boards of such counties so provide and a majority of the electors of each county voting on the issue approve. A person shall not be eligible for the office of State's Attorney unless he is a United States citizen and a licensed attorney-at-law of this State. His salary shall be provided by law.

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LEGISLATION AFFECTING THE COURTS 1973

During the 1973 special sessions of the 77th General Assembly and the regular sessions of the 78th General Assembly, numerous bills affecting the practice of law, criminal and juvenile justice, the operation of the court system and court personnel were introduced. Summaries of some of the more significant bills enacted into law are set out below. References are to III.Rev.Stat., ch.____, \mathbb{S} _____. However, before attending to the new laws, it is important to note some legislation, which would have vitally affected the court system, that ultimately failed to pass the General Assembly.

Senate Joint Resolution 23 (SJR-23) passed the General Assembly on June 25, 1973 and would have placed on the ballot in the November 1974 general election the following proposition: Article VI, Section 12(d) of the 1970 Constitution would be amended by deleting that section from the Constitution. Section 12(d) provides that a judge, once elected to his office, may continue to serve in that office upon expiration of the term to which he was elected, provided that he files a declaration of candidacy to succeed himself (to be retained in office) and further provided he receives a 60% affirmative popular vote at the general election. That is, SJR-23 would have required an elected judge to run in a partisan, contested election to remain in office upon expiration of the term to which he was initially elected. If adopted by the electorate, SJR-23 would have returned the judiciary to the pre-1964 days of contested elections when a judge's term in office had expired.

A vigorous campaign to urge the General Assembly to withdraw SJR-23, pursuant to Article XIV, Section 2(a) of the Constitution, was waged by present and former elected public officials, the bar associations, individual lawyers, citizen and civic groups, and segments of the news media. When the General Assembly reconvened in the fall of 1973, SJR-50 was offered. That resolution provided that SJR-23 would be withdrawn. On November 27, 1973, after adoption by the General Assembly, SJR-50 was filed in the Secretary of State's office and accordingly, the retention provision of the Constitution remains intact.

Several other joint resolutions to amend the Constitution in regard to the manner in which judges are initially selected and retained in office were introduced in the 78th General Assembly; however, the resolutions failed to pass out of the originating house. See SJR-18, HJR Const. Amend. No. 5, HJR Const. Amend. No. 18, and HJR Const. Amend. No. 24.

Changes in Substantive and Procedural Law

SB-32 (PA 78-594) requires that adequate notice be given to current foster parents and the agency designated, by the court or the Department of Children and Family Services, as custodian of a minor who has been adjudicated by a neglected or dependent minor, under the Juvenile Court Act, of all stages of any hearing or proceeding wherein the custody or status of the minor may be changed. (Ch. 37, § 701-20)

SB-132 (PA 78-522) repeals the present provisions of Section 2 of the Dead Man's Act and substitutes new provisions which (1) limit the bar of the statute to conversations with the deceased or incompetent person and to any event which took place in his presence; (2) expressly permits testimony competent under Section 3 of the Act and facts relating to the heirship of a decedent; (3) defines an incompetent person as one who is adjudged by the court in the action to be unable to testify by reason of mental illness, mental retardation or deterioration; (4) excludes from the definition of an interested person one who is interested solely as a fiduciary; and (5) permits the survivor to testify to rebut any witness called by the protected party. (Ch. 51, § 2)

SB-345 (PA 78-531) amends the definition of "parent" in the Juvenile Court Act, and provides for notice to the putative father in adoption cases and for his declaration or disclaimer of paternity. (Ch. 37, §§ 701-14 and 705-9.4)

SB-1133 (PA 78-550) eliminates the requirement for the examination of witnesses other than the plaintiff, where the complaint is taken as confessed in divorce proceedings. (Ch. 40, § 9)

HB-18 (PA 78-921) provides that in any case in which a defendant is convicted of murder, falling into a category requiring imposition of capital punishment, the State shall seek imposition of the death penalty. It provides that after there has been a finding of guilty the trial judge shall, before entering sentence, notify the chief judge of the circuit court to assign three judges to hear evidence and determine whether the case requires imposition of the death penalty. The Act also sets out the procedures to be followed after such determination. (Ch. 38, §§ 9.1 and 1005-5-3)

HB-129 (PA 78-201) changes the limitation on actions brought under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act from 1 year to 2 years. It also changes the notice requirement to within one year of the accrual of the cause of action, and it permits service thereof by registered or certified mail in lieu of personal service. (Ch. 85, §§ 8-101 and 8-102)

HB-373 (PA 78-255) combines multiple forms of sections amended two or more times by the 77th General Assembly. Where the last amendment of a section incorporated all previous amendments, it identifies the Public Act on which to rely. It conforms two sections to decisions by the Illinois Supreme Court in *Carey v. Elrod*, 49 III.2d 464, 275 N.E.2d 367 (1971), and *Stein v. Howlett*, 52 III.2d 570, 289

N.E.2d 409 (1972), and restores the section on uninsured motorists repealed by the no-fault bill held unconstitutional in *Grace* v. *Howlett*, 51 III.2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972). (Ch. 46, § 23-23; Ch. 73, § 755a; Ch. 127, § 604 A-106)

HB-417 (PA 78-665) amends various provisions of the Civil Practice Act to coordinate them with the Supreme Court Rules. (Ch. 110, §§ 21, 64, 67, 68.1, 68.3, 72, 73, 81 and 83)

HB-527 (PA 78-264) permits proof of heirship by affidavit. (Ch. 3, § 57)

HB-865 (PA 78-602) assures minors subject to the Juvenile Court Act of all fundamental rights of adults, and it provides for a number of other significant substantive and procedural changes in the Act. (Ch. 37, §§ 701-2, 703-6, 704-2 and 705-8)

HB-1086 (PA 78-939) amends and adds to the Unified Code of Corrections. It contains significant amendments to the sentencing provisions. In particular, § 1005-6-3(d) was amended to permit sentences of up to 6 months imprisonment as a condition of probation. (Ch. 38, § 1005-6-3(d))

HB-1089 (PA 78-940) amends the act creating the Department of Children and Family Services to make it clear that delinquents, who are minors less than 13 years of age, committed to it shall be accepted for care without a requirement for the Department's approval. (Ch. 23, § 5005)

HB-1395 (PA 78-287) provides that in replevin cases there must be notice to the defendant and a hearing prior to issuance of a writ of replevin, to conform with the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in *Fuentes* v. *Shevin*, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972). (Ch. 119, §§ 1, 4, 7, 12 and 21)

Changes Affecting Courts and Judges

SB-6 (PA 77-2nd SS-6) raises the annual salary of judges of the Illinois Supreme Court from \$40,000 to \$42,500; of Appellate Court judges from \$37,500 to \$40,000; of circuit court judges from \$27,500 to \$30,000, with judges in Cook and DuPage counties receiving an additional \$7,500 to be paid by the county. (Ch. 53, §§ 3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3)

SB-8 (PA 77-2nd SS-8) increases the salary of the clerk of Supreme Court from \$20,000 to \$25,000 per year. (Ch. 53, § 28.1)

SB-9 (PA 77-2nd SS-9) increases the salary of clerks of the Appellate Court as follows: first judicial district, from \$20,000 to \$23,000; all other districts, from \$18,000 to \$21,000. (Ch. 37, § 27)

SB-105 (PA 78-520) provides for summoning grand and petit jurors by certified mail, in other than

single county circuits, and for personal service of summons in single county circuits. (Ch. 78, §§ 9, 9.1, 10, 10.1, 11, 11.1 and 32)

SB-535 (PA 78-356) requires clerks of the circuit court to notify the Department of Law Enforcement of all felony convictions. (Ch. 38, § 83-8.1)

SB-1186 (PA 78-552) provides for a 30 day extension to file statements of economic interests, for persons who, within 10 days before or after the final filing date, file a declaration of intention to defer the filing of such statement. It also provides for a 30 day grace period, after the effective date of the bill, for the filing of statements of economic interests which were due before that date. (Ch. 127, § 604A-105)

HB-719 (PA 78-273) amends the Illinois Vehicle Code to provide, in counties other than Cook, that when police officers of municipalities issue tickets under the provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code or municipal ordinances which regulate the ownership, use or operation of vehicles, that such citation shall also include a notice to the accused that if he intends to plead not guilty or, in addition, demand a trial by jury, he should notify the clerk of the court. (Ch. 951/2, § 16-106)

HB-767 (PA 78-558) increases from 3 to 4 the number of Appellate Court judges to be elected in each downstate judicial district. (Ch. 37, § 25)

HB-782 (PA 78-666) makes the salaries of all associate judges the same, at \$23,500 per year, to be paid out of the State treasury, and provides for an additional salary of \$4,500 per year in Cook and Du-Page counties. (Ch. 53, § 3.3)

HB-1138 (PA 78-784) permits judges to file a notice, before January 1, 1974, rescinding their decision not to participate in the judges retirement system. (Ch. 1081/2, §§ 18-121, 18-123, and 18-125.1)

HB-1304 (PA 78-805) permits any judge in office on June 30, 1973, who reaches age 70, to complete his unexpired term in order to fulfill the minimum requirement under the judges retirement system. (Ch. 37, § 23.72)

HB-1653 (PA 78-792) amends the Election Code to make it clear that judges are to be elected at the November 1974 general election. (Ch. 46, § 2-7.2)

HB-1866 (PA 78-910) extends to judges in service on July 1, 1972, rather than judges in service on July 1, 1969, the privilege of establishing service credit in the judges retirement system for periods of service before January 1, 1964 as a justice of the peace, police magistrate, master in chancery or civil referee in the Municipal Court of Chicago. (Ch. 1081/2, § 18-112)

NEW PROCEDURES FOR REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS

The Illinois Supreme Court historically has had the power to regulate the practice of law in this State (*In re Day*, 181 III. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899)), and has upheld its inherent power to discipline attorneys, *In re Teitelbaum*, 13 III.2d 586, 150 N.E.2d 873 (1958). In the exercise of those powers, the Supreme Court adopted rules governing the procedures to be employed where allegations are made that attorneys' practices tend to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts and the legal profession into disrepute.

Prior to 1973, Supreme Court Rules 751 and 752 set out the procedures for disciplining attorneys. Briefly, the rules provided: (a) The Illinois State Bar Association's Board of Governors and its committee on grievances and The Chicago Bar Association's Board of Managers and its committee on grievances were appointed as commissioners of the Supreme Court and were empowered to make investigations, receive, inquire into and take proof concerning complaints against attorneys; (b) Complaints against attorneys were signed by the person aggrieved or by certain members of the bar associations: (c) The clerk of the Supreme Court noticed the respondent attorney concerning the pendency of the complaint and issued writs of subpoena; (d) Hearings were held before the commissioners or committees, and if any action by the Supreme Court was recommended, the appropriate governing board of the bar associations reported to the Supreme Court conclusions of fact and law concerning the complaint; and (e) The matter was then docketed and set down for a disposition hearing by the Supreme Court. If an attorney's name was stricken from the rolls of attorneys, he could apply for reinstatement upon the rolls, pursuant to the procedures enumerated in Rule 752.

In 1971, the Illinois State Bar and Chicago Bar Associations filed in the Supreme Court a joint petition and report requesting changes in Rules 751 and 752 and citing deficiencies in the disciplinary process. The petition suggested the need for a professional, full-time staff to investigate complaints, with said staff and its operations being financed by all members of the legal profession. The Chicago Council of Lawyers also filed a petition requesting a change in the disciplinary system. After more than a year of study and consultation with the bar associations in and out of the State, the Supreme Court adopted a comprehensive set of rules, effective February 1 and April 1, 1973 which not only provide for discipline procedures but also require registration of attorneys licensed to practice in Illinois. In summary form, the rules provide:

Rule 751—Creates the Attorney Registration Commission which is the administrative supervisor of disciplinary proceedings affecting Illinois lawyers. The five member, unsalaried commission is appointed by the Supreme Court and is charged with:

(a) Making rules for disciplinary proceedings; (b) Supervising the activities of the administrator of the disciplinary system; (c) Authorizing the administrator to employ staff; (d) Appointing lawyers to serve as commissioners; (e) Collecting and administering a disciplinary fund and filing annually with the Supreme Court an accounting of monies received and disbursed; and (f) Submitting an annual report to the Supreme Court evaluating the disciplinary system and making recommendations thereon.

Rule 752-Provides that the Supreme Court appoint an administrator of the disciplinary system to serve at the Court's pleasure as the principal executive officer of the system. Subject to the supervision of the commission, the administrator shall: (a) On his own motion, on the recommendation of an inquiry board or at the instance of an aggrieved party, investigate the conduct of attorneys which tends to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute; (b) Assist the inquiry boards in their investigations and prosecute disciplinary cases before the hearing boards, the review board and the Court; (c) Employ necessary investigative, clerical and legal personnel and discharge such personnel whose performance is unsatisfactory to him; and (d) Maintain records, make reports and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the commission.

Rule 753—Establishes inquiry, hearing and review boards, provides for membership of said boards and sets out procedures and jurisdiction of said boards. The members of the inquiry and hearing divisions of the disciplinary committees of the State and Chicago Bar Associations are appointed as commissioners of the Court to serve on the inquiry and hearing boards.

- (a) There are two inquiry boards, each composed of at least 10 members, for disciplinary matters arising in Cook County and downstate. The boards are responsible for investigating matters referred to them by the administrator and may initiate their own investigations or refer matters to the administrator for investigation. The boards, or panels thereof composed of at least five members, after investigation and consideration, shall dispose of matters before them by vote; however, a complaint must be voted only upon the affirmative vote of a majority of a board, but in no event shall a complaint be voted by less than four panel members. A voted complaint shall be prepared by the administrator and filed with a hearing board.
- (b) There are two hearing boards, each composed of at least 21 members, for disciplinary matters arising in Cook County and downstate. The duties of the hearing panels

of the hearing boards are to conduct hearings on filed complaints and on referred petitions, to make findings of fact and conclusions of fact and law, and to make recommendations for discipline, dismissal or non-disciplinary suspension. The hearing panels, composed of at least three members, by the concurrence of a majority, shall decide matters before them. Notice and hearing are provided for and proceedings are conducted according to the practice in civil cases as modified by commission rules. The standard of proof shall be clear and convincing evidence.

(c) There is a nine member review board appointed by the Court. This board reviews the reports of the hearing boards where action by the Court is recommended and in all other cases upon application of the administrator after service of a hearing board report. The respondent attorney, in whose case the hearing board report recommends action by the Court, and the administrator may file exceptions to the report. The review board may approve or reject the hearing board's findings and may approve, reject or modify the recommendations, may remand the proceedings for further action or dismiss the proceedings. The standard of review relating to the sufficiency of the evidence shall be whether the hearing board's findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Where the review board concludes that disciplinary action is required, the board's report is transmitted to the Supreme Court. The respondent attorney is notified of the filing of the report with the Court, and he may file exceptions thereto.

Rules 754 and 755—Empower the inquiry and hearing boards to take and transcribe the evidence of witnesses and require the Supreme Court clerk to issue subpoenas upon request of the boards. The inquiry, hearing and review boards may call to their assistance other attorneys and may make rules and regulations concerning procedures before the respective boards.

Rule 756—Requires that every attorney admitted to practice law in Illinois pay an annual registration fee to the commission, sets out exemptions to paying the fee and provides for penalties for nonpayment.

Attorneys admitted to the bar for less than one year pay no fee; those admitted more than one but less than five years pay a \$10 fee per year; and those admitted for more than five years, pay a \$20 fee per year. Attorneys exempt from paying the fee include those in the U.S. military service, those licensed to practice law for more than 50 years, those having attained 75 years of age, or those

who are admitted but do not practice, reside in or are employed in Illinois.

The administrator is required to maintain, and file a copy thereof, with the clerk of the Supreme Court, a current master roll of attorneys who have paid, or are exempt from, the annual registration fee. An attorney whose name does not appear on the roll is not entitled to practice law.

Rule 757, 758, 759 and 760—Set out procedures for transferring an attorney to inactive status because he has been declared by a court to be mentally incompetent, in need of mental treatment, has been involuntarily committed to a hospital on such grounds or because of mental infirmity, mental disorder or addiction to drugs or intoxicants. The rules also provide that any attorney so disabled may be ordered by the Supreme Court upon motion to be mentally or physically examined by a physician. Attorneys transferred to inactive status may be reinstated to active status.

Rule 761—Makes provisions for procedures to be followed upon an attorney's conviction of certain crimes. The administrator may file a complaint with the Supreme Court, with a certified copy of the conviction judgment, where an attorney has been convicted by any court of: (1) theft or any offense involving fraud; (2) forgery; (3) extortion; (4) bribery; (5) perjury; or (6) an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing. The Supreme Court may suspend said attorney and provide for a further hearing before a hearing board to determine whether the crime warrants additional discipline.

Rules 762 and 763—Establish procedures for disbarment on consent and for reciprocal disciplinary action. An attorney who is charged with misconduct and who is under investigation or has charges pending against him before any of the disciplinary boards, may move in the Supreme Court to have his name stricken from the roll of attorneys. The administrator prepares a statement of charges and the movant attorney files an affidavit with the Court stating that he has received a copy of the statement, that his motion is freely and voluntarily made and that he understands the nature and consequences of his motion.

An attorney licensed in Illinois and in another state who is disciplined in the sister state may be subject to the same discipline in Illinois upon proof of the order of the sister state imposing the discipline. Hearing procedures regarding the foreign order are provided for, and the administrator may elect to institute independent disciplinary proceedings against any attorney based on his conduct in another state.

Rules 764, 765, 766, 767 and 768—Provide that an attorney who is disbarred, suspended or transferred to inactive status must notify his clients that he cannot continue to represent them in any pend-

ing matter. The rule also provides that the clerk of the Supreme Court shall notify certain State and Federal judicial officers of an attorney's disbarment, suspension or transfer to inactive status. Additionally, the rules make provisions for the manner of service of process and for reinstatement. Proceedings before the disciplinary boards shall be private and confidential unless the respondent attorney requests that they be made public.

In creating the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, the Supreme Court's primary objective was to eliminate unnecessary delay in the processing of complaints against attorneys. The Court was cognizant that the public, court system, bar and the respondent have a vital interest in an early and just determination of any charge which bears upon the fitness of an attorney to practice law.


During the formative, organizational period of the registration and disciplinary system—February 1 to December 31, 1973—the Supreme Court appointed, among others, two highly qualified persons to manage the system: Justin A. Stanley as chairman of the

Attorney Registration Commission and Carl H. Rolewick, former deputy director of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts, as administrator. The administrator retained the full-time services of eleven persons to staff his office, among whom were: John M. Oswald, former assistant director of the Administrator Office, as assistant administrator and chief investigator; and John Dixon, retired circuit court judge, as assistant administrator and chief counsel.

During 1973, the commission established two offices for the system, one in Chicago and the other in Springfield. The commission also adopted a set of regulations concerning the operation and procedures of the system. The following facts regarding the operation of the registration and disciplinary system for 1973 have been published: (1) There are 26,056 attorneys licensed to practice law in Illinois; (2) Over \$378,000 in registration fees have been collected; and (3) 1616 investigative files were opened.

The chart following on page 24 illustrates, in summary form, the organizational procedures of the attorney registration and disciplinary system.

CHART ON GENERAL ORGANIZATIONAL PROCEDURES OF THE ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM



ACTIVITIES OF THE JUDICIARY



The Supreme Court

The Illinois Supreme Court is the pinnacle of the three-tier Illinois court structure, and it is, by its constitutional nature, the final arbiter in this State of litigation which it hears by mandatory or discretionary appeal or in original actions.

Pursuant to statute, the Court holds five terms each year during the months of January, March, May, September and November. During the 1973 terms, the Court sat a total of 63 days. When the Court is not in session, each justice is preparing his assigned opinions. At each term, the Court issues opinions, holds conferences on drafts of proposed opinions, hears oral arguments, rules on motions, considers modifications to the Supreme Court rules, and meets with the Administrative Director to discuss budgetary requirements and to consider other administrative matters.

When in session, the justices reside in the Supreme Court Building at Springfield. In addition, the Court meets regularly in its Chicago quarters in the Civic Center. Once each year the Court hears oral arguments at the University of Chicago Law School and at the Urbana-Champaign campus of the University of Illinois College of Law. The sessions at the law school present an invaluable opportunity for law school students to observe the highest State court in action.

Besides deciding cases and administering and supervising the entire judicial system in accordance with its constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court has multifarious duties which are weighty, yet less prominent than its more publicized opinions. For example, the Court approves, after preparation by the Administrative Director, the annual budget for the State's courts; employs two law clerks for each justice who assist in researching the law and preparing legal memoranda; selects a marshal who attends each term of Court and performs such other duties, at the direction of the Court, which are usually performed by the sheriffs to the trial courts, and in that regard, the Court appointed, effective July 1, 1973. William G. Lyons as marshal; and appoints the Supreme Court librarian who is charged with keeping the library in current condition and preserving all books and documents in the library. In addition, the Court appoints the Appellate Defender and two persons to the Appellate Defender Commission; a member of the board of commissioners of the Illinois Defender Project and the Court has designated William M. Madden, deputy director of the Administrative Office as its appointee; and judicial members of the

board of trustees of the Judges Retirement System. Furthermore, the Court selects committees, as the need arises, to study and suggest amendments in substantive and procedural law; for example, during 1973, the Court appointed a seven member committee on clerks to recommend to the Supreme Court appropriate legislation and rule changes which are necessary to implement the provisions of the 1970 Constitution and which would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the operations of the several clerks' offices throughout the State.

The Supreme Court, pursuant to the Constitution, selects one of its members as Chief Justice. Commencing January 1, 1973, the Court selected Robert C. Underwood as Chief Justice for a three year term. This is Justice Underwood's second consecutive three year term as Chief Justice.

The primary reason, of course, that the Supreme Court exists is to render decisions which require adjudication by the court of last resort. During 1973, the seven justices of the Court delivered 207 full opinions which affected every citizen of Illinois to some degree; filed 16 memorandum opinions; ruled on 46 petitions for rehearing; decided 555 petitions for leave to appeal, a 19.4% increase over last year (about 20% of the petitions were allowed); and disposed of 570 other motions. The Court additionally received 974 new filings as compared to 879 filings in 1972, a 9.8% increase. Many of the new filings included petitions from inmates at the State penitentiaries praying for modifications of sentences to conform to the new Unified Code of Corrections.

By the very nature of the type of litigation which the Supreme Court hears, many of its opinions deal with issues which are particularly germane to Illinois; however, since Illinois is one of the major and leading jurisdictions in the United States, it is not uncommon that sister states and the federal courts cite the Illinois Supreme Court opinions as authority in their jurisdictions. Some of the Court's most significant opinions in 1973 follow.

• Interpretation of the Constitution. In Oak Park Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Village of Oak Park, 54 III.2d 200, 296 N.E.2d 344 (three justices dissenting), the Supreme Court interpreted the "home rule" article of the Constitution and held that a home rule unit's power to levy taxes to provide special services is not self-executing. "[The Village] cannot, without enabling legislation adopted by the General Assembly, create a special service area or impose taxes or issue bonds to provide special services..."

Board of Education v. Bakalis, 54 III.2d 448, 299 N.E.2d 737, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision that the education article of the Constitution does not prohibit school boards from providing the same transportation along its regular school routes for nonpublic school pupils as it provides for its public school pupils. In the lengthy opinion, the Court ruled that the statute requiring bussing of nonpublic school pupils "was enacted for the secular legislative purpose of protecting the health and safety of children traveling to and from nonpublic schools; that the primary effect of the statute neither advances nor inhibits religion; that any benefit to the parochial school or church controlling it is incidental and that the statute does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion."

People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Beck, 54 III.2d 561, 301 N.E.2d 281 (one justice dissenting), presented the issue whether the Cook County Board, pursuant to its home rule powers, had authority to supplant an existing statute which assigned certain functions to the county clerk. The Supreme Court decided that the Constitution permits a home rule county to validly transfer the powers, duties and functions of certain county officers, notwithstanding a statute enacted prior to the adoption of the 1970 Constitution.

Blase v. State, 55 III.2d 94, 302 N.E.2d 46, provided the Supreme Court with the opportunity to interpret the funding clause of the education article: "The State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public education." After reviewing the record of proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, the Court reasoned that the clause "was [not] intended to impose a specific obligation on the General Assembly. Rather its purpose was to state a commitment, a purpose, a goal."

People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 56 III.2d 1, 305 N.E.2d 129 (two justices dissenting), adjudged that a legislative plan to provide indirect financial assistance to nonpublic education was constitutionally impermissible. The Court determined that the Illinois Constitution's impositions of restrictions concerning the establishment of religion are identical to those contained in the Federal Constitution. The standards enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in interpreting the First Amendment are to be measured against the Illinois statutes in question. The Court concluded the plan failed to reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose, to have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and to avoid excessive governmental entanglement with religion.

 Environment. In North Shore Sanitary District v. Pollution Control Board, 55 III.2d 101, 302 N.E.2d 50, the Court held that neither the Environmental Protection Act nor the Sanitary District Act authorizes the Pollution Control Board to order the issuance of bonds to abate a nuisance. The Board has authority to order abatement of pollution practices; however, it is the polluter's obligation to raise funds to abate the pollution by the issuance of bonds.

• Divorce. In Mogged v. Mogged, 55 III.2d 221, 302 N.E.2d 293 (two justices dissenting), the Court reversed the trial court's decree awarding both parties a divorce on grounds of mental cruelty. The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether the doctrine of recrimination should be abolished or modified in Illinois. The Court held that public policy questions relating to recrimination are "appropriately within the province of the legislature, and that, if there is to be a change in the law of this State on this matter, it is for the legislature and not the courts to bring about that change."

Gill v. Gill, 56 III.2d 139, 306 N.E.2d 281 (three justices dissenting), adjudicated that defendant was obligated to reimburse plaintiff \$13,500.00 for monies expended over a 13 year period following the divorce to support his child. The Court approved the statement that "when a divorce decree provides for the custody of a child but is silent as to the question of child support, a mother may maintain an action against her former husband for moneys expended by her after the decree to support the child."

• Tax and Bonds. The City of Chicago under its home rule powers enacted an ordinance providing for a 15¢ tax on the privilege of parking a vehicle in a parking lot. The Supreme Court in Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 53 III.2d 421, 292 N.E.2d 401, ruled that the tax ordinance, which provided that the ultimate incidence of and liability for the tax was to be borne by the person seeking the privilege of occupying the parking space and which required the operator of the parking lot to collect and remit the tax, was not invalid as an attempt by the city to exercise the restrictive power to license for revenue but, rather, constituted a tax enacted pursuant to the home rule power to tax.

Dick's Vending Service, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 53 III.2d 375, 293 N.E.2d 129 (three justices dissenting), resolved that the Illinois cigarette use tax is a tax upon the consumer and that portion of the sales receipts attributable to the collection of said tax should not be included within the plaintiff's gross receipts which are subject to the retailers' occupation tax.

Bridgman v. Korzen, 54 III.2d 74, 295 N.E.2d 9, struck down a Cook County ordinance which would have allowed the county to collect real estate property taxes on a quarterly basis rather than semi-annually as permitted by statute. The Court held that the 1970 Constitution does not provide "that the collection of property taxes is a home

rule power or function" and that said collection is not one of the "powers and functions of county government which pertain to its government and affairs within the contemplation of section 6 of article VII."

Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 54 III.2d 237, 296 N.E.2d 342 (one justice partially dissenting), determined the type of ownership of personal property which would subject that property to the personal property tax. The Supreme Court held at 49 III.2d 137, 273 N.E.2d 592 (1971), that the constitutional amendment prohibiting ad valorem taxation of personal property owned by a natural person or by two or more natural persons as joint tenants or tenants in common was invalid. On a writ of certiorari granted by the U.S. Supreme Court, 409 U.S. 1103, 93 S.Ct. 1001, that Court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court decided that the personal property remaining subject to taxation included such categories of ownership as partnerships, professional associations and service corporations, joint ventures and limited partnerships.

Titus v. Texas Company, 55 III.2d 437, 303 N.E.2d 361, upheld the statute which imposed a tax on the privilege of operating a motor vehicle (motor boat) on the waters of the State at a specified rate per gallon of gasoline used, but did not impose such a tax on the users of marine diesel fuel. The Court held that the "statutory classification is not unreasonable. The legislature could have intended to tax those boaters for whose benefit the State's boating program is primarily designed. It could have concluded that a tax on the marine use of diesel fuel would produce little revenue..."

Rozner v. Korshak, 55 III.2d 430, 303 N.E.2d 389, decreed that home rule units can impose a tax on automobiles, based on horsepower. The Constitution prohibits the use of the police power to produce revenue; however, the city ordinance is a taxing measure and is a proper exercise of the home rule power to tax.

Elk Grove Engineering Co. v. Korzen, 55 III.2d 393, 304 N.E.2d 65 (one justice dissenting), affirmed the trial court's ruling that statutes exempting certain classes from payment of the ad valorem personal property tax were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court decided that "the provisions of section 5(c) [of article IX of the 1970 Constitution] constitute a mandate to the General Assembly to abolish all ad valorem taxes on personal property on or before January 1, 1979; that the provision is not self-executing and legislation is both contemplated and necessary to carry it into effect [citations ommitted]; and that the provision does not require that all such taxes be abolished at one and the same time but the General Assembly is under a continuing duty to effect their abolition on or before January 1, 1979 [citations

omitted]. Further, section 5(c) requires the General Assembly, when abolishing the *ad valorem* personal property taxes, to concurrently therewith and thereafter replace all revenue lost by units of local government and school districts by imposing statewide taxes solely on those classes relieved of the burden of the taxes abolished."

Consolidated Distilled Products, Inc. v. Mahin, 56 III.2d 110, 306 N.E.2d 465, attacked the validity of statutes which imposed a privilege tax upon the distributors of wine made from Illinois grapes at a lower rate than that imposed upon the distributors of wine made from grapes or other fruits grown outside of Illinois. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the statutes holding that the fine distinction between a tax imposed on the importation of foreign liquor and a tax imposed on the importer engaged in the business of selling such liquor is sufficient to sustain the statute.

- Quasi-Criminal Litigation. In the ever-changing law of procedures to be employed in the trial of ordinance violation cases, the Supreme Court decided two cases which clarified the trial procedures in cases that are "criminal in nature but civil in form." In City of Danville v. Hartshorn, 53 III.2d 399, 292 N.E.2d 382, the Court ruled that the defendant has a statutory right to trial by jury and that the discovery provision of the civil practice act may be invoked at the discretion of the trial court. In City of Chicago v. Wisniewski, 54 III.2d 149, 295 N.E.2d 453, the Court held that while the speedy trial statute is not to be applied literally to prosecutions for ordinance violation cases, a 17 month delay before defendant's trial was excessive.
- Criminal. In People v. Crowell, 53 III.2d 447, 292
 N.E.2d 721, the Supreme Court provided that "a
 violation of the conditions of probation must be
 proved by a preponderance of the evidence." This
 standard is now incorporated by legislation into the
 statutes.

People v. Zuniga, 53 III.2d 550, 293 N.E.2d 595, reiterated the Court's previous interpretations of the speedy trial statute, viz., a delay occasioned by the defendant is a waiver of the right to be tried within 120 days after he is taken into custody and the statute will not apply to discharge the defendant until a new 120 day period has elapsed.

People v. Frey, 54 III.2d 28, 294 N.E.2d 257, interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade, _____ U.S. ____, 93 S.Ct. 705, as it applied to Illinois' abortion statute. The Court held that the statutes did not meet the standards set down in Roe v. Wade and, accordingly, found them to be unconstitutional.

People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Power, 54 III.2d 154, 295 N.E.2d 472 (one justice dissenting), an original proceeding in *mandamus*, adjudged that requiring production of handwriting samples to the grand jury does not violate the witness' constitutional rights.

People v. Warr, 54 III.2d 487, 298 N.E.2d 164, a very significant opinion, held that misdemeanants may have the benefit of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act to remedy alleged denial of constitutional rights. The Court stated that "we direct, in exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction, that until otherwise provided by rule of this court or by statute a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor who asserts that in the proceedings which resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his constitutional rights may institute a proceeding in the nature of a proceeding under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act."

People v. Ray, 54 III.2d 377, 297 N.E.2d 168, emphasized that using convictions for impeachment purposes under the guidelines set out in People v. Montgomery, 47 III.2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695, applies to trials subsequent to Montgomery. "We consider it clearly important that the use of convictions for impeachment purposes should be governed in future trials by the 10 year limit..."

People v. Sarelli, 55 III.2d 169, 302 N.E.2d 317, decided the issue of whether the holding invalid of a statute upon which a conviction rests requires vacation of the judgment when the issue of its constitutionality is raised for the first time in a post-conviction proceeding. The Supreme Court held that "considerations of justice and fairness require reversal of a conviction obtained under an invalid procedural provision, even though questioned for the first time in a post-conviction proceeding..."

People v. Steskal, 55 III.2d 157, 302 N.E.2d 321, reversed the trial court's ruling that obscene materials, illegally seized from the defendant, who was charged but not convicted of violating the obscenity statute, are contraband and must be destroyed. The Court reasoned that to allow "a forfeiture under such circumstances would permit the State an opportunity to vindicate its allegation that defendant committed a criminal offense....We hold that...articles may be destroyed only as a consequence of a successful criminal prosecution for violation of the obscenity statute."

People v. Lentz, 55 III.2d 517, 304 N.E.2d 278, reasoned that where the State does not record the proceedings of the grand jury and defendant files a motion to produce the transcript of the grand jury testimony, then the indictment should not be dismissed for failure to produce since the State has no duty to record said testimony.

 Commerce Commission Cases. In two particularly important cases, the Supreme Court decided whether certain expenses could be considered in fixing the rates for a telephone utility and whether cable television is within the jurisdiction of the Illinois Commerce Commission. In Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 55 III.2d 461, 303 N.E.2d 364, Bell was granted by the Commission a telephone rate increase of \$44,562,000.00. The Commission considered, inter alia, in awarding the increase charitable contributions and dues in trade and social clubs paid by Bell. The Supreme Court decreed that the "allowance of such contributions as operating expenses for purposes of ratemaking constitutes an involuntary assessment on [Bell's] patrons, and we question the propriety of Bell's being permitted to thus dispense largesse at their expense. We hold. therefore, that such expenditures are not operating expenses cognizable for the purposes of ratemaking...and [we] hold that expenditures for dues to civic, social and athletic clubs are not operating expenses to be considered in the fixing of rates."

In Illinois - Indiana Cable Television Association v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 55 Ill.2d 205, 302 N.E.2d 334, the Court was presented an issue of first impression: Whether the words "telephone or telegraph" as used in the statute conferring jurisdiction on the Commission encompass cable television. The Court reasoned that the legislature did not by its enactments authorize the Commission to regulate the operation of cable television and that it is for the legislature, not the Commission, to expand the Commission's jurisdiction to the entire public telecommunications field.

Civil. In Blanton v. Denniston, 54 III.2d 1, 294
N.E.2d 283, the Court held that the defendant was
not entitled to a directed verdict on the basis of
plaintiff's opening statement where a jury determination was necessary on the question of contributory negligence.

Wessel v. Carmi Elks Home, Inc., 54 III.2d 127, 295 N.E.2d 718 (one justice dissenting), resolved a question which had been decided by the Appellate Court with conflicting results, to wit: Whether one who may incur dramshop liability because of the sale or gift of intoxicating liquors to a third party has the right to seek indemnification from the latter whose activity is alleged to be the primary or active cause of the damages. The Court concluded that "those who may incur liability...may not seek indemnity from one who, being in an intoxicated condition, committed a tortious act which gives rise to the dramshop action."

Watson v. Fischbach, 54 III.2d 498, 301 N.E.2d 303, held that remarriage of the plaintiff surviving spouse does not affect the damages recoverable for the wrongful death of the deceased spouse. The Court amplified that "prospective jurors may be told by the judge that applaintiff has remarried. Beyond this point, however, we believe defendants have no legitimate interest in exploring....Beyond the voir dire, questions, comments or argument relating to the remarriage will, ordinarily, be improper."

Mieher v. Brown, 54 III.2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307

(one justice dissenting), dealt with the issue of whether the manufacturer of a truck was liable in common law negligence for alleged defective design of the truck where said design may have caused the death of plaintiff's deceased spouse who collided with said truck. The Court ruled that "the foreseeability rule...is [not] intended to bring within the ambit of the defendant's duty every consequence which might possibly occur....Although the injury complained of may have been, in a sense, foreseeable, we do not consider that the alleged defective design created an unreasonable danger or an unreasonable risk of injury."

Adkins v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co., 54 III.2d 511, 301 N.E.2d 729 (one justice dissenting), held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens would apply where injury occurred in lowa, where the decedent was a resident of Michigan, where the only connection Illinois had with the suit was that the defendant did business in Illinois, and where there was a 18.5 month delay between date of filing and date of verdict in Rock Island County (citing the Annual Report of the Administrative Office).

Reese v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 55 III.2d 356, 303 N.E. 2d 382 (three justices dissenting), sanctioned the use of "loan receipt agreements." Plaintiff brought suit against the railroad and the Koehring Co., and the railroad counter-claimed against Koehring for indemnity. Prior to the trial, plaintiff and the railroad contracted whereby the railroad loaned plaintiff a sum of money which was to be repaid by plaintiff from any judgment in favor of plaintiff against Koehring. The railroad was then dismissed from the suit. The Supreme Court held that the "salutary effects of the loan agreement" outweigh the policy of denying contribution between joint tort feasors.

Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 III.2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (three justices dissenting), plowed new ground in Illinois by holding that there can be recovery under the Wrongful Death Act for the wrongful death of a viable child or fetus born dead as a result of injuries negligently inflicted *en ventre sa mere*.

Barnes v. Washington, 56 III.2d 22, 305 N.E.2d 535 (two justices dissenting), reversed the Appellate Court's general ruling that a mentally incompetent adult should be afforded the same protection as a child of tender years and held that the standards of care owed by a landowner to a child may be applicable to a mentally incompetent adult, depending on the factual basis of each case.

Boyd v. Racine Currency Exchange, Inc., 56 III.2d 95, 306 N.E.2d 39 (one justice dissenting), adjudged that where a business invitee plaintiff was injured by a third party in the commission of a criminal act against defendant, the defendant is not liable to plaintiff for the injuries caused by the

- third party since the defendant breached no duty owed to plaintiff.
- Appeals. In *People v. Brown*, 54 III.2d 25, 294 N.E.2d 267 (one justice dissenting), reversed the Appellate Court's dismissal of defendant's appeal. The Supreme Court held that although the defendant did not file a petition for leave to file a late notice of appeal, the Appellate Court abused its discretion in dismissing the appeal since defendant was not advised by the trial court of the time period in which to file a notice of appeal, since the case had been briefed and argued in the Appellate Court and since the dismissal occurred more than two years after defendant filed a late notice of appeal.

In two cases dealing with the applicability of lesser sentences under the Unified Code of Corrections to defendants sentenced under prior law, the Supreme Court held in *People v. Harvey*, 53 III.2d 585, 294 N.E.2d 269, and *People v. Chupich*, 53 III.2d 572, 295 N.E.2d 1, that the lesser sentences provided in the Code apply to defendants who were convicted prior to its effective date of January 1, 1973 and who have not reached the sentencing stage or a final adjudication.

People ex rel. Ward v. Moran, 54 III.2d 552, 301 N.E.2d 300, resulted in the Supreme Court entering a supervisory order to the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court ruled that Rule 615 "was not intended to grant a court of review the authority to reduce a penitentiary sentence to probation."

Bohn Aluminum & Brass Co. v. Barker, 55 III.2d 177, 303 N.E.2d 1 (two justices dissenting), decided that "whether the order is captioned as a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order, it constitutes a restraint upon the defendant which is essentially injunctive in character," and where the defendant moved to vacate the order and the motion was denied, the order was appealable.

Estates and Trusts. In Montgomery v. Michaels, 54 III.2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 465, the Court held that a "Totten Trust" is sufficiently testamentary in nature that by analogy the statutory policy of permitting a surviving spouse to renounce under decedent's will and share in the proceeds of such estate is applicable to such trust to the same extent as to an estate passing under a will. Such a trust cannot defeat the surviving spouse's statutory share in the estate of the deceased spouse.

In re Estate of Baxter, 56 III.2d 223, 306 N.E.2d 304 (one justice dissenting), the Supreme Court decreed that a certificate of deposit payable in the alternative to deceased and two others as joint tenants created a joint tenancy which did not require an underlying signed agreement between the joint tenants.

Industrial Commission Cases. In County of Cook
 v. Industrial Commission, 55 III.2d 540, 304 N.E.2d
 616, the Supreme Court held that juvenile proba-

tion officers appointed by the circuit court are employees of the county and are therefore eligible for workmen's compensation benefits.

- Landlord-Tenant. In Peoria Housing Authority v. Sanders, 54 III.2d 478, 298 N.E.2d 173 (one justice dissenting), the Supreme Court stated that "when an action for possession is based upon nonpayment of rent, the question whether the defendant owes rent to the plaintiff is germane, whether or not the plaintiff seeks judgment for the rent..."
- Juveniles. In People v. Owen, 54 III.2d 104, 295 N.E.2d 455, the Supreme Court held that the Juvenile Court Act does not authorize the circuit court "to establish detailed procedures for the care and discipline of its wards while committed to an institution under the supervision of the Department of Corrections....If the juvenile division of the court of each county in Illinois were to undertake to prescribe specific procedures to be used in treating and disciplining its wards, the divergence of thought among the several courts as to what constitutes correct treatment and discipline of its wards could make it impossible to operate an institution."

People v. Norwood, 54 III.2d 253, 296 N.E.2d 852, ruled that the statutes are not to be construed as prohibiting access to the records of juvenile delinquents when those records are sought in order to impeach credibility of the juvenile as a witness by showing a possible motive for testifying falsely.

People v. McCalvin, 55 III.2d 161, 302 N.E.2d 342, upheld the then provision of the Juvenile Court Act that provided, except as otherwise provided, no boy under 17 years of age or girl under 18 years of age at the time of the alleged offense may be prosecuted under the criminal law. The Court held that the statutory scheme did not violate the equal protection clause since it was not discrimination based on sex alone.

 Other cases. During the year, the Supreme Court also rendered opinions relating to State employees, elections, declaratory judgments, habeas corpus, contempt, contracts, prohibition, many Industrial Commission (workmen's compensation) orders, criminal matters, civil cases, and other litigation which required review by the State's highest court.

The Supreme Court's disposition of cases by full opinion was less in 1973 than in the preceding year for several reasons: The substantial increase in the number of petitions for leave to appeal required significant reflection on the part of the justices, not only because of the numerical gain in petitions filed but also because most of the Court's dispositions by full opinion airse from cases where the Court allows petition for leave to appeal, and therefore, the Court is selective in allowing petitions in cases which present issues that need resolution by the Supreme Court;

several cases surfaced, e.g., election matters, requiring expeditious rulings in the public interest, which the Court heard on an emergency basis; and illnesses among members of the Court affected opinion writing. However, the Court was very involved with several cases, as noted above, which required interpretation of the 1970 Constitution, particularly in the "home rule," education and tax articles. Substantial attention was also given to the administrative problems of the court system and to filling judicial vacancies. Considerable consideration was also directed to the necessary amendments to the Supreme Court rules which created the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. The only changes in the rules of the Supreme Court during 1973 were related to the new commission.

Briefly mentioned *supra* was another responsibility of the Supreme Court: The power of the Court to fill judicial vacancies in absence of a law enacted by the legislature. This grant of constitutional authority enables the Court to select and appoint lawyers and judges of the highest caliber and qualifications to the circuit and appellate benches where vacancies exist by reason of death or resignation; it allows the Court to maintain the judicial system at full strength to hear the torrent of litigation being filed in the Illinois courts.

The Court has wisely and prudently exercised its appointment power by selecting the following attorneys and sitting judges to fill vacancies.

David R. Babb - 17th Judicial Circuit Frank W. Barbaro - Cook County Circuit Court Robert C. Buckley - Cook County Circuit Court Thomas M. Burke - 5th Judicial Circuit William T. Caisley - 11th Judicial Circuit Henry H. Caldwell - 19th Judicial Circuit Robert E. Cherry - Cook County Circuit Court Daniel P. Coman - Cook County Circuit Court Thomas R. Doran - 19th Judicial Circuit Edward J. Egan - First District Appellate Court Thomas R. Flood - 13th Judicial Circuit Robert C. Gill - 17th Judicial Circuit William J. Gleason - 19th Judicial Circuit Albert E. Hallett - First District Appellate Court Moses W. Harrison, II - 3rd Judicial Circuit Allen Hartman - Cook County Circuit Court Warren J. Hickey - Cook County Circuit Court John J. Hoban - 20th Judicial Circuit William V. Hopf - 18th Judicial Circuit Glenn T. Johnson - First District Appellate Court Alfred Y. Kirkland - 16th Judicial Circuit Everett E. Laughlin - 15th Judicial Circuit Richard F. LeFevour - Cook County Circuit Court F. Lawrence Lenz - 15th Judicial Circuit Benjamin S. Mackoff - Cook County Circuit Court Frederick P. Patton - 14th Judicial Circuit Alfred L. Pezman - 8th Judicial Circuit Joseph Schneider - Cook County Circuit Court Glenn K. Seidenfeld - Second District Appellate Court

Harold A. Siegan - Cook County Circuit Court Jack I. Sperling - Cook County Circuit Court John J. Sullivan - First District Appellate Court Daniel J. White - Cook County Circuit Court

It should be observed that of the thirty-three appointments, fifteen appointees were sitting judges who were elevated to higher judgeships. Thus, it can be stated that where the Supreme Court discerned outstanding performance by sitting judges, then these well qualified jurists were selected to fill vacant judgeships which carry greater responsibility in the judicial system.

What has been detailed here is representative of the manifold responsibilities and duties exercised by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1973. Some of the other business handled by the Court included hearing and adjudicating disciplinary proceedings against attorneys; admitting 1712 lawyers to the Illinois bar; appointing special committees to study particular legal problems and receiving reports thereon; maintaining close liaison with the executive committee of the Illinois Judicial Conference and Conference of Chief Circuit Judges; making appearances before the State and local bar associations; appointing members of the bar to the committee on character and fitness which passes on the "moral character and general fitness to practice law" of applicants seeking admission to the bar; and appointing the administrator of the attorney registration and disciplinary system as well as members of the State board of law examiners.

The Illinois Supreme Court, and its individual justices, has achieved national recognition for its scholarly and well-reasoned opinions, and the Court's faithful discharge of its duties, and in particular the execution of its general and supervisory authority over the Illinois courts, has earned the respect and admiration of the public, court administrators, lawyers and judges throughout the United States.

1973 Annual Report of the Supreme Court to the General Assembly

[Chief Justice Robert C. Underwood on behalf of the Supreme Court, submitted the following report on the activities of the Illinois court system during 1973 to the General Assembly.]

Introduction

This report is submitted by the Supreme Court in accordance with section 17 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 which states: "The Supreme Court shall provide by rule for an annual judicial conference to consider the work of the courts and to suggest improvements in the administration of justice and shall report thereon annually in writing to the General Assembly not later than January 31."

The organization of the Illinois Judicial Conference is established by Supreme Court Rule 41.¹ That rule was revised on July 1, 1971, to bring it into conformity with the Constitution of 1970. The conference each year provides a number of seminars and continuing judicial education programs,² including visitations by judges, in cooperation with the Director of the Department of Corrections, to various penal institutions. Conference study committees are active throughout the year and include the Juvenile Problems Committee, Committee on Probation and numerous others.

General Recommendations Concerning The Administration Of Justice In Illinois

Defender Services

In recent years we have seen a steady expansion of the right to court-appointed counsel in criminal cases. In *Argersinger* v. *Hamlin*,³ the United States Supreme Court rejected distinctions between felony and misdemeanor or petty offenses and held that no person may be imprisoned as a result of a criminal prosecution in which he was not afforded the opportunity to be represented by counsel.

A study to determine the need for defender services in Illinois is presently being conducted by the Illinois Defender Project, pursuant to a grant from the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission. This study will be completed in early 1974. It would be imprudent to attempt to anticipate the specific findings the final report will contain. However, it can safely be stated that trial level defender services in Illinois need to be increased substantially.

The establishment of the office of State Appellate Defender⁴ in 1972 was a major step toward meeting the need for representation of defendants on appeal in this State, but the trial level defense of indigent persons charged with crime does not meet the standards required by *Argersinger*, supra. At the present time, providing public defender services at the trial level is the responsibility of the various counties.⁵ A public defender office must be established in counties of 35,000 or more inhabitants⁶ and may be established in counties of less than 35,000 inhabitants.⁷ Most of the 102 counties in Illinois do not have public defender services. Of the 44 counties which have public defender offices, extremely few have full-time offices.

It is anticipated that the Illinois Defender Project's study will contain recommendations concerning the various methods by which Illinois can meet its responsibility to provide defender services at the trial level. The precise manner in which Illinois responds to the constitutional requirements to provide counsel to indigent defendants will, of course, initially be de-

cided by the General Assembly. However, the adequacy of defender services, whatever the organizational structure, will be determined ultimately by the courts. Any system adopted should: (1) Provide for the services of a full-time public defender organization, possibly supplemented by participation of the private bar; (2) provide the indigent defendant with assurance that his publicly appointed counsel has the same professional independence before the courts as private counsel; and (3) provide investigatory, expert, and other supporting services necessary for an effective defense.

Restructuring Of Judicial Selection Districts

The basic geographical unit of the Illinois trial courts is the judicial circuit. While judicial circuits are co-extensive with the boundaries of one or more contiguous counties,⁸ the county itself is not the significant unit.

Through the exercise of the chief judges' power to assign judges within the circuit and the Supreme Court's power to assign judges to serve where needed,9 without concern for the area from which they were originally selected, the influence of county boundaries on the organization and operation of the circuit courts has been greatly diminished.

Section 19 of article VI of our constitution provides that a State's Attorney may be elected to serve two or more counties. The General Assembly has implemented that provision by setting up specific procedures. In addition, the General Assembly has provided by law that counties may join together for the purpose of hiring a public defender to serve two or more contiguous counties within any circuit. These provisions offer express recognition of the fact that some counties are simply not big enough or busy enough to warrant the exclusive services of a State's Attorney or a public defender. In the same vein, the Court suggests to the General Assembly that not every county in Illinois is big enough or busy enough to warrant a resident circuit judge.

The provision that there be one circuit judge from each county is a troublesome anachronism which, quite candidly, simply reflects political considerations at the time of the 1962 Judicial Article referendum. For the smallest counties, one associate judge on a part-time basis would usually be adequate to handle the routine business of the court. There is little merit to a requirement that a county having a population of less than 5,000 persons be required, or even permitted, to elect a resident circuit judge to handle its business. There is clearly not enough business to keep him busy in his own county; and assigning him out of his county to serve in other counties or other circuits is inconvenient for the judge being assigned and expensive for the people of the State of Illinois who must pay the additional travel and living expenses while the judge is serving on assignment.

As a practical matter, it is important to the administration of justice that a judicial officer be reasonably available within a given geographical area on relatively short notice. Requiring that each county be entitled to elect a resident circuit judge is one method (but certainly not the best method) of insuring the availability of a judge in every geographical area. The requirement that there be at least one judge for each county was mandated by the previous Judicial Article—the legislature had no alternative in the matter.¹² However, in 1970 the Constitutional Convention, at the request of a Judicial Conference committee, the Illinois State Bar Association, the Chicago Bar Association and many private groups amended the constitution13 to give the General Assembly the authority to modify that requirement.

In its report, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Constitutional Convention said:

"Counties generally need not fear that they will lose their circuit judge by such authorization to the General Assembly. It is unthinkable that the Assembly will not be responsive to the public's need for judicial service. The granted authority should and would be exercised only in those limited few instances of small counties having an insufficient volume of judicial business, and would be subject to a continuing legislative review.

"In these small counties which may not have its resident circuit judge, the judicial business would be handled by other circuit judges of the same judicial circuit, as well, generally, by its associate circuit judge." ¹⁴

We recommend that the General Assembly consider consolidating two or more counties, which have small populations, within any one circuit into one "division of [the] circuit for the purpose of selection of circuit judges" and provide for the selection of one judge to serve that geographical division. ¹⁵ By doing so, the General Assembly could, as existing judgeships expire, allocate additional judgeships to the high population, high volume counties throughout the State without effecting any real increase in the number of sitting judges, but reallocating them on a more rational basis.

Shortage Of Qualified Court Reporters

The Illinois Constitution is unique in providing that every court in this State is a court of record. Our system is hailed universally as a model of court organization for it allows prompt access to a reviewing court, no matter how humble the litigants or how "insignificant" the issues.

However, when we abolished justices of the peace and police magistrates, we dramatically increased our need for court reporters or alternative means for keeping a verbatim record of all trial court proceedings; for review in all cases is now on the record and not by trial *de novo* in "minor" cases.

Prior to 1965, only 67 downstate circuit judges and 45 judges in Cook County had court reporters who were paid by the State. There were 134 court reporters serving various county, probate, city or municipal courts who were paid by the political subdivision which they served. In smaller counties, reporters were paid on a *per diem* basis and some worked only a few days a month.

In 1965, all reporters formerly paid by a county or city, etc., were placed on the State payroll. However, only those court reporters who could thereafter qualify by passing an examination¹⁷ conducted by the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts were retained as State employees.

Since the first court reporter proficiency tests were administered in 1966, the Administrative Office has offered a continuing series of proficiency tests in Normal and Chicago, in which persons have attempted to qualify either for appointment as official court reporters or for advancement to a higher official pay level. Unfortunately, relatively few candidates demonstrate the ability to pass these tests, despite the fact that the tests are considered only moderately difficult by professional reporters. While the number of official reporters in Cook County has been increased from 54 in 1966 to 175 in 1973, the majority of judges in Cook County still must rely on litigants to provide private reporters to keep the verbatim record or, in some cases, must proceed to trial with no reporter present.

In *People v. Seals*, ¹⁸ the Appellate Court for the First District reversed a theft conviction and remanded for a new trial because a "bystander's record" failed to provide enough detail of what occurred to enable the Appellate Court to properly review alleged errors at trial. Where a colorable need for a complete transcript is shown, the State bears the burden of showing that something less will suffice. See *Mayer v. City of Chicago*. ¹⁹ In the *Seals* case, supra, and in many similar cases, nothing less than a verbatim transcript will suffice.

Nevertheless, the critical shortage of qualified applicants for the position of official court reporter has, thusfar, made it impossible for our Court to fill the pressing need exemplified by the *Seals* case, supra. Because of the shortage of qualified reporters, the Supreme Court has been unable to fill as many positions as needed.

In order to meet the immediate needs raised by *Mayer*, supra, our Administrative Director is reviewing all possible methods of preserving testimony and preparing verbatim transcripts or other suitable records on appeal. But the Court will also need funds with which to preserve a strong and well-trained cadre of court reporters and to supplement our existing staffs in all parts of the State. Realistic appraisals of the operation of our courts has convinced our Administrative Director that electronic recording will not, in the forseeable future, be an adequate substitute

for a court reporter in every case.

Our Court has budgeted \$10,000 for the coming fiscal year to develop programs to recruit and train official court reporters. A recent survey conducted by an independent consultant revealed that little or no effort is being made to recruit court reporter candidates at the high school level. Where those efforts are being made, the teachers and counselors are not well-informed concerning reporting career prospects, and the recruiting messages are "blurred and distorted and not always realistic or honest." It appears, therefore, that the business colleges are not reaching most prospective reporter trainees and misinforming those who are reached about the true nature of the court reporting profession and its potential as a rewarding, though strenuous, career. Because we face a serious need for qualified reporters, the Court feels obliged to take positive steps to improve the methods by which reporter candidates are recruited both for training and, subsequently, as candidates for appointment to official reporting positions.

Salaries

When an Illinois lawyer becomes a judge, he does so despite the fact that he knows he will thereby suffer a financial loss. A competent practicing lawyer in Illinois can anticipate a substantially higher annual income and substantially greater tax advantages than do our judges. Our judges are subject to the most restrictive ethical and financial regulations²⁰ of any judges in the United States. An Illinois judge may not assume any active role in the management of any business, he may not serve as an officer or director of any for-profit corporation,21 and he may not accept any compensation of any kind for any service performed by him, except that compensation which is provided by law for the performance of his judicial duties. The sole exception to these prohibitions is that a judge may accept reasonable compensation for lecturing, teaching, writing or similar activities.²²

The clear consequence of these highly restrictive provisions is that most judges must support their family solely from the salary provided by statute,²³ and that salary has not even kept pace with the increased cost of living over the past few years. During this past year alone, the United States Department of Labor advised that the cost of living index has increased by 7.9 percent,²⁴ and the economic predictors for the coming years indicate that this inflation will continue.

Circuit judges of Illinois receive an annual State salary of \$30,000. That salary is less, in every county above 80,000, than the salary of the State's Attorney who practices before him and who may, in addition to his salary, augment his income by outside activities other than practicing law.²⁵ A review of salaries payable to other State employees shows that over 350 employees of various code departments of the

State may receive salaries which equal or, in many cases, exceed salaries paid to the judges of our circuit courts. Judges must have a high level of training and experience to ascend the bench and to bear the heavy decision-making responsibility. Their salaries should reflect a more adequate recognition of the responsibilities they bear. [The chart following the Chief Justice's report at page 35 illustrates the judicial salary structure as of December 31, 1973.]

Since court personnel other than the judges have been the recipients of annual increases in compensation approximating the annual decline in purchasing power of the dollar, it is only fair that judges receive similar consideration.

It is imperative, in our judgment, to provide, as a minimum, a salary increase coupled with some automatic method by which the salaries of judges can be adjusted annually to reflect cost of living increases. Many formulae could be proposed, but the General Assembly may well wish to devise its own method of calculating automatic increases so that judges will not be paying 1975 expenses from salaries which have steadily eroded during the past decade.

We commend to the General Assembly's consideration the report of the Governmental Salary Commission regarding judicial salaries submitted last year; the reports of the Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations on the same subject; and the fact that the judges of Illinois rank progressively lower each year in the comparative tables of compensation of state court judges.

The effect of this inadequate salary structure is rapidly becoming evident in the unwillingness of competent lawyers to accept appointment to the bench and in the resignation of competent judges in order to return to law practice. Its inevitable result, if continued, will be a steady deterioration in the quality of the judiciary of Illinois.

Pensions

At present a judge who fully participates in the Judges Retirement System pays 11% of his annual income into the program.²⁶ A downstate circuit judge has \$3,300 of his annual salary automatically taken from his check and paid into the retirement system. We are informed that payment of federal income tax on that amount might be deferred at no substantial detriment to the retirement system or cost to the State, if the State were to pay that \$3,300 directly into the retirement fund.

The General Assembly has effected many improvements in the judicial retirement system over the

past several years; however, additional improvements can be made without substantial cost to the taxpayers.

House Bill 1137 (which was assigned to an Interim Study Calendar during the 1973 Session of the General Assembly) and Senate Bill 641 (which was assigned to the Committee on Pensions and Personnel) would provide that after 20 years of contributing to the retirement system, a judge could elect to freeze his ultimate benefits and cease paying into the retirement fund.

It has been recommended that the average salary for the last two years of judicial service be considered as the base upon which retirement benefits will be calculated rather than the last four years of service. The present requirement has resulted in some judges, who probably should retire, continuing to serve beyond the time that they are able to perform their duties in an efficient manner in order to secure the retirement benefits of an increase in salary.

The present period of vesting should be reduced from 10 years to 8 years. Both the General Assembly Retirement System²⁷ and the State Employees' Retirement System²⁸ provide for vesting after 8 years of service. Many lawyers who enter the judiciary do so after they have established themselves as successful practicing attorneys, and, of these, many are between the ages of 50 and 60 years when they become judges. Under the 1970 Constitution, associate judges of the circuit court are appointed for four-year terms,²⁹ and reducing the period of vesting from 10 years to 8 years would coincide with two completed terms for associate judges.

Clerks Of Court


In September of 1973, our Court appointed a committee³⁰ to review existing laws and rules as they apply to clerks of court and to recommend changes which might be necessary to implement the provisions of the 1970 Constitution, and which might otherwise improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the several clerks' offices.

The most obvious area of change, of course, is that which makes the office of Supreme Court clerk and clerk of the several Appellate Court Districts appointive rather than elective.³¹

That committee has filed its report with our Court. When the Court has had an opportunity to review the report in detail, we expect to forward appropriate recommendations for statutory revisions to the Judicial Advisory Council through our Administrative Director.

JUDICIAL SALARY STRUCTURE

December 31, 1973



Footnotes

- ¹ III. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110A, §41,
- ² See the annual reports of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts and of the Illinois Judicial Conference for a detailed explanation of judicial education programs.
- ³ 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972). See *People v. Coleman*, 52 III.2d 470, 288 N.E.2d 396 (1972), and *People v. Morrissey*, 52 III.2d 418, 288 N.E.2d 397 (1972) which implement *Argersinger*.
- ⁴ III.Rev.Stat., 1972 Supp., ch. 38, §208-1 et seq.
- ⁵ III.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 34, §5601 et seq.
- ⁶ III.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 34, §5601.
- ⁷ III.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 34, §5601.1.
- 8 III.Const. 1970, art. VI, §7(a).
- ⁹ III.Const. 1970, art, VI, §§7(c), 15(a), 16.
- 10 III.Rev.Stat., 1972 Supp., ch. 14, §21.
- ¹¹ III.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 34, §5601.2.
- ¹² III.Const. 1870, amend art. VI, §8.
- ¹³ III.Const. 1970, art. VI, §7(b); III.Rev.Stat., 1972 Supp., ch. 37, §72.41-1 et seq.
- ¹⁴ Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, vol. VI, pages 990 and 991.
- ¹⁵ III.Const. 1970, art. VI, §7(a).
- 16 III.Const. 1970, art. VI, §9.

- ¹⁷ III.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 37, §657.
- ¹⁸ 14 III.App.3d 413, 302 N.E.2d 701 (1973).
- ¹⁹ 404 U.S. 189, 92 S.Ct. 410, 30 L.Ed.2d 372 (1971).
- ²⁰ III.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 110A, §61 et seq.
- ²¹ III.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 110A, §63.
- ²² III.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 110A, §65.
- ²³ Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973 Supp., ch. 53, §§3, 3.1 and 3.2 provide that judges of the Supreme Court shall receive \$42,500 annually, judges of the Appellate Court \$40,000, and circuit court judges \$30,000. The latter in Cook and DuPage Counties receive an additional \$7,500 county supplement. Public Act 78-666, amending ch. 53, §3.3, provides that associate judges shall receive \$23,500 annually; however, in Cook and DuPage Counties associate judges receive an additional \$4,500 county supplement.
- ²⁴ Preliminary estimate. The U.S. Department of Labor in its final report demonstrated that the cost of living index increased by nearly 9% during 1973.
- ²⁵ III.Rev.Stat., 1972 Supp., ch. 53, §§17, 22a.
- ²⁶ III.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 108-1/2, §18-101 et seq.
- ²⁷ III.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 108-1/2, §2-119.
- ²⁸ III.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 108-1/2, §14-148.
- 29 III.Const. 1970, art. VI, §10.
- ³⁰ Supreme Court order M.R. 1541.
- 31 III.Const. 1970, art. VI, §18.

The Appellate Court

The Illinois Appellate Court is the intermediate court of review of this State. Its foundation and organization are set forth in Section 5 of the Judicial Article which provides that judges of the Appellate Court are to be elected from the five Judicial Districts in such numbers as determined by the legislature, except that each division within the Appellate Court districts must have at least three judges. Presently, there are thirty-four elected judgeships in the Appellate Court: The First District (Cook County) has five divisions consisting of 18 judges, and the Second through the Fifth Districts each has one division of four judges; however, the additional judgeship in each of the four downstate districts created by statute (PA 78-558, effective October 1, 1973) is presently vacant.

Prior to the adoption of the 1964 Judicial Article and the 1970 Constitution, the creation of an Appellate Court was authorized by the 1870 Constitution; however, its establishment was left to the legislature. By law, the legislature provided that the Supreme Court appoint sitting circuit judges, and in the case of Cook County, Superior Court judges, to man the four appellate court districts and that the appointees could not receive compensation beyond their circuit judges' salaries. After 1964, the constitutional structure of the Appellate Court was substantially altered, and its origin and establishment were conferred with constitutional dignity.

The Constitution (there are only a handful of states which constitutionally provide for an intermediate appellate court) provides that the Appellate Court and its judges (a) be elected for ten-year terms; (b) be elected from the same five Judicial Districts as the justices of the Supreme Court; (c) each district have at least three judges; (d) a concurrence of a majority is necessary for a decision; and (e) mandates the Supreme Court to exercise its rule-making authority to structure the divisions of the Appellate Court.

Pursuant to Section 5 of Article VI, the Supreme Court has adopted Rule 22, which establishes the organization of the Appellate Court. The rule makes the following provisions.

- Divisions—The Appellate Court shall sit in divisions of three judges. The First District shall have five divisions and shall sit in Chicago; the Second through the Fifth Districts shall each have one division, and shall respectively sit in Elgin, Ottawa, Springfield and Mount Vernon. The Appellate Court in each district shall be in session throughout the year, and each division shall sit periodically as its judicial business requires.
- Assignments—The Supreme Court shall assign judges to the various divisions.
- Decisions—Three judges must participate in the decision of every case, and the concurrence of two shall be necessary to a decision.
- Presiding Judge—The judges of each division shall select one of their number to serve for one year as presiding judge.

- Executive Committee—The presiding judges shall constitute the executive committee of the Appellate Court.
- First District Executive Committee—The First District Executive Committee shall be composed of five members, one from each division, and shall have general administrative authority.

The heart of the Appellate Court is its jurisdiction; and the form, which has been described above, that the Appellate Court takes is secondary to its power to hear cases. Section 6 of Article VI of the 1970 Constitution spells out the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court: every final judgment (and in some cases, nonfinal judgments) of the circuit court is appealable as a matter of right to the Appellate Court, except those cases appealable directly to the Supreme Court and except in criminal cases where the accused has been acquitted after a trial on the merits.

It is interesting to observe that Illinois is only one of a few states that provides for appeal as a matter of constitutional right in the intermediate court of review. Furthermore, the Constitution in Article VI, Section 16 directs that the Supreme Court implement the right of appeal by promulgating rules "for expeditious and inexpensive appeals" to the Supreme and Appellate Courts. Thus, it may be fairly stated that an aggrieved litigant, who disagrees with the decision of the circuit court, can appeal the judgment to the Appellate Court. This right of appeal applies equally to the defendant who is adjudged guilty of violating a traffic ordinance, as well as to the plaintiff who has lost a \$1,000,000 personal injury lawsuit. In addition, a litigant has a right to appeal from a decision of the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court if the Appellate Court issues a certificate of importance or a question arises under the Federal or State Constitutions for the first time as a result of the action of the Appellate Court.

Generally, Article III and Article VI of the Supreme Court rules govern the mechanics of appellate procedure in civil and criminal cases. Of particular note, is Rule 335 which controls direct appeals from administrative actions to the Appellate Court. Section 6 of Article VI of the Constitution states that the "Appellate Court shall have such powers of direct review of administrative action as provided by law." Effective July 1, 1970, the legislature enacted into law the Environmental Protection Act which provides that orders of the Pollution Control Board are directly appealable to the Appellate Court. In its essence, Rule 335 is not dissimilar to the procedures for reviewing administrative actions in the circuit court.


The independent observer will discern that the broad jurisdictional base of the Appellate Court is probable cause to project that it has a massive caseload (see chart at page 38). On December 31, 1964, a full year after the 1964 Judicial Article was effective, the Appellate Court had 859 cases pending, and only 2 cases which were disposed of were more than two years old; three years later, 1967, the Court received 1402 new filings, disposed of 1310

cases of which 129 were more than two years old, and had 1462 cases pending; during 1970, the Appellate Court disposed of 1496 cases (1079 cases by full opinion) of which 351 were more than two years old, but 1856 appeals were filed, and 2261 cases were pending on December 31, 1970. In 1971, the Appellate Court disposed of 1944 cases (1410 cases by full opinion) of which 370 cases were more than two years old, received 2499 new cases, and had 2816 cases pending as of December 31, 1971. During 1972, the Court disposed of 2526 cases (1763 cases by full opinion) of which 340 cases were more than two years old, received 3020 new cases, and had 3310 cases pending at the close of 1972.

The year 1973 has produced statistics which seem to indicate that the Appellate Court is on its way to disposing of cases in more timely fashion and reducing the number of cases pending. In 1973, the Appellate Court disposed of 2958 cases (2037 by full opinion) of which 277 cases were more than two years old, received 3044 new cases, and had 3396 cases pending as of December 31, 1973. Comparing the pertinent statistics for 1971 and 1973 reveals the progress being made in the Appellate Court's disposition of cases: The judges of the Appellate Court disposed of 52.2% more cases in 1973 than in 1971, with a 44.5% increase in the number of cases disposed of by full opinion; yet, there was an increase of 21.8% in cases filed in 1973 as compared to 1971, and there was 20.6% more cases pending at the end of 1973 than in 1971. Every year since 1964, the Appellate Court as a whole has lost ground in currency, i.e., more cases pending on January 1 than on December 31 of each year; however, the increase in the 1973 inventory was only 86 cases over the inventory at the end of 1972.

The Appellate Court judges are disposing of more and more cases each year. For example, one judge authored 83 full opinions (including two specially concurring and six dissents) in 1973. However, the caseload continues to grow in striking proportions. In addition to the trend of increased fillings, 21 cases were transferred to the Appellate Court from the Supreme Court, and many cases which would have been heard in the Supreme Court prior to July 1, 1971, are now filed in the Appellate Court because the 1970 Constitution has lessened the Supreme Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction. As mentioned *supra*, the Appellate Court is also required to directly review orders of the Pollution Control Board.

To attain a more reasonable degree of currency in the Appellate Court, appropriate and innovative measures have been and will continue to be employed. But still the volume of business in the Appellate Court presents new challenges to the principle that justice delayed is justice denied. Using the years 1965 and 1973 as examples, the Appellate Court judges disposed of 228.7% more cases in 1973 than in 1965; however, there were 127.5% more appeals filed in 1973 than in 1965, and the percentage of cases pending at the end of 1973 was 161.6% great-



er than in 1965. Cognizant of the need to achieve currency in the Appellate Court, action has been and will be taken by the Appellate Court itself, by the Supreme Court and by the legislature. Some noteworthy measures employed thus far are as follows:

(1) Increase the number of Appellate Court judgeships. The 77th General Assembly authorized the selection of three additional judgeships in the First District. This brings the total number of elected judgeships up to 18 in that district. Because no contested judicial elections have been held since November 1970 (the next judicial election will be November 1974), the new judgeships have not been filled by election; however, the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VI, Section 12(b) of the Constitution, has filled the positions by appointment.

The 78th General Assembly authorized the selection of one additional judgeship for each of the four downstate districts. PA 78-558 creates the four positions which will be filled at the November 1974 general election.

(2) Curtail the number of full opinions where appropriate. Effective January 31, 1972, the Supreme Court adopted Rule 23 in accordance with a recommendation of the Appellate Court. The rule authorizes the Appellate Court to adopt memorandum opinions in affirming judgments when certain factors are present. Because of the apparent limitations of the rule, it remains to be seen whether it will be a significant tool in expediting cases in the Appellate Court. The rule is set out below.

"RULE 23. Signed memorandum opinions may be used in affirming a judgment when the Appellate Court determines that no error of law appears, that an opinion would have no precedential value, and that any one or more of the following circumstances exists and is dispositive of the case:

- (a) That a judgment in a civil case is not against the manifest weight of the evidence;
- (b) That a judgment in a civil case entered upon allowance of a motion for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be affirmed because all of the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the appellant, so overwhelmingly favors the appellee that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand (*Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co.* (1967), 37 III.2d 494);
- (c) That in a criminal case the evidence is not so unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt;
- (d) That the decision of an administrative body or agency reviewed under the provisions of the Administrative Review Act and confirmed by the circuit court is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

In the memorandum opinion the Appellate Court shall state at least the following: the court from which the appeal comes; the nature of the proceedings below, *i.e.*, bench trial, jury trial, adminis-

trative review, etc.; the nature of the case, e.g., personal injury or contract suit; and such other matters as in the judgment of the court are necessary for an understanding of the case; and shall thereupon, with a minimum of discussion, affirm, indicating that the affirmance is in compliance with this rule."

(3) Assign judges to the Appellate Court. Pursuant to Section 16 of Article VI, the Supreme Court "may assign a judge temporarily to any court." During 1973, thirty-eight circuit judges (not necessarily all different judges) were temporarily assigned to the Appellate Court and/or Appellate judges (not necessarily all different judges) to Appellate Court districts other than districts where they are permanently serving. Additionally, nine circuit judges were relieved of their circuit court duties and fully assigned to the Appellate Court:

First District—Edward J. Egan (until February 15, 1973)
Robert J. Downing
James J. Mejda
Second District—Glenn K. Seidenfeld (until October 1, 1973)
L. L. Rechenmacher
Third District—Albert Scott
Fourth District—Leland Simkins

Fourth District—Leland Simkins
Fifth District—Charles E. Jones (until
December 31, 1973)
Richard T. Carter

Appellate Court judges from the Third District delivered three opinions in 1973 in cases from the Second District; one judge in the Second District rendered one opinion in a Third District case; and one judge in the Fifth District delivered one opinion in a First District case.

Three circuit judges temporarily assigned to the Appellate Court rendered three opinions in cases assigned to them during and prior to 1973.

- (4) Assign retired judges to the Appellate Court. Section 15 of Article VI provides that the Supreme Court may assign a retired judge, with his consent, to judicial service. In 1973, the Supreme Court assigned retired Appellate Court judge, Ulysses S. Schwartz to full judicial service in the First Appellate Court District.
- (5) Fill Appellate Court vacancies by appointment. Article VI, Section 12 permits the Supreme Court, in absence of law, to fill vacancies. The Supreme Court by appointment during 1973 filled four vacancies in the First District and one in the Second District.
- (6) Propose solutions to Appellate Court problems. In late 1971, the Illinois Appellate Court, with the approval of the Supreme Court, established an Administrative Committee to propose solutions to expeditiously handle the increasing caseload of the Appellate Court.

The Committee, after a year of intensive research, produced a comprehensive report which suggested extensive amendments to the Supreme Court rules governing appeals. In summary, the report recommended: (a) The creation of a central research department composed of attorneys whose duties would include preparing a prehearing report for each case appealed to the Appellate Court, preparing and publishing a weekly cumulative digest of opinions for each case decided in the Supreme or Appellate Courts, and publishing a digest of issues for each issue presented to the courts of review but not yet decided; (b) The appointment of a director of research who would be a lawyer and responsible for the supervision and administration of the research department; and (c) The creation of the position of chief judge of the Appellate Court who would serve as the administrative coordinator of the Appellate Court.

The Supreme Court took the report of the Committee under advisement in 1972, and this year the Court returned the report to the Committee with the recommendation that the Committee re-evaluate and reanalyze the problems in the Appellate Court and submit revised recommendations.

In 1972, the Supreme Court approved the creation of an experimental research staff in the First Appellate Court District. The experiment is funded by the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, and the National Center for State Courts is assisting in the implementation of the project. The purpose of the project is to expedite the consideration and disposition of cases appealed to the First District Appellate Court by screening routine cases and composing memoranda which are suitable to assist the Appellate Court judges in arriving at per curiam opinions. The project has been in full operation for more than a year, and the statistical data contained elsewhere in this report seems to indicate that the experiment is, in part, responsible for the increased number of dispositions in the First District. It is anticipated that the Supreme Court will seek State funding of the project from the General Assembly in its judicial appropriation bills. In addition, some of the other Appellate Court districts are investigating the feasibility of developing similar research projects.

Still another approach to expediting cases in the Appellate Court which is being examined by individual members of that Court is the application of modern technology to assist the judges. Begin probed are the possible uses of audio-visual equipment, computer capabilities, and other automated and semi-automated systems.

In conclusion, it can be observed that the Illinois Appellate Court is a constitutionally based intermediate court of review which possesses expansive power of review from judgments of the circuit court and from orders of the Pollution Control Board. The constitutional right to appeal and the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court to hear most appeals enhances the importance of the Appellate Court and makes it the final arbiter in the vast majority of cases which it decides.

The mammoth caseload of the Appellate Court continues to increase; however, the flexibility permitted by the Constitution should ameliorate the pressing caseload of the Appellate Court. Retired judges and sitting judges on the circuit court level will continue to be assigned to the Appellate Court, and the Supreme and Appellate Courts will seek new means to alleviate caseload problems.

The Circuit Courts

The main nerve center of the Illinois court system is the circuit court which is the court of first impression, the trial court, for virtually all litigation. There are only three broad areas where the circuit court cannot or may not exercise its jurisdiction: (1) The Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases involving legislative redistricting and the ability of the Governor to serve in office; (2) the Supreme Court has discretionary original jurisdiction to hear cases relating to revenue, mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus; and (3) by statute, the Appellate Court directly reviews orders of the Pollution Control Board. The grant of jurisdiction to the circuit court by Section 9 of Article VI of the Constitution -"Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters..." — is a simple concept which, however, initially startles those who reside in multitrial court jurisdictions in sister states. Once the concept of a single trial court with unlimited jurisdiction is developed, it is understandably accepted as a model to emulate.

Illinois, which pioneered the unified trial court (and while other states have tried, they have not succeeded in providing for such a court), had a galaxy of trial courts prior to 1964. There were hundreds and hundreds of courts with limited, special, parallel and overlapping jurisdictions. For example, Cook County had 208 courts in 1962: Circuit court, Superior court, Family court, Criminal court, Probate court, County court, Chicago Municipal court, 23 city, village, town and municipal courts, 75 justice of the peace courts, and 103 police magistrate courts. The Judicial Article of 1964, which was continued nearly in toto in the 1970 Constitution, completely and totally abolished all of the State's trial courts of first impression and in their stead created the circuit court which is the only trial court in Illinois. Virtually all causes of action are filed, litigated, and adjudicated in the circuit court, and an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court is filed in the Supreme Court or, as in most instances, in the Appellate Court. A judge of the circuit court has no power to review the decision of another circuit court judge.

The circuit courts are comprised of 594 judges who are designated as circuit judges and associate judges. The former are initially elected either on a circuit-wide basis or from the county where they reside; in the case of the Circuit Court of Cook County, circuit judges are elected in the entire county, in the city of Chicago, or outside of Chicago. The associate judges are appointed on a merit basis by the circuit

judges of their respective circuits. Supreme Court Rule 39 establishes the procedures for nominating and appointing lawyers who have applied for the position of associate judge. It should be noted here that circuit judges and associate judges possess the full jurisdiction of the circuit court. Circuit judges are elected for six-year terms, and associate judges are appointed for four-year terms (Article VI, Section 10). The circuit judges pursuant to Section 7 of Article VI select by secret ballot from their own number a chief judge in their respective circuits. Subject to the authority of the Supreme Court, the chief judge has general administrative authority over his court.

Geographically, there are 21 judicial circuits in Illinois which are composed of one or more counties. One circuit contains over 5,000,000 people while another circuit has less than 150,000 people. The Second Judicial Circuit contains twelve counties, 4796 square miles and 196,404 people in southern Illinois, while the Circuit Court of Cook County, for example, is within one county and has nearly 5,500,000 people in a 954 square-mile area. The diversity of Illinois' geography and its people are reflected in the composition of the judicial circuits; e.g., urban versus rural, industry versus agriculture, densely versus sparsely populated areas, etc. These differences are also mirrored in the quantity and types of litigation filed in the circuit courts.

It staggers the imagination when one is confronted with the fact that over 3,000,000 cases were filed or reinstated in the circuit courts in 1973. That is a ratio of more than one case filed for every three persons in Illinois. Yet, because of the elasticity and flexibility of the court system, 2,895,348 cases were terminated, which is more than 4,874 cases disposed of by each of the State's 594 judges. While the sole purpose of creating the unified trial court system was to expeditiously and justly protect the liberties and quarantee the rights of Illinois citizens, an ancillary financial benefit has accrued to the taxpayers by virtue of the organization of the circuit court and its efficient handling of litigation. It is estimated that the circuit courts of Illinois have generated in recent years about \$50,000,000 per year in fines, costs and other court related revenue.

The volume of litigation varies substantially from circuit to circuit due in part to the concentration of population, State institutions and industry. For example, the Eighth Judicial Circuit recorded less than 22,000 newly filed cases during 1973, but the Circuit Court of Cook County received over 2,000,000 new filings. Because Cook County has approximately one-half of the State's population, numerous highways and streets, and is one of the world's leading business centers, the Circuit Court of Cook County has a greater volume of cases than any other single court system in the country, and it has the largest number of judicial officers working under one head.

Not surprising is the difficulty of maintaining and, in some situations, achieving currency in high volume circuits, in particular Cook County. The chief judge of


the Circuit Court of Cook County has employed many innovative ideas to prevent his court from becoming clogged in the morass of litigation. With the cooperation of the Supreme Court and its Administrative Director, Chief Judge John S. Boyle has reserved the tide in the delay of disposition of cases within certain divisions of the circuit court (see graph at page 42).

This accomplishment in significant part is due to the constitutional authority of the Supreme Court to assign sitting and retired judges from other circuits into those circuits which are in need of additional judicial manpower. Acting on behalf of the Supreme Court, the Administrative Director assigned 104 sitting circuit and associate judges (not necessarily all different judges) and 1 retired circuit judge from other circuits to the Circuit Court of Cook County for a total of 1352 days during 1973. Additionally, the Director assigned 50 sitting circuit and associate judges (not necessarily all different judges) and 6 retired circuit and associate judges to the other 20 circuits for a total of 776 days.

The Illinois unified trial court system has proven itself to be the most efficient and modern court system yet devised by mankind. The circuit courts have demonstrated the ability and potential, as the need may arise, to effectively and justly dispose of a massive number of cases within a reasonable time after filing. The volume of cases which are filed or reinstated is immense; e.g., 2,250,233 cases were filed during 1964, but 3,066,160 cases were filed during 1973, an increase of nearly 5% over 1972 (see chart at page 43). It is anticipated that the circuit courts can and will meet the challenge and continue to deliver justice with fairness and dispatch to the citizens of Illinois.


A typical example of how the circuit courts seek to serve the people is illustrated by General Order 72-8(M), entered in 1972 by Judge Eugene L. Wachowski, presiding judge of the First Municipal District (Chicago) of the Circuit Court of Cook County. (A similar order is in effect in the 17th Judicial Circuit, Winnebago County.) A study of small claims indicated that many individuals often cannot economically justify the employment of a lawyer to prosecute a small claim. Accordingly, Judge Wachowski entered the General Order to establish a *pro se* small claims section of the court to provide substantial justice between the parties in a forum where litigants can obtain a prompt and inexpensive hearing and adjudication of their claim.

The Illinois circuit courts are also investigating and experimenting with novel, modern technology to provide the public, lawyers and litigants with more efficient services. In the Tenth Judicial Circuit (Peoria County) and in the Circuit Court of Cook County, courtrooms where traffic violation cases are heard are using the cathode ray tube (CRT) to retrieve driving records from the Springfield office of the Secretary of State. Where a traffic offender is adjudged guilty of a traffic offense, the judge, prior to imposi-



CASES BEGUN OR REINSTATED AND TERMINATED IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS

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tion of the sentence, can input the offender's driver's license number and in a matter of seconds, the monitor in the courtroom will display the offender's previous record of traffic offenses of which he was convicted.

Several circuit courts are utilizing electronic data processing equipment to track the flow of cases through the court system. The degree of sophistication for which data processing is used ranges from providing case history in felony cases, daily disposition reports, indices, etc. in the Circuit Court of Cook County to pending indictments in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit (LaSalle County). Other circuit courts employing data processing are: Seventh Judicial Circuit (Sangamon County); Tenth Judicial Circuit (Peoria County); Twelfth Judicial Circuit (Will County); Sixteenth Judicial Circuit (Kane County); Seventeenth Judicial Circuit (Winnebago County); Eighteenth Judicial Circuit (DuPage County); Nineteenth Judicial Circuit (Lake County); and the Twentieth Judicial Circuit (St. Clair County). The Third and Ninth Judicial Circuits (Madison and Knox counties, respectively) have started preliminary planning to acquire data processing services.

Some other developments where scientific technology is being applied to the court system include:

- (1) Electronically supported (including videorecording) model courtrooms in the McDonough County courthouse (9th Circuit) and in the criminal court building in Chicago (criminal division of the Cook County Circuit Court);
- (2) Experimentation with "picturephone" in Cook County in which defendants charged with criminal offenses in outlying police district stations are televised to the courtroom where judges set bond. The defendant makes his appearance for the bond setting via "picturephone" telecast without leaving the police station;
- (3) Issuing of warrants by computer to offenders who have failed to pay parking violation fines. Tracking of the delinquent parking violator has resulted in the collection of hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines in Cook County;
- (4) Employment of trial court administrators. The Third and Nineteenth Judicial Circuits are in consultation with the Administrative Office concerning the use of full-time circuit court administrators to assist the chief judge with his administrative duties. Several other circuit courts have also expressed interest in securing the services of a trial court administrator.

The judges of the circuit courts and the judges of the Appellate Court are also bringing the courtroom experience to the future lawyers of Illinois. For example, the University of Illinois College of Law sponsors a trial advocacy program wherein Illinois jurists act as trial judges in the mock-trial setting. Once a year, the criminal division of the Circuit Court of Cook County conducts the trial of a felony case at Northwestern University School of Law.

The judges of the Illinois circuit courts are vitally

concerned, as the foregoing in a small part illustrates, not only with performing their official duties but also with providing the court system with automated devices where appropriate to assist the judges in the efficient and just management of the judicial process. Yet, mechanization of the court is but one factor in the dispensing of justice. In the doing of justice, to paraphrase a justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, the judge has no mean duties, and, in a proper sense, no case in which a judge presides is of greater importance than another.

Judicial Elections

During 1973 there were not any elections to fill judicial vacancies since judicial elections are not held in odd numbered years. Section 12 (a), Article VI of the Constitution provides that "Supreme, Appellate and circuit judges shall be nominated at primary elections or by petition. Judges shall be elected at general or judicial elections as the General Assembly shall provide by law."

The General Assembly passed legislation in 1971 making the primary election law applicable to judicial elections; however, the Governor vetoed the bill. The legislature overrode the veto in January of 1972, but since the time had already passed for filing in the March 1972 primary, judicial candidates were foreclosed from seeking election. Thus, there will not be contested judicial elections in Illinois until 1974.

The Illinois Constitution provides that a Supreme, Appellate and circuit judge who has been elected to that office may upon expiration of his term of office file a declaration of candidacy to succeed himself. A judge who so files "runs on his record" and without opposition. A 60% affirmative vote of the electors voting on the question is required for the judge to retain his office. In November of 1974, it is anticipated that about forty judges will seek to be retained.

Federal Court Decisions Affecting Illinois Judges

Two important federal cases with issues involving federal court interference with the State judicial process and attacking the county salary supplement to some Illinois judges were decided during 1973.

In O'Shea v. Littleton, 94 S. Ct. 669, and its companion case, Spomer v. Littleton, 94 S. Ct. 685, the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal courts should not anticipatorily intervene in state court judicial proceedings. Illinois Judges O'Shea and Spomer were alleged to have racially discriminated against minority groups in granting bail and sentencing in criminal cases. The federal district court dismissed the complaint but was reversed by the federal circuit court of appeals (468 F. 2d 389 (7th Cir.)) which held that the Illinois state judges in their official capacities were not immune from injunction and that the federal district court had the power to fashion an appropriate remedy to require Illinois judges to administer bail and impose sentences without racial discrimination.

In reversing the circuit court, the U.S. Supreme Court admonished "... recognition of the need for a proper balance in the concurrent operation of federal and state courts counsels restraint against the issuance of injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of the State's criminal laws. ... A federal court should not intervene to establish the basis for future intervention that would be so intrusive and unworkable. ... [The court of appeals] misconceived the underlying basis for withholding federal equitable relief when the normal course of criminal proceedings in the state courts would otherwise be disrupted."

In Johnson v. Scott (E.D. III. 1973, No. 71-47), plaintiff-downstate judges attacked the provision in the Illinois Constitution which authorized the General Assembly to allow counties to supplement judges' salaries. The General Assembly authorized a county supplement, in addition to the salary paid by the State, for judges in certain counties, and the plaintiffs alleged that the county paid supplement violated the equal protection clause. The three judge federal court held that "[there] is nothing invidious about permitting local governmental units to experiment with different levels of compensation for their personnel. . . . We do not believe the equal protection clause authorizes us to impose a requirement of territorial uniformity with respect to the compensation of Illinois iudaes."

The Courts Commission

Prior to the effective date of the 1970 Constitution, the sole method of redressing grievances against judges was to file a complaint with the courts commission. The commission would investigate, prosecute and adjudicate to determine whether a judge should be disciplined. The courts commission as established under the 1964 Judicial Article subsisted for 7-1/2 years, January 1, 1964 to July 1, 1971; and during that time, the commission received 922 complaints about the conduct or disability of judicial officers. Many of the complaints were from prisoners and disgruntled litigants; however, each complaint was thoroughly investigated. Those complaints having merit were brought to the attention of the commission by its secretary. The confidentiality requirement before the formal filing of the complaint with the commission was an effective fulcrum to induce judges, who were found to be physically or mentally disabled or guilty of serious judicial impropriety, to retire or resign from the bench. The courts commission was an effective but unobserved body that truly served the best interests of the public and its iudaes.

Now, Section 15 of Article VI of the 1970 Constitution provides that the Judicial Inquiry Board "shall be convened permanently, with authority to conduct investigations, receive or initiate complaints concerning a Judge or Associate Judge, and file complaints with the Courts Commission...All proceedings of the Board shall be confidential except the filing of a com-

plaint with the Courts Commission." The Board is composed of nine members, seven of whom are appointed by the Governor, and two circuit judges appointed by the Supreme Court. The Court has appointed Judge Walter P. Dahl of Cook County and Judge John T. Reardon of Quincy to the Board.

The Judicial Inquiry Board reports it had received 150 complaints about judges during the period July 1971 through June 1973, and of that number, 124 files were closed because "the Board determined that a reasonable basis did not exist to conduct further investigations or to file a complaint with the Courts Commission." The Board has found, just as the former courts commission did, that the vast majority of complaints are filed by "persons who have had a disappointing experience in the courts or have lost a case."

During 1973, six formal complaints were filed by the Board with the Courts Commission, and another complaint filed in 1972 was carried over into 1973. These first cases are significant to the Board and the Commission in that precedents will be created and procedures established. Of course, these early cases will be the first matters to come before the Commission strictly in its new adjudicatory posture. The Commission, upon a finding against a respondent judge and after a public hearing, may discipline the judge by removal from office, suspension with or without pay, retirement, censure or reprimand.

The 1973 activities of the Illinois Courts Commission were:

(1) Complaint 72-CC-1 alleged that a certain judge in the Eighth Judicial Circuit, Calhoun County, violated the Judicial Article of the Constitution and the Supreme Court rules on standards of judicial conduct in that he did not devote full-time to his judicial duties, that he engaged in the practice of law, that the judge failed to recuse himself in cases where one of the attorneys of record was the judge's business partner, that he operated a land title company in the county, and that he filed a false statement of economic interest with the Secretary of State.

On August 1, 1973, the Commission entered an order which found that most of the allegations were "sustained by clear and convincing evidence," and ordered the respondent judge "suspended without pay for a period of one year." The judge subsequently resigned.

(2) Complaint 73-CC-1 charged that a Cook County associate judge had brought the judicial office into disrepute by abusive conduct toward two citizens. The respondent judge was alleged to have threatened the citizens by displaying a handgun contrary to law and using profane language during an altercation which happened not in the course of the respondent's duties.

The Commission ruled on June 29, 1973 that the allegations were "sustained by clear and convincing evidence," and ordered the respondent judge "suspended without pay for a period of four months."

(3) Complaint 73-CC-2 stated that a Cook County circuit judge was "physically or mentally unable to perform his duties as a judge" and particular facts were alleged to evidence his inability.

Before a Commission hearing could be held, the judge resigned, and the Commission dismissed the complaint on April 10, 1973.

(4) Complaint 73-CC-3 alleged that a Cook County circuit judge accepted favors, arranged by an attorney, who frequently litigated cases before the judge in a legal representative capacity as well as a party litigant, from a merchant who was or had been a party in litigation heard by the judge and who was or had been represented by said attorney.

On December 18, 1973, the Commission held that the allegations were "sustained by clear and convincing evidence" and ordered the respondent "suspended without pay for a period of two months."

(5) Complaint 73-CC-4 charged a Cook County circuit judge with violating the Supreme Court rules on standards of judicial conduct by finding defendants in three cases "guilty . . . before [he] had heard the evidence in full and given the defendants an opportunity to argue their cause by counsel."

The Commission has set this case down for hearing in February 1974.

(6) Complaint 73-CC-5 alleged that a certain judge in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Ford County, improperly interfered with the attorney-client relationship, willfully and improperly abused his judicial office, attempted to usurp the authority of the circuit judges and chief judge by promulgating certain administrative orders, and acted in an intemperate and abusive manner to the chief judge, lawyers, witnesses and litigants.

This case will be heard by the Commission in June 1974.

(7) Complaint 73-CC-6 charged a certain judge in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Stephenson County, with conduct that brings the judicial office into disrepute in that the respondent on several occasions was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

In February 1974 this matter will be heard by the Commission.

The powers of the Board and the application of that power has caused some concern. Chief Justice Robert C. Underwood commented on the concern in a recent law review article, 47 Notre Dame Lawyer 247:

"While the creation of the Judicial Inquiry Board was opposed by the members of the Supreme Court as unnecessary, and as creating a potential threat to the independence of the judicial branch of government, I am sure that the members to be appointed will be selected with care and will be sincere, conscientious individuals, aware of the seriousness of their responsibilities. It is their con-

stitutional obligation to maintain the confidentiality of all complaints until such time as a formal charge, if warranted, is filed against a judge. A working knowledge of the judicial process will be imperative for the Board members if they are to distinguish between improper judicial conduct as opposed to mere dissatisfaction with a judicial ruling or opinion. While a potential threat to judicial independence has been created, I trust that will never become a reality. That independence can, in fact, be enhanced if the Board performs its duties in a responsible, impartial and nonsensational manner."

Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court appoints one of its justices as chairman of the Commission and two circuit court judges, and the Appellate Court selects two of its judges as commissioners. The present commissioners are Justice Walter V. Schaefer, chairman, Judge Edward C. Eberspacher and Judge John J. Stamos (both from the Appellate Court), Judge Robert J. Dunne and Judge Seely P. Forbes (both from the circuit court.). Roy O. Gulley, the Administrative Director, is the Commission secretary.

What the future holds for the judges of Illinois relating to the regulation of the judiciary is difficult to perceive. The overwhelming majority of judicial officers are men and women of high integrity, honesty, virtue and self-discipline for hard work and devotion to their judicial duties. Judges are human beings with the same virtues and failings of other professional people; but because they are public servants, they are rightly held to a high degree of trust and confidence. It remains to be seen whether the Judicial Inquiry Board will perform, as the Chief Justice stated, "its duties in a responsible, impartial and nonsensational manner." However, the Illinois Courts Commission stands ready to perform its constitutional function with fidelity and impartiality.

The Judicial Conference

The Illinois Constitution provides in Section 17 of Article VI that there shall be "an annual judicial conference to consider the work of the courts and to suggest improvements in the administration of justice." Supreme Court Rule 41 implements Section 17 by establishing membership in the Conference, creating an executive committee to assist the Court in conducting the Conference, and appointing the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts as secretary of the Conference. The text of the rule follows.

"RULE 41. (a) *Duties.* There shall be a Judicial Conference to consider the business and the problems pertaining to the administration of justice in this State, and to make recommendations for its improvement.

(b) *Membership*. The judges of the Supreme Court, the judges of the Appellate Court, and the judges of the circuit courts shall be members of the conference.

- (c) Executive Committee. The Supreme Court shall appoint an executive committee to assist it in conducting the Judicial Conference.
 - (1) The committee shall consist of six judges from Cook County, the First Judicial District, and six judges from the other judicial districts outside Cook County. A designated Justice of the Supreme Court shall be an ex officio member of the committee. Members shall be appointed for a term of three years.
 - (2) Each year the Supreme Court shall designate one of the members of the committee to act as chairman.
 - (3) The committee shall meet at such time and such place as may be necessary, or at the call of the Supreme Court.
 - (4) The committee shall recommend to the Supreme Court the appointment of such other committees as are necessary to further the objectives of the conference.
 - (5) At least 60 days prior to the date on which the Judicial Conference is to be held the committee shall submit to the Supreme Court a suggested agenda for the annual meeting.
- (d) Meetings of Conference. The conference shall meet at least once each year at a place and on a date to be designated by the Supreme Court.
- (e) Secretary. The Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts shall be secretary of the conference."

The Judicial Conference membership includes all elected judicial officers in the State; i.e., Supreme Court justices, Appellate Court judges and circuit court judges. From this pool of judges, the Supreme Court designates six judges from Cook County and six judges outside Cook County as members of the executive committee. As of December 31, 1973, the executive committee consisted of Appellate Court Judges Jay J. Alloy (3rd District), Henry W. Dieringer (1st District), and Daniel J. McNamara (1st District); and circuit court Judges Nicholas J. Bua (Cook County), Joseph J. Butler (Cook County), Harold R. Clark (3rd Circuit), Frederick S. Green (6th Circuit), Mel R. Jiganti (Cook County), Peyton H. Kunce (1st Circuit), Daniel J. Roberts (9th Circuit), Rodney A. Scott (6th Circuit), and Eugene L. Wachowski (Cook County). Supreme Court Justice Thomas E. Kluczynski is the liaison officer to the executive committee. The Supreme Court appointed Judge McNamara as chairman and Judge Green as vice-chairman.

The executive committee meets regularly every month except during July and August and discusses, studies, and makes recommendations relating to the business of the courts. In recent years, the Judicial Conference has devoted considerable time to continuing judicial education in the form of planning seminars; however, a constant concern of the Conference and its executive committee is the improvement of the administration of justice through legislation, rule changes, and procedural modifications. Illinois has

long been an innovative leader in continuing judicial education. Many years before judicial education was fashionable, the Illinois Judicial Conference and its predecessor conference were bringing judges together from every corner of the State to discuss and develop recent case law and legislation which affected the courts.

While in recent years, the executive committee has emphasized judicial education, there has been much discussion and contemplation by the members of that committee regarding the Conference's obligation "to suggest improvements in the administration of justice." In early 1973, the executive committee appointed a subcommittee to re-evaluate the duties and function of the Conference. The subcommittee consisted of Judge Daniel J. McNamara, chairman; Judges Harold R. Clark and Mel R. Jiganti as members; and Administrative Director Roy O. Gulley, ex officio. After months of indepth study of the internal operation of the Judicial Conference and of judicial conferences in other states, the subcommittee presented a comprehensive report to the executive committee. That committee approved the report and transmitted it to the Supreme Court for its consideration. In late 1973, the Supreme Court endorsed the recommendations contained in the report.

The report urged the Conference to establish study committees to investigate and analyze problem areas of the law and make recommendations thereon for specific legislation and rule changes in substantive and procedural law. Additionally suggested was that the Conference conduct regional civil and criminal law seminars to permit the judiciary to study in detail particular segments of the law while spending a minimum of time off the bench.

In brief the report recommended:

- "(1) Continuation of the annual Judicial Conference, including lectures and seminar topics. However, the primary function of the Conference should be to consider the work of the courts and to suggest improvements in the administration of justice, as developed by study committees;
- (2) Creation of study committees to explore, analyze and report on problem areas in the administration of justice, and to make recommendations thereon;
- (3) Establishment of continuing educational seminars throughout the State in appropriate areas of civil and criminal law; and
- (4) Staff support to effectuate the work of the study committees, and to assist in the organization of the seminas."

The executive committee expects to implement the report, commencing in 1974.

On September 5, 1973, the Judicial Conference convened its twentieth annual meeting and seminar. The 351 judges from the Supreme, Appellate and circuit courts, who had gathered together for the three day meeting, heard lectures and investigated current developments in the law. Supreme Court Justice

Thomas E. Kluczynski, liaison officer to the executive committee, opened the Conference with a discerning and informative address which set the theme of the Conference and suggested innovative action on the part of judges to resolve crucial problems facing the judiciary. In his remarks, Justice Kluczynski emphasized a variety of topics of concern to the judiciary:Continuing judicial education; Application of federal grant funds to the court system; Reducing the time in disposition of cases; Use of the Supreme Court's supervisory authority; and Attorney discipline.

Justice Kluczynski reminded the conferees that judges must become immersed in judicial education:

"... Although the primary purpose of the annual Conference is to review and recommend improvements in the administration of justice, the seminars also provide us with an opportunity to increase our legal knowledge and judicial skills. The annual seminars for circuit judges and associate judges. the new judge seminar and specialized regional seminars in criminal law have been very successful. Judges, no less than the attorneys who practice before them or the members of other professions, must continue to learn. The performance of a trial judge depends on what he brings to the bench, what he absorbs after he ascends it and how well he applies his knowledge, training and personal qualities. The vast increase in litigation, the criminal law explosion and the growing and changing complexities of the law have led to national recognition of the need for a comprehensive program of judicial education within each

Continuing, Justice Kluczynski discussed some uses and possible uses of federal grant funds. He mentioned that federal funds have been used for regional criminal law seminars for Illinois judges and for the experimental defender project, which matured into the Illinois Appellate Defender, a State agency, and which provides counsel to indigent defendants on appeal. The Justice also noted that funds are needed for courthouse construction and renovation:

"[The Supreme Court is] looking forward to finding some way in which federal funding can be used to build or remodel court facilities which are outdated or inadequate. In a recent report, [the committee on criminal justice programs] characterized the courtroom facilities used for some criminal cases in Cook County as 'obsolete' and 'grossly inadequate' and stated that these conditions represent 'the most serious problem confronting the administration of the criminal courts in Cook County.' Judges from downstate indicate that they have similar problems in their own counties. Many trial courtrooms are poorly lighted, poorly ventilated, and badly maintained. Accoustical problems are so serious that hearing is difficult without loud speaker systems. Staff quarters are crowded, conference rooms are not available, parking and other service facilities for judges, jurors, witnesses, attorneys, court staff and visitors are inadequate or non-existent. Nevertheless, many of our counties are to be commended for their efforts to improve the court facilities even without federal assistance. . . . Many of our counties have been unable or unwilling to commit adequate resources to improve the physical facilities in which our courts must operate and the federal government has been hesitant to allow grant money to be used for construction. But until and unless the resources are forthcoming either from the counties, the State or the federal government an essential part of our program to improve the administration of justice will not be adequately dealt with."

Commenting on how cooperation among the judiciary can solve complex problems which face the court system, Justice Kluczynski directed the conferees' attention to the continuing substantial reduction in delay between date of filing and date of verdict in cases in the Law Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County:

Delay in the trial of law jury cases in the Circuit Court of Cook County has long been one of the most serious and most highly publicized problems in the operation of the Illinois courts. Cook County had long been charged with having had the worst civil law jury backlog in the nation. I think we can take some pride in the fact that Illinois now has less delay than three other major jurisdictions. Cook County, as of the end of 1972 suffered a delay of 49.8 months. Philadelphia has a delay of 53 months, Boston has a delay of 51 months and the Bronx has a delay of 52.2 months. Almost equally important, when we look at the overall problem, is the fact that of 20 jurisdictions reporting delays of 30 months or more, 13 are now suffering greater delay than they did 10 years ago. Only 6 have, over the last decade, reduced the time it takes to get a jury verdict in their jurisdiction. Cook County stands out as one of those having accomplished the greatest reduction since 1962. Cook County has shaved a full one and one half years off the delay between the date on which a case is filed and the date of verdict. As recently as January 1. 1971, a litigant in the Law Division would wait an average of over 5 years for a jury verdict. Today, while the wait is still too long, it has been reduced to an average of 44.5 months as of May 1973.

* * *

"The Illinois court system has achieved international prominence because of its simplicity, efficiency and flexibility. We can be proud of the fact that our court system is among the most modern, most efficiently organized in the country. Unlike many other major jurisdictions our system has demonstrated its ability to cope with the difficult problem of delay. While the civil law jury backlog continues to be a matter for concern, the steady progress made in recent years has given us reason to believe that the backlog will be beaten. It al-

so gives us confidence that other problems facing our courts can be dealt with and that we can achieve justice with dispatch throughout the system."

In discussing the Supreme Court's supervisory authority as a tool to be used to improve the management of the court system, Justice Kluczynski remarked:

"Since 1964, our Court has had 'general administrative authority over all courts... 'Under section 16 of article VI of the 1970 Constitution our Court has now also been given 'supervisory authority over all courts....' In its April 10, 1970 report to the Illinois Constitutional Convention, the Committee on the Judiciary recommended that supervisory authority be added to our Court's administrative authority 'to emphasize the urgency and importance of the general administrative authority...' in the Supreme Court. The Committee on the Judiciary of the 1970 Constitutional Convention commented that vesting supervisory authority in the Supreme Court would 'strengthen the concept of an effective centralized administration of the judicial system.'

"Since July 1, 1971, our Court has invoked its supervisory authority on many occasions. Depending upon the nature of the case, our Court has entered supervisory orders in two broad areas: First, where the order was directed to a specific judge. Second, where the order was directed to the circuit or Appellate Court to carry out a policy laid down by our Court. The latter instance shows our willingness to use our supervisory authority to carry out general policy and provide for effective centralized administration of the court system."

In conclusion, Justice Kluczynski observed that the Supreme Court had adopted new rules regarding attorney misconduct:

"Every lawyer and judge in Illinois shares in the responsibility of maintaining high professional standards in our community, and judges in their particularly sensitive position of public trust are obligated to participate in the work of maintaining high professional responsibility. Judges are in a unique position to observe violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, actions which bring the courts or profession into disrepute, and especially the first signs of physical or mental disability which may impair an attorney's ability to property represent a client. We all realize that these problems are sensitive, but I can assure you that they can be discussed at your convenience on a personal basis with a professional member of the staff of the office of [the] Attorney Registration [and Disciplinary Commission]."

The Honorable Daniel Walker, Governor of the State of Illinois, in the main address to the assembled judges, delivered thought-provoking observations on the problems with which the judiciary must deal:

"...I would like to raise with you this question

..., a question for which I have no answer: Are we in America today asking too much of our judicial system? As I said, life used to be different in the courts. The courts were there, and they were almost totally pre-occupied with resolving two-party litigation, constitutional and statutory interpretation, and criminal law problems. Now the courts, you the judges, are thrust daily into large questions of public policy and new forms of litigation that affect very, very broad groups of people.

* * *

"At the same time that you are being thrust into social arenas, we have the other problems with which you are familiar, the ones you deal with every day: Crowded calendars in metropolitan areas and too many civil and criminal cases for some courts to cope with. You have the concept of bargaining in the criminal courts. Many of you, more familiar than I, know that system of justice. We have the problem of continuance after continuance; the effect this has on the witnesses, on you, on the lawyer, on justice, and on the physical facilities. How many of you have the kind of physical facilities that you really need in order to do the kind of job that is expected of you? Some of you do. I have seen your courtrooms around the State. I have walked and jeeped for two years through the communities of Illinois, and some courtrooms are good, but a lot of them are not. I wondered time and time again as I went into the courtrooms: How could you render justice in that kind of cramped surroundings?

"Let me specifically say that I believe our State can be proud of the progress that we have made in some of the areas that I have mentioned. I think we are way ahead of some of the states in the Union, thanks to some very outstanding people, many of them here, who have worked on this problem. This kind of conference, the Administrative Office, and the hard work that a lot of people are putting into making the judicial system work better are examples of progress. But we have a long way to go, and I am sure that you would agree with me on that."

In concluding, the Governor noted that there is a terrific onslaught on a judge's time and that modern technology may be of some help in conserving judicial time; however, he admonished:

"Let us not turn our judges, our judicial system, into administrative robots as we try to modernize the system. I would like to suggest something that I think on which every judge here agrees with me. That is, that justice requires thoughtfulness. Judges must have time: Time to reflect; time to read; time for quiet discussions with your colleagues. Yes, time to take a brief or a law book and walk out in the court yard and sit under a tree and do some quiet reflection as you study a brief of a case. Time to sit in your library and let some of the precedents seep into your mind. If we come

to the time when every judge has to rely on his law clerks to do all of his research, and if we come to a time when a judge does not have time to sit in the library and think as he reads, then I think we have come to a time that bornes ill to our judiciary."

The educational portion of the Conference offered six topics of which any three could be selected by the judges. Each topic was presented three times simultaneously with every other topic, except the lecture on evidence which was only presented once. Four topics were presented in seminar format while the remaining two topics were discussed by lecture. The executve committee established the following Conference committees to research and conduct the seminar:

- Evidence Lecture. In depth analysis of the proposed federal rules of evidence and comparison of the proposed rules to Illinois law of evidence.
- II. Criminal Law Lecture. Discussion of significant opinions on criminal law and procedure decided by the U.S. Supreme Court at its October 1972 term.
- III. Sentencing. Comprehensive study of the effect of the new Unified Code of Corrections on sentencing procedures.
- IV. Torts. Development of recent case law deciding questions relating to products liability and the structural work act.
- V. Function of the Trial Judge. Problem oriented approach to common situations faced by trial judges, e.g., dealing with motions for continuance, contempt situations, attorney misconduct and managing court calendars.
- VI. Trial Judge and the Record on Appeal. Exploration of methods which the trial judge could employ to reduce errors on appeal, discussion of Supreme Court rules governing appeals and acceptance of guilty pleas in criminal cases.

The second educational seminar for Illinois judges was held on March 7, 8 and 9, 1973 in Chicago for the appointed judiciary, i.e., the associate judges. The executive committee appointed a coordinating committee, chaired by Judge Glenn K. Seidenfeld and Judge Charles P. Horan, to organize and plan the seminar. A total of 244 judges was assembled for the three day seminar.

The Director of the Administrative Office, Roy O. Gulley, welcomed the conferees on behalf of the Supreme Court, and he stressed the significance of the unified court system in Illinois:

"I have been asked to appear all over the United States to explain our [court] system. The feature which has consistently drawn the most interest and which commands the most respect is our associate judge operation. This class of judicial officer in any court system is the one that sets the standard and gives the impressions that create the image of the judiciary in a state. I think that we have made great strides in improving that image in

our State as evidenced by the interest from other states.

"Next week I will be in New York City to talk with the Citizens Committee on the Reorganization of the New York Courts and to explain to them how we accomplished unification of the judicial system in Illinois. Today New York is where we were way back in 1963. It has been the success of the unified court system in Illinois which has caused concerned citizens in New York to conclude that they should consider unification of the court system. Since imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, I think that all of you should be gratified that your story is attracting such interest throughout the nation."

Supreme Court Justice Daniel P. Ward delivered the main address to the assembled associate judges. His poignant remarks received an excellent reception from the judges:

"I think that the development of the associate judgeship in the judicial structure of our State has truly been one of the most significant developments in our judiciary in modern times. It would be a truism to point out to you that the greatest number of cases handled by judges in Illinois are handled by associate judges. And it is interesting to observe that it is estimated, considering the number of cases which were in the case load in 1971, that 98 percent of those matters were capable of assignment to and disposition by associate judges. The associate judges by and large are the ones whom the public knows in greater numbers.

* * *

"The Supreme Court has not been unaware, of course, of the splendid work that is being done throughout our State by the associate judges. In part this is reflected by the fact that eighteen associate judges have been the subject of appointments by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its appointment authority."

The coordinating committee selected the following committees to research and present topics at the seminar. Each topic was presented twice, except the lectures on evidence and criminal law. These lectures were attended by all of the conferees, and following each lecture, the judges divided into small groups to discuss the content of the lectures.

I. Function of the Trial Judge. The innovative approach to presenting this topic was through the medium of videotape. The committee used videotaped enactments of a modern traffic court statement, statement to veniremen, plea and arraignment procedures and a bail hearing. "Stop-action" techniques were used for some of the scenarios, playing them through completely once and then breaking them into small segments for discussion purposes.

- Family Law. Discussion of amendments to the Juvenile Court Act, adoption and custody, and divorce.
- III. Sentencing, Probation and Corrections. Analysis of the sentencing provisions of the new Unified Code of Corrections and study of Illinois' probation system.
- IV. Lecture on Individual Rights Under the 1970 Constitution. Exploration of the right to remedy and justice, to a healthy environment, to privacy and various provisions prohibiting discrimination.
- V. Recent Developments in the Law. Study of the implied consent act and the impact of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, on Illinois law
- VI. Evidence Lecture. Competency of witnesses, qualification of witnesses, limitations on direct and cross examination, and impeachment and rehabilitation.
- VII. Criminal Law Lecture. In depth study of recent developments in the law of search and seizure.

The third educational program for judges was a series of regional seminars on criminal law. The executive committee appointed a committee on criminal law seminars for Illinois judges, chaired by Judge Richard Mills, to plan and obtain the necessary funds to conduct the seminars. The committee developed a program and requested the Supreme Court committee on criminal justice programs to apply for a grant of funds from the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission. That grant and subsequent grants have been approved, and five regional seminars were held in 1971 and 1972. During 1973, three additional seminars took place: Mt. Vernon on January 5 and 6; Rockford on November 9 and 10; and Champaign on December 14 and 15. Another seminar is planned for Mt. Vernon in March 1974. The subject matter of the regional seminars included motions in criminal cases, guilty pleas under Supreme Court Rules 401 and 402, sentencing under the Code of Corrections, identification evidence problems, and jury selection problems in criminal cases. The committee is also in the process of drafting a criminal law benchbook which will contain checklists, forms and readily available reference materials on the various stages of criminal court proceedings. The benchbook is expected to be distributed in late 1974. Each seminar was limited to less than 40 judge participants, and from all indications, the seminars were very successful.

Because of the enthusiastic response to the criminal law regional seminars, the executive committee with the approval of the Supreme Court requested a grant of funds through the committee on criminal justice programs to conduct a series of regional seminars on juvenile law and procedure. The juvenile problems committee (Judge Richard F. Scholz, Jr., chairman) of the Conference is in the process of planning and developing a program on juvenile court procedures; overview of the Juvenile Court Act, in-

cluding recent amendments; and the dispositional phase of the juvenile court hearing. Seminars have tentatively been scheduled for three locations during 1974.

In addition to the considerable time devoted to judicial education and to the previously mentioned study on the function of the Judicial Conference, the executive committee spent long hours studying problems which face the judicial system. Some of the committee's decisions are highlighted here:

- Recommended that the Supreme Court authorize appointment of a Conference committee to study the law of evidence and make recommendations thereon.
- (2) Approved attendance of Illinois judges at various in and out of state educational programs.
- (3) Authorized the juvenile problems committee to establish liaison with the commission on children.
- (4) Heard reports on pending legislation which affected judges and court procedures.
- (5) Discussed the approach the judiciary should take where a lawyer publicly announces that he is about to file an unfounded complaint against a judge with the Judicial Inquiry Board in apparent violation of the spirit of the confidentiality requirement of the Constitution.
- (6) Approved proposed amendments to Supreme Court Rules 201 and 214, drafted by executive committee members, Judges Bua and Jiganti, and transmitted same to the Court for its consideration.
- (7) Received a report on the problem of multiple attacks—direct and collateral—on guilty judgments in criminal cases.
- (8) Accepted reports which emanated from the 1972 associate judge seminar committees and made specific recommendations to improve the administration of justice by new legislation or court rules.
- (9) Heard a report that the Supreme Court had authorized an increase in the judicial mileage, housing and meal allowances.
- (10) Appointed a committee to plan and organize regional seminars on civil law topics to be presented in 1974. Judge Paul C. Verticchio was appointed as chairman of the committee.

It is anticipated that the Illinois Judicial Conference, with the guidance of the Supreme Court, will continue to grow in stature and provide the judiciary of this State with continued leadership in judicial education and in suggesting recommendations to improve the administration of justice.

The Conference of Chief Circuit Judges

Subject only to the Supreme Court, the chief judge of each Judicial Circuit has the power and responsibility to administer his circuit. As the day to day manager of the circuit court, the chief judge is immediately responsible for operating his circuit court in such a manner that the ends of justice on the trial court level are fully satisfied.

The State's 21 chief circuit judges first met in late 1963 in anticipation of the transition from the system of multiple trial courts, which then existed in Illinois, to the unified trial courts which would begin to operate on January 1, 1964. The chief judges have met regularly since then as the Conference of Chief Circuit Judges, and the regular meetings of the Conference present invaluable opportunities for the chief judges to discuss problems common to the administration of the circuits. The Conference of Chief Circuit Judges is a standing committee of the Illinois Supreme Court. It develops and proposes uniform circuit court rules and policies and, where appropriate, advocates legislation and Supreme Court rules designed to effectuate a high degree of uniform management in the circuit courts. The Administrative Office is secretary to the Conference and, during calendar year 1973, Justice Thomas E. Kluczynski served as liaison between the Supreme Court and the Conference.

During 1973, the Conference met six times. Early in 1973 the Conference commissioned Mr. William Bohn, then an employee of the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, to undertake a research project to define the powers and responsibilities of chief circuit judges. Mr. Bohn undertook, by interviews and study of the position of chief judge, to analyze the administrative responsibilities related to the operation of the circuit courts in this State. His objective was to put into perspective the powers and responsibilities of the chief judge of a judicial circuit in relation to personnel administration, budgeting, probation services, the operation of the court reporter system, relationships with the circuit clerks and the county boards and other matters of concern to the chief judges. The first draft of Mr. Bohn's manual was submitted to the Conference late in 1973 and met with general approval from the chief judges. A subcommittee of the Conference was appointed to study Mr. Bohn's proposals in depth and make recommendations concerning specific guidelines for administration of the office of the chief judge.

The Illinois State Bar Association's Section on Probate Law presented to the Conference, for consideration and approval, uniform circuit court probate rules. Mr. Austin Fleming, chairman of the section on probate law appeared before the Conference to ask that each chief judge return to his individual circuit, call a meeting of circuit judges and consider adoption of the uniform probate rules. Several circuits have adopted the probate rules in whole or in substantial part.

During the year, the Conference of Chief Circuit Judges concerned itself with the Criminal Justice Standards, promulgated in 1972 at the National Conference on Criminal Justice in Washington, D.C. The most controversial recommendation was that all plea

bargaining be eliminated over a five-year period. The Conference did not take an official position on the standards, but there was a consensus that the effort of the commission of the National Conference to establish what it considered to be desirable standards was undertaken without sufficient input from judges of the state courts.

Provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections which affect the administration of circuit courts were also considered on several occasions. Chief Judge John T. Reardon of the 8th Judicial Circuit raised the problem of "expunging" criminal records after a satisfactory pre-adjudication probation period. The Cannabis Control Act provides that certain first offenders who are found guilty or who plead guilty to certain violations of that Act may be placed on probation without a guilty judgment (III. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 56-1/2, §710). The court can defer the proceedings and if the person satisfactorily fulfills the conditions of probation, the court may discharge the person and dismiss the proceedings. A finding of guilty, without an adjudication, will not (according to that statute) be deemed a conviction for any purposes—despite the plea or finding of guilty. The chief judges were concerned that this provision could cause recordkeeping and other administrative problems.

The chief judges dealt with the prohibition against putting minors under 16 years of age in jail (III. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 37, §702-8(1)). Many smaller counties have no detention facilities for juveniles, and in some cases, it is necessary to transport juveniles many miles to find suitable detention facilities in which to hold minors during the pendancy of proceedings. It was concluded that the statute which causes this very troublesome administrative problem was enacted by the General Assembly with full understanding of the potential consequences. The chief judges considered what could be done with those minors between 14 and 16 years of age who previously could be kept in "jail" facilities but must now be kept elsewhere. An official of the Department of Corrections issued an advisory opinion to the 7th Judicial Circuit wherein he stated that if the probation department provides full-time social workers to supervise juveniles being held in a physically separated part of the county jail, then the county would not be in violation of the statute. Generally, the chief judges believed that efforts must be made, and funds must be provided, to create either regional or county detention facilities to accommodate this requirement of the Juvenile Court Act.

The Conference also approved a request by the Department of Conservation to recommend that Supreme Court Rule 505 be amended to allow enforcement officers of the Department of Conservation to issue the notices provided for in that rule. If the recommendation is accepted by the Supreme Court, conservation enforcement personnel will not need to be present in court on the date set for the first appearance of a violator. The violator will be able to notify the court if he intends to plead not guilty and a

new appearance date will be set, so both the violator and the arresting officer can be present to try the case on its merits, on a date convenient to both.

Mr. Richard Dunn, chairman of the Judicial Inquiry Board, was a guest of the Conference at its meeting in Champaign on September 28, 1973, and he explained the operation of the Judicial Inquiry Board. Mr. Dunn pointed out that a majority of the members of the Judicial Inquiry Board felt that the chief judge has a unique responsibility in the area of judicial conduct. Each chief judge, according to Mr. Dunn, should monitor the conduct and performance of the judges of his circuit. It appears to be the position of the Board that each chief judge has an affirmative responsibility to cooperate with the Judicial Inquiry Board to assure that any judge, who may be guilty of misconduct or who may be infirm or unable to carry out the responsibilities of his office, is brought to the attention of the Judicial Inquiry Board so that appropriate action may be taken.

Two judicial circuits during 1973 sought funding to staff an office of trial court executive or trial court administrator. The chief judges of the 3rd Judicial Circuit and the 19th Judicial Circuit planned to obtain federal funding to sponsor an experimental program in trial court administration. The Administrative Direc-

tor felt that funding for trial level court administration should be through the Administrative Office to insure uniform fiscal, personnel and policy controls through the central administrative authority of the State system. With the approval of the Supreme Court, the Director will submit an application for funding for experimental programs in trial court administration to be conducted in the 3rd and 19th Judicial Circuits during 1974.

Other 1973 highlights of the Conference of Chief Circuit Judges include: Unanimous approval to support legislation to increase the salaries of the administrative secretaries to the chief judges, and the election of John S. Boyle, chief judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, as its chairman. The Conference also selected Chief Judge Jacob Berkowitz of the 5th Judicial Circuit to serve as vice-chairman; and, in accordance with its by-laws, Chief Judge Victor N. Cardosi, 12th Judicial Circuit, to serve as the third member of the Conference's executive committee, a position which otherwise would be filled by Chief Judge Boyle, ex officio, in his capacity as chief judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County. However, because he was elected chairman, the executive committee position was vacant and to be filled by a vote of the membership.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE

Introduction

The predecessor to the present Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts was a statutory creature into which the General Assembly breathed life in 1959. The entity was known as the Court Administrator's Office, and it so existed until 1964. The office in those past years was chiefly concerned with studying caseloads to determine the needs of particular courts for assistance and to provide a statistical background for further studies.

The 1964 Judicial Article directed that the "Supreme Court shall appoint an administrative director and staff, who shall serve at its pleasure, to assist the Chief Justice in his administrative duties." That verbiage was retained, virtually intact, by Section 16. Article VI of the 1970 Constitution. Thus, the fledgling administrator's office of 1959 was continued and conferred with constitutional dignity in 1964 and in 1970. Two Illinois constitutional commentators. Messrs. Braden and Cohn, in analyzing this section have stated that "only five [states] have a constitutional office similar to the administrative director provided by Illinois...", and the authors noted that the constitutional grant of administrative power to the Supreme Court as exercised by the Chief Justice through the Administrative Director is an excellent "mechanism for a coordinated and efficient administration of the judicial system." Braden and Cohn. The Illinois Constitution: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis, at page 335.

During the fifteen years that it has been in existence, the Administrative Office has matured from infancy to adulthood, and correspondingly it has taken on and has been assigned by the Supreme Court greater duties and responsibilities. The growth of the office has been carefully nurtured by a succession of highly qualified and distinguished lawyers: Henry P. Chandler, former administrator of the federal court system; Albert J. Harno, former dean of the University of Illinois College of Law; Hon. John C. Fitzgerald. now a circuit judge, former dean of the School of Law of Loyola University, Chicago: John W. Freels. now a special assistant Attorney General, former general counsel of the Illinois Central Railroad. The present Director is Roy O. Gulley, former chief judge of the Second Judicial Circuit.

Today, the Administrative Office has more than a score of employees who serve the Supreme Court and supervise the activities of the judges of all the courts in the State and court-related personnel. In addition to the Director, the office employs six persons (four of whom are lawyers) on a managerial or supervisory level, with the balance of employees serving in various supporting capacities.

During 1973, several personnel changes occurred in the Administrative Office: Carl H. Rolewick, deputy director, was appointed by the Supreme Court as administrator of the attorney registration and disciplin-

ary system; John M. Oswald, assistant director, was appointed assistant administrator of the same system; and Mary Skaljak, administrative assistant, was employed in a similar capacity in the office of attorney registration. To fill these vacancies, Director Gulley made the following appointments: William M. Madden, deputy director responsible for the daily operation of the Chicago office; Lester A. Bonaguro, attorney and former employee of the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, as assistant director, Chicago; David F. Rolewick, former law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Daniel P. Ward, as assistant director; Karen Reynertson as administrative assistant, Chicago; and W. Stephen Swinney was employed in Springfield to assist Jerry B. Gott, assistant director, with installation of the uniform recordkeeping system in the various circuit court clerks' offices.

The many duties performed by this office are not all easily reducible to writing; however, some of the more prominent functions of this office are summarized below. Generally, the Constitution provides for the obligations of the Administrative Office as directed by the Chief Justice; yet by Supreme Court order or rule or by legislative enactments, the office has been delegated specific functions. Additionally, the office has assumed other duties relating to the courts by necessity or by default or for the simplistic reason that this office is the "logical place" to execute a given responsibility.

Fiscal

An integral part of the structure of the Administrative Office is the accounting division which administers monies appropriated by the legislature to the judicial system. Monthly reports are submitted to the Supreme Court reflecting the expenditures of funds for salaries, travel for judges and court reporters, transcript fees, and general operational costs. The division is supervised by Jeanne Meeks of the Springfield office.

At the close of calendar year 1973, the Administrative Office completed ten years as a constitutional entity. The growth and successful operation of the office from January 1, 1964 through December 31, 1973 is in large part reflected in the *modus operandi* of the accounting division.

In anticipation of the effectiveness of the 1964 Judicial Article, the Supreme Court appointed a supervisor of the newly created accounting division on October 1, 1963. The new division had the initial responsibility for establishing new records as well as accounting procedures which was a task of gargantuan proportions. Ledgers were set up, an internal control system for all appropriations was devised, and procedures were developed for auditing and processing vouchers relevant to the appropriations which were the responsibility of the Supreme Court.

There were many forms to be designed, correspondence to be answered, a filing system to be organized and summarized monthly reports to the Supreme Court to be organized. The accounting division began processing vouchers that had accumulated since July 1, 1963, which were for the operational costs of the Administrative Office, the travel expenses of all judges and court reporters, as well as transcription fees for court reporters. Additionally, the judicial and related personnel payrolls were calculated, changes were made, the necessary internal controls were documented and, finally, payrolls were typed for issuance of warrants.

The January 1964 payroll—the first payroll under the provisions of the new Judicial Article—was indicative of some of the important changes in the judicial system, i.e., the unified court structure. The Judicial Article provided for a Supreme Court, an Appellate Court and circuit courts (circuit and associate judges and magistrates). However, there was not a central source to determine the names and addresses of police magistrates and justices of the peace who were now to be paid out of State appropriations. The Administrative Office undertook a massive mailing to political subdivisions, and based on the responses, a certified list of police magistrates and justices of the peace was compiled. From that list, salaries were paid to the above judicial officers until their terms expired.

To clarify the changes in classification of judges under the new unified court system, the following information is offered: The functions of the justice of the peace courts, police magistrate courts, city, village and incorporated town courts, municipal courts, county courts, probate courts, the Superior Court of Cook County, the Criminal Court of Cook County, and Municipal Court of Chicago were transferred to the circuit courts. Police magistrates and justices of the peace became magistrates of the several circuit courts, the downstate county and probate judges became associate judges of the circuit court, the judges of the Municipal Court of Chicago became associate judges of the circuit court, and in Cook County, the judges of the Superior Court, the County Court, and Chief Justice of the Municipal Court of Chicago became circuit judges. The Judicial Article required that salaries of all judges were to be paid by the State, and provisions were made for the circuit and associate judges and magistrates of Cook County to receive additional compensation from Cook County. On Janaury 1, 1964, there were seven Supreme Court Justices, 139 circuit judges, 204 associate judges, 170 magistrates in Cook County and 591 downstate judges. The former police magistrates and justices of the peace, known as magistrates, were permitted to continue to perform their non-judicial functions for the remainder of their respective terms.

The payrolls were prepared after having categorized the respective classifications of the old system to the three-tier structure. The completion of the January 1964 payroll was a momentous occasion; this payroll implemented the new Judicial Article and was the forerunner of payrolls carrying thousands of warrants to be issued to the judiciary in the future.

When the Judicial Article was adopted by the 72nd General Assembly in 1961 for popular vote in 1962, and during the intervening period before the referendum, one of the chief criticisms of the new judicial system was the assumption that the cost would be prohibitive. Those who advanced that argument pointed out the number of judicial personnel who would be paid by the State and the various other expenses to be assumed by the State. The probability of these expenses became evident from a mere reading of the proposed Article itself since it provided the State would assume the salaries of all judges. This would include the 36 judges of the Municipal Court of Chicago, whose salaries had previously been borne entirely by the City of Chicago. It would also include prospective higher salaries for all municipal, city, town and village court judges. It would additionally include the new office of magistrate whose entire salary would be paid by the State. Many other expenses, some probable and many imaginary, were also suggested as indicative of the high cost which might be expected under the new system if adopted.

It is true that the State has assumed a large financial burden which was previously borne by the counties or cities. Some of the financing resulted from the Article itself and some from legislation adopted both before and after its effective date. During the past ten years, the additional cost to the State most certainly represents a direct savings to the counties and municipalities. The counties and municipalities are not only realizing an annual savings but are also receiving monies from fines and costs which have resulted from the unified court system.

The installation of the new associate judges pay scale in 1967 increased the duties of the accounting division. At the same time, the Supreme Court decided that its account, as well as the account of the Judicial Conference, be transferred to the accounting division on July 1, 1967. Implementing the Supreme Court decision made for a smoother operation as well as providing for ready access to budget matters which were necessary by way of preparation to finalizing requests and justifications to the General Assembly.

When the 76th General Assembly convened, an important change in State government occurred, i.e., changing State financing from biennium to annual budgeting. The implementation of this new system has doubled the amount of time required to prepare

budgets, that is, two budgets within a biennium instead of one within the same period. Since the accounting division is the monitor of funds allocated to the Supreme Court, it may be helpful to outline the procedures preparatory to completing the budget forms which are submitted to the Bureau of the Budget each year.

There is a short intervening period from the beginning of each fiscal year (July 1) until the time when new projections for the forthcoming year are commenced. Preparatory to the budget conferences conducted by the Administrative Office, which are held during the month of October each year with the presiding justice of each Appellate Court district, statistical material is forwarded for the purpose of aiding the presiding justice in calculating and projecting the funds required for the forthcoming fiscal year. The day of conferences, each budgetary item is reviewed and adjustments are made so that the requests which are presented are justified as the estimated funds required for the operation of the Appellate Court. Subsequently, all the requests received from each of the presiding justices are computed in the accounting division using the internal control records as a basis for evaluating requests, adding or reducing funds where necessary, and, finally, recommending approval.

The new budget must be finalized and delivered in December of each year. In reality then, this means there are three months of expenditures of the current fiscal year underway when those current figures coupled with past expenditures and experiences in each area over the years are compared and reviewed and the estimated projections are calculated for the forthcoming fiscal year. After much detailed compilation, the projected budget for the Supreme Court and allied appropriations, which cover the period of July 1 through June 30 of any given year, are submitted to the Bureau of the Budget and finally to the General Assembly.

The accounting division prepares the necessary legislation, and the supervisor appears with the Director before the appropriations committees of the General Assembly to obtain passage of the necessary bills to provide funds for the operation of the court system. The budget forms represent the anticipated funds which will be needed to operate the judicial system in the State. Each appropriation is perused and carefully computed using as a barometer expenditures of the past, current, and the anticipated costs for that period. Each line item within the total budget is calculated as nearly as possible on the exact amounts required for the operation of the court system. Requests in each of the line items in each of the appropriations are qualified with a succinct written explanation which accompanies the completed budget forms.

All budget forms, object code forms, back-up sheets, written justifications, etc., are arranged in book form. The preparation of the budget is a prominent part of the work of the accounting division. It is a herculean task which requires much overtime in order to keep abreast with the daily demands of business which must be executed in an efficient manner in the accounting division. In addition thereto, there are other duties relevant to the budget. The foregoing for the most part is but a minipanorama of the duties performed in preparing budgetary matters in the accounting division.

In addition to the already established accounts, there are other accounts which were added to the accounting division. The Supreme Court appointed a committee on criminal justice programs which has requested and has been granted awards from the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission for the establishment of an office to handle other court-related federally funded projects. All vouchers for those federal grants are processed in the accounting division, as well as all records retained and reports furnished to the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission on a monthly basis.

Additionally, duties created by statute which provides insurance for all State employees, falls within the division. Each employee's record must be perused monthly to establish ages which affect insurance rates. Accordingly, changes in rates automatically dictate adjustments on the payrolls. Also, requests for handling of insurance claims must be handled in the division. There are detailed insurance reports which cover transactions exercised in the various options contained in the types of health and life insurance for which each member has subscribed. These intricate reports are furnished to the Insurance Commission on a semi-monthly and monthly basis.

Monthly reports are submitted to members of the Supreme Court reflecting the expenditures of funds for salaries, travel expenses for judges and court reporters, transcription fees, Judicial Conference, etc., and general operational costs of the Supreme Court, Administrative Office, and all five Appellate Court districts. As previously stated, annual State budgets with individually itemized written justifications are prepared which include salaries for judicial and related personnel, as well as all ordinary and contingent expenses for the Administrative Office, Appellate and Supreme Courts and allied accounts.

All vouchers submitted are thoroughly checked against vendor records to avoid duplicate payment. Each voucher must be audited according to the administrative standards set within the office. Any discrepancy concerning a voucher is corrected by correspondence or returned for adjustment. There are many accounting procedures executed before a

voucher is ready for processing for payment. The accounting division processes approximately 15,000 vouchers per annum. Included in this figure are vouchers for judges' and court reporters' travel expenses as well as transcription fee vouchers. Each of the travel vouchers is checked for proper charges for mileage, lodging and food, and receipts and signatures. Transcription fees are audited pursuant to the number of pages, and they are checked against previous vouchers to avoid duplicate payment. Exclusive of the above figures are the payrolls.

The payroll section computes all deductions affecting warrants such as federal and State withholding tax, judicial and State employees' retirement, bonds, and State employees' insurance. This section adds new employees to respective payrolls, deletes resignees, retired and deceased personnel, calculates all salaries for approximately 1300 judicial and related personnel on a semi and monthly basis. Other payroll functions of the accounting division are to maintain payroll controls, registers and ledgers, and make

monthly entries in posting ledgers for each employee with an accumulative balance. The payroll for judicial and related personnel totals approximately \$2,160,793.00 monthly.

The flow chart on page 59 describes in greater detail the duties of the accounting division. The accounting division is audited each year by a battery of outside auditors who examine the accounting procedures, internal controls, and all ledgers. Thus far, no recommendations for changes in procedures have been made by the outside auditors. This has been accomplished through hard work, tight controls, and constant perusal. The accounting division's system has been described by certified public accountants who have made perpetual audits, as well as by the Bureau of the Budget, as the model accounting system in the State.

The fiscal note below covering the period of July 1, 1963 through June 30, 1974 depicts the specific appropriations and expenditures for the judicial system in the State of Illinois.

FISCAL NOTE JUDICIAL AND RELATED PERSONNEL July 1, 1963 through June 30, 1974

Period	Appropriation (in millions of dollars)	(in millions
July 1, 1963 - June 30, 1965 73rd Biennium July 1, 1965 - June 30, 1967 74th Biennium July 1, 1967 - June 30, 1969 75th Biennium July 1, 1969 - June 30, 1970 76th G. A 1st Half July 1, 1970 - June 30, 1971 76th G. A 2nd Half July 1, 1971 - June 30, 1972 77th G. A 1st Half July 1, 1972 - June 30, 1973 77th G. A 2nd Half July 1, 1973 - June 30, 1974 78th G. A 1st Half	\$16.3 \$27.4 \$35.0 \$23.1 \$23.4 \$27.6 \$27.8 \$29.2	\$14.7 \$24.5 \$32.7 \$20.1 \$21.0 \$23.3 \$26.0

A point of great interest is that the projected cost of administering the judicial system for fiscal year 1974 was .4% of the total expenditure (see chart on page 60).

Teller of Elections


The Director acts as a teller of judicial elections in two areas. By agreement of the circuit judges, several circuits have the Administrative Office mail out ballots and tabulate the votes in elections to select the chief judge of the circuit.

Supreme Court Rule 39 provides that a vacancy in the office of associate judge shall be filled by an elective process among the circuit judges. In general, the number of associate judges each circuit may have is determined by population (one associate judge for every 35,000 inhabitants in the circuit or fraction thereof) and by need. In the latter instance,

the chief judge files with the Director a statement supporting the circuit's need for an additional associate judge, and the Director then makes a recommendation to the Supreme Court which may allocate an additional associate judge to the circuit. The "permissive" associate judgeships are in addition to those authorized under the population formula, and the Supreme Court can authorize new associate judgeships in those circuits where litigation is particularly heavy.


Once a vacancy exists in the ranks of associate judge, whether by death, resignation or authorization of additional associate judges, the chief judge notifies

ACCOUNTING DIVISION FLOW CHART OF ORGANIZATION & DUTIES



STATE OF ILLINOIS

Appropriated funds for Fiscal Year 1974 — in millions of dollars \$7,575.0



^{*}The cost of administering the Judicial System is .4 of 1 per cent of the total State Budget for fiscal year 1974.

the bar of the circuit that a vacancy exists and that it will be filled by the circuit judges. Any Illinois licensed attorney may apply for the position by completing an application and filing it with the chief judge and the Director. The names of the applicants are certified to the Director, who then places the names on a ballot which is mailed to the circuit judges. The Director tabulates the ballots and certifies the results to the chief judge, maintaining the secrecy of the ballots. The applicant receiving the majority of votes is then declared appointed to the associate judge vacancy.

During 1973, the Director certified that the following persons had been selected as associate judges:

- Third Circuit Clayton R. Williams
- Sixth Circuit Worthy B. Kranz
- Seventh Circuit Dennis L. Schwartz
- Eleventh Circuit William D. DeCardy
- Twelfth Circuit John F. Michela
- Nineteenth Circuit Harry D. Hartel and Richard C. Kelly
- Cook County Jerome T. Burke, Peter Costa, Robert E. Cusack, Aubrey F. Kaplan, Benjamin E. Novoselsky and Michael F. Zlatnik

Secretariat

The dictionary defines secretariat as an "office entrusted with administrative duties, maintaining records, and overseeing or performing secretarial duties." That definition is inadequate and incomplete insofar as it applies to the Administrative Office acting as secretary to a host of committees and conferences. For in addition to arranging meetings, recording minutes and keeping records, the office acts as a fact finding body, does research, conducts surveys and apprises judges of recent developments in procedural and substantive law. Some of the committees served by the Administrative Office are:

- (1) Illinois Judicial Conference. Rule 41 designates the Administrative Office as secretary to the Conference. The office handles all details for the regular meetings of the executive committee, including research, drafting of minutes, preparing agendas, arranging meetings and assisting the chairman with his correspondence. The office implements plans to conduct the annual meeting of the Conference and the Associate Judge Seminar and validates expense accounts. Also, the office services the coordinating committee and the subcommittees which research topics for the seminars.
- (2) Conference of Chief Circuit Judges. The office prepares agendas, arranges meetings, assists in drafting proposed traffice rule amendments, maintains close liaison with the chairman, and prepares a synopsis of bills introduced in the General Assembly.
- (3) Courts Commission. The Director, pursuant to Rule 2 of Rules of Procedure of the Commission, is the secretary in all proceedings before the

Commission. He performs the duties ordinarily performed by circuit court clerks, preserves the records, and prepares subpoenas returnable before the Commission.

- (4) Administrative Committee of the Appellate Court. The Office arranges meetings, assists in drafting proposed rule changes, and provides research assistance.
- (5) Supreme Court Committee on Clerks. By order of the Supreme Court, the Administrative Office is secretariat to this committee which is charged with recommending "appropriate legislation and rule changes which are necessary to implement the provisions of the 1970 Illinois Constitution and which would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the operations of the several clerks' offices throughout the State."
- (6) Juvenile Problems Committee of the Judicial Conference. The Juvenile Problems Committee is a standing committee of the Illinois Judicial Conference, and in addition to the Administrative Office acting as secretary, the committee utilizes a staff member of the Supreme Court committee on criminal justice programs in the area of juvenile probation

During 1973, the committee developed plans for a series of regional seminars on juvenile justice, to be held in the spring of 1974, reviewed and revised several of the uniform court forms used in juvenile proceedings; appointed a subcommittee to investigate the feasibility of developing uniform rules for juvenile proceedings; and drafted uniform forms for social history and probation reports which await final consideration by the committee.

With the consent of the executive committee of the Judicial Conference, the Juvenile Problems Committee has maintained a close working relationship with the Commission on Children and has expressed to the commission, the committee's reaction to legislative proposals affecting children and the juvenile justice system. During 1973, the committee advised the commission of its support for efforts to have Illinois participate in the interstate compact on the placement of children. Additional items on which the committee's advice was sought included rights of a putative father under the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act; juvenile detention facilities; and guardian's reports.

(7) The Judicial Conference's Committee on Probation in Illinois. The Committee on Probation is a standing committee of the Judicial Conference and is staffed by the Administrative Office and the Supreme Court committee on criminal justice programs. The committee was created in 1967 to study, evaluate and make recommendations concerning the operation and organization of probation services in Illinois. The committee's review of probation revealed that in many circuits probation services are generally not adequate and that steps should be taken to improve the organization and administration of probation; upgrade personnel;

provide adequate salary levels; provide training; reduce the size of caseloads per officer; and establish standards and adopt uniform procedures.

During 1973, improvement of probation services was the subject of several studies and proposed legislation. There is no disagreement over the need to improve probation. However, whether probation should continue to be supervised by the judiciary and whether it should be organized and funded at the State or local level continue to be debated.

It is anticipated that the Committee on Probation will submit specific recommendations for the improvement of probation services in the near future.

Judicial Statistics

Over 75 years ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked, "For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics." As far as the judicial system is concerned, Justice Holmes' prophetic statement is a reality today. There is, perhaps, no more accurate method of determining the progression and disposition of caseloads than by compiling numbers and analyzing them. Yet, any statistical data regarding the flow of cases through the court system must be tempered with the principle that the primordial purpose of the judicial system is the doing of justice, giving each litigant an impartial forum where the law will be justly and fairly applied to the facts in each case.

The Administrative Office receives from every division and department in the Circuit Court of Cook County monthly reports which, in general, show the number, kind, and disposition of cases handled by the judges. The judges of the other twenty circuits also file monthly reports which additionally indicate the amount of time spent on their cases. Detailed reports are also received from the clerks of the circuit courts and Appellate Court. The reports are analyzed for correctness and tabulated by Mr. Clarence Hellwig in Chicago, and assistant director Jerry Gott and Mr. W. Stephen Swinney of Springfield. Monthly reports showing the trend of cases in Cook County are issued and a periodic report is published for the downstate circuits. In addition, the office receives regular reports from the Appellate Court.

As indicated elsewhere in this report, the installation of the recordkeeping system in counties throughout Illinois is proceeding on schedule and will provide the Administrative Office with uniform summary data on case activity in the courts. The Administrative Office continually is evaluating the type of statistics which should be collected and analyzed as required by the Director to fulfill his responsibility in administering the court system on a statewide basis. The staff of the Administrative Office also works closely with the clerks and judges in those circuits where automated judicial information systems are or will be in-

stalled. Illinois, in addition, conditionally agreed during 1973 to participate in a nationwide experimental program, which is funded by a federal grant, to develop a model judicial statistical information system. Under the auspices of Project SEARCH, the program has as its purpose "to perform a requirements analysis and design effort for the development of a statewide judicial statistics and information system," and will seek "to establish minimum judicial data elements required and to design and document a model for collecting and analyzing judicial information and statistics."

The statistical reports presently filed in the Administrative Office are valuable for many obvious reasons; however, one truly significant advantage to the reports is that they enable the Supreme Court, through the Director, to assign on a temporary or permanent basis judges to Appellate Court districts and to judicial circuits where the caseloads are so heavy as to delay timely disposition. Thus, as Justice Holmes prophesied, statistics have permitted the Illinois Supreme Court and its Administrative Director to master the economy of judicial manpower.

Administrative Secretaries Conference

On November 30, 1973 the Administrative Office sponsored the first annual conference for the administrative secretaries to chief circuit judges. The purpose of this annual conference is to assist the administrative secretaries to develop a more thorough understanding of the judicial system and administrative procedures as well as providing them with the opportunity to discuss mutual problems with each other.

The conference was held in Springfield. The all day program included an overview of the Illinois judicial system, and discussions of the role and responsibilities of the chief circuit judges, administrative secretaries, and court clerks. Program participants included a chief circuit judge, two court clerks, two administrative secretaries, the author of the recent study on the role of chief circuit judges, and Administrative Office staff. The program concluded with a tour of the Supreme Court building and presentation of certificates of attendance.

The conference was well received by the administrative secretaries and increased their awareness of being part of a unified court system. The conference will be continued in future years.

Court Administration Internship Program

In late 1972, Prof. Victor E. Flango of Northern Illinois University at DeKalb entered into discussions with the Administrative Office concerning the development of a clinical program in judicial administration which would lead to a Master of Arts in Public Affairs degree for qualified graduate students. After surveying the field of possible management techniques

which might be employed in the court system, Prof. Flango concluded that a "promising remedy to the problem of [court] congestion is to free judges for making judicial decisions by utilizing court executives to accomplish administrative tasks."

An academic and clinical program was designed for graduate students wherein they would pursue a course of study which would prepare them for a career as court administrators. The intent of the program is to provide a comprehensive academic background and to require students to serve an internship period in the courts, under the guidance of experienced judges and court administrators. To fund the program a grant for federal monies was applied for and awarded by the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission.

The program commenced operation in October 1973 when the first intern arrived at the Administrative Office in Chicago. Each intern will serve 17 weeks in and under the supervision of the Administrative Office in Springfield and Chicago. Additionally, interns will spend 30 weeks in the courts of the State. While in the Administrative Office, interns are familiarized with the Illinois court system and the duties and responsibilities of the office, and are assigned for a period to work with each member of the office staff in assisting him in executing his duties. In addition, interns are assigned to write a research paper on a particular problem area in court administration and recommend therein solutions.

The Administrative Office also makes arrangements for the student to serve periods in judges' courtrooms, circuit court clerks' offices and offices of other court-related personnel. The staff of the Administrative Office and judges also participate in seminars at the university in connection with the academic portion of the program. A retired circuit court judge conducts a seminar course on court procedures, statistics and recordkeeping at DeKalb, too.

While it is premature to determine whether the experimental program can attain the goal of training court administrators, the Administrative Director has indicated that the office will continue to participate in this cooperative effort between academia and the Administrative Office.

Recordkeeping

Prior to the adoption of the Judicial Article of 1962, which resulted in the integration on January 1, 1964 of a proliferation of courts into one trial court—the circuit court, little had been done to change or improve the archaic and antiquated requirements provided by statutes enacted in 1874 for making and preserving the records in the courts.

Recognizing the need to improve and simplify the keeping of records under the new unified trial court structure, the Illinois State Bar Association in 1963 formed a committee directed to develop a modern and efficient approach to recordkeeping—a system to

be uniformly employed by the clerk's office in each of the 102 counties. That committee was comprised of lawyers, judges, clerks of courts, court administrators, certified public accountants, and land title experts, each possessing particular experience or knowledge essential to the work of the committee. This committee later became the Supreme Court committee on recordkeeping in the circuit courts and was supported through the Administrative Office.


After thoroughly studying the existing recordkeeping systems and considering the requirements of a system for keeping complete and conveniently organized records of proceedings in the trial court, the committee concluded that recordkeeping is an administrative function of the courts, that uniformity is essential and in order to achieve uniformity, supervision of recordkeeping on a statewide basis should be a function of the Administrative Office. To effect the change and control of recordkeeping procedures, the General Assembly in 1965 passed enabling legislation which provided that the statutory system would remain in effect in each county until changed by Supreme Court rule or administrative order.

The product of the committee was a proposed administrative order prescribing a uniform recordkeeping system for maintaining and destroying records of cases, for maintaining uniform financial records and accounting procedures, for providing statistical data to be furnished the Court and providing for the destruction of existing records. In addition, the proposed order provided that: (a) The recordkeeping system would become effective in each county at such time as the Director of the Administrative Office from time to time specified; (b) The Director would prescribe forms to be used for all records and provide necessary instructions to implement the order: and (c) The Director would establish a program of supervision to insure the minimum standards provided by the order were correctly and uniformly employed in each county. The order was adopted by the Supreme Court on May 20, 1968.

A Manual on Recordkeeping prepared by the staff of the Administrative Office and containing specimen forms to be used for all records as well as detailed instructions for implementing the required procedures has been furnished each circuit court clerk's office and each chief circuit judge. The cost of reproducing and binding the Manual was paid out of a grant from the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission to the Supreme Court committee on criminal justice programs.

Prior to 1973, the recordkeeping system provided by the Court's order was in effect in 39 counties. During 1973, the Administrative Office supervised the implementation of the recordkeeping system and the uniform procedures in the following 14 counties: Bond County in the Third Judicial Circuit; Christian,

UNIFORM RECORDKEEPING IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS



Clay, Clinton, Effingham, Fayette, Marion, Montgomery and Shelby Counties in the Fourth Judicial Circuit; Edgar County in the Fifth Judicial Circuit; Fulton County in the Ninth Judicial Circuit; Bureau County in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit: DeKalb County in the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit; and Boone County in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit. With the addition of these counties, the recordkeeping system is now in operation in 53 counties. Circuits in which the system is in effect in each county are the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 8th, and 9th. The remaining downstate counties continue to maintain their records in accordance with the statutory provisions until such time as the recordkeeping system provided by the Supreme Court's order becomes effective in each of these counties by administrative directive.

The recordkeeping system, which has attracted nationwide interest, is a sound, practical, efficient and economical approach to managing the courts; and the system will be further improved and refined as its use becomes more commonplace.

Official Court Reporters

Since January 1, 1966, all official court reporters in the State have been paid by the Administrative Office. By statute, court reporters are qualified by testing their proficiency in reducing the spoken word to writing. The tests are devised by the Administrative Office and are consistent with accepted minimum standards promulgated by the court reporting profession. The tests are administered by the Administrative Office at least twice each year. To date, 1,710 reporters have attempted to qualify either for appointment as official court reporters or for advancement to a higher official pay level.

The proficiency tests are composed of three parts: "A", "B", and "C". The "A" test requires the greatest proficiency, while the other two are less demanding. Each test consists of a "Q & A" section and a legal opinion section (the former being on a two-voice basis) which are dictated by professional instructors. No official court reporter may remain in the system unless he eventually passes at least one part of the test. Those who have performed satisfactorily in the test may be appointed by the circuit court as official court reporters.

The Supreme Court determines the number of court reporters in each circuit, and the Court may allocate additional court reporters upon a showing of need. The statute sets out criteria by which the need for court reporters in the circuits is measured. The Administrative Director can recommend to the Supreme Court allocation of additional court reporters when a need is shown. As of December 31, 1973, there were 362 official court reporters in Illinois, of whom 20 were on a part-time basis.

During 1973, a total of seven court reporter proficiency examinations were administered—three in Chicago and four at Illinois State University at Nor-

mal. Of the 278 test applicants, 37 passed the "A" test and 31 passed the "B" test. The shortage of qualified applicants for the proficiency examination is cause for continuing concern.

On February 6, 1973 the Supreme Court approved a federally funded program in which the Administrative Office will conduct an experimental program to use a computer to assist in the translation of court reporters' stenographic machine notes, to automatically produce typewritten English transcripts. A grant from the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission which will make this experiment possible has been approved. However, no contract has yet been issued. The contractors have not thus far been able to perfect the programs to a point that the Director feels the program is mature enough to warrant costly experimentation. It is hoped that during the year 1974 the experiment will proceed as originally planned.

The Supreme Court approved inclusion in the Administrative Office's 1974 fiscal year budget \$10,000 to be used for programs aimed at recruiting court reporters. The Administrative Office will create programs to entice qualified young people to enter the field of court reporting and, to do so, plans to design recruitment brochures, counselling packets, etc. to be distributed to high schools and junior colleges throughout the State.

In addition, in a project funded through the Supreme Court's committee on criminal justice programs, a management consultant has undertaken a study of problems relating to the training and hiring of official court reporters. The report of this consultant will be important to the Administrative Office as it begins outlining its own projects.

A court reporter's salary increase became effective October 1, 1973. As soon as the Governor signed the pay bill, the Director communicated with the Cost of Living Council in Washington, D.C. to ascertain the amount of the raise that might be put into effect, without violating the Cost of Living Council's guidelines. The Cost of Living Council eventually authorized 100% of the raises proposed under the new salary schedule beginning December 1, 1973. In addition, the Cost of Living Council authorized up to 50% of the proposed raises for the period from October 1, 1973 to December 1, 1973. A deficiency appropriation in an amount necessary to meet the additional expenditures for court reporters' salaries was prepared, introduced and approved. The court reporters were paid appropriate increases retroactively to October 1, 1973.

The maximum court reporter salary is now \$16,000 per year. In addition, court reporters may sell transcripts at rates approved by the Supreme Court in its order issued on September 29, 1972. The job of official court reporter of the State of Illinois is attractive enough in both pay and status to attract fully-qualified people interested in public service. The Administrative Office will undertake an extensive recruitment campaign during 1974 in an effort to alleviate the shortage of qualified reporters.

Judicial Visitation Programs to Penal Institutions

Events which have occurred in the first years of this decade have catapulted the condition of the national and state prisons to the forefront of public concern. Indeed, probing questions have been raised by the general public and governmental officials as to the objectives and purposes of incarceration.

No person has a greater responsibility and burden of determining whether a convicted defendant will be imprisoned than the sentencing judge. It is he who must decide whether the convicted defendant will lose his freedom by imprisonment. In making that decision the judge considers many factors including the feasibility of rehabilitation, reintegration of the defendant into society and the best forum to accomplish these objectives.

Recognizing that judges must be familiar with the State's penal system and programs, the Director of the Administrative Office and the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections formulated plans for organized visits by judges to the various correctional facilities. During 1971, two programs were conducted, and in 1972 two more programs were held. On November 16, 1973, a visit was arranged at Stateville Penitentiary at Joliet. Thirty-three judges attended the program.

The program ran for a full day, and the judges were given access to institutional buildings, including vocational workshops, cell-houses and isolation units. The judges freely mixed and conversed with inmates. The visit ended with a question and answer period in which the Director of Corrections, the Chairman of the Parole and Pardon Board, and institutional administrators participated.

Of particular interest to the judges were the views expressed by the officials of the Department of Corrections. They observed that the penitentiary system is in the process of being decentralized and reorganized by the application of modern business techniques. It was noted that the reorganization is in part due to greater judicial intervention into prison administration, and this has lessened administrative discretion by prison authorities. The intervention has resulted in new rehabilitation programs with greater emphasis on "assessment" of the inmate's abilities rather than on "diagnosis or cause" of the inmate's conduct which resulted in imprisonment.

The judges also participated in a panel discussion with inmates and prison administrators in which there was a lively and candid exchange of opinions regarding the philosophy and practices of the criminal justice system.

Legislation

In addition to appearing before the appropriation committees of the legislature regarding the judicial budget of the State, the Director regularly appears before the Judicial Advisory Council of the legislature. The Director's advice is sought on proposed legislation which may affect the courts or its personnel. The Director also frequently appears before the judiciary committees of the House and Senate to testify on bills affecting court procedure and the number of judicial officers required to maintain currency in the disposition of litigation.

The Administrative Office has developed a sound working relationship with the legislature and the Governor's office, and the office operates as a clearing house for information between the judicial branch of government and the legislative and executive branches. This flow of information and data is constantly maintained and updated, and the Director is in close communication with the Supreme Court, apprising the justices of the status of legislation.

In addition, the Administrative Office prepares a synopsis of bills affecting the judiciary which are pending in the General Assembly. The bills are tracked and their progress is reported to the Supreme Court. At the conclusion of each regular session of the legislature, the Administrative Office sends to the judiciary a synopsis of key bills which have passed the legislature and have been enacted into law or are awaiting the Governor's approval.

Judicial Economic Statements

The Administrative Director is directed in Supreme Court Rule 68 to be custodian of certain statements which every judge is required to file.

The rule provides that "a judge shall file annually with the Director...(1) a sealed, verified, written statement of economic interests and relationships of himself and members of his immediate family and (2) an unsealed, verified, written list of names of the corporations and other businesses in which he or members of his immediate family have a financial interest." The sealed statements cannot be disclosed except on order of the Supreme Court or Courts Commission. The unsealed statements may be revealed to any party in a case where specific information is requested as to whether the presiding judge or members of his immediate family had a financial interest in the outcome of the case or in the corporation or business which was a party to the case.

Impartial Medical Expert Rule

The Administrative Office is charged with administering Supreme Court Rule 215(d). The statistical summary on page 67 provides a profile of the use of Rule 215(d) in the circuit courts of Illinois during 1973. The 1972 report on Rule 215(d) explained that in 1972, for the first time, impartial medical experts were utilized in divorce cases and child custody matters extensively. In 1973 judges hearing child custody matters have increased their use of Rule 215(d). While the number of 215(d) orders entered in 1973 has dropped 11 below the 1972 total, the number of orders entered in child custody matters has increased by three.

The reason for the decrease in the number of im-

IMPARTIAL MEDICAL EXPERTS—SUPREME COURT RULE 215(d) 1973 STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Totals		88	Divorce Child Custody 88 66	Psychiatry 89*	1 Judge \$\int 23 Judges\$ Ordered 215(d) Exams in a Total of 8 Cases			Performed 193 County 162)	Psychiatry 172	1 I.M. perts Per- Expert formed a Total 39 Exams Exams		\$173.24	\$76.20	Φ		
		Cook County 76		Neurology Ortho- 6 pedics 111	1 Judge Ordered 215(d) Ord Exams in 18 Cases 2			Examinations Actually Performed 172 (Downstate 10) (Cook County 162)	Radiology P	1 I.M. 1.M. Expert Expert Performed Performed 34 Exams		ounty 08	ounty 10	Neurology Deposition		
		Cook	Civil Personal Injury 17	Internal Medicine 3	1 Judge Ordered 215(d) Exams in 6 Cases	2 specialties were required.		ancelled For asons	Internal Medicine 3	1 I.M. Expert Performed P		Cook County \$176.08	Cook County \$74.90	y,		
Statistical Breakdown			Criminal 2	Pediatrics 1	1 Judge Ordered 215(d) Exams in 5 Cases	case 2 specialties		Examination Cancelled For Other Reasons	Neurology 4	1 I.M. Expert Performed 11 Exams			Geriatrics			
Statistica		le	Ö	Otolaryn- gology	2 Judges Ordered 215(d) C Exams in 4 Cases	*in 1 0		efore Trial	Orthopedics 8	1 I.M. Expert Performed 10 Exams				Neurology 1 (\$150.00)		
			te	Downstate 12	Adoption 2	ology Opthal- mology	2 Judges Ordered 215(d) Oi Exams in 3 Cases			Case Settled Before Trial 8	Opthal- mology	ts Expert ned Performed ms 4 Exams		ate 17	ate J	Neurology
					Downstat 12		Geriatrics Gynecology	3 Judges Ordered 215(d) Oi Exams in 2 Cases			, Order	Otolaryn- gology 1	2 I.M. 3 I.M. Experts Experts Performed Performed 2 Exams 3 Exams		Downstate \$146.07	Downstate \$97.20
			Probate	Allergies Ger	12 Judges Ordered 215(d) (Exams in 1 Case			Vacated by Order	Geriatrics 1	10 I.M. Experts Experts Performed Per 1 Exam 2				Psychiatry 3 (\$130.00)		
Subject	Orders	Orders Entered During 1973	Action	Specialties Required	Frequency of Use of Rule 215(d) By Judges		Examinations	IME Examinations Scheduled in 1973	Specialties Required - Exams Actually Performed	Number Of Exams Performed by Indi- vidual IME—Fre- quency of Use of Panelists	Cost	Average Cost Per Case	Average Cost Per Exam	Number of Cases in Which Testi-		

CUMULATIVE STATISTICAL SUMMARY

January 1970 - December 1973

Subject				Statist	Statistical Breakdown				Totals
Orders									
Total Orders Entered		Downstate 47	state 7			0	Cook County 220		267
Action	Probate 2	July	Juvenile 2	Adoption 3	Criminal 20	inal	Civil-Personal Injury 104	Divorce-Child Custody 136	267
Testimony Re- quired at Trial								***	22
						5.5			
Examinations									
IME Examinations Scheduled	Case	Case Settled Before Trial 13	rial	Can	Cancelled Exams 34		Examinations Actually Performed 386	ually Performed	433
Specialties Required—Examinations Actually Performed	Geriatrics 1	Otolaryn- gology 1	Opthal- mology 1	Radiology 1	Internal Medicine 3	Neurology 4	Orthopedics 8	Psychiatry 153	172
							-		
Cost									
Average Cost Per Exam	Including Ancilla	Including Ancillary Cost & Testimony	ynor						\$86.51

partial medical examinations can be attributed to the premature exhaustion of appropriations to finance the program for the fiscal year. Therefore, from March, 1973 until July, 1973, no impartial medical examiniations were conducted and judges were requested not to utilize the rule since no funds were available to reimburse examining experts. The total number of examinations increased from 133 in 1972 to 172 in 1973. This increase can be attributed to the fact that there was an increase in use of medical experts in child custody matters where more than one party is examined in the case.

It should be explained that examinations scheduled in 1973 did not necessarily result from orders entered in 1973, but also resulted from orders entered in 1972. Similarly, the section of the statistical summary concerned with "orders" entered in 1973 does not totally correlate to the "examinations" section, in that some examinations for these orders will occur in 1974. This distinction explains why "specialties required" for orders entered in 1973 do not correlate with the "specialties required-exams actually performed" section.

In downstate Illinois, there remains a problem of engaging adequate numbers of qualified specialists in the IME program. Because no member of the Illinois State Medical Society's Expert Panel was available, two orders for impartial medical examination had to be vacated.

Representation By Supervised Senior Law Students

Supreme Court Rule 711 has been in effect for four years and seven months. Since its inception in May 1969, a total of 1630 senior law students have participated in this legal internship program.


During 1973, an additional 467 temporary licenses were issued. This number represents approximately 25% or one out of four graduates who sat for the 1973 Illinois bar examination.

The comparative chart (below) indicates a rapid increase in the use of Rule 711 in the first four years and then a leveling off in the last year. Although it cannot be stated with certainty, this leveling off may indicate that the maximum number of readily available positions in authorized agencies has been attained.

The number of temporarily licensed law students and their law schools for 1973 are as follows:

na their law believes for 1970 are as	IOIIOWS.
IIT-Chicago-Kent	97
University of Illinois	81
DePaul University	57
Northwestern University	49
University of Chicago	45
Loyola University (Chicago)	40
St. Louis University	31
John Marshall Law School	20
Washington University (St. Louis)	8
University of Michigan	4
University of California	3

University of Iowa Indiana University	3
University of Texas	2
Tulane University	2 2 2 2
Valparaiso University	2
Notre Dame University	2
Arizona State University	1
Boston College Law School	1
Case Western Reserve	1
Catholic University	1
Drake University	1
George Washington University	1
Harvard University	1
Hastings College of Law	1
University of Mississippi	i
Ohio Northern University	1
Rutgers	1
Southern Methodist University	1
Temple University	1
University of Colorado	1
University of Kansas	1
University of Kentucky	1
University of Maryland	1
University of Virginia	1
University of Wisconsin	1
or mooning	1



Agencies with which temporarily licensed students were associated during 1973 are as follows:

Public Agencies

County State's Attorneys' Offices	77
County Public Defender Offices and	
Illinois Defender Project	59
Attorney General's Office	24
Municipal Legal Departments	24

State Appellate Defender	14
Illinois Department of Children	
and Family Services	4
Cook County Department of Public Aid	1
Circuit Court of Cook County,	
First Municipal District, Planning	
Department	1
Public Administrator of Cook County	1
Public Guardian and Conservator of	
Cook County	1
University of Illinois College of Law	1
Duivata Amanaisa	
Private Agencies	
Cook County Legal Assistance Foundation	32
Mandel Legal Aid Clinic	31
Northwestern University Legal	
Assistance Clinic	24
Land of Lincoln Legal Aid Bureau	21

Land of Lincoln Legal Aid Bureau Chicago Volunteer Legal Services Foundation 15 DePaul University Law Clinic 12 Woodlawn Criminal Defense Services 11 Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago 10 Legal Aid Bureau of Chicago 8 7 Illinois Migrant Legal Assistance Project Civil Legal Aid Clinic of the 4 Foundation for the New Business Ethic Northwest Neighborhood Legal Services 3 3 Uptown Legal Services 2 Cook County Special Bail Project Legal Aid Services of Rock Island 2 County Civil Legal Aid Project 1 Community Legal Counsel Office 1 Lawndale Legal Aid Clinic Legal Referral Bureau of Lake County North Lawndale Economic Development Rock Island County Legal Referral Bureau University of Illinois Clinic

Public Information and Publications

One of the time consuming duties of the Administrative Office is its contact with the public, organizations interested in the Illinois court system and the news media. People constantly telephone, write or appear at the office to inquire about specific litigation or about the general organization of the judicial system. It is the policy of the Administrative Office to supply each inquirer with a complete answer to questions which he may ask about the Illinois courts. The office is of the firm belief that it must be oriented to serve the public. This philosophy has enhanced the reputation of the Administrative Office in Illinois and in sister states.

Because the Illinois courts are a model among judicial systems, citizens, judges, lawyers and court administrators from the other states and from foreign

nations are constantly visiting the office and the courts throughout the State. An important function of the office is to discuss the court system with the visitors and arrange visits to courthouses and interviews with judges. The Director, or his assistants, is asked to address civic groups, bar associations, legislative commissions, and court reform organizations to tell the Illinois story regarding the operation of the unified trial court. Some of the organizations which were addressed in 1973 were: Chicago South Chamber of Commerce; Galesburg Rotary Club; Illinois Conference of Women Leaders for Traffic Safety; Sangamon State University; Maryland State Bar Association: Judiciary Subcommittee of the Missouri House of Representatives; Citizens Conference of Kentucky; Citizens Conference of New York Courts; McDonough County Courthouse Dedication; and the National Conference of Judicial Disability and Removal Commissions.

The Administrative Office publishes and/or distributes several books or pamphlets which are available to the public. These publications can be obtained by contacting the Springfield or Chicago office.

- (1) A Short History of the Illinois Judicial System
- (2) Manual on Recordkeeping
- (3) Annual Report of the Administrative Office
- (4) Annual Report of the Judicial Conference
- (5) Article V of the Supreme Court Rules relating to trial court proceedings in traffic cases
- (6) A series of handbooks for jurors in grand jury proceedings, in criminal cases and in civil cases
- (7) A pamphlet relating the history of the Supreme Court Building in Springfield
- (8) Illinois Supreme Court Rules
- (9) Interim Report: Experimental Video-Taping of Courtroom Proceedings
- (10) Rules of Procedure of the Illinois Courts Commission
- (11) Chief Circuit Judge's Manual On Guidelines For the Administration Of Circuit Courts (draft form only; printed version will not be available until late 1974)
- (12) Benchbook (Criminal Cases) for Illinois Judges (partially completed; full printed version expected to be available in late 1974)
- (13) Reading and Reference Materials used at seminars and conferences sponsored by the Judicial Conference.

Membership in Organizations

The Administrative Office, Director and/or his assistants maintain membership or are participants in the following organizations:

(1) The Director is a member of the Council On The Diagnosis And Evaluation Of Criminal Defendants. The Council is a creature of the legislature, and one of its purposes is to draft a correctional code for Illinois. A major portion of the Council's work was completed with the enactment into law of

the Unified Code of Corrections. The Council is now engaged in preparing legislation which would create a statewide probation system to be administered by the Administrative Office.

- (2) The Director by appointment of the Governor is a commissioner (until March 1973) of the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission. This is the State agency which oversees the allocation of federal funds authorized by the Crime Control Act of 1973.
- (3) The Governor's Traffic Safety Coordinating Committee. By statute, the Director is a member of this committee.
- (4) The Conference of State Court Administrators. The Director additionally serves as chairman of the Conference's executive board.
- (5) The Director serves on the Board of Directors of the American Judicature Society.
 - (6) Council of State Governments.
- (7) By order of the Supreme Court, the Director is an *ex officio* member of the Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Justice Programs. This committee has an executive secretary and staff and is funded by the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission. It is charged with studying and proposing recommendations in the area of criminal and juvenile justice.
 - (8) The Institute of Judicial Administration.
- (9) National Association of Trial Court Administrators
- (10) American, Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations and the Chicago Council of Lawyers.
- (11) Uniform Circuit Court Rules Committee of the State Bar Association.
- (12) Judicial Administration Section of the State Bar Association.
- (13) National advisory committee on video tape in the courts.
- (14) The Illinois Parole, Probation and Correctional Association.
 - (15) Probation Services Council of Illinois.

(16) Board of Commissioners of the Illinois Defender Project.

Other Duties of the Administrative Office

Some of the other duties of the office which the Director and his assistants perform are summarized below:

- (A) Suggest amendments to Supreme Court rules and recommend legislation where appropriate.
- (B) Keep the judiciary informed of current legislation, rule changes and decisions emanating from the federal and State courts of review.
- (C) Advise the State Board of Elections and Governor's office of judicial vacancies created by death, retirement, or resignation.
- (D) Reply to correspondence from inmates at the State penitentiaries.
- (E) Act as a repository of rules adopted by the Appellate and the circuit courts, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 21.
- (F) Meet formally with the Supreme Court during each of its five terms and more frequently if necessary. These administrative sessions are guided by an agenda prepared by the Director, and they serve to keep the Court informed of recent developments in the court system and provide guidance to the Director as to the action he should take regarding administrative problems.
- (G) Arrange for judges to attend judicial education programs outside of Illinois; e.g., National College of the State Judiciary.
- (H) Arrange for the State Attorney General to represent judges who are named as defendants in law suits. Many of these cases are filed in the federal and State courts by inmates of the State penitentiary system and by other disgruntled litigants.
- (I) Act as liaison between the judiciary and the State code departments, boards and commissions.

CONCLUSION

As this report clearly illustrates, 1973 was a busy and fruitful year, particularly for the Supreme Court and the Administrative Office. Much was accomplished in the form of administering the court system, shepherding legislation through the General Assembly, and executing new and old duties in the Administrative Office. We anticipate that the Court will continue to be occupied in the coming years with questions arising under the 1970 Constitution which require adjudication by the State's highest court. Because the Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction is not as burdensome under the new Constitution as it was under the 1964 Judicial Article, we believe the Court will be able to devote substantially more of its time to administration of the entire judicial system.

Therefore, we foresee substantial demands being made upon the Administrative Office to assist the Chief Justice in his administrative duties.

Illinois has what we firmly believe to be the soundest court structure in the nation. We have the basic implements to permit the judiciary and the Administrative Office to make great progress in the efficient administration of justice. Our praises have been sung many times by judges, lawyers and court administrators throughout this nation. In such an environment, it is not uncommon for human nature to relax, to bask in the glory, and to rest on its laurels. We are determined that Illinois will continue to push ahead.

We are resolute in our determination that the Supreme Court, with the assistance of its Administrative Office, will be in the forefront of resolving administrative problems as they arise as well as planning for the future needs of the Illinois judiciary and its citizenry. Solutions must be found to eliminate the official court reporter shortage, to adequately fund the judicial system to meet its present and future needs. to provide for a more effective utilization of probation officers, and to construct new court facilities and refurbish antiquated courthouses. Efforts must continue to accelerate the disposition of cases on appeal, to amplify the statistical process particularly in criminal and juvenile proceedings, to expand judicial education, and to support a more effective vehicle for presenting researched recommendations to the Supreme Court and General Assembly for the improvement of the administration of justice.

It is a highly valued tradition and obligation for the judges of Illinois to look to the Supreme Court for leadership and guidance. Custom dictates that opinions of the Supreme Court are the law, and the precepts enunciated in those opinions are to be implemented by the courts. This type of leadership, of course, is extremely important, but by its limited nature, it is probably not the most acceptable manner to resolve administrative problems which do not lend themselves to the formal judicial process. Sound management necessarily infers decision-making within a reasonable time frame. Problems must be identified and solved before they become a crisis. The alternative to aggressive judicial administration is passivity and a shrinking of the public's confidence in the court system.

The intricacies and delicate balance between the branches of government is a considerable factor to be dealt with where legislation is needed to fulfill the requirements of the judicial system. Sufficient State funding to operate the State court system has been a characteristic example of differences of opinion in the

legislative branch and judicial branch of State government. For instance, questions are increasingly being asked in Illinois as to whether the State's obligation to finance the courts extends to the circuit court level; whether the legislature should fully fund the operation of the probation system and the operation of the circuit court clerks' offices; or whether State funding is desirable for constructing and maintaining county courthouses. While these issues are being examined, there are soluble problems which should, perhaps, be addressed promptly since they will affect long-range planning. The 1970 Constitution mandates that the four downstate judicial districts be of "substantially equal population." Based on the 1970 federal census, the downstate districts fail to satisfy the constitutional provision. If the districts are reapportioned, it seems likely that the judicial circuits will also be realigned. Until the legislature acts on this issue, it will be difficult for the judicial department to make recommendations to the General Assembly regarding the judicial and court-related personnel needed at the circuit level and regarding State funding of the entire operation of the circuit courts.

With the help of the legislative and executive branches of government, we believe the judicial branch can and will provide Illinois with a court system which will more efficiently and justly serve the requirements and best interests of its citizens.

Respectfully submitted,


Roy O. Gulley DIRECTOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS

1973 CASE LOADS AND STATISTICAL RECORDS

JUDICIAL OFFICERS

OF THE

STATE OF ILLINOIS



SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

Walter V. Schaefer Chicago, Illinois

Thomas E. Kluczynski Chicago, Illinois Daniel P. Ward Chicago, Illinois

SECOND DISTRICT

Charles H. Davis Rockford, Illinois

THIRD DISTRICT Howard C. Ryan Tonica, Illinois

FOURTH DISTRICT


Robert C. Underwood* Bloomington, Illinois

FIFTH DISTRICT

Joseph H. Goldenhersh E. St. Louis, Illinois

* Chief Justice


SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS NUMBER OF CASES DECIDED WITH FULL OPINIONS 1950-1973




*Not included is a total of 16 Memorandum Opinions filed.

1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 9/ 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 20--06 -09 20-

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS NUMBER OF PETITIONS FOR REHEARING 1950—1973





APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS (May 1, 1973)

FIRST DISTRICT *

First Division

Joseph Burke, Presiding Justice Edward J. Egan Mayer Goldberg Albert E. Hallett

Second Division

John J. Stamos, Presiding Justice Robert J. Downing (assigned from the Circuit Court of Cook County) John C. Hayes George N. Leighton

Third Division

John T. Dempsey, Presiding Justice Thomas A. McGloon Daniel J. McNamara Ulysses S. Schwartz (retiredserving by assignment)

Fourth Division

Henry L. Burman, Presiding Justice Thaddeus V. Adesko Henry W. Dieringer Glenn T. Johnson

Fifth Division

Joseph J. Drucker, Presiding Justice Robert E. English Francis S. Lorenz John J. Sullivan

SECOND DISTRICT

William L. Guild, Presiding Justice
Mel Abrahamson
Thomas J. Moran
Glenn K. Seidenfeld (assigned
from the 19th Judicial Circuit)

THIRD DISTRICT

Jay J. Alloy, Presiding Justice
Walter Dixon
Albert Scott (assigned
from the 9th Judicial Circuit)
Allan L. Stouder

FOURTH DISTRICT

James C. Craven, Presiding Justice Leland Simkins (assigned from the 11th Judicial Circuit) Samuel O. Smith Harold Trapp

FIFTH DISTRICT

Edward C. Eberspacher, Presiding Justice
Caswell J. Crebs
Charles E. Jones (assigned from
the 2nd Judicial Circuit)
George J. Moran

THE TREND OF CASES IN THE APPELLATE COURT DURING 1973

	de de deservoirement	-950	1	No. of Cases	No. of Cases Disposed of During 1973 With Full	No. of Cases	Gain or in Curre	
Appellate Distric	t	Pending 1-1-73	Filed During 1973*	Disposed of During 1973	Opinions	Pending 12-31-73	Gain	Loss
Eirat	Civil	887	711	764	521	834	53	
First	Criminal .	1,081	743	969	687	855	226	
Second	Civil	191	231	148	108	274		83
Second	Criminal .	185	224	128	89	281		96
Third	Civil	84	128	138	104	74	10	
Third	Criminal .	163	209	166	133	206		43
Fourth	Civil	126	176	131	83	171		45
Fourth	Criminal .	254	194	216	137	232	22	
Eifth	Civil	146	170	138	90	178		32
Fifth	Criminal .	193	258	160	85	291		98
Total	Civil	1,434	1,416	1,319	906	1,531		97
10lal	Criminal .	1,876	1,628	1,639	1,131	1,865	11	_

^{*}Includes 21 cases transferred from the Supreme Court to the five Appellate Court Districts.

CASES DISPOSED OF IN THE APPELLATE COURT IN 1973

Appellate	District	Affirmed 🌦	Reversed	Affirmed in Part	Modified	Disposed of without Opinion	Dismissed with Opinion	Total
	Civil	295	170	36	7	243	13	764
First	Criminal	463	193	35	64	209	5	969
Canada	Civil	60	34	9	3	39	3	148
Second	Criminal	62	16	6	6	37	1	128
Third	Civil	63	31	8	1	34	1	138
Third	Criminal	60	44	4	23	33	2	166
	Civil	50	21	8	0	48	4	131
Fourth	Criminal	77	26	32	0 ,	79	2	216
Eifth	Civil	51	30	5	1	49	2	138
Fifth	Criminal	38	36	3	6	76	1	160
Total	Civil	519	286	66	12	413	23	1,319
Total	Criminal	700	315	80	99	434	11	1,639

TIME LAPSE BETWEEN DATE OF FILING AND DATE OF DISPOSITION OF CASES DECIDED IN THE APPELLATE COURT DURING 1973

	**			Time E	Elapsed		
Appellate District		Under 6 Mos.	6-12 Mos.	1-1 ¹ / ₂ Years	1 ¹ / ₂ -2 Years	2-3 Years	Over 3 Years
Eirot	Civil	88	171	209	159	113	24
First	Criminal	108	268	319	170	85	19
Casard	Civil	25	22	94	6	0	0
Second	Criminal	19	53	52	5	0	0
	Civil	46	76	14	2	0	0
Third	Criminal	38	57	63	5	3	0
F	Civil	36	35	44	12	4	0
Fourth	Criminal	50	58	63	34	11	0
	Civil	34	38	37	20	6	3
Fifth	Criminal	59	36	36	20	7	2
	Civil	229	342	398	199	123	27
Total	Criminal	274	472	533	234	106	21


TIME LAPSE BETWEEN DATE BRIEFS WERE FILED AND DATE OF DISPOSITION OF CASES DECIDED IN THE APPELLATE COURT DURING 1973

W	***	*		Time E	lapsed		
Appellate District		Under 6 Mos.	6-12 Mos.	1-1 ¹ / ₂ Years	1 ¹ / ₂ -2 Years	2-3 Years	Over 3 Years
First	Civil	218	191	86	21	4	1
riist	Criminal	466	180	30	8	3	0
Canand	Civil	49	70	26	2	0	0
Second	Criminal	69	52	8	0	0	0
Third	Civil	72	28	0	0	0	0
mira	Criminal	68	15	0	0	0	0
Fourth	Civil	63	48	20	0	0	0
Fourth	Criminal	129	75	12	0	0	0
Filal	Civil	50	39	19	2	3	0
Fifth	Criminal	83	28	9	9	1	0
Total	Civil	452	376	151	25	7	1
Total	Criminal	815	350	59	17	4	0

ABSTRACT SUMMARY OF THE NUMBER OF OPINIONS WRITTEN BY JUDGES OF THE APPELLATE COURT DURING 1973

		TYPE OF OPINION												
Appellate District	Majority	Memorandum	Specially Concurring	Dissenting	Supplemental (non-add)	Total								
First District	1,112*	2	4	14	16	1,132								
Second District	196*	0	1	7	8	204								
Third District	237	0	4	20	0	261								
Fourth District	220	0	1	18	1	239								
Fifth District	165*	10	2	11	2	188								
Total	1,930	12	12	70	27	2,024								

^{*} Includes 251 per curiam opinions in First District, 1 in Second District and 8 in Fifth District.



CIRCUIT COURT JUDICIAL OFFICERS OF THE STATE (April 1, 1973)

COOK COUNTY

Circuit Judges

John S. Boyle, Chief Judge

Earl Arkiss Marvin E. Aspen James M. Bailey Frank W. Barbaro Charles R. Barrett Thomas W. Barrett Norman C. Barry William M. Barth Raymond K. Berg L. Sheldon Brown Abraham W. Brussell Nicholas J. Bua Robert C. Buckley Felix M. Buoscio Joseph J. Butler David A. Canel Archibald J. Carey, Jr. David Cerda Robert E. Cherry Nathan M. Cohen Robert J. Collins Harry G. Comerford Daniel A. Covelli James D. Crosson Wilbert F. Crowley Walter P. Dahl William V. Daly Russell R. DeBow Francis T. Delaney George E. Dolezal Thomas C. Donovan Robert J. Downing (assigned to Appellate Court - 1st District) Raymond P. Drymalski Arthur L. Dunne Robert J. Dunne Norman N. Eiger Irving W. Eiserman Herbert A. Ellis Paul F. Elward Samuel B. Epstein Saul A. Epton Hyman Feldman

James H. Felt George Fiedler John C. Fitzgerald Richard J. Fitzgerald Thomas H. Fitzgerald Philip A. Fleischman Herbert R. Friedlund Louis B. Garippo James A. Geocaris James A. Geroulis Louis J. Giliberto Richard A. Harewood Edward F. Healy John F. Hechinger Jacques F. Heilingoetter Joseph B. Hermes Harry G. Hershenson Warren J. Hickey George A. Higgins Reginald J. Holzer Charles P. Horan Robert L. Hunter Harry A. Iseberg Mel R. Jiganti Mark E. Jones Sidney A. Jones, Jr. William B. Kane Nathan J. Kaplan Anthony J. Kogut Norman A. Korfist Walter J. Kowalski Franklin I. Kral Alvin J. Kvistad Irving Landesman David Lefkovits Robert E. McAuliffe Helen F. McGillicuddy John P. McGury Frank B. Machala Benjamin S. Mackoff Robert L. Massey Nicholas J. Matkovic Robert A. Meier, III

James J. Mejda F. Emmett Morrissev James E. Murphy James C. Murray Gordon B. Nash Benjamin Nelson Irving R. Norman Donald J. O'Brien Wayne W. Olson Margaret G. O'Malley William F. Patterson John E. Pavlik Edward E. Plusdrak Maurice D. Pompey Albert S. Porter Joseph A. Power Daniel A. Roberts Philip Romiti Thomas D. Rosenberg Daniel J. Ryan Edith S. Sampson Raymond S. Sarnow George J. Schaller Joseph Schneider Ben Schwartz Anton A. Smigiel

Joseph A. Solan Pasquale A. Sorrentino Jack I. Sperling Harry S. Stark Sigmund J. Stefanowicz Earl E. Strayhorn James E. Strunck Chester J. Strzalka Harold W. Sullivan Robert J. Sulski Fred G. Suria, Jr. Vincent W. Tondrvk Raymond Trafelet Eugene L. Wachowski Harold G. Ward Alfonse F. Wells Kenneth R. Wendt Louis A. Wexler Daniel J. White William Sylvester White Frank J. Wilson Kenneth E. Wilson Minor K. Wilson Joseph Wosik Arthur V. Zelezinski

Associate Judges

Charles A. Alfano Peter Bakakos Lionel J. Berc Nicholas J. Bohling Anthony J. Bosco John M. Breen, Jr. Martin F. Brodkin Thomas R. Casey, Jr. Thomas P. Cawley Paul G. Ceaser Irwin Cohen Cornelius J. Collins James A. Condon Francis X. Connell Richard K. Cooper Ronald J. Crane John J. Crowley Robert J. Dempsey Russell J. Dolce John T. Duffy George B. Duggan Charles J. Durham Ben Edelstein

Nathan Engelstein Carl F. Faust William F. Fitzpatrick John M. Flaherty John Gannon Lawrence Genesen Paul F. Gerrity Joseph R. Gill Francis W. Glowacki Mever H. Goldstein Ben Gorenstein Myron T. Gomberg James L. Griffin Jacob S. Guthman Arthur N. Hamilton Edwin C. Hatfield John J. Hogan Louis J. Hyde Thomas J. Janczy Rudolph L. Janega Lester Jankowski Robert F. Jerrick Eddie C. Johnson

Richard H. Jorzak Benjamin J. Kanter Wallace I. Kargman Helen J. Kelleher John J. Kelley, Jr. Irving Kipnis Marilvn R. Komosa Edwin Kretske Albert H. LaPlante Maurice W. Lee Richard F. LeFevour Reuben J. Liffshin John J. Limperis David Linn Frank S. Loverde Martin G. Luken James Maher, Jr. John M. Murphy Erwin L. Martay John H. McCollom John J. McDonnell William J. McGah, Jr. Dwight McKay Anthony J. Mentone Joseph W. Mioduski Anthony S. Montelione Joseph C. Mooney John J. Moran John W. Navin Earl J. Neal James L. Oakey, Jr. Paul A. O'Mallev John A. Ouska Burton H. Palmer

Marvin J. Peters Frank R. Petrone James P. Piragine Bernard A. Polikoff Simon S. Porter Francis X. Poynton Seymour S. Price John F. Reynolds Emanuel A. Rissman Allen F. Rosin Joseph A. Salerno Richard L. Samuels George M. Schatz Harry A. Schrier Joseph R. Schwaba Anthony J. Scotillo Samuel Shamberg David J. Shields Harold A. Siegan Frank M. Siracusa Jerome C. Slad Raymond C. Sodini Milton H. Solomon Robert C. Springsguth Adam N. Stillo James N. Sullivan Robert A. Sweeney John F. Thornton Alvin A. Turner Thomas M. Walsh James M. Walton Jack A. Welfeld Willie Mae Whiting James A. Zafiratos George J. Zimmerman

FIRST CIRCUIT Circuit Judges

John H. Clayton, Chief Judge

Robert H. Chase Stewart Cluster Peyton H. Kunce William A. Lewis Harry L. McCabe Jack C. Morris George Oros

William E. Peterson

Robert B. Porter Everett Prosser Paul D. Reese Richard E. Bichman Dorothy W. Spomer R. Gerald Trampe

Associate Judges

Michael P. O'Shea

Robert W. Schwartz

SECOND CIRCUIT Circuit Judges

Henry Lewis, Chief Judge

Philip B. Benefiel
John D. Daily
William G. Eovaldi
Don Al Foster
Charles Woodrow Frailey
F. P. Hanagan
A. Hanby Jones
Charles E. Jones (assigned to Appellate Court)

Clarence E. Partee Randell S. Quindry Wilburn Bruce Saxe Alvin Lacy Williams Carrie LaRoe Winter Harry L. Ziegler

Associate Judges

Roland J. DeMarco Charles Deneen Matthews Charles L. Quindry

THIRD CIRCUIT Circuit Judges

Fred P. Schuman, Chief Judge

Joseph J. Barr William L. Beatty Harold R. Clark John L. DeLaurenti John Gitchoff James O. Monroe, Jr. Victor J. Mosele

Associate Judges

Thomas R. Gibbons Arthur L. Greenwood Merlin Gerald Hiscott William E. Johnson A. Andreas Matoesian Harry R. Mondhink Roy W. Strawn Doane Kent Trone

FOURTH CIRCUIT Circuit Judges

George W. Kasserman, Jr., Chief Judge

Daniel H. Dailey William A. Ginos Arthur G. Henken Paul M. Hickman Raymond O. Horn George R. Kelly James E. McMackin, Jr. Gail E. McWard Jack M. Michaelree Robert J. Sanders Bill J. Slater E. Harold Wineland

Associate Judge

Robert M. Washburn

FIFTH CIRCUIT Circuit Judges

Jacob Berkowitz, Chief Judge

Caslon K. Bennett Harry I. Hannah Carl A. Lund Frank J. Meyer Ralph S. Pearman James Kent Robinson William J. Sunderman James R. Watson Paul M. Wright

Associate Judges

Lawrence T. Allen, Jr. Thomas Michael Burke Matthew Andrew Jurczak Richard E. Scott John F. Twomey

SIXTH CIRCUIT Circuit Judges

Birch E. Morgan, Chief Judge

William C. Calvin Frank J. Gollings Frederick S. Green Roger H. Little Donald W. Morthland Joseph C. Munch Rodney A. Scott James M. Sherrick John P. Shonkwiler Creed D. Tucker Albert G. Webber, III

Associate Judges

Henry Lester Brinkoetter John L. Davis Wilbur A. Flessner Sarah McAllister Lumpp James R. Palmer George Richard Skillman Andrew Stecyk

SEVENTH CIRCUIT Circuit Judges

Howard Lee White, Chief Judge

J. Waldo Ackerman Jack A. Alfeld Harvey Beam Francis J. Bergen William D. Conway George P. Coutrakon Simon L. Friedman Byron E. Koch Paul C. Verticchio John B. Wright

Associate Judges

Richard J. Cadagin Eugene O. Duban Imy J. Feuer Jerry S. Rhodes Charles J. Ryan Dennis L. Schwartz Gordon D. Seator

EIGHTH CIRCUIT Circuit Judges

John T. Reardon, Chief Judge

Cecil J. Burrows Paul R. Durr Lyle E. Lipe Richard Mills J. Ross Pool Fred W. Reither Richard F. Scholz Edward D. Turner Ernest H. Utter Guy R. Williams

Associate Judges

Leo J. Altmix Owen D. Lierman Alfred L. Pezman Virgil W. Timpe

NINTH CIRCUIT Circuit Judges

Daniel J. Roberts, Chief Judge

Ezra J. Clark U.S. Collins John W. Gorby Earle A. Kloster Scott I. Klukos Gale A. Mathers
Francis P. Murphy
Albert Scott (assigned
to Appellate Court)
Keith F. Scott

Associate Judges

Jack R. Kirkpatrick Lewis D. Murphy Russell A. Myers G. Durbin Ranney William K. Richardson Keith Sanderson

TENTH CIRCUIT Circuit Judges

Ivan L. Yontz, Chief Judge

Richard E. Eagleton Edward E. Haugens James D. Heiple Robert E. Hunt Charles W. Iben Albert Pucci John E. Richards Calvin R. Stone Charles M. Wilson

Associate Judges

Robert A. Coney Carl O. Davies Arthur H. Gross John A. Holtzman David C. McCarthy William John Reardon John D. Sullivan John A. Whitney Espey C. Williamson William H. Young

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Circuit Judges

Wendell E. Oliver, Chief Judge

Stephen Adsit Keith E. Campbell Wilton Erlenborn

Samuel Glenn Harrod, III

George Kaye

John T. McCullough Leland Simkins (assigned to Appellate Court) Wayne C. Townley, Jr.

Associate Judges

William T. Caisley Luther H. Dearborn William D. DeCardy

Ivan Dean Johnson Darrell H. Reno Robert Leo Thornton

TWELFTH CIRCUIT Circuit Judges

Victor N. Cardosi, Chief Judge

Patrick M. Burns Wayne P. Dyer Robert E. Higgins Robert J. Immel

David E. Oram Michael A. Orenic Angelo F. Pistilli Thomas W. Vinson

Associate Judges

Roger A. Benson Robert W. Boyd Robert R. Buchar Charles P. Connor Emil DiLorenzo Thomas P. Faulkner

Louis K. Fontenot John F. Gnadinger John C. Lang John F. Michela John Verklan

THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT Circuit Judges

Thomas R. Clydesdale, Chief Judge

William P. Denny Thomas R. Flood Leonard Hoffman

Robert W. Malmquist John S. Massieon W. J. Wimbiscus

Associate Judges

John J. Clinch, Jr. Herman Ritter

Wendell LeRoy Thompson

C. Howard Wampler Robert G. Wren John D. Zwanzig

FOURTEENTH CIRCUIT Circuit Judges

Dan H. McNeal, Chief Judge

Robert M. Bell **
Charles H. Carlstrom
Robert J. Horberg
Wilbur S. Johnson
Frederick P. Patton
John Louis Poole

Paul E. Rink Charles J. Smith Conway L. Spanton Richard Stengel L. L. Winn

Associate Judges

Joseph G. Carpentier Walter E. Clark John B. Cunningham John R. Erhart Jay M. Hanson Ivan Lovaas Edwin Clare Malone Henry W. McNeal

FIFTEENTH CIRCUIT Circuit Judges

James E. Bales, Chief Judge

Eric S. DeMar Wesley A. Eberle Thomas E. Hornsby

Robert D. Law John L. Moore John W. Rapp, Jr.

Associate Judges

Alan W. Cargerman James R. Hansgen Martin D. Hill Dexter A. Knowlton James M. Thorp

SIXTEENTH CIRCUIT Circuit Judges

John A. Krause, Chief Judge

Ernest W. Akemann James E. Boyle Neil E. Mahoney Rex F. Meilinger John S. Page John S. Petersen Paul W. Schnake Robert J. Sears Carl A. Swanson, Jr.

Associate Judges

Donald T. Anderson Thomas J. Burke James W. Cadwell Thomas S. Cliffe William H. Ellsworth Joseph T. Suhler Carlyle Whipple

SEVENTEENTH CIRCUIT Circuit Judges

Albert S. O'Sullivan, Chief Judge

David R. Babb Seely P. Forbes John S. Ghent, Jr. John C. Layng William R. Nash John E. Sype

Associate Judges

John T. Beynon Robert A. Blodgett Edwin John Kotche Robert Elwood Leake Michael R. Morrison John W. Nielsen Alford R. Penniman

EIGHTEENTH CIRCUIT **Circuit Judges**

LeRoy L. Rechenmacher, Chief Judge

Edwin L. Douglas Bruce R. Fawell William V. Hopf

Philip F. Locke George W. Unverzagt Alfred E. Woodward

Associate Judges

William E. Black George Borovic, Jr. George Herbert Bunge Richard L. Calkins James E. Fitzgerald Marvin E. Johnson Helen C. Kinney

Gordon Moffett Robert A. Nolan Charles R. Norgle, Sr. Jack T. Parish Lester P. Reiff George B. VanVleck

Blair Varnes

NINETEENTH CIRCUIT **Circuit Judges**

Lloyd A. VanDeusen, Chief Judge

Henry H. Caldwell James H. Cooney LaVerne A. Dixon Fred H. Geiger William J. Gleason John J. Kaufman Charles S. Parker Glenn K. Seidenfeld (assigned

to Appellate Court) Harry D. Strouse

Associate Judges

Thomas F. Baker Leonard Brody Eugene T. Daly Thomas R. Doran Warren Fox John L. Hughes

Bernard J. Juron Paul J. Kilkelly Robert K. McQueen Alvin I. Singer Robert J. Smart

TWENTIETH CIRCUIT **Circuit Judges**

Richard T. Carter, Chief Judge

Robert Bastien Carl H. Becker Joseph F. Cunningham Harold O. Farmer William P. Fleming

Robert L. Gagen James Wendell Gray John J. Hoban Alvin H. Maevs. Jr. Francis E. Maxwell

Associate Judges

Anthony A. Bloemer David W. Costello John T. Fiedler Barney E. Johnston Billy Jones

Ora Polk Robert B. Rutledge, Jr. George H. Sansom Robert J. Saunders James F. Wheatley

RATIO OF CASELOAD PER JUDGE IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF ILLINOIS DURING 1973

Circuit	Number of Counties	Population (1970 Federal Census)	Area (Square Miles)	Total Number of Cases Filed During 1973	Number of Circuit Judges, Associate Judges	Average No. of Cases per Judge
Cook	1	5,492,369	954	2,043,994	253	8079
1st	9	191,873	3,242	31,503	16	1969
2nd	12	199,194	4,796	24,909	18	1384
3rd	2	264,946	1,114	44,976	16	2811
4th	9	226,934	5,425	31,642	14	2260
5th	5	192,441	2,885	28,991	15	1933
6th	6	353,035	3,178	58,898	19	3100
7th	6	283,668	3,485	42,826	18	2379
8th	8	149,507	3,918	21,236	15	1416
9th	6	193,514	3,904	30,432	16	1902
10th	5	339,786	2,129	55,122	20	2756
11th	5	223,011	3,853	47,962	15	3197
12th	3	380,280	2,647	73,196	20	3660
13th	3	176,485	2,453	28,872	13	2221
14th	4	300,122	2,492	61,063	20	3053
15th	5	170,717	3,136	30,106	12	2509
16th	3	349,033	1,472	84,412	17	4965
17th	2	272,063	803	84,578	14	6041
18th	1	491,882	331	91,820	21	4372
19th	2	494,193	1,068	98,498	21	4690
20th	5	368,923	2,652	51,124	21	2434
Downstate Total	101	5,621,607	54,983	1,022,166	341	2998
State Total	102	11,113,976	55,937	3,066,160	594	5161

				Over 5,000		\$15,000 Under	Chancery	Miscellaneous Remedies	Eminent Domain		Municipal Corporations	Mental Health	ce
Circuit	County	*	Jury	Non- Jury	Jury	Non- Jury	Chai	Misc	Emir	Tax	Mun M	Ment	Divorce
1st	. Alexander	Begun	14 — — 14 6	1 — — 1 5	1 1 	27 — — 27 19	6 - 6 5	33 — — 33 23	1 1 1	9		13 — — 13 16	92 — 92 86
	Jackson	Begun	57 — — 57 80	26 — — 26 17	22 — — 22 10	150 — — 150 167	40 40 48	17 — — 17 8	19 — — 19 13	50 — 50 31	_ _ _ _		279 — 279 263
	Johnson	Begun	5 — 5 6	4 4 3	2 — 2 3	12 — — 12 12	2 — 2 6	3 — 3 3	 _ _ _ 2	3 3 5			33 — — 33 23
	Massac	Begun	8 8 10	1 1	2 — 2 1	24 1 — 25 26	6 - - 6 3	8 8 7	 1	20 — 20 26	2 — 2 —		91 — 91 83
	Pope	Begun	1 - - 1	3 -3 2	 1	9 — — 9 9	_ _ _ _ 2	3 — — 3 4		4 - 4 1			19 — 19 17
	Pulaski	Begun Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	3 — — 3 1	1 — — 1 1	1 — — 1 1	11 — — 11 11	4 — 4 3	3 — 3 2	1 — — 1 1	4 - 4 10	1 1 1	2 — 2 —	35 — 35 35 36
	Saline	Begun	28 — — 28 30	10 — — 10 7	5 — 5 5	93 — — 93 91	19 — 19 24	15 — — 15 7	 1	25 — 25 36		13 — — 13 13	172 — 172 172
	Union	Begun	11 — — 11 13	9 — 9 2	 3	34 — — 34 37	17 — 17 7	7 — 7 2	4 — 4 —	4 4 		852 — 852 857	86 — 86 78
	Williamson	Begun	54 6 — 60 69	12 — — 12 9	10 2 +3 15 29	97 4 -3 98 128	44 1 — 45 48	16 — — 16 27	2 - 2 6	24 — — 24 34	7 2 — 9 6	2 - - 2 2	340 7 — 347 401
1st	Circuit Totals	Begun	181 6 — 187 215	67 — 67 46	43 2 +3 48 53	457 5 -3 459 500	138 1 — 139 146	105 — — 105 83	27 — — 27 25	143 — 143 143	10 2 — 12 6	— 882	1,147 7 — 1,154 1,159

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 1973

Family	Juvenile	Felony	Misdemeanors	Small Claims	Probate	Ordinance Violations	Traffic	Conservation Violations	Total	·	County	Circuit
24	36	54	435	34	40	120	2,151	122	3,213	Begun	Alexander	1st
		_		_			_		_	Reinstated		
24 24	36 34	54 53	435 335	34 30	40 29	120 118	2,151 1,997	122 114	3,213 2,895	Net Added		
68	39	178	413	596	150	1,553	5,497	72	9,226	Begun	Jackson	
	_	<u> </u>	+4	_		_			_	Reinstated		
68	39	174	417	596	150	1,553	5,497	72 71	9,226	Net Added		
73	33	182	418	623	156	1,752	5,469		9,414			
8	_	16	45	42	14	_	707 —	12	908	Begun	Johnson	
		-1	+1	_	_		707	-	— 908	Transferred		
8 7		15 17	46 52	42 42	14 13	-2	707 653	12 6	855			
23	20	60	186	128	29	92	1,101	30	1,831 5			
		2 -7	2 +7					_		Transferred		
23 27	20 42	55 66	195 251	128 114	29 31	92 83	1,101 1,076	30 27	1,836 1,874	Net Added		
5	9	7	66	20	17		164	28	355			
			_		_	_			_	Reinstated		
5	9	7 4	66 48	20 20	17 17		164 161	28 28	355 321			
3	4			-								
15	9	32	246	62	17	34	1,806	37	2,324	Reinstated	Pulaski	
 15	9	-3 29	+3 249	62	17	34	1,806	 37	2,324	Transferred		
10	8	25	243	62	17	31	1,801	34	2,297			
39	63	84	343	267	86	139	1,743	_	3,144	Begun		-
	_				_		_	_		Transferred		
39 39	63 67	84 74	343 289	267 266	86 69	139 115	1,743 1,684	_	3,144 2,989	Net Added		
19	25	57	135	132	45	117	1,698	29	3,281			
_	_		+3					_		Reinstated		
19	25	54	138	132	45	117	1,698	29	3,281			
4	5	28	90	102	15	71	1,625	16				
58 —	59	146	397 1	691	111	183	4,868 —	63	7,184	Reinstated		
— 58	 59	-1 154	+1 399	691	111	183	4,868	63	7.216	Transferred		
87	20	165	308	704	120	142	4,810	55		Terminated		
259	260	634	2,266	1,972	509	2,238	19,735	393		Beinstate		1st
		11 -19	+19	_	_		_		37	Transferred	<u> </u>	
259 274	260 213	626 614	2,288 2,034	1,972 1,963	509 467	2,238 2,314	19,735 19,276	393 351	31,503 30,770	Net Added		
	1 - 10	1 014	12,00	1.,555		1-,		1	1 ,,,,,			1

Circuit	County	94	Law \$15,	Over 000 Non- Jury		S15,000 Under Non- Jury	Chancery	Miscellaneous Remedies	Eminent Domain	Tax	Municipal Corporations	Mental Health	Divorce
2nd	.Crawford	Begun Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	2 - +1 3 9	6 -1 5 3	3 +2 5 4	40 -2 38 33	20 — — 20 7	9	1 1 1	11 — — 11 8		9 9 9	162 ————————————————————————————————————
	Edwards	Begun Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	1 - +1 2 2	8 -1 7 2		8 — — 8 14	2 — — 2 3		4 4 1	9 — 9		1 - 1 1	19 — — 19 21
	Franklin	Begun	43 — — 43 31	9 9 9	6 — 6 8	61 — 61 62	29 — 29 25	9 — 9 13		34 34 20	2 2 	4 — 4 2	224 — 224 211
	Gallatin	Begun	4 4 6	2 — — 2 3	_ _ _ _ 2	18 — — 18 23	8 8 1	5 — 5 3	2 2 	5 — 5 —		1 1	48 — 48 38
	Hamilton	Begun	4 4 5	2 — — 2 2	_ _ _ _ 2	23 — — 23 22	9 — 9 7	1 — — 1 1		1 - 1 1		3 3 3	35 — — 35 46
	Hardin	Begun	3 — — 3 2	1 - - 1	1 — — 1 —	6 — — 6 2	3 — — 3 6	1 — — 1 1		5 — 5 6		1 - - 1	25 25 29
	Jefferson	Begun	31 +1 32 29	17 — —1 16 7	11 +3 14 12	141 2 139 108	28 1 — 29 12	16 — — 16 12	2 2 4	9 - 9 2	1 — — 1 1	56 — — 56 38	232 15 — 247 215
	Lawrence	Begun	3 — — 3 5	3 — — 3 1	1 1 4	18 2 — 20 13	17 — 17 4	5 5 4		9 9 12		2 — — 2 1	86 8 — 94 77
	Richland	Begun	6 6 10	20 — — 20 12	4 — 4 2	23 — — 23 24	12 — 12 13	4 — 4 4	1 1	26 — 26 48		10 — — 10 12	72 — — 72 70
	Wabash	Begun	 1	5 — — 5 1	2 2 	40 — — 40 9	10 — — 10 2	8 8 1	2 — 2 —	26 — 26 11		5 — 5 3	71 — 71 48

								7-1 -1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1				
Family	Juvenile	Felony	Misdemeanors	Small Claims	Probate	Ordinance Violations	Traffic	Conservation Violations	Total		County	Circuit
36	30	27	273	236	103	119	1,110	16	2,213	Begun	Crawford	2nd
		_	_			_		_		Reinstated		
36	30	-2 25	+2 275	236	103	119	1,110	16	2,213	Transferred		
40	18	11	221	217	82	84	1,077	15	2,015	Terminated		
12	12	7	45	106	41	4	540	40	861	D		
	12		45	100	-		340	42		Begun	Edwards	
		-2	+2		_					Transferred		
12 9	12 3	5 6	47 29	106 108	41 47	4 3	540 551	42 42	861 854	Net Added Terminated		
				100	ļ		331	72	004	reminated		
52	28	72	395	405	112	187	2,843	90	4,605	Begun	Franklin	
		-8	2 +8						2	Reinstated Transferred		
52	28	64	405	405	112	187	2,843	90	4,607	Net Added		
33	8	67	387	345	88	179	2,635	73	4,196	Terminated		
6	6	9	120	161	39	170	786	9	1,399	Begun	Gallatin	
		-1	+1			NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY.				Reinstated		
6	6	8	121	161	39	170	786	9	1,399	Net Added		
6	5	31	159	138	17	150	733	9	1,324	Terminated		
8	5	12	50	67	45	17	673	11	966	Begun	Hamilton	
					1	_	_		1	Reinstated		
8	 5	-5 7	+5 55	 67	46	— 17	 673	— 11	967	Transferred		
9	15	14	65	58	37	16	677	10	990	Terminated		
		7	0.5	07	10		005	7	400	D	1 1 1	***************************************
1	6	7	35 —	97	16	6	205	7	426 —	Begun	Hardin	
				_					-	Transferred		
1	6 17	7 9	35 51	97 80	16	6 6	205 191	7 6	426 410	Net Added		
-	17	3	31			U	191	0	410	reminateu		
38	57	85	176	362	120	52	1,860	39	3,333	Begun	Jefferson	
		3 -4	+4	5 -1	1				25 —	Reinstated		
38	57 ′	84	180	366	121	52	1,860	39	3,358	Net Added		
33	31	129	208	285	131	38	1,798	37	3,130	Terminated		
26	28	34	193	174	81	217	1,571	26	2,494	Begun	Lawrence	
	_	1 -6	 +6			_			11	Reinstated		
26	28	29	199	174	81	217	1,571	— 26	2,505	Net Added		
24	19	19	208	168	62	170	1,381	27	2,199	Terminated		
30	46	30	356	168	48	18	1,429	33	2,336	Begun	Richland	***************************************
	_			3				_	3	Reinstated	*	
30	<u></u> 46	-1 29	+1 357	— 171	— 48	 18	— 1,429	33	2,339	Transferred		
66	32	33	347	351	46	12	1,429	33	2,302	Terminated		
20	24	95	267	232		15/	754	-11	1 701	D = ~	14/21-2-1-	
	24 —			<u> </u>	55 —	154	751 —	14	1,781 —	Begun	Wabash	
_		-3	+3							Transferred		
20 5	24 5	92 79	270 192	232 138	55 45	154 147	751 617	14 15	1,781 1,319	Net Added		
		, ,			70		317	10	,,010			

		*	Law (\$15,	000 Non-	and	015,000 Under	Chancery	Miscellaneous Remedies	Eminent Domain	ax	Municipal Corporations	Mental Health	Divorce
Circuit	County		Jury	Jury	Jury	Jury			ļ	-			
	Wayne	Begun	10 — — 10 3	3 — 3 3	 1	20 — — 20 25	14 — — 14 10	5 5 5	1 1 1	29 — — 29 24	 3	7 — 7 —	67 — 67 68
	White	Begun	10 — — 10 2	3 — — 3 3		30 — — 30 24	14 — 14 11	14 — 14 11	1 1	4 4 6	2 — 2 3	2 — — 2 1	122 1 — 123 149
2nd	. Circuit Totals	Begun	117 — +3 120 105	79 — -3 76 46	28 +5 33 37	428 2 -4 426 359	166 1 — 167 101	77 — — 77 66	14 — 14 7	168 — — 168 147	5 — 5 14	101 — — 101 70	1,163 24 — 1,187 1,140
3rd	Bond	Begun	5 — 5 3	1 - 1 1	13 — — 13 3	21 — — 21 15	7 — 7 3	3 3 3		8 - 8 6		3 - 3 2	67 19 — 86 80
	Madison	Begun	544 6 +39 589 713	266 -38 228 153	313 8 +68 389 374	530 2 -69 463 476	234 — 234 370	170 1 — 171 270	82 — 82 98	209 — 209 —	2 - 2 1	351 — 351 403	1,701 — 1,701 1,717
3rd	. Circuit Totals	Begun	549 6 +39 594 716	267 — —38 229 154	326 8 +68 402 377	551 2 -69 484 491	241 — 241 373	173 1 — 174 273	82 — 82 98	217 — 217 6	2 - 2 1	354 — 354 405	1,768 19 — 1,787 1,797
4th	. Christian	Begun	9 1 +4 14 10	7 2 -4 5 4	4 1 +7 12 5	91 4 -7 88 69	14 — — 14 5	8 8 7		30 30 28	1 - 1 7	_ _ _ 3	134 37 — 171 141
	Clay	Begun	7 — 7 7	2 — 2 1	4 2 — 6 6	50 3 — 53 49	22 — 22 28	6 - 6 5	4 4 4	9 9 28		3 - - 3 11	63 — 63 67
	Clinton	Begun	13 — — 13 41		8 8 15	26 — — 26 4	7 — 7 4	4 - 4 -	3 3 -	9 — 9 —		6 - 6 1	52 — 52 48
	Effingham	Begun	14 — — 14 14	7 — 7 4	1 — — 1 2	28 — +1 29 63	14 — — 14 8	8 8 4	4 4 3	16 — 16 26		2 2 1	108 — — 108 103

Family	Juvenile	Felony	Misdemeanors	Small Claims	Probate	Ordinance Violations	Traffic	Conservation Violations	Total		County	Circuit
24	19	29	144	683	43	20	863	25	2,006	Begun		
***************************************		_					_	_		Reinstated		
	10	-4	+4	-	<u> </u>			_		Transferred		
24 24	19 19	25 30	148 181	683 544	43 92	20 18	863 835	25 22	2,006 1,908			
			101	044	52	10	000	22	1,906	reminateu		
27	30	52	147	177	89	119	1,569	34	2,446	Begun	White	
	_		-	-		_	_		1	I tomotatoa		
27	30	52	147	177	89	119	1,569	34	2,447	Transferred		
19	6	32	88	136	103	106	1,419	32	2,153			
280	291	450	2.001	0.000	700	1 000	44.000	0.40	04.000	_		
200 —	291	459 4	2,201	2,868 8	792 2	1,083	14,200	346	24,866	Begun	Circuit Totals	2nd
_	—	-36	+36	-1	_					Transferred		
280	291	427	2,239	2,875	794	1,083	14,200	346	24,909	Net Added	*	
269	178	460	2,136	2,568	753	929	13,094	321	22,800	Terminated		
15	33	15	143	161	64	17	903	23	1,502	Begun	Bond	
				2		-			21	Reinstated		
15	33	15	142	160	-	17				Transferred		
8	33	17	143 140	163 138	64	17 15	903 825	23 20		Net Added Terminated		
	-			100			020	20	1,009	reminated		***************************************
623	442	1,062	2,938	7,300	669	3,936	21,967	97		Begun	Madison	3rd
		-48	+48		_			_	17	Reinstated Transferred		
623	442	1,014	2,986	7,300	669	3,936	21,967	97	43,453	Net Added		
407	404	938	2,765	10,903	620	3,776	21,924	88	46,400	Terminated		
638	475	1,077	3,081	7,461	733	3,953	22,870	100	44,938	Desuin	Circuit Tatala	01
				2			22,070	120 —	38	Begun	Circuit Totals	3rd
		-48	+48	. —			No.COMPANY			Transferred		
638 415	475 437	1,029 955	3,129 2,905	7,463	733	3,953	22,870	120	44,976	Net Added		
413	437	955	2,905	11,041	647	3,791	22,749	108	47,739	Terminated		
44	38	94	226	409	242	6	3,055	56	4,468	Begun	Christian	4th
	_	1		82			_		128	Reinstated		
44	38	-14 81	+14 240	491	242	6	3,055	— 56	4,596	Transferred		
33	34	83	210	460	148	5	2,890	54	4,196	Terminated		
		40	000	0.47								
29	29	48	223	247	90	42	1,031	20	1,929 5	Begun		
		-9	+9					_	_	Transferred		
29	29	39	232	247	90	42	1,031	20	1,934	Net Added		
25	15	25	198	376	104	39	936	20	1,944	Terminated	,	
19	19	42	202	155	129	48	1,206	139	2,087	Begun		
	_			_		_		_		Reinstated	····	
10		40	_		100		_			Transferred	**	
19 10	19 1	42 19	202 76	155 87	129 77	48 53	1,206 1,115	139 141	2,087 1,692	Net Added		
		13	, 0	07	' '	- 55	1,115	141	1,092	i emimated		
16	51	26	519	234	132	66	4,113	28	5,387	Begun	Effingham	
			1	 _1		_		-	1	Reinstated		
16	51	26	520	233	132	 66	4,113	28	5,388	Transferred		
13	43	43	587	197	127	39	4,021	27		Terminated		
						l						

Circuit	County	59-	Law \$15,			15,000 Under Non- Jury	Chancery	Miscellaneous Remedies	Eminent Domain	Тах	Municipal Corporations	Mental Health	Divorce
	Fayette	Begun	4	10	1	55	17	13		4	2		74
	ayelle	Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	- - 4 13	10 — 10 3	1 -	55 55 47	17 17 14	13 10	_ _ _	4 7			74 64
	Jasper	Begun	1 +2 3 4	9 -2 7 7	1 - 1 2	19 — — 19 18	9 9 9	2 — 2 1	7 7 	8 8 5	1 - 1 1	1 — 1 1	21 — 21 16
	Marion	Begun	21 +2 23 40	12 -2 10 11	9 9 11	78 2 — 80 184	16 — — 16 23	25 — — 25 25	1 1 4	15 — — 15 27	1 - 1	52 — 52 45	278 — 278 286
	Montgomery	Begun	22 — — 22 14	8 8 4	3 3 7	62 — 62 30	4 - 4 10	19 — 19 16	 17	11 — — 11 14		1 1 1	138 — — 138 125
	Shelby	Begun	3 1 - 4 10	4 - 4 10	1 1 - 2 3	22 2 — 24 65	6 2 — 8 15	4 — 4 16	4 4 2	30 — 30 43			76 2 — 78 87
4th	. Circuit Totals	Begun	94 2 +8 104 153	59 2 -8 53 44	32 4 +7 43 51	431 11 -6 436 529	109 2 — 111 116	89 — 89 84	23 — — 23 30	132 — — 132 178	5 - - 5 9	65 — 65 63	944 39 — 983 937
5th	. Clark	Begun	7 1 — 8 9		1 - 1 1	30 — — 30 25	16 — — 16 20	6 6 8	3 3 3	31 — 31 37			67 — 67 60
	Coles	Begun	35 — — 35 31	18 — — 18 14	13 — — 13 5	110 — — 110 116	29 — 29 26	18 — — 18 16	2 - 2 -	6 - 6 6	_	3 - 3 -	302 — 302 291
	Cumberland	Begun	2 - - 2 1		 - - - -	7 — 7 2	9 9 	1 — 1 1	4	_ _ _ _ 1			30 — 30 29
	Edgar	Begun	13 — — 13 6	3 — — 3 3		44 — — 44 33	5 1 — 6 6	4 - 4 3	23 — — 23 12	2 — 2 22		1 - 1 -	129 — — 129 106

Family	Juvenile	Felony	Misdemeanors	Small Claims	Probate	Ordinance Violations	Traffic	Conservation Violations	Total		County	Circuit
29	35	53	164	209	130	6	2,808	66	3,680	Begun	Fayette	
 29 26	— 35 34	-7 46 36	+7 171 162	209 171	130 202	— 6 5	2,808 2,941	— 66 67	3,680 3,803	Reinstated Transferred Net Added	,	
14	17	6	47	48	66	5	428	9	719	Begun	Jasper	
			+1					********		Reinstated		
14 8	17 3	5 5	48 35	48 40	66 32	5 5	428 414	9 8	719 614	Net Added		
103	123	83 1	451	376	183	381	3,924	19	6,151		Marion	
		-3	+3	_	_				3	Reinstated Transferred		
103 114	123 115	81 89	454 662	376 341	183 125	381 322	3,924 3,670	19 20	6,154 6,114	Net Added		
46	51	83	543	399	179	112	2,868	45	4,594		Montgomery	
	_	-4	+4	_						Reinstated		
46 40	51 22	79 62	547 479	399 222	1 ₹ 9 141	112 102	2,868 2,562	45 35	4,594 3,903	Net Added		
19	15	16	397 4	154	138	55	1,304	230	2,478 12		Shelby	
	_	-4	+4	_	_	-	_	_	- 12	Transferred		
19 36	15 6	12 13	405 353	154 305	138 285	55 42	1,304 1,097	230 201	2,490 2,589	Net Added		
319	378	451 2	2,772 5	2,231 82	1,289	721 —	20,737	612	31,493 149		Circuit Totals	4th
_		-42	+42	-1						Transferred		
319 305	378 273	411 375	2,819 2,762	2,312 2,199	1,289 1,241	721 612	20,737 19,646	612 573	31,642 30,180	Net Added Terminated		
33		6	146 —	270 1	92 —	78 —	2,160 —	45 —	2,991 2	Begun	Clark	5th
33	_	— 6	— 146	 271	92	— 78	0.160	45	2,993	Transferred		
37		3	156	246	85	77	2,160 2,097	45 46	2,993			
113 —	53 —	121 —	466	549 —	352 —	481 —	2,757 —	37	5,465 —	Begun	Coles	
_		-22	+22		_	404				Transferred		
113 98	53 55	99 94	488 402	549 699	352 231	481 481	2,757 2,757	37 37	5,465 5,360	Net Added Terminated		
3	_	13	118	35	50		677		945	Begun	Cumberland	
	_	-1	+1					-		Reinstated	*	
3 3	_ 2	12 13	119 99	35 38	50 38		677 626	_	945 858	Net Added	***	
35	53	72	262	254	134	2	1,287	27	2,350	Begun	Edgar	
		 _7	+7		*******	_			1	Reinstated		
35 18	53 15	65 28	269 248	254 191	134 318	2 2	1,287 1,286	27 27	2,351 2,324	Net Added		
		2.0	270		010		-,,,,		۷,024	reminated		

		\$	Law \$15,	000 Non-	and	015,000 Under Non-	Chancery	Miscellaneous Remedies	Eminent Domain	Тах	Municipal Corporations	Mental Health	Divorce
Circuit	County		Jury	Jury	Jury	Jury	ļ						·
	Vermilion	Begun	69 +1 70 75	22 — —1 21 22	41 +3 44 37	258 1 -2 257 177	53 1 — 54 49	35 — 35 45	17 — — 17 3	155 — — 155 119	1 - 1 1	88 — 88 81	633 — — 633 618
5th	Circuit Totals	Begun	126 1 +1 128 122	43 — —1 42 46	55 — +3 58 43	449 1 -2 448 353	112 2 — 114 101	64 — 64 73	45 — 45 22	194 — — 194 185	1 - 1 2	92 — 92 82	1,161 — 1,161 1,104
6th	Champaign	Begun	175 2 — 177 139	67 — 67 17	4 — 4 23	572 — 572 404	122 — — 122 80	55 — — 55 34	2 2 1	16 — — 16 2		83 — — 83 50	936 — 936 808
	DeWitt	Begun	8 8 12	7 1 — 8 3	4 4 	21 — — 21 29	17 — — 17 11	9 — 9 1		9 9 18	1 - 1 1	6 6 4	85 — 85 97
	Douglas	Begun	11 — — 11 10		1 1 2	53 — — 53 53	10 — — 10 5	3 — 3 3	6 - 6 4	25 — 25 24	_	2 - 2 2	71 — — 71 53
	Macon	Begun	88 — — 88 101	20 — — 20 17	23 — — 23 22	538 — — 538 496	75 — — 75 47	28 — — 28 22	4 4 2	10 — — 10 7	 23	31 — — 31 54	805 — 805 830
	Moultrie	Begun	3 - 3 4	3 — — 3 —	 3	40 — — 40 39	5 — 5 1	2 — 2 4		6 — 6 9	_ _ 1	1 - 1 1	41 8 - 49 41
	Piatt	Begun	7 — 7 6	2 — 2 2	5 — 5 10	16 — — 16 15	10 — — 10 9	9 9 6	5 — 5 —	12 — — 12 7	— 1	3 - - 3 1	79 79 69
6th	.Circuit Totals	Begun	292 2 — 294 272	99 1 — 100 39	37 — 37 60	1,240 — — 1,240 1,036	239 — — 239 153	106 — — 106 70	17 — 17 8	78 — 78 67		126 — — 126 112	2,017 8 — 2,025 1,898
7th	. Greene	Begun	5 — — 5 3	 3	1 1 1	39 — — 39 28	6 — 6 —	1 — 1 1		5 	_ 	3 - - 3 3	85 2 — 87 119

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 1973

Family	Juvenile	Felony	Misdemeanors	Small Claims	Probate	Ordinance Violations	Traffic	Conservation Violations	Total		County	Circuit
207	192 4	211 5	1,010 9	1,089	344	2,502	10,150	137	17,214 23	Begun	Vermilion	
210 168	196 195	-7 209 177	+7 1,026 886	-1 1,088 807	344 317	2,502 2,407	10,150 10,169	137 147	17,237 16,500	TransferredNet AddedTerminated		
391 3	298 4	423 5	2,002 9	2,197	972	3,063	17,031	246 —	28,965 26	Begun	Circuit Totals	5th
394 324	302 267	-37 391 315	+37 2,048 1,791	-1 2,197 1,981	972 989	3,063 2,967	17,031 16,935	246 257	28,991 27,959	Transferred Net Added Terminated		
229	225	923 1	1,300	2,187	583	2,591	14,969 —	4	25,043 3		Champaign	6th
229 195	225 167	-167 757 612	+167 1,467 1,386	2,187 1,614	583 338	2,59 <u>1</u> 1,975	14,969 14,898	4 7	25,046 22,750	TransferredNet AddedTerminated		
35 —	30 —	71 1	244	338	113	57 —	1,553 —	7 —	2,615 3	Begun	DeWitt	
35 29	30 35	-8 64 79	+8 253 257	338 349	113 139	57 69	1,553 1,303	7 7	2,618 2,443			
29	7 —	29 —	175 —	309	90		1,671	56 —	2,548 —	Begun	Douglas	
29 23	7 13	29 24	175 300	309 300	90 111	— — 6	1,671 1,798	— 56 54	— 2,548 2,785			
165	393	409 —	2,164 —	2,831	448	1,104 —	15,416 —	91 —	24,666 —	Begun	Macon	
— 165 49	393 300	409 282	2,164 1,676	2,831 2,541	448 338	1,104 901	15,416 13,169	91 87	24,666 20,951	TransferredNet AddedTerminated		
11	7	22 —	87 —	205	99 2	4	926 —	253 —		Begun	Moultrie	
11 10	7 4	-6 16 8	+6 93 93	205 295	101 100	4 4	926 955	 253 256		TransferredNet AddedTerminated		
17 —	16 —	118 —	170 —	264 1	83 —	26 —	1,390 —	60 —	2,293 1	Begun	Piatt	
17 13	16 13	-1 117 31	+1 171 157	265 226	83 68	26 24	1,390 1,399	60 56		TransferredNet AddedTerminated		
486 —	678 —	1,572	4,140	6,134 1	1,416 2	3,782	35,925 —	471 —	17	Begun	Circuit Totals	6th
486 319	678 532	-182 1,392 1,036	+182 4,323 3,869	6,135 5,325	1,418 1,094	3,782 2,979	35,925 33,522	 471 467	58,898	TransferredNet AddedTerminated	***	
12	26 —	9	92 —	157 —	97 1	9	797 —	2	3	Begun Reinstated	Greene	7th
12 25	26 14	9 45	92 262	157 54	98 102	9 4	797 628	_ 2 2	1,349	TransferredNet AddedTerminated		

		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Law (\$15,	000 Non-	and	15,000 Under Non-	Chancery	Miscellaneous Remedies	Eminent Domain	Тах	Municipal Corporations	Mental Health	Divorce
Circuit	County		Jury	Jury	Jury	Jury					2		
	Jersey	Begun	18 — — 18 14	2 — 2 8	14 — 14 5	69 — 69 76	14 — — 14 14		_ _ _ _	1 — 1 12		3 — 3 1	94 — 94 108
	Macoupin	Begun	30 — — 30 38	22 — — 22 12		89 — — 89 88	28 — — 28 17	5 — 5 5	 11	169 — — 169 72			192 — 192 191
	Morgan	Begun	10 — — 10 19	6 — — 6 11	3 — — 3 5	81 1 — 82 123	12 — — 12 7	8 - 8 5	14 — 14 —	33 — — 33 15	— — 1	236 — 236 236	190 — — 190 172
	Sangamon	Begun	169 — — 169 127	54 — — 54 34		732 — 732 1,035	180 — — 180 230	139 — — 139 153	91 — 91 30	100 — — 100 114	************	124 — 124 106	1,118 — — 1,118 1,313
	Scott	Begun	1 1 1	2 2 	1 - 1 1	13 — — 13 22	2 — 2 3			12 — 12 13		1 - 1	16 — 16 17
7th	.Circuit Totals	Begun	233 — — 233 201	86 — — 86 68	19 — — 19 19	1,023 1 — 1,024 1,372	242 — 242 271	153 — — 153 174	105 — — 105 41	320 — 320 249	1 - 1 2	367 — 367 346	1,695 2 — 1,697 1,920
8th	. Adams	Begun	35 +7 42 51	15 -6 9 8	17 — +5 22 19	143 — —6 137 135	33 — — 33 25	49 — 49 39	11 — — 11 —	14 — 14 10	_	9	401 — — -401 330
	Brown	Begun		1 - 1 2	2 - 2 -	14 — 14 14	5 — 5 3	2 — 2 4		9			9 — 9 7
	Calhoun	Begun			 +1 1	8 -1 7 14	1 — 1 2	5 — — 5 9			1 - 1	1 - 1	19 5 — 24 19
	Cass	Begun	4 4 5	3 - - 3 1	1 - 1 2	15 1 — 16 15	5 — 5 10	11 11 9		8 	_ _ 1	1 - 1 1	70 — 70 59

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Family	Juvenile	Felony	Misdemeanors	Small Claims	Probate	Ordinance Violations	Traffic	Conservation Violations	Total		County	Circuit
31	41	52	224	158	87	1	1,291	33	2,133	Begun	Jersey	
		_								Reinstated Transferred		
31 10	41 42	52 33	224 260	158 299	87 43	1	1,291 1,108	33 39	2,133 2,072	Net Added		
37	76	67	476	451	266	198	2,053	15	4,174	Begun	Macoupin	
		 _5	— +5						<u> </u>	Reinstated	,	
37	76	62	481	451	266	198	2,053	15	4,174	Net Added		
31	65	55	458	344	201	140	2,087	12	3,830			
69 —	46	87 —	281 —	405 99	189	89 —	3,108	1 —	4,869 100	Begun	Morgan	
 69	— 46	-5 82	+5 286	— 504	189	— 89	3,108	<u> </u>	4,969	Transferred		
56	76	80	390	487	181	56	3,009	1	4,931	Terminated		
336	247	1,249	1,591	3,534	558	75	19,297	42	29,636		Sangamon	
	_	-35	+35		_					Reinstated Transferred		
336 916	247 231	1,214 1,065	1,626 1,576	3,534 3,584	558 561	75 42	19,297 19,120	42 38	29,636 30,279	Net Added Terminated		
17		5	38	131	40		264	21	564	Begun	Scott	
	_	-3	+3	_	1			_	1	Reinstated		
17	_	2	41	131	41		264	21	565	Net Added		
14		4	35	116	38		244	12	519	Terminated		
502	436	1,469	2,702	4,836 99	1,237 2	372	26,810	114	42,722 104		Circuit Totals	7th
		-48	+48					_		Transferred		
502 1,052	436 428	1,421 1,282	2,750 2,981	4,935 4,884	1,239 1,126	372 242	26,810 26,196	114 104	42,826 42,958			
81	158	188	351	634	406	1,490	5,833	38	9,906	Begun	Adams	8th
		 _27	+27	5 —	1	_		_	6	Reinstated		
81 77	158 135	161 135	378 390	639 999	407 502	1,490 1,378	5,833 5,670	38 37		Net Added		
5	11	41	122	59	34	1	496	19		Begun	Brown	
					- 34		490	-	- 030	Reinstated	BIOWII	
5	11	-2 39	+2 124	59	34	1	496	19	830			
2	14	34	106	59	26	2	503	17	802	Terminated		
2	13	29 1	120	7 2	28		591	26	851 8	Begun	Calhoun	
	13	-1 29	+1 121	9			 591	 26	859	Transferred		
12	12	28	136	18	17		581	18		Terminated		
23	21	36	154	204	81	39	1,348	20		Begun	Cass	
		-3	+3	***************************************		_	_	_	_	Reinstated Transferred		
23 27	21 19	33 31	157 144	204 229	81 70	39 35	1,348 1,292	20 20	2,046 1,983	Net Added		
		L			<u> </u>			<u> </u>		1	1	L

Circuit	County	300	Law (\$15,			15,000 Under Non- Jury	Chancery	Miscellaneous Remedies	Eminent Domain	Tax	Municipal Corporations	Mental Health	Divorce
	Mason	Begun Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	11 1 +1 13 8	3 -1 2 3	2 — — 2 1	38 38 39	5 5 10	9		6 - - 6 12		1 - 1 1	68 — — 68 82
	Menard	Begun	7 2 — 9 7	2 2 	 +1 1	29 — —1 28 22	7 — 7 6	1 — — 1	1 1	7 — 7 15			48 — 48 47
	Pike	Begun	6 +1 7 5	9 -1 8 3	4 +1 5 6	45 -1 44 46	7 — 7 12	9 9 9	5 — 5 1	21 — — 21 26	2 2 2		94 5 — 99 107
	Schuyler	Begun	8 — — 8 5		2 — 2 —	9 9 9	2 — 2 4	2 — 2 —		6 6 6		1 - 1 1	33 — — 33 33
8th	Circuit Totals	Begun	71 3 +9 83 84	33 — -8 25 18	28 +8 36 28	301 1 -9 293 294	65 — 65 72	88 — — 88 79	17 — — 17 1	71 — 71 91	4 — 4 4	13 — — 13 4	742 ,10 ,— 752 684
9th	Fulton	Begun	41 +1 42 55	6 1 5 3	11 +3 14 15	84 1 -3 82 80	18 — — 18 22	5 1 — 6 9	4 — 4 4	18 — 18 23		1 - - 1 1	219 — 219 220
	Hancock	Begun	8 - 8 8	8 8 2	2 — — 2 6	45 — — 45 40	7 — 7 10	13 — — 13 12	 1	5 5 5		3 — — 3 3	87 2 — 89 83
	Henderson	Begun	2 2 9	1 - 1 2	1 5 — 6 1	24 2 — 26 26	10 5 — 15 10	_ _ _ 1		4 — 4 12		3 — — 3 —	43 — 43 44
	Knox	Begun	49 +4 53 14	8 4 4 6	12 +11 23 16	145 1 -11 135 132	28 — — 28 21	22 — 22 21		9 93		168 — — 168 169	495 1 — 496 493
	McDonough	Begun	10 — — 10 19	13 — — 13 11	7 — 7 12	62 — — 62 69	9 — 9 5	59 — 59 56	 2	29 — 29 8			173 — — 173 194

Family	Juvenile	Felony	Misdemeanors	Small Claims	Probate	Ordinance Violations	Traffic	Conservation Violations	Total		County	Circuit
28 — 28 42	21 — 21 24	51 4 47 44	312 — +4 316 332	137 — — 137 123	112 1 — 113 101	60 — 60 109	1,061 — — — 1,104	49 — 49 48	1,974 2 — 1,976 2,092	Begun Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	Mason	
10 — 10 16	13 — — 13 21	18 — —1 17 18	132 — +1 133 136	141 5 — 146 187	63 — 63 60		761 — 761 766	17 — — 17 12	1,257 7 — 1,264 1,313	BegunReinstatedTransferredNet AddedTerminated	Menard	
19 — — 19 21	47 — 47 48	44 — —1 43 43	182 — +1 183 203	225 — — 225 214	90 — 90 66	38 — — 38 36	2,397 — 2,397 2,447	77 — — 77 64	3,321 5 — 3,326 3,359	Transferred	Pike	
5 — 5 5	6 6 3	6 — 6 16	36 — — 36 30	35 — — 35 35	50 — 50 59	5 — 5 5	783 — — 783 779	34 — 34 32	1,023 — — 1,023 1,022	Reinstated Transferred Net Added	Schuyler	
173 — 173 202	290 — — 290 276	413 1 -39 375 349	1,409 	1,442 12 — 1,454 1,864	864 2 — 866 901	1,633 — 1,633 1,565	13,270 — — 13,270 13,142	280 — — 280 248	21,207 29 — 21,236 21,383	Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	Circuit Totals	8th
41 41 38	32 — — 32 29	77 — —17 60 57	355 — +17 372 395	464 1 — 465 472	222 — — 222 200	264 — — 264 269	2,806 — 2,806 2,535	95 — — 95 98	4,763 3 — 4,766 4,625	Reinstated Transferred Net Added	Fulton	9th
38 — — 38 32	44 — — 44 55	38 — -6 32 34	243 — +6 249 247	256 — — 256 291	167 3 — 170 175	147 — — 147 145	1,629 — — 1,629 1,603	14 — — 14 19	2,754 5 — 2,759 2,771	Reinstated Transferred Net Added	Hancock	
19 — 19 16	5 5 2	28 — -4 24 10	103 +4 107 117	156 — — 156 133	54 — 54 42	34 — — 34 38	794 — — 794 781	129 — — 129 118	12 — 1,422		Henderson	
91 — 91 101	114 — — 114 86	166 — -40 126 134	619 +40 659 688	1,098 2 — 1,100 1,140	306 2 — 308 267	970 — 970 934	7,378 — 7,378 7,267	75 — — 75 70	11,759			
32 — 32 34	8 8 2	72 — 72 59	291 — — 291 299	208 — — 208 174	150 — 150 391	515 — — 515 388	4,034 — 4,034 3,496	95 — — 95 55	5,767	Rejunt Rejunt Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated		

		\$20	Law \$15,	Over ,000 Non- Jury		S15,000 Under Non- Jury	Chancery	Miscellaneous Remedies	Eminent Domain	Tax	Municipal Corporations	Mental Health	Divorce
Circuit	County	D		ļ	-	ļ			 		 	+	
	Warren	Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	14 — 14 12	3 — — 3 1	2 — 2 3	84 — 84 69	15 — — 15 13	2 — 2 3		8 - 8 6	 2		99 — 99 108
9th	. Circuit Totals	Begun	124 +5 129 117	39 -5 34 25	35 5 +14 54 53	444 4 -14 434 416	87 5 — 92 81	101 1 — 102 102	4 4 9	73 — — 73 57	 2	175 — — 175 173	1,116 3 — 1,119 1,142
10th	. Marshall	Begun	3 — — 3 14	3 - - 3 2		15 — — 15 18	7 — 7 8	1 — 1 2		24 — 24 17		3 - - 3 -	41 — 41 41
	Peoria	Begun	436 — — 436 411	80 — 80 37	56 — — 56 83	628 — — 628 532	138 — 138 243	187 — — 187 146	15 — — 15 17	292 — 292 197		322 — 322 268	1,431 — 1,431 1,555
	Putnam	Begun	5 — — 5 8	4 - 4 1		15 — — 15 9	4 4 4	1 1	 1	2 — — 2 5			14 — — 14 26
	Stark	Begun	+1 1 4	2 -1 1 4	2 — 2 1	3 — — 3 3	2 — 2 3		 1	2 - - 2 2	2 - - 2 2	1 1 1	15 1 — 16 15
	Tazewell	Begun	157 +2 159 195	14 — —1 13 12	25 — +6 31 47	275 1 -7 269 252	45 — — 45 54	61 — 61 50	4 4 9	51 — 51 29			694 3 — 697 685
10th	Circuit Totals	Begun	601 +3 604 632	103 — —2 101 56	83 — +6 89 131	936 1 -7 930 814	196 — 196 312	250 — 250 198	19 — — 19 28	371 — 371 250	2 - 2 2	326 — 326 269	2,195 4 — 2,199 2,322
11th	Ford	Begun	10 — — 10 15	2 2 4		30 — — 30 22	9 — 9 9	5 — 5 4	1 1 1	1 — 1 3		1 - 1 1	53 — — 53 52
	Livingston	Begun	31 — — 31 21	8 — — 8 10	1 - 1 2	98 — — 98 93	22 — — 22 14	31 — — 31 40	15 — 15 35	24 — 24 28		26 — — 26 39	208 — — 208 175

Family	Juvenile	Felony	Misdemeanors	Small Claims	Probate	Ordinance Violations	Traffic	Conservation Violations	Total		County	Circuit
29 — — 29 35	63 — 63 38	33 — -3 30 52	293 — +3 296 308	286 — 286 259	134 9 — 143 119	50 — — 50 52	2,787 — 2,787 2,722	48 — — 48 49	3,950 9 — 3,959 3,851	BegunReinstatedTransferredNet AddedTerminated	Warren	
250 — 250 250 256	266 — 266 212	414 -70 344 346	1,904 +70 1,974 2,054	2,468 3 — 2,471 2,469	1,033 14 — 1,047 1,194	1,980 — 1,980 1,826	19,428 — — 19,428 18,504	456 — 456 409	30,397 35 — 30,432 29,447	BegunReinstatedTransferredNet AddedTerminated	Circuit Totals	9th
17 — 17 13	3 3 	29 -6 23 14	74 — +6 80 79	115 — — 115 164	74 — — 74 62	71 — — 7† 1	567 — 567 620	45 — — 45 46	1,092 — — 1,092 1,101	Begun Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	Marshall	10th
433 — 433 393	495 — 495 605	966 	2,637 	3,904 — 3,904 3,455	818 — — 818 632	1,352 — 1,352 1,128	21,630 — — 21,630 21,859	37 — — 37 38	35,857 — 35,857 34,013	Begun Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	Peoria	
8 8 6	1 1 1	27 — -3 24 2	10 +3 13 17	46 — 46 47	23 — — 23 23		410 — 410 371	37 — — 37 37	607 607 558	BegunReinstatedTransferredNet AddedTerminated	Putnam	
7 7 6	6 6 3	1 -2 -1 4	45 1 +2 48 77	76 — — 76 74	63 — 63 52	8 8 9	213 — — 213 210	16 — — 16 20	464 2 — 466 491	Begun Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	Stark	
202 — 202 172	147 — 147 114	196 — —2 194 150	702 +2 704 717	938 — — 938 936	442 — 442 389	1,253 — — 1,253 1,129	11,656 — — 11,656 11,468	234 — 234 223	17,096 4 — 17,100 16,631	BegunReinstatedTransferredNet AddedTerminated	Tazewell	
667 667 590	652 — 652 723	1,219 -83 1,136 712	3,468 1 +83 3,552 2,762	5,079 — 5,079 4,676	1,420 — 1,420 1,158	2,684 ————————————————————————————————————	34,476 — 34,476 34,528	369 — 369 364	55,116 6 — 55,122 52,794	BegunReinstatedTransferredNet AddedTerminated	Circuit Totals	10th
23 — — 23 32	7 — 7 6	38 — -21 17 14	123 — +21 144 141	95 — 95 89	109 — — 109 187	47 — 47 37	1,564 — — 1,564 1,529	49 — 49 36	2,167 — 2,167 2,186	Begun Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated		11th
74 — 74 57	84 — 84 52	149 — —34 115 157	771 — +34 805 830	460 — 460 397	278 — — 278 174	79 — — 79 28	5,736 — 5,736 5,372	53 — — 53 30	8,148 — — 8,148 7,554	Begun Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	Livingston	

Circuit	County	sp.	Law \$15,	Over 000 Non- Jury		\$15,000 Under Non- Jury	Chancery	Miscellaneous Remedies	Eminent Domain	Tax	Municipal Corporations	Mental Health	Divorce
		Degue			2					37		<u> </u>	176
	Logan	Begun	23 2 +1 26 30	6 1 -1 6 6	+3 5 2	145 — -3 142 160	19 — — 19 20	10 — 10 14	3 — 3 25	37 — 37 42		1 1 1	176 6 — 182 178
	McLean	Begun Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	113 14 +10 137 128	20 -10 10 13	37 3 +18 58 49	321 23 -17 327 305	52 5 — 57 44	25 — 25 24	30 1 — 31 47	103 — 103 84	3 3 4	1 - 1	541 29 — 570 586
	Woodford	Begun	19 +1 20 23	24 8 -1 31 29	5 5 5	70 5 — 75 74	9 5 	1 - 1 1	1 1 2	7 — 7 8			136 2 — 138 138
11th	.Circuit Totals	Begun	196 16 +12 224 217	60 9 -12 57 62	45 3 +21 69 62	664 28 -20 672 654	111 10 — 121 101	72 — — 72 83	50 1 — 51 110	172 — — 172 165	3 3 4	29 — — 29 41	1,114 37 — 1,151 1,129
12th	. Iroquois	Begun	14 3 — 17 31	2 — 2 3	23 1 — 24 16	53 — — 53 88	14 — 14 22	12 — 12 10	1 - 1	7 — 7 20	2 - 2 2	4 - 4 8	99 — — 99 105
	Kankakee	Begun	55 1 +10 66 114	63 2 -10 55 32	12 1 +35 48 16	422 42 -35 429 493	42 4 46 40	97 1 — 98 159	2 2 — 4 4	151 2 — 153 143		102 10 — 112 114	607 36 — 643 738
	Will	Begun	259 11 +126 396 482	235 5 -122 118 78	30 14 +72 116 85	1,060 55 -71 1,044 916	299 5 — 304 162	243 1 — 244 212	23 — — 23 7	111 3 — 114 85	8 - - 8 10	133 — — 133 137	1,299 5 — 1,304 1,239
12th	Circuit Totals	Begun	328 15 +136 479 627	300 7 -132 175 113	65 16 +107 188 117	1,535 97 -106 1,526 1,497	355 9 — 364 224	352 2 — 354 381	26 2 — 28 11	269 5 — 274 248	10 — — 10 12	239 10 — 249 259	2,005 41 — 2,046 2,082
13th	Bureau	Begun	35 +2 37 37	12 1 -2 11 9	4 +5 9 2	97 5 92 95	18 2 — 20 22	47 — 47 44	3 3 2	29 — — 29 29	1 - - 1 1		182 3 — 185 163
	Grundy	Begun	32 +16 48 53	36 — -16 20 15	5 1 +1 7 9	39 -1 38 51	15 — — 15 18	11 — — 11 13	3 — — 3 8	23 — — 23 28	1 1 1		165 — — 165 192

Family	Juvenile	Felony	Misdemeanors	Small Claims	Probate	Ordinance Violations	Traffic	Conservation Violations	Total		County	Circuit
36 — 36 34	43 — — 43 35	98 2 -4 96 71	198 1 +4 203 216	648 — 648 566	152 — — 152 182	30 — — 30 27	5,043 — 5,043 4,829	12 — — 12 10	6,682 12 — 6,694 6,448	BegunReinstatedTransferredNet AddedTerminated	Logan	
132 — 132 149	92 — 92 94	128 19 -3 144 130	1,895 99 +3 1,997 1,831	1,907 86 -1 1,992 1,912	615 — 615 627	1,015 11 — 1,026 988	19,961 98 — 20,058 20,241	31 — — 31 27	27,022 388 — 27,410 27,283	BegunReinstatedTransferredNet AddedTerminated	McLean	
31 1 32 28	30 1 — 31 28	77 5 -21 61 64	219 1 +21 241 241	110 30 — 140 150	183 5 — 188 245	9 -9 11	2,527 — 2,527 2,618	22 — — 22 29	3,480 63 — 3,543 3,708	BegunReinstatedTransferredNet AddedTerminated	Woodford	
296 1 — 297 300	256 1 — 257 215	490 26 -83 433 436	3,207 101 +83 3,391 3,259	3,220 116 -1 3,335 3,114	1,337 5 — 1,342 1,415	1,180 11 — 1,191 1,091	34,831 98 — 34,929 34,589	167 — — 167 132	47,499 463 47,962 47,179	Begun Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	Circuit Totals	11th
42 — 42 43	52 — — 52 37	125 4 121 120	473 — +4 477 458	245 — 245 296	221 — — 221 235	8 — — 8 6	5,168 — 5,168 5,140	180 — — 180 154	6,745 4 — 6,749 6,794	BegunReinstatedTransferredNet AddedTerminated	Iroquois	12th
185 21 — 206 208	122 43 — 165 162	145 27 — 172 167	838 6 — 844 862	1,370 1 — 1,371 1,324	292 — 292 253	525 — — 525 537	14,283 — — 14,283 14,073	358 — 358 394	19,671 199 — 19,870 19,833	BegunReinstatedTransferredNet AddedTerminated	Kankakee	
234 2 — 236 616	409 — 409 207	330 4 -35 299 315	1,491 2 +35 1,528 1,411	3,493 203 -5 3,691 3,487	464 1 — 465 444	2,254 23 — 2,277 2,297	33,158 236 — 33,394 32,287	473 ,1 — 474 455	571 — 46,577	BegunReinstatedTransferredNet AddedTerminated	Will	
461 23 — 484 867	583 43 — 626 406	600 31 -39 592 602	2,802 8 +39 2,849 2,731	5,108 204 -5 5,307 5,107	977 1 — 978 932	2,787 23 — 2,810 2,840	52,609 236 — 52,845 51,500	1,011 1 — 1,012 1,003	774 — 73,196	BegunReinstatedTransferredNet AddedTerminated	Circuit Totals	12th
41 — 41 38	50 1 — 51 44	62 -21 41 32	415 5 +21 441 416	283 2 — 285 273	190 — — 190 209	119 — — 119 124	5,751 — 5,751 5,896	72 — 72 66	7,411 14 — 7,425 7,502	Begun Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	Bureau	13th
35 — 35 31	54 — 54 30	72 — –21 51 37	439 — +21 460 399	285 4 — 289 271	90 — 90 106	148 — — 148 127	2,871 — 2,871 2,801	151 — — 151 148	4,475 5 4,480 4,338	Begun Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	Grundy	

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			Law (\$15,	000		15,000 Under	Chancery	Miscellaneous Remedies	Eminent Domain		Municipal Corporations	ental Health	rce
Circuit	County	*	Jury	Non- Jury	Jury	Non- Jury	Chai	Misc	Emir	Тах	Mun	Mental	Divorce
	LaSalle	Begun	162 5 — 167 157	40 — 40 122	14 1 — 15 22	259 — — 259 155	65 — 65 42	35 — — 35 26	12 — 12 26	40 — 40 24	2 2 	14 — 14 13	624 — 624 524
13th	. Circuit Totals	Begun	229 5 +18 252 247	88 1 -18 71 146	23 2 +6 31 33	395 6 389 301	98 2 — 100 82	93 — — 93 83	18 18 36	92 — 92 81	4 4 2	14 — — 14 13	971 3 — 974 879
14th	. Henry	Begun	22 — — 22 26	7 7 4	5 — 5 7	85 — — 85 79	25 — — 25 23	32 — 32 32	7 — 7 5	7 — 7 20		7 7 7	208 — — 208 199
	Mercer	Begun	7 — 7 12	1 1	2 — 2 1	23 — — 23 36	11 — — 11 8	3 — — 3 6		3 3 2		4 4 4	82 — 82 79
	Rock Island	Begun	158 17 +11 186 138	60 2 -10 52 30	27 11 +30 68 97	473 1 -31 443 391	149 13 — 162 134	58 — — 58 66	12 — — 12 14	169 1 — 170 152		345 14 — 359 359	1,208 60 — 1,268 1,213
	Whiteside	Begun	18 — — 18 56	12 — 12 13	3 3 14	115 — — 115 121	24 — — 24 30	35 — — 35 35	1 1 3	34 — 34 35		5 — 5 6	362 1 — 363 312
14th	.Circuit Totals	Begun	205 17 +11 233 232	80 2 -10 72 47	37 11 +30 78 119	696 1 -31 666 627	209 13 — 222 195	128 — — 128 139	20 — 20 22	213 1 — 214 209		361 14 — 375 376	1,860 61 — 1,921 1,803
15th	.Carroll	Begun	7 — 7 8	3 — — 3 5	2 — — 2 3	65 65 63	10 — — 10 11	7 1 — 8 10		8 8 10	1 - 1 1	7 — 7 7	86 — 86 83
	Jo-Daviess	Begun	7 — 7 10	9 9 6	1 +2 3 7	52 3 -2 53 28	12 — — 12 7	 2	1 1 1	40 40 32		8 1 — 9	71 12 — 83 61
	Lee	Begun	21 +6 27 28	66 -4 62 58	3 1 +5 9 6	86 3 -7 82 64	30 — 30 31	16 — — 16 19		51 — 51 50		23 — — 23 15	175 2 — 177 171

Family	Juvenile	Felony	Misdemeanors	Small Claims	Probate	Ordinance Violations	Traffic	Conservation Violations	Total		County	Circuit
215 — 215 215 147	128 — — 128 114	135 — —12 123 92	1,640 +12 1,652 1,512	2,014 — 2,014 2,923	438 — 438 551	1,580 — — 1,580 1,414	9,446 — 9,446 9,275	98 — — 98 131	16,961 6 — 16,967 17,270	Begun Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	LaSalle	
291 — 291 216	232 1 — 233 188	269 	2,494 5 +54 2,553 2,327	2,582 6 — 2,588 3,467	718 — 718 866	1,847 — 1,847 1,665	18,068 — — 18,068 17,972	321 — — 321 345	28,847 25 — 28,872 29,110	BegunReinstatedTransferredNet AddedTerminated	Circuit Totals	13th
90 — 90 64	57 — 57 59	50 — -21 29 33	372 — +21 393 379	385 — 385 397	248 — 248 201	416 — — 416 365	7,416 — 7,416 7,405	54 — 54 58	9,493 — — 9,493 9,363	Reinstated Transferred Net Added	Henry	14th
20 — 20 15	20 — — 20 5	41 -7 34 22	121 +7 128 120	125 — — 125 129	110 — — 110 85	10 — — 10 7	1,233 — — 1,233 1,129	59 — — 59 63	1,875 — — 1,875 1,723	Reinstated Transferred Net Added	Mercer	
326 19 — 345 704	213 65 — 278 257	521 17 -19 519 532	3,012 10 +19 3,041 3,118	3,019 2 — 3,021 3,840	635 1 — 636 573	849 1 — 850 765	30,039 7 30,046 30,034	122 — — 122 117	41,395 241 — 41,636 42,534	Reinstated Transferred Net Added	Rock Island	
159 — 159 162	133 — — 133 141	249 5 244 249	1,053 — +5 1,058 921	461 — 461 471	268 — — 268 191	54 — — 54 47	4,922 — 4,922 4,953	150 — — 150 154	8,058 1 — 8,059 7,914	Reinstated Transferred Net Added	Whiteside	
595 19 — 614 945	423 65 — 488 462	861 17 -52 826 836	4,558 10 +52 4,620 4,538	3,990 2 — 3,992 4,837	1,261 1 — 1,262 1,050	1,329 1 1,330 1,184	43,610 7 43,617 43,521	385 — 385 392	60,821 242 — 61,063 61,534	Transferred	Circuit Totals	14th
25 — — 25 43	21 — — 21 83	28 -7 21 14	240 +7 247 250	167 — 167 168	78 — — 78 69	86 3 — 89 159	1,763 — 1,763 1,775	89 — — 89 88	2,693 4 — 2,697 2,850	Reinstated Transferred Net Added	Carroll	15th
17 1 — 18 15	25 1 — 26 20	46 2 -6 42 24	259 +6 265 257	203 — — 203 217	110 — — 110 117	410 — 410 399	2,987 ————————————————————————————————————	486 — 486 487	4,744 20 4,764 4,640	Reinstated Transferred Net Added	Jo-Daviess	
66 66 79	73 3 — 76 53	210 1 -18 193 166	972 1 +18 991 883	270 1 — 271 256	154 2 — 156 221	45 — — 45 43	5,099 — 5,099 4,890	103 — — 103 99	7,463 16 — 7,479 7,155	Reinstated Transferred Net Added	Lee	

Circuit	County	94	Law(\$15,(Jury	Over 000 Non- Jury		15,000 Under Non- Jury	Chancery	Miscellaneous Remedies	Eminent Domain	Тах	Municipal Corporations	Mental Health	Divorce
	Ogle	Begun	32 +1 33 19	17 2 -1 18 25	9 +1 10 11	179 1 -1 179 150	38 — — 38 35	15 1 — 16 15	2 — — 2 4	13 — — 13 7		17 — — 17 17	268 3 — 271 263
	Stephenson	Begun	15 — +1 16 21	10 -1 9 11	1 - +1 2 7	70 — —1 69 93	43 — 43 37	5 — 5 —		15 — — 15 2		9 - 9 -	233 — — 233 245
15th	Circuit Totals	Begun	82 +8 90 86	105 2 -6 101 105	16 1 +9 26 34	452 7 -11 448 398	133 — — 133 121	43 2 — 45 46	3 2 — 5 28	127 — — 127 101	1 - 1 1	64 1 65 48	833 17 — 850 823
16th	. DeKalb	Begun	46 4 +12 62 46	33 2 -10 25 17	13 1 +12 26 27	179 1 -11 169 166	39 — 39 43	22 1 — 23 24	53 — — 53 24	48 1 — 49 71	2 - 2 1	17 — — 17 19	310 15 — 325 329
Acceptance of the Control of	Kane	Begun	319 20 — 339 278	152 7 — 159 164	75 5 — 80 67	1,121 22 — 1,143 1,017	220 11 — 231 190	127 5 — 132 103	3 1 4 16	560 3 — 563 486	6 1 7 5	704 — 704 669	1,710 30 — 1,740 1,652
	Kendall	Begun	23 +7 30 18	15 6 9 10	3 +4 7 7	66 4 62 54	24 — 24 15	3 — 3 5	3 3 	2 - 2 -	2 - 2 1	9 - 9 9	145 — — 145 133
16th	. Circuit Totals	Begun	388 24 +19 431 342	200 9 16 193 191	91 6 +16 113 101	1,366 23 - 15 1,374 1,237	283 11 — 294 248	152 6 — 158 132	59 1 — 60 40	610 4 — 614 557	10 1 11 7	730 — 730 697	2,165 45 — 2,210 2,114
17th	. Boone	Begun	11 — — 11 22	7 — 7 6	2 - 2 3	68 68 73	23 — — 23 21	7 - 7 6		2 — 2 2	1 1 1	9 9 	238 — 238 358
	Winnebago	Begun	248 3 +3 254 225	52 1 -3 50 60	52 1 +8 61 48	958 5 -8 955 829	328 6 — 334 271	185 3 — 188 113	49 49 7	71 — — 71 75		625 — 625 602	1,866 4 — 1,870 1,974
17th	.Circuit Totals	Begun	259 3 +3 265 247	59 1 -3 57 66	54 1 +8 63 51	1,026 5 -8 1,023 902	351 6 — 357 292	192 3 — 195 119	49 — — 49 10	73 — — 73 77	1 - 1 1	634 — 634 602	2,104 4 2,108 2,332

Family	Juvenile	Felony	Misdemeanors	Small Claims	Probate	Ordinance Violations	Traffic	Conservation Violations	Total		County	Circuit
88	76	209	1,368	477	193	3	3,685	221	6,910		Ogle	
	_		+29	1 —			_		8	Transferred		
88 117	76 141	180 141	1,397 1,510	478 453	193 174	3 3	3,685 3,433	221 229	6,918 6,747	Net Added Terminated		
129	48 —	191 —	597 —	662 —	263 22	500 —	5,346 27	62 —	8,199 49	Reinstated	Stephenson	
129 81	 48 24	-17 174 157	+ 17 614 693	662 544	285 272	500 450	5,373 5,141	62 82	8,248 7,860			
325 1	243 4	684 3	3,436	1,779 2	798 24	1,044	18,880 27	961	30,009 97	Begun	Circuit Totals	15th
326 335	247 321	-77 610 502	+77 3,514 3,593	1,781 1,638	822 853	1,047 1,054	18,907 18,180	961 985	30,106 29,252	Transferred Net Added Terminated		
102 10	80 38	238	1,404	694 1	217	310	8,083	36	1 ₄ ,926 74	Begun	DeKalb	16th
112	— 118	−7 231	+7 1,411	-3 692	 217	 310	8,083	— 36	12,000	Transferred		
105	88	217	1,441	649	215	338	7,514	36	11,370	Terminated		
406 8	521 2	852 6	4,656	11,396 133	604 —	1,943	42,524 —	134 —	68,033 254	Begun Reinstated	Kane	
414 380	523 410	-1 857 810	+1 4,657 4,527	11,529 10,828	604 556	1,943 1,891	42,524 43,223	134 134	68,287 67,406	TransferredNet AddedTerminated		
47	55 —	56	231	137	99	53	3,076	76 —	4,125	Begun	Kendall	
 47	 55	-4 52	+4 235	-1 136	99	 53	3,076	— 76	 4,125	Transferred		
28	43	39	146	120	89	43	2,674	65	3,499			
555 18	656 40	1,146	6,291	12,227 134	920 —	2,306	53,683	246 —	84,084 328	Reinstated	Circuit Totals	16th
 573	696	-12 1,140	+12 6,303	-4 12,357	920	2,306	53,683	246	84,412	Transferred		
513	541	1,066	6,114	11,597	860	2,272	53,411	235	82,275	Terminated		
80	32	34	439	308	104	634	4,273	29 —	6,301 —	Begun	Boone	17th
 80	32	-6 28	+6 445	308	104	634	4,273	 29	6,301	Transferred		
83	29	18	422	433	151	637	4,291	26	6,585	Terminated		
714 8	612 10	1,173 1	3,300	8,788 7	831	4,053	54,135 —	185 —	78,225 52	Begun	Winnebago	
 722	622	-158 1,016	+158 3,461	8,795	831	4,053	54,135	— 185		Transferred	***	
671	591	586	3,282	9,020	533	4,053	48,493	185	71,618			
794 8	644 10	1,207 1	3,739 3	9,096 7	935	4,687	58,408	214	84,526 52	Begun	Circuit Totals	17th
— 802	654	-164 1,044	1 + 164 3,906	9,103	935	4,687	 58,408	 214	84,578	Transferred		
754	620	604	3,704	9,453	684	4,690	52,784	211	78,203			

		(ja.	Law (§ \$15,	000 Non-	and	\$15,000 Under Non-	Chancery	Miscellaneous Remedies	Eminent Domain	Тах	Municipal Corporations	Mental Health	Divorce
Circuit	County		Jury	Jury	Jury	Jury					Σ		
18th	DuPage	Begun	487 9 +194 690 649	374 2 -193 183 200	138 3 +94 235 147	1,775 17 -95 1,697 1,076	327 4 — 331 270	300 — 300 243	25 — 25 21	1,124 — — 1,124 898		22 — — 22 3	2,233 5 — 2,238 2,148
18th	Circuit Totals	Begun	487 9 +194 690 649	374 2 -193 183 200	138 3 +94 235 147	1,775 17 -95 1,697 1,076	327 4 — 331 270	300 — 300 243	25 — 25 21	1,124 — 1,124 898		22 — — 22 3	2,233 5 2,238 2,148
19th	Lake	Begun	413 4 +9 426 541	249 4 -9 244 270	59 2 +3 64 79	1,524 5 -2 1,527 1,260	376 1 377 349	184 1 — 185 158	29 — — 29 22	236 1 — 237 138	21 — — 21 11	123 — — 123 129	2,143 — 2,143 2,301
	McHenry	Begun	123 1 — 124 226	14 — 14 17	18 — — 18 22	501 — 501 424	95 — 95 128	44 — 44 50	8 - - 8 3	34 — 34 37			628 — 628 846
19th	. Circuit Totals	Begun	536 5 +9 550 767	263 4 -9 258 287	77 2 +3 82 101	2,025 5 -2 2,028 1,684	471 1 — 472 477	228 1 — 229 208	37 — 37 25	270 1 — 271 175	_ _ 27	123 — — 123 129	2,771 — 2,771 3,147
20th	. Monroe	Begun	8 +2 10 12	8 -2 6 3	 +3 3 6	17 2 15 16	7 — 7 9	11 — — 11 11	1 - 1 4	4 - 4 3			53 — 53 49
	Perry	Begun	15 +2 17 13	9 2 7 7	5 — 5 8	41 7 — 48 58	21 — — 21 12	7 — 7 7		13 — 13 6	_		89 7 — 96 117
	Randolph	Begun	12 1 — 13 25	6 6 10	7 — 7 5	19 — — 19 14		74 — 74 64	1 — 1 1	17 — — 17 15		224 — — 224 221	117 1 — 118 113
	St. Clair	Begun	623 12 +34 669 527	82 3 -11 74 42	160 16 +57 233 535	859 13 -79 793 893	306 5 — 311 115	196 5 — 201 142	31 - 31 20	321 	3		1,891 1,891 1,827
	Washington	Begun	9 +1 10 3	4 -1 3 1	1 1	9 — 9 6	2 — 2 6	4 4 2	 2	8 8 11		3 - - 3 4	32 — 32 28

			JIII 13									
Family	Juvenile	Felony	Misdemeanors	Small Claims	Probate	Ordimance Violations	Traffic	Conservation Violations	Total		County	Circuit
610	458 —	1,778	4,863	3,743	763 —	12,171 —	60,580 —		91,771 49	Begun	DuPage	ļ
610 490	458 305	-442 1,345 1,000	+442 5,305 4,853	3,743 3,477	763 605	12,171 9,952	60,580 60,467	_	91,820 86,804	TransferredNet AddedTerminated		
610	458 —	1,778 9	4,863 —	3,743 —	763 —	12,171 —	60,580		91,771 49		Circuit Totals	18th
610 490	458 305	-442 1,345 1,000	+442 5,305 4,853	3,743 3,477	763 605	12,171 9,952	60,580 60,467		91,820 86,804	Transferred Net Added Terminated		
564	578 —	181 —	4,314 —	8,679	1,350 —	5,635 —	50,150 —	352 —	77,160 18	Reinstated	Lake	19th
564 521	578 468	181 198	4,314 4,412	-1 8,678 8,337	1,350 1,398	5,635° 5,354	50,150 50,396	352 345	77,178 76,687	TransferredNet AddedTerminated		
215	166	245 —	1,528	1,604	355 —	920 —	14,748 —	67 —	21,319 1	Begun	McHenry	
215 160	166 129	-11 234 230	+11 1,539 1,210	1,604 1,516	355 464	920 746	14,748 13,608	67 67	21,320 19,890	TransferredNet AddedTerminated		
779 —	744 —	426 —	5,842	10,283	1,705 —	6,555 —	64,898 —	419	98,479 19	Begun	Circuit Totals	19th
779 681	744 597	-11 415 428	+11 5,853 5,622	-1 10,282 9,853	1,705 1,862	6,555 6,100	64,898 64,004	419 412	98,498 96,577	TransferredNet AddedTerminated		
15 —		13 —	201	96 —	118 —	1	1,409 —	7 —	1,969 —	Begun	Monroe	20th
15 12		-1 12 12	+1 202 201	-1 95 102	118 110	1	1,409 1,393	7 6	1,969 1,949	TransferredNet AddedTerminated		
29 —	5 —	25 1	78 1	104 —	119 3	85 —	1,274 —	9		Begun	Perry	
29 19	5 5	-5 21 30	+5 84 79	104 95	122 98	— 85 88	1,274 1,244	9	1,947 1,896	TransferredNet AddedTerminated		
64 1	12 —	60 —	182	275 —	163 —		2,208 —	42 —	3,483 3	Begun Reinstated	Randolph	
65 65	12 10	-5 55 43	(+)5 187 202	275 225	163 102	. —	2,208 2,189	42 34	3,486 3,337	TransferredNet AddedTerminated		
1,050 —	688 —	434 —	2,369	6,197 —	696 —	2,876 —	23,434 —	2	54	Begun	St. Clair	
1,050 742	688 534	-39 395 352	+39 2,408 2,200	-1 6,196 4,989	696 583	2,876 2,394	23,434 21,294	2 2	42,272	TransferredNet AddedTerminated		
8	3	11 —	37 1	108	112		1,091 —	7		Begun	Washington	
 8 9	 3 9	11 14	 38 39	108 122	112 86	<u>-</u>	1,091 1,140	7 7		TransferredNet AddedTerminated		

NUMBER OF CASES BEGUN AND TERMINATED

				Over 5,000		\$15,000 Under	cery	Miscellaneous Remedies	ent.	maın	nicipal Corporations	ental Health	ео
Circuit	County	*	Jury	Non- Jury	Jury	Non- Jury	Chancery	Misce Rer	Eminent	Tax	Municipal	Mental Healt	Divorce
20th	Circuit Totals	Begun	667 13 +39 719 580	109 3 -16 96 63	173 16 +60 249 554	945 20 -81 884 987	336 5 — 341 142	292 5 — 297 226	33 — 33 27	363 — 363 971	3 - 3 5	227 — — 227 225	2,182 8 — 2,190 2,134
	Downstate Totals	Begun	5,765 127 +517 6,409 6,611	2,513 43 -480 2,076 1,822	1,405 80 +468 1,953 2,171	17,139 231 -489 16,881 15,527	4,269 72 — 4,341 3,878	21	673 6 — 679 599	5,080 11 — 5,091 4,855	3 — 118	25 — 4,969	32,186 337 — 32,523 32,694
	Cook	Begun	2,919 1,552 +10,869 15,340 15,763	15,063 689 -10,869 4,883 4,612	7,056 1,710 +1,794 10,560 10,876	73,307 1,428 -1,782 72,953 75,287	13,499 (3 — 13,502 11,175	1,097 1 — 1,098 696	_	100,909 3,365 — 104,274 90,137	_ _ 41	3,868	29,226 — 29,226 29,537
	State Totals	Begun	8,684 1,679 +11,386 21,749 22,374	17,576 732 -11,349 6,959 6,434	8,461 1,790 +2,262 12,513 13,047	90,446 1,659 -2,271 89,834 90,814	75 — 17,843	22 — 4,177	6 — 848	105,989 3,376 — 109,365 94,992	3 — 159	25 — 8,837	337 — 61,749

FOOTNOTES - The following notes are made for the statistics of the Circuit Court of Cook County: (a) The chancery category includes housing cases, e.g., cases requiring appointment of trustees in receivership during rehabilitation or demolition of buildings; (b) The felony category includes cases initiated as felonies but may have been reduced to misdemeanors; (c) The misdemeanor

											····	
Family	Juvenile	Felony	Misdemeanors	Small	Probate	Ordinance Violations	Traffic	Conservation Violations	Total		County	Circuit
1,166 1 — 1,167 847	708 — 708 558	543 1 -50 494 451	2 +50	-2		2,962	_	— 67	77 —		Circuit Totals	20th
9,837 74 — 9,911 9,954	168 — 9,139	16,135 119 -1,588 14,666 12,530	151 +1,588 67,783	679 -16 96,159	56 — 20,943	38	368 — 659,832	7,199	2,610 — 1,022,166	BegunReinstatedTransferredNet AddedTerminated	Downstate Totals	
4,260	21,292 216 — 21,508 23,058	1,674 (b) 7,766		79,971 767 -12 80,726 79,972		(e) (e) (e)	1,274,426 — — 1,274,426 1,229,053	(e) (e) (e)	11,405 — 2,043,994	Begun Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	Cook	
74 — 14,171	384 — 30,647	1,793 -1,594 22,432	151 +1,588 458,242	1,446 -28 176,885	56 — 31,466	38 — 58,415	368 — 1,934,258	7,199	14,015 — 3,066,160	Begun Reinstated Transferred Net Added Terminated	State Totals	

category includes ordinance and conservation violation cases, and (d) preliminary hearings in felony cases; and (e) In the ordinance violation and conservation violation categories reference should be made to footnote (c).

Felony	Misdemeanors	This errata corrects the state totals in the felony and misdemeanor categories.	•
1,793 -1588 22,432	151 +1,588 456654	Begun State Totals Transferred Net Added Terminated	

THE TREND OF ALL CASES, THE NUMBER OF LAW-JURY CASE VERDICTS, TIME LAPSE BETWEEN DATE OF FILING AND DATE OF VERDICT AND THE AVERAGE DELAY (IN MONTHS) IN REACHING VERDICT IN LAW-JURY CASES TRIED DURING 1973

Alexander Jackson Johnson Massac Pope Pulaski Saline Union Williamson Circuit Total Crawford Edwards Franklin Gallatin Hamilton Hardin Jefferson Lawrence Wayne Wayne Wayne Circuit Total Golf Colnistian Circuit Total Colay Madison Circuit Total Colay Madison Circuit Total Colay Madison Circuit Total Colay Madison Circuit Total Colay Circuit Total Colay Circuit Total Colay Madison Circuit Total Colay Circuit Total Circuit Total Circuit Total Circuit Total Circuit Total	3,213 3,213 9,226 908 1,836 3,55 2,324 3,144	erminated	Gain	300	Law-July Cases	\C									Timo
kander kander kan nison nison nison nison nison nison nison nison night niton niton niton nistian nist	3,213 9,226 908 1,836 3,55 2,324 3,144 3,144			660	Terminated by Verdict	Verdict Which Involve A Death or Personal Injury	Under 1 Year	1 Year to 11/2 Years	11/2 Years to 2 Years	2 Years to 21/2 Years	21/2 Years to 3 Years	3 Years to to 31/2 Years	31/2 Years to 4 Years	Over 4 Years	Elapsed (Months)
awford. wards anklin allatin militon mordin fferson. fferson. fferson. wrence chland abash abash hite coult Total mristian adison ristian mristian av mristian adison adison mristian adison a	31,503	2,895 9,414 855 1,874 321 2,297 2,989 2,955 7,170	188 88	318 	- E S - 0 0 0 E 8 8	- E S - S - 5	0 -0	0	6 %	4			*	- - 014	72.3 16.0 23.8 20.6 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
ond adison ircuit Total ircuit Total hristian hristian linton ffingham ayette ssper arion ontgomery helby	2,213 4,607 1,399 967 967 2,505 2,505 2,505 2,781 1,781 2,447 2,409	2,015 854 1,324 990 410 3,130 2,139 2,302 1,908 1,908 2,153 2,153		198 7 4111 75	000000400-008	0 0 - 0	0 0 4	- - - 0	î i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i	- -			*		9.9 9.9 13.1 17.5 12.5
hristian Jay Jinton Jinton Jintoham Jayette Jayette Jayette Jayette Jarion Johntgomery Johntgomery Johnty Total	1,523 43,453 44,976	1,339 46,400 47,739	2,947	184	6 75 81	4 64 68	223	049	13	1 4 4	20	1 2 5 2	1 & &	100	13.6 31.5 30.2
	4,596 1,934 2,087 5,388 3,680 7,19 6,154 4,594 31,642	4,196 1,944 1,692 5,325 3,803 6,114 6,114 2,589 30,180	123 10	400 395 63 63 105 40 691 1,462	1 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	- + 00 + 0 ×	- -	- -			111111111			- 0 6	20.2
Clark Coles Cumberland Edgar Vermillion Circuit Total	2,993 5,465 945 2,351 17,237 28,991	2,917 5,360 858 2,324 16,500 27,959	11111	76 105 87 27 737 1,032	0400770	4 0 o t	- 64	1- 000	53 2	0 0			+		16.5 14.2 24.0 21.5
Champaign DeWitt Douglas Macon Moultrie Piatt Circuit Total	25,046 2,618 2,548 24,666 1,726 2,294 58,898	22,750 2,443 2,785 20,951 1,828 2,113 52,870	237	2,296 175 3,715 181 6,028	11 8 1 9 1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	200	9 4 - #	0 - 0 0	- 0 m	0 0	0 0	1	0 +0	0 0	20.9 23.9 15.1 23.1 7.5 21.5

THE TREND OF ALL CASES, THE NUMBER OF LAW-JURY CASE VERDICTS, TIME LAPSE BETWEEN DATE OF FILING AND DATE OF VERDICT AND THE AVERAGE DELAY (IN MONTHS) IN REACHING VERDICT IN LAW-JURY CASES TRIED DURING 1973

Average	Elapsed (Months)	62.0 15.0 20.8 15.8 21.6	24.1 13.4 21.6 5.9 18.5	20.8 9.7 20.9 22.4 34.7 21.5	17.8 17.8 — — 15.1 16.7	22.9 26.4 19.2 23.1 12.9 21.9	3.2 30.3 41.7 37.6	22.1 19.7 25.6 24.2	31.1 19.5 20.3 11.7 20.1
	Over 4 Years	- -		111111	11111	2	1 1 0 0	1100	-1-10
	31/2 Years to 4 Years	- -		111111	11111	11111	ოო		1111
	3 Years to 31/2 Years	- -	-	111111	+- +-	111010	11		- -
esdi	21/2 Years to 3 Years		0 0	- - 4	0 0	- 10 0	4 4		1
Time Lapse	2 Years to 21/2 Years		0 0		0 - 4	0 0	4+0	ω ω	18814
	11/2 Years to 2 Years	- 0 4	- - []0	0 - 0	9 8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	0	11	3 7 01	8 2 10
	1 Year to 11/2 Years	aa 9	- - 0	0 - 0	1	- 2 2 2 2 5 0	1100	- C 8 L	1-6-0
	Under 1 Year	- - 0	2 2 6	11112	101195		- 4 ·c	1 1	+ 0 ts + 0
Number of Cases Terminated by		c 8 1	0 2 - 0 2	4 00	22 - 1	0.4 rv ti 0.00	1 7 7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	9 0 0 0 0	- E - T - Z - Z - Z - Z - Z - Z - Z - Z - Z
Number of	Terminated by Verdict	1	800 W + 0 W O 9	v-00v-5	23 2 2 3 4 5 5 3 4 5 5 3 4 5 5 3 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6	£ 4 0 8 5 £ £	1 8 22 31	7 3 20 30	2 14 31 31
	Loss	22 61 344 38 46	18 83 1 1 - 1	141 60 195 493 108 985	1,844 49 469 2,328	594 246 127 783	37 1,645 1,637	142	130
Currency	Gain	643 132	28 13 116 49 33 147	15	9	19 	45	77 303 238	898 471
Total Cases		1,327 2,072 3,830 4,931 30,279 519 42,958	9,940 872 872 1,983 2,092 1,313 3,359 1,022 1,022	4,625 2,771 1,362 11,564 5,274 3,851 29,447	1,101 34,013 558 558 491 16,631 52,794	2,186 7,554 6,448 27,283 3,708 47,179	6,794 19,833 44,932 71,559	7,502 4,338 17,270 29,110	9,363 1,723 42,534 7,914 61,534
	Reinstated	1,349 2,133 4,174 4,969 29,636 565 42,826	9,912 830 859 2,046 1,976 1,264 3,326 1,023 2,1,236	4,766 2,759 1,422 11,759 5,767 3,959 30,432	1,092 35,857 607 466 17,100 55,122	2,167 8,148 6,694 27,410 3,543 47,962	6,749 19,870 46,577 73,196	7,425 4,480 16,967 28,872	9.493 1,875 41,636 8,059 61,063
County		Greene Jersey Macoupin Morgan Sangamon Scott Circuit Total	Adams. Brown Calhoun Cass Mason Meard Pike Schulyer Circuit Total	Fulton Hancock Henderson Knox McDonough Warren Circuit Total	Marshall Peoria Putnam Stark Tazewell Circuit Total	Ford Livingston Logan McLean Woodford Circuit Total	Iroquois Kankakee Will Circuit Total	Bureau Grundy LaSalle Circuit Total	Henry Mercer Rock Island Whiteside Circuit Total
Circuit		7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th

THE TREND OF ALL CASES, THE NUMBER OF LAW-JURY CASE VERDICTS, TIME LAPSE BETWEEN DATE OF FILING AND DATE OF VERDICT AND THE AVERAGE DELAY (IN MONTHS) IN REACHING VERDICT IN LAW-JURY CASES TRIED DURING 1973

Average Time	Elapsed (Months)	15.0 10.9 18.1 14.5	25.6 21.0 30.9 22.0	42.2 23.3 23.9	22.5 22.5	26.5 35.8 28.3	16.1 8.5 29.3 34.6 28.0	37.1 37.1	24.6	32.0
	Over 4 Years	- -	4 4	100		ω 4	5 5		46	46
	31/2 Years to 4 Years		0 4	~ ~		ღღა	0 0		30	30
	3 Years to 31/2 Years	[]]]]]	0 0	2	44	4 t c	∞ ∞		41	41
арѕе	2 ¹ / ₂ Years to 3 Years		12+0	1	88	752	~ + 8		72	72
Time Lapse	2 Years to 21/2 Years		- -	 4 4	===	4 - 5	1 1 2 2		98	98
	11/2 Years to 2 Years		- 2 6	ى مى س	16 16	0t 10	2 		134	134
	1 Year to 11/2 Years	0 - 6	9 + 10	اسم	21	01 2 2 2	ε 4 <i>γ</i>		138	138
	Under 1 Year	2428	2 18 20	155	22	9 1 7	- - 0 4		128	128
Number of Cases Terminated by	Verdict Which Involve A Death or Personal Injury	0-041	3 33 1 37	20 21	41	38 8 46	4 1 4 4 1 0 0 0 0	N/A N/A	499	499
Number of I	Terminated by Verdict	0 2 2 2 2 4 4	5 42 3 50	30 31	62 62	45 11 56	6 0 1 62 7 70	975 975	675	1,650
ncy	Loss	124 324 171 388 854	630 881 626 2,137	6,659	5,016 5,016	491 1,430 1,921	20 51 149 4,140 	15,241*	33,970	49,211
Currency	Gain	153	1111	284	1 1				1	ı
Total Cases		2,850 4,640 7,155 6,747 7,860 29,252	11,370 67,406 3,499 82,275	6,585 71,618 78,203	86,804 86,804	76,687 19,890 96,577	1,949 1,896 3,337 38,132 1,489 46,803	1,907,152 1,907,152	988,196	2,895,348
Total Cases	Reinstated	2,697 4,764 7,479 6,918 8,248 30,106	12,000 68,287 4,125 84,412	6,301 78,277 84,578	91,820 91,820	77,178 21,320 98,498	1,969 1,947 3,486 42,272 1,450 51,124	2,043,994	1,022,166	3,066,160
County		Carroll Jo Daviess Lee Ogle Stephenson Circuit Total	DeKalb Kane Kendall Circuit Total	Boone	DuPage	Lake	Monroe Perry Randolph St. Clair Washington Circuit Total	Cook	Downstate Totals	State Totals
Circuit		15th	16th	17th	18th 18th	19th	20th	Cook Cook		-

*This figure represents the difference between the number of cases pending at the start of calendar year 1973 and the end of calendar year 1973, including inventory adjustments.

DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH FELONIES

						DISPUSITIO	NOT CONVIC				LEOI
					Red	duced or Dismiss			d But Not C	Convicted	
Circuit	County	Total Number of Defendants Disposed of	Total Not Convicted	Discharged at Preliminary Hearing	Dismissed On Motion of Defendant	Dismissed On Motion of State	Reduced To Misdemeanor	Acquitted By Court	Acquitted By Jury	Convicted of Misdemeanor	Total Convicted
1st	Alexander Jackson Johnson Massac Pope Pulaski	213 18 74 4 29	44 140 12 59 3 20	*> 	1 1 - - - 2	43 125 10 48 3 11	11 1 10 	- - - - -	- 3 1 1 -	_ _ _ _	18 72 6 15 1
	Saline Union Williamson	74 33 175	33 27 107	2 1 —	3 2	31 18 98	5 4	 2	_ 		41 6 68
1st	Circuit Totals	682	445	7	9	387	34	2	6		236
2nd	Crawford Edwards Franklin Gallatin Hamilton Hardin Jefferson Lawrence Richland Wabash Wayne White Circuit Totals	13 8 77 42 24 9 132 30 34 82 34 44 529	7 6 60 39 22 4 106 22 18 26 27 30 367	1 8 2 12	1 19 1 4 25	3 4 52 33 17 4 69 13 11 16 19 26 267	2 8 5 5 - 4 6 1 3 4 - 40			1 1 1 3 5	6 2 17 3 2 5 24 8 16 56 7 14
3rd	Bond	18 815 833	6 594 600	1 56 57	1 22 23	1 362 363	2 130 132	1 3 4	 5 5	16 16	12 219 231
4th	Christian Clay Clinton Effingham Fayette Jasper Marion Montgomery Shelby Circuit Totals	70 39 19 43 41 6 116 79 17 430	41 27 8 27 27 5 79 56 15 285	3 1 2 4 10	2 1 2 2 7	25 15 5 27 18 2 69 50 8 219	12 9 — 7 1 6 3 3 41	3 - 1 - - - 4	2 1 3	- - - - - - 1	29 12 9 16 14 1 37 23 2 143
5th	Clark Coles Cumberland Edgar Vermillion Circuit Totals	3 114 14 38 228 397	1 80 10 35 108 234	11 11 22	 3 7 10	1 39 8 22 65 135	25 2 11 9 47	 9 9		- - - 1 1	2 34 4 3 117 160
6th	Champaign	779 87 24 352 14 37 1,293	652 58 13 170 11 23 927	39 7 — 3 — 49	20 6 1 27	323 37 13 140 4 16 533	200 8 — 6 5 219	4 - 2 - - 6	16 — — 14 — 1 31	50 — — 11 1 — 62	127 29 10 176 3 14 359
7th	Greene Jersey Macoupin Morgan Sangamon Scott Circuit Totals	45 36 60 85 1,473 7 1,706	44 35 31 73 1,235 3 1,421		1 10 131 — 142	44 35 16 54 780 3 932	5 6 89 —		 1 18 19	8 2 23 — 33	1 1 29 12 237 4 284
8th	Adams Brown Calhoun Cass Mason Menard Pike Schuyler Circuit Totals		118 20 28 26 37 21 16 11 277	9 2 4 1 — 9 — — 25	18 18	61 16 23 21 36 7 12 10	27 2 1 4 1 4 4 4 1	— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —	3 1 4	- - - - - - - -	44 16 1 12 11 10 24 2 120
9th	Fulton Hancock Henderson Knox McDonough Warren Circuit Totals	41 14 184 68	59 26 12 150 30 39 316			38 16 8 87 17 32 198	20 8 4 44 3 4 83	1 - - 1 2*	1 - - 4 1 6	1 - - - - 1	17 15 2 34 38 16 122

	Ple	a Of Gu	uilty				ONVICTE				Conv	icted By	/ Jury		Found Unfit		
Murder	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	Murder	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	Murder	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	To Stand Trial Or To Be Sexually Dangerous	County	Circuit
	2 2 — 1 1 6 1 5	9 26 4 7 — 3 24 2 17 92	5 31 5 8 3 35 87	2 8 1 1 - 4 9 25	 		1 1	% 		1	2	1 			1 1	Alexander Jackson Johnson Massac Pope Pulaski Saline Union Williamson Circuit Totals	1st ———————————————————————————————————
	4 	1 7 2 1 2 13 3 7 — 1 — 37	1 1 6 1 1 	1 — 4 — — — 3 4 3 3 18			11 11 27		 1 1 9 11							Crawford Edwards Franklin Gallatin Hamilton Hardin Jefferson Lawrence Richland Wabash Wayne White Circuit Totals	2nd
	 14 14	6 93 99	5 73 78	 11 11			 3 3		_ 1 1	 1 1	 15 15	 4 4	1 3 4		 2 2	BondMadisonCircuit Totals	
1		13 3 1 2 4 — 23 8 1 55	12 7 5 12 2 1 12 8 — 59	1 2 — 3 — 2 2 — 10	 	1	3		1				1	1 1	2 2	Christian Clay Clinton Effingham Fayette Jasper Marion Montgomery Shelby Circuit Totals	4th
1	1 3 2 — 12 18	13 2 — 42 57	14 — 3 25 42	1 3 — — 16 20		 2 2	 5	 2 2		_ _ _ _ _		 6	 6 6		 3 3	Clark Coles Cumberland Edgar Vermillion Circuit Totals	5th
2 1 3	16 3 — 5 — 24	52 6 3 67 1 1	39 7 6 84 2 10 148	5 2 — 13 — 2 22	 		3 3	1 5 — — — — 6		1 - 1 - 2	7 1 8	2 1 1 4	1 - 1 - 1 3	1 - - - - 1	1 6 —	Champaign DeWitt Douglas Macon Moultrie Piatt Circuit Totals	6th
	- 3 1 92 - 96	 11 8 45 4 68	1 1 12 — 6 — 20				 12 12				 1 23 24	1 1 2			- - - 1 - 1	Greene Jersey Macoupin Morgan Sangamon Scott Circuit Totals	7th
	3 1 — 1 — 1 — 5	19 9 1 8 9 2 6 1 55	17 6 4 1 8 13 49	3 5 1 9	 	 			— — — — —	 	1 1	1 1				Adams Brown Calhoun Cass Mason Pike Schuyler Circuit Totals	8th
	4 2 — 1 7 1 15	3 5 12 3 1 24	6 3 1 15 12 12 49	3 4 1 4 14 2 28	 				 1 1					1 1 — 1 — 3		Fulton Hancock Henderson Knox McDonough Warren Circuit Totals	9th

DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH FELONIES

	T.					DISPOSITIO	NOT CONVIC				
					Red	duced or Dismiss			d But Not C	onvicted	
Circuit	County	Total Number of Defendants Disposed of	Total Not Convicted	Discharged at Preliminary Hearing	Dismissed On Motion of Defendant	Dismissed On Motion of State	Reduced To Misdemeanor	Acquitted By Court	Acquitted By Jury	Convicted of Misdemeanor	Total Convicted
10th	Marshall Peoria Putnam Stark Tazewell Circuit Totals	20 596 5 6 171 798	14 413 5 5 75 75	1 35 — — 14 50	63 1 64	6 204 4 3 56 273	6 71 1 2 3 83			1 35 — — — 36	6 183 — 1 96 286
11th	Ford Livingston Logan McLean Woodford Circuit Totals	35 196 77 134 85 527	35 163 41 66 63 368	9 9	1 2 — 3 1 7	12 93 36 56 42 239	20 35 4 3 20 82		3 - 3 - 6	2 19 1 — — 22	28 36 68 22 154
12th	Iroquois	119 171 435 725	107 79 361 547	5 8 3 16	4 9 — 13	74 51 315 440	12 1 39 52	5 — 5	3 5 4 12	9 — — 9	11 91 72 174
13th	Bureau	53 59 112 224	41 43 79 163			18 20 61 99	21 22- 14 57		2 2 4	 1 2 3	12 16 32 60
14th	Henry	65 28 442 278 813	44 21 274 211 550	1 1 14 15	_ _ 1 _ 1	19 15 200 166 400	25 5 65 28 123	- 3 - 3	 5 1 6	 2 2	21 7 166 67 261
15th	Carroll Jo Daviess Lee Ogle Stephenson Circuit Totals	21 22 194 161 174 572	16 15 155 130 139 455	1 6 11 14 32	- - - - -	6 8 128 89 104 335	7 7 19 29 19	 	1 2 1 1 5	1 - - 1 2	5 7 39 31 34 116
16th	DeKalb	224 724 43 991	176 546 32 754	5 72 1 78		139 320 21 480	7 13 6 26	11 8 — 19	4 11 — 15	10 115 — 125	48 175 11 234
17th	Boone	24 796 820	16 543 559	1 43 44	 5 5	9 332 341	6 159 165		 4 4	_	8 252 260
18th 18th	DuPage	1,275 1,275	1,067 1,067		4 4	96 96	576 576	2 2	1	388 388	207 207
19th	Lake	232 241 473	96 132 228	21 — 21	5 — 5	38 119 157	7 11 18	2 2 4	13 — 13	10 — 10	131 109 240
20th	Monroe Perry Randolph St. Clair Washington Circuit Totals Cook*	11 40 56 465 14 586 7,529	3 30 30 168 5 236 2,315	 4 1 5		2 17 16 110 3 148	1 9 10 39 — 59	5 1 6 330	1 12 - 13 82		8 10 26 297 9 350 5,214
	Cook County Totals Downstate Totals State Totals	7,529 14,509 22,038	2,315 10,311 12,626	534 534	394 394	1,903 6,228 8,131	2,062 2,062	330 195 525	82 179 261	719 719	5,214 4,157 9,371

^{*}See page 151 for tables on method of disposition and sentence imposed on defendants charged by indictment and information in the Criminal Division of the Circuit

DURING THE YEAR 1973

						CC	NVICTE	ED .						***************************************			
	Ple	a Of Gu	ilty			Convid	cted By	Court			Conv	ricted By	/ Jury		Found Unfit. To Stand		
Murder	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	Murder	Class 1	Class	Class 3	Class 4	Murder	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	Trial Or To Be Sexually Dangerous	County	Circuit
	 17 7 24	6 69 — — 26 101	 68 31 99	14 20 34				_ _ _ 1 1		1 - - - 1		- 4 - 1 5	5 — — 4 9	1 - - 4 5		Marshall Peoria Putnam Stark Tazewell Circuit Totals	10th
	4 1 1 2 8	10 4 20 4 38	10 14 30 14 68	4 8 4 2 18			 4 2 6		_ _ _ 1 _ 1						5 — — — 5	Ford Livingston Logan McLean Woodford Circuit Totals	11th
	2 8 5 15	1 41 28 70	5 13 16 34	2 22 6 30		 	3 2 5	_ 1 1	1 1 2	1 2 3	 5 5	 4 4	1 - 2 3		1 1 2 4	Iroquois Kankakee Will Circuit Totals	12th
	5 2 7	5 4 8 17	6 7 16 29	 5 5			_ */	_ _ _	_ _ _ _		_ _ _	1 - 1 2			 1 1		13th
_ _ _ 1 1	1 - 9 2 12	6 6 59 16 87	13 1 67 23 104	 15 18 33	_ _ _ _	_ _ _ _				 	7 2 9	5 5 10	_ _ 1 _ 1	1 - - - 1		Henry Mercer Mercer Rock Island Whiteside Circuit Totals	14th
	1 3 5 9	3 3 13 11 3 33	1 4 18 10 20 53	 3 4 2 9				_ _ _ _		_ _ _ _ _	 1 1	 2 1 3		1 - 1 2	 1 1	Carroll Jo Daviess Lee Ogle Stephenson Circuit Totals	15th
1 1 — 2	9 6 — 15	15 57 3 75	6 60 3 69	16 9 3 28		 1 1	 16 16	9 9	_	 1 1	1 4 — 5	 5 5	 7 1 8			DeKalb Kane Kendall Circuit Totals	16th
 2 2	12 12	3 108 111	1 74 75	2 8 10	_ _ _	 3 3	_ 2 2	1 5 6	1	1 15 16	_ 6 6	 5 5	11 11		1 1	Winnebago	17th
1	7 7	45 45	93 93	27 27	1	2 2	7 7	4	8 8	2 2	5 5	3 3	1	1	1	DuPage Circuit Totals	18th 18th
1 1	4 10 14	48 16 64	36 62 98	19 12 31	1 1	_ 2 2	_	3 2 5	_	 1 1	10 1 11	3 2 5	6 — 6	1 1	5 <u>—</u> 5	LakeMcHenryCircuit Totals	19th
	1 37 2 40	5 5 12 143 2 167	1 2 10 50 4 67	1 3 4 45 1 54	 		 7 7	_ _ _ 1 _ 1	_ _ _ _			1 1	4 4	_ _ _ 1 _ 1	 	Monroe Perry Randolph St. Clair Washington Circuit Totals Cook*	20th 20th Cook
19	366	Pleas 4 1,425 btotal 7,	1,364	426	4	73	otal 555 85 btotal 79	49	30	34	99	Fotal 27 72 ubtotal 5	83	28	41	Cook County Totals Downstate Totals State Totals	

Court of Cook County.

SENTENCES IMPOSED ON DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH FELONIES DURING THE YEAR 1973

	t · tion)	Class 4		_1_1_1	111	0 - 0	0 0	1	1 1 1 1 1 1
	Periodic Imprisonment (Local Correctional Institution)	Class 3				- -	161 40	1-1-12	- -
	Imprisc	Class (- 2 °		1		99	1 - 1 - 2	0 0
	riodic	Class (၈ ၈		11111		76 26 26 26
	Pe (Local	Murder		1111111111				- -	
	Periodic Imprisonment and Fine (Dept. of Corrections)	Class 4							
	ections	Class 3	- -0						
	risonm of Corr	Class 2							
	ic Impi Dept. o	Class 1					11111	1	
	Period (Murder			1 1 1				
		lass 4 N	1			0 0			
	nment ctions)	Class Class 3 4	- 0.4	1111111111-11-		1		& &	
	mpriso Correc	Class (0 0 0 0 0			5	- -	1 1 0]
	Periodic Imprisonment (Dept. of Corrections)	Class C	- -		111			7 2 2	111111
	Pe (D	Murder			1 1 1				
	Ф							111111	- -
	br Fin	Slass 3		111111212	Andrew States			0 0 4	- 2 9
	nent ar	Class Class Class	01- 0	111111111		0 0		0- - 4	- -
SENTENCES	Imprisonment and Fine	Class 1						- -	111
SENT		Murder						1112112	111111
			-4	- -	1	- -	4 4	4-1-110	
		Class Class	21 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	- 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	1 26 27	52 6 2 - 1 - 1 - 2 9	11112	11 10 4 26	-2 - 4
	ment		1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 3	4 + 0 0 8 0 + 5	3 24 27	10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1	223 256	12 12 13 35 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13	21 238
	Imprisonment	Class Class	12 + + & 2		21	- 6	-2 5 6	21 - 20	1 2 2 3 8 4 2 1 4 2
	<u> </u>	Murder	- - -«	1111111111	1		- -	ω - 4	1111-1-
	Death	Murder							111111
		County	Alexander Jackson Johnson Massac Pope Pulaski Saline Union Williamson Circuit Totals	Crawford Edwards Franklin Gallatin Harmition Hardin Jefferson Lawrence Richland Wabash Wayne Wayne Circuit Totals	Bond Madison Circuit Totals	Christian Clay Clinton Effingham Fayette Jasper Marion Monitomery Shelby Circuit Totals	Clark Coles Coles Cumberland Edgar Vermilion Circuit Totals	Champaign Dewkitt Douglas Macon Macon Piatt Circuit Totals	Greene Jersey Macoupin Morgan Sangamon Scott Circuit Totals
		Circuit	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th 5th	6th	7th 7

SENTENCES IMPOSED ON DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH FELONIES DURING THE YEAR 1973—Continued

		Total Sentences	18 72 6 15 15 14 6 6 8 8 8 8 8 23 6	6 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 8 8 8 9 1 9 1 4 1 4 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1	12 219 231	29 12 16 14 143 23 143	2 34 4 117 160	127 29 10 176 3 14	237 237 24 284
	nced	Class 4		111111111					1
	Sente ted	Class 3					11111	1 1 1 1 1 1	
	To Be Execut	Class Class						- -	
	Found Unfit To Be Sentenced or Executed	Class 1							
-	Foun	Murder		1111111111					
	harge	Class 4	000 20	11111111		11111-11-	11111	- -	- -
	al Disc Cond	Class 3	5	- - 2 4		m - 4 - 0	1-10-4	9 19 29 29	- -
	andition etionary	Class 2	24 0		1 1	m 4 8	m m	81 2 0 8	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
	or Co Discre	Class 1	01 0		1 1	- 0 6		- - 2	37
	Probation or Conditional Discharge With No Discretionary Conditions	Murder							
	tharge ditions	Class 4	19 - - 90	8 - 8 5 7 - 8	100	1-11-1-010	+ w v o	2 - 1 2 2 2	2
	al Disc ry Con	Class (2 5 1 19 48 48	1	5 37 42	4 - 6 - 1 - 1 - 2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8	20 28	91 82 82 47	4 2 9
	onditior cretiona	Class (2	7	1 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +	3 59 62	20 12 20	e e	11 28 17 17 17 17 17	1 2 51 13
	or C ner Disc	Class Class	0 1 - 0 0 8	4 6	100		1-2100	-4 m m	25 25
	Probation or Conditional Discharge With Other Discretionary Conditions	Murder						1	
	sharge ent	Class 4			laa	11111111	11112		
ENCES	itional Dischar Imprisonment	Class 3		- - 0	155	1-111-12	ოო	- 0 8 9	- - 2
NTEN	ondition lic Imp	Class Class Class	0 - 6	2	1 4 4			42 9	
SENT	bation or Cono With Periodic	Class 1			1		1111	- -	27 27 27
	Probation or Conditional Discharge With Periodic Imprisonment	Murder		11,111111111					
	Fine tion)	Class 4					11111		
	nt and Institu	Class Class Class					m m	0 0 8	
	sonme ctional	Class 2	[100		101110	5 5	2 4 9
	c Impri Corre	Class 1			1		111188		1 1 1 6 1 6 1
	Periodic Imprisonment and Fine (Local Correctional Institution)	Murder			1				
		County	Alexander Jackson Johnson Massac Pope Pulaski Saline Union	Crawford Edwards Franklin Gallatin Hardin Jefferson Lawrence Richland Wabash Wayne Wayne Wayne Wayne Circuit Totals	Bond Madison Circuit Totals	Christian Clay Clinton Effingham Fayette Jasper Marion Montgomery Shelby Circuit Totals	Clark Coles Cumberland Edgar Vermilion Circuit Totals	Champaign DeWitt Douglas Macon Moultrie Pratt Circuit Totals	Greene Jersey Macoupin Morgan Sangamon Scott Circuit Totals
		Circuit	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th

SENTENCES IMPOSED ON DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH FELONIES DURING THE YEAR 1973

	t ition)	Class 4	11111111		11111		1		11111	11111
	onmen Institu	Class 3	- -	ლო	5 5					1-10-4
	Impris	Class 2	2		7 52				- -	1 2
	Periodic Imprisonment (Local Correctional Institution)	Class 1				1				
	P (Loca	Murder								1 1 1 1 1 1
	Fine	Class 4			% %				1111	11111
	Periodic Imprisonment and Fine (Dept. of Corrections)	Class 3			 					
	isonme if Corre	Class 2							1111	11111
	ic Impr Dept. c	Class 1								1
	Period (I	Murder		111111	1 1 1 1 1	11111				
		Slass 4 N					~	1111		- -
	Periodic Imprisonment (Dept. of Corrections)	Class Class 3 4		e e	- e4	1 2 2	1 1	1100		
	Impriso Corre	Class 2	4	- -	2 2 4	11111		1122		1
	eriodic Jept. of	Class (2 2	4 4	11111				11111
) A	Murder								
	ə	Class 4				11111	1919	2 2		- -
	ınd Fin	Class 3	- -		- -2	1 2 2		1 2		1 1 1
	ment a	Class 2			121128	11111	1111	1 1 + +	1111	1112
SENTENCES	Imprisonment and Fine	Class				- -				
SEN	_	Murder		11111	11111					
		Class Class 3 4	e e	m r	161100	1640	4 4	1111	- e 4	- -
		Class 3	24 8 - 8 2 5	1	13 8 1 1 23 1	1-9640	1 8 7 0 1	3 2 10	1 16 3 20	5 19 19
	Imprisonment	Class 2	V 8 V 4 + 1 + 1 82	8 - =	28 16 44	1200-6	20 21 42	9 9	21 21 31 31	m & m 4+
	Impriso	Class Class	e - 4	01 - -4	1511-4	14	29 67	1227	1 4 8	11-028
		Murder		111-11-	- -	1110	1 - 0 6			
	Death	Murder		111111	11111	11111				
		County	Adams Brown Calhoun Cass Mason Menard Pike Schuyler Circuit Totals	Fulton Hancock Henderson Knox McDonough Warren Circuit Totals	Marshall Peoria Putham Stark Tazewell Circuit Totals	Ford Livingston Logan McLean Woodford Circuit Totals	Iroquois Kankakee Will Circuit Totals	Bureau Grundy LaSalle Circuit Totals	Henry Mercer Rock Island Whiteside Circuit Totals	Carroll Jo Daviess Lee Ogle Stephenson Circuit Totals
		Circuit	8th 8th	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th 13th	14th	15th 15th

SENTENCES IMPOSED ON DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH FELONIES DURING THE YEAR 1973—Continued

		Total Sentences	44 10 11 12 12 12 12 13	17 15 2 34 38 38 16	183 183 1 1 286 286	28 36 68 22 154	11 91 72 174	12 16 32 60	21 7 166 67 261	5 7 39 31 34 116
	nced	Class 4			1 1 1 1 1 1					
	Sente	Class 3			11111		1111	1 1	1111	
	nfit To Be S or Executed	Class 2		111111					1111	
	Found Unfit To Be Sentenced or Executed	Class 1						1111		1 1 1 1 1 1
	Found	Murder						1 1 1 1		
	harge tions	Class 4	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	- 4 3	4 1 5		1 6 6 6	1111	6 S 4 P	11-1-8
	al Disc Cond	Class 3	- -	0.00	1611-1	1627	1000	w w	33	- 0 4
	ndition	Class 2	- -	-11111-	& &	111-1-	1467	11	27 2 2 29	- -
	or Co Discre	Class 1	1111111		11111	1-111-	1-1-	1111		111010
	Probation or Conditional Discharge With No Discretionary Conditions	Murder			1		1711		1	1
	tharge	Class 4		20 T T 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	0 8 7	1-44-0	20 20	1100	11005	- 0 4
	al Disc ry Con	Class (13 2 1 1 1 25 25	25 8 1 25 25	24 	18 23 24 6 42	4400	1255	8 1 17 17 46	1 - L S S E
	ondition	Class (2	0 8 5	- m 4 m - t	16 16 22 22	12 11 20	16 7 23	1 12 12	6 3 15 12 36	1 2 2 2
	or Co	Class Class		0 1 1 1 1 2	101104		12	1111	- 2 6	1
	Probation or Conditional Discharge Probation or Conditional Discharge With Periodic Imprisonment With Other Discretionary Conditions	Murder	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1			1 1 1		1 1	1111	1 1 1
	sharge ent	Class 4		111111	1014	11111	1100	1 [1111	111100
SES	nal Disc risonm	Class Class Class 2	6 5 1 1		1 = 1 - 5	110000	1100	1	0 0 4	1 2 2 2 7 7 7
SENTENCES	ondition lic Imp		a- -a a-0		8 1 1 1 - 51	1-1000	1400	4 4	1111	2 23.62
SE	n or Co Perioc	Class 1		1 1 1 1 1 1	0 00	1-111-	1111	1111	1111	1 - -
	Probatic With	Murder		11111	1	11111	1111	1111		
	Fine ion)	Class Class 3 4		1 1 1	66	11111			1111	1 1 1
	nt and Institut	Class 3		-1111-		11111	24-1	1111	2 2	1111
	sonmer	Class 2				11111	11		1111	
	Impris	Class 1		111111		11111	1111	1111		1 1
	Periodic Imprisonment and Fine (Local Correctional Institution)	Murder		111111		11111			3	1
		County	Adams Brown Calboun Cass Mason Menard Pike Schuyler	Fulton Hancock Henderson Knox McDonough Warren Circuit Totals	Marshall Peoria Putnam Stark Tazewell Circuit Totals	Ford Livingston Logan McLean Woodford Circuit Totals	Iroquois Kankakee Will Circuit Totals	Bureau Grundy LaSalle Circuit Totals	Henry Mercer Rock Island Whiteside Circuit Totals	Carroll Jo Daviess Lee Ogle Stephenson Circuit Totals
		Circuit	8th	9th 9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th	15th

SENTENCES IMPOSED ON DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH FELONIES DURING THE YEAR 1973

	ion)	Class 4				- -	- -	-	=
	Periodic Imprisonment (Local Correctional Institution)	Class (11	- -	1110	24	24
	Imprise	Class 2				1 1	*s	38	28
	eriodic Corre	Class		111	11		11111	59	29
	Pe (Local	Murder						-	-
	Fine	Class 4					11111	e e	8
	nt and ctions)	Class (111	11	1 1 1	1 1, 1 1 1 1	က	8
	isonme f Corre	Class 2		111	11	111	11111	-	-
	Periodic Imprisonment and Fine (Dept. of Corrections)	Class	1			111	11111	0	0
	Periodi ([Murder	1		11	1	11111	0	0
			1-1-	1111	11	1	11111	01	9
	Periodic Imprisonment (Dept. of Corrections)	Class Class	16				111-1-	42	42
	Periodic Imprisonment (Dept. of Corrections)	Class 2	20 20	1 00 00	1 1	ო ო	11111	70	02
	eriodic Jept. o	Class	1515		1 1	100		21	21
	P, (1)	Murder	- -	111	1 1			-	-
		Class 4						18	
	d Fine	Class C							
	nent ar	Class (2			11	1 1		e Only	Subtotal 91
ENTENCES	Imprisonment and Fine	Class ((Total Fine Only 13)	Subto
SENTE	Ē	Murder			1 1			7 (Tc	
				0 0	£ £		1 2 2	72	
		Class Class	1122	13 23	24	9 2 11	1 ८० छ	338	
	ment		2 2	1 88 88	788	19 5 24	36 47		,371
	Imprisonment	Class Class	0 0	1 6 6	7	£ 10 8E	24 22 26	(Total 2,129) 258 522	Subtotal 3,371
		Murder	- - 0	17	4 4	- 26	2 2	(7	Sut
	Death	Murder		1 1				0	
		County	DeKalb Kane Kendall Circuit Totals	Boone Winnebago Circuit Totals	DuPageCircuit Totals	19th Lake McHenry McHenry Circuit Totals	20th	Cook Cook Cook Cook Cook Cook Oirout Totals Cownstate Totals Cook	State Totals
		Circuit	16th	17th	18th 18th	19th	20th	Cook Cook Cook Downstate Tota	State To

SENTENCES IMPOSED ON DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH FELONIES DURING THE YEAR 1973—Continued

-								SEI	SENTENCES	ES																	
***************************************		Periodi (Local	Periodic Imprisonment and Fine (Local Correctional Institution)	isonme	ant and Institu		Probatic With	obation or Conditional Dischar With Periodic Imprisonment	andition ic Impr	al Disclisonme	narge F	Probation or Conditional Discharge Probation or Conditional Discharge With Periodic Imprisonment With Other Discretionary Conditions	or Co	ondition	hal Disc ry Con	<u> </u>	Probation or Conditional Discharge With No Discretionary Conditions	or Co Discre	nditiona	al Disch Condit	ions	Found	Found Unfit To Be Sentenced or Executed	nfit To Be S or Executed	Senter	peou	
Circuit	County	Murder	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	Murder	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	Murder	Class (Class C	Class (3	Class 4	Murder	Class 1	Class (2	Class 3	Class 4 N	Murder	Class C	Class Class Class	Jass C	T	Total Sentences
16th	DeKalb Kane Kendall Circuit Totals	1111	1-1-	1 1 1 1		1 1 1 1	111	1 1	2 / 2	m m	0- 6		2 2	27 1 32	4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	01 0 + 2 4 + 4	1 1 1 1	2 2	24 31	23 25	e 9 6						48 175 11 234
17th	Boone Winnebago Circuit Totals	111						1 1	15 16	44		111	1	277	23 25	285			 46 46	138	4 4	111	1 1 1	111			8 252 260
18th 18th	DuPage Circuit Totals		1 1		4 4			33	14	8 8	9	1 1	00	വവ	8 8	2 2			∞ ∞	32	4 4		11	11	<u> </u>		207
19th	Lake McHenry Circuit Totals				2 2			- -	20 1 21	13 2 15	8 8	111	9	10 9 19	13 58 71	5 12		111	0 0	2 6	5 0			1 1 1	1 1		131 109 240
20th	Monroe Perry Randolph St. Clair Washington Circuit Totals								0 0	111010	4 4	111-1-	111515	121	12 2 8 2 4	8 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4		- -	- 01 - 4	- -	-1111-	11111					8 10 26 297 9 350
Cook	Cook Cook Cook Cook Cook Cook Cook Cook							(T	(Total 226)	(9)								(Total	(Total 2,122)				(Total	(Total 179*)			(4669)
Downstat	Downstate Totals	0	26	21	38	6	0	39	149	115	37	1	108	561	674	251	0	53	207 2	230	73	0	0	-	0	0	4,157
State Tot	State Totals	0	56	21	38	6		Sut	Subtotal 566	99		-	108	561	674	251		Subto	Subtotal 2,685	35	\Box		Subtc	Subtotal 180			8,826

*Includes defendants committed as unfit to stand trial and as sexually dangerous.

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REPORT ON THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1973

TREND OF CASES IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY

																		Γ	<i>y</i>	,											
Inventory	Increase(+) Decrease (-)	-423	+271	+1079	+84	+402	(+1413)	+859	+1468	(+2327)	*-311	+10928	+23		+370	+15	(+11336)		-468	+652			-258	-2334	+754	+2130				(+292)	+15241
Pending	At End	28171°	7879°	9202	591	2279	(48122)	5988	9894	(15882)	11146	21839	38		4255	81	(26213)		2830'	2737			14869 ⁿ	21038	6326	42012				(84245)	191175
	erminated	`15763	4612	19579	85	969	(40735)	7665	3510	(11175)	29537	15083	3845		3890	26	(22844)	9777	23058	7114			10876	75287	79972	55475	272517	39732	1229053	(1762912)	1907152
-	l otal Added l erminated	15340	4883	20658	169	1098	(42148)	8524	4978	(13502)	29226	26011	3868		4260	41	(34180)	10523	21508	9922			10560	72953	80726	50925	346022	42849	1274426	(1885141)	2043994
		+10869	- 10869	0	0	0	(0)	0	0	(0)	0	0	0		0	0	(0)	0	0	0			+1794	-1782	-12	0	0	0	0	(0)	0
-	Heinstated Transferred	1552	689	954	0	-	(3196)	က	0	(3)	0	0	0		0	0	(0)	0	216	1674			1710	1428	292	2411	0	0	0	(6316)	11405
ſ	Begun	2919	15063	19704	169	1097	(38952)	8521	4978	(13499)	29226	26011	3868		4260	41	(34180)	10523	21292	6092			7056	73307	79971	55194	346022	42849	1274426	(1878825)	2032589
	At Start	28594ª	4809∠	8123	507	1877	(46709)	5129°	8426	(13555)	11457	10911	15		3885	99	(14877)		3298	20859			15127	23372	5572	39882				(83953)	175934
County Department	Type of Case	Ad damnum Jury	& over Non-Jury	Tax	Condemnation	Miscellaneous Remedy	Subtotals	Chancery	Housing	Subtotals	Divorce	Тах	Mental Health	Adoption, Marriage of	Non-Support	Municipal Corporations	Subtotals	Estates, Guardianships & Conservatorships	Delinquency, Dependency, Neglect & Supervision	Felony (Indictment & Information)	Municipal Department	Type of Case	Ad damnum Jury	\$15,000 Non-Jury	Small Claims	Tax#	Criminal & Ordinance Violations	Family & Youth	Traffic	Subtotals	GRAND TOTAL
	Division			∢	1	}			CHANCERY	L	DIVORCE		O	0 >	z F	- >-		PROBATE	JUVENILE	CRIMINAL		C	<u> </u>	S	- C	c –	0 -	ر د د	O NE	S × I S	

FOOTNOTES: (a) Adjusted by -186 cases due to +18 cases previously not counted and -204 Special Calendar cases incorrectly included in pending cases; (b) Adjusted by +2663 cases due to +479 cases filed in 1971 and +2184 cases filed in 1972 which were not included in previous inventories; (c) Does not include 516 jurý and 106 nonjury cases pending on Special Calendars (military, appeal, insurance liquidation and bankruptcy); (d) Adjusted by +178 cases after physical inventoryr, (e) Adjusted by +706 adoption cases not previously counted; (f) Adjusted by +1082 cases after physical inventory; (g) Adjusted by +4 cases filed in 1972 but not counted in 1972 pending inventory; (h) Adjusted by +58 cases after physical inventory in District 5 (+70 cases); (i) Adjusted by +41 cases after physical inventory in District 5.

COMMENTARY

The Cook County Circuit Court during 1973 had a caseload per judge of about 8100 cases, based on filings and reinstatements during 1973. The following chart compares caseload per judge in Cook County during the last 5 years (figures are rounded off).

Year	Cases Filed or Reinstated	Average Number of Cases per Judge (based on filings)	Cases Terminated
1973	2,044,000	8,100	1,907,000
1972	1,952,000	7,500	1,938,000
1971	2,090,000	8,500	2,034,000
1970	1,965,000	7,600	1,881,000
1969	1,936,000	8,000	1,820,000

The above chart considers only filings and reinstatements, and the statistics therein do not reflect ancillary hearings and post-termination matters. For example, substantial judge-time is required in the post-decree section of the Divorce Division and in hearings on habeas corpus and post-conviction petitions in the Criminal Division.

A significant accomplishment has occurred during 1973 in the Law Jury Trial Section of the Law Division. The average elapsed time from date of filing to date of verdict in 593 law jury cases terminated by verdict in 1973 was 42 months (less than 5% of all law jury cases disposed of are terminated by verdict). Municipal District 1 also continues to reduce the elapsed time from date of filing to date of verdict in law jury cases terminated therein. The average elapsed time in said cases (based on 270 verdicts during 1973) was 34 months. Of course, the average elapsed time to terminate by verdict in law jury cases is not respresentative of the average elapsed time to terminate by verdict in other types of jury cases disposed of in the Circuit Court. Traffic and small claim jury cases which are terminated by verdict, for example, are disposed of in substantially less average elapsed time.

The following comparison highlights the continuing decline in elapsed time between date of filing and date of termination by verdict in law jury cases terminated in the Law Division and Municipal District 1.

		onths) Between Date of Filing t in Law Jury Cases
Year	Law Division	Municipal District 1
1973 1972	42 months 49.8 months	34 months 37.9 months
1971 1970 1969	58 months 61.7 months 60.7 months	43 months 39 months 42.8 months

Chief Justice Robert C. Underwood remarked at the 1972 Judicial Conference "...it would appear that the goal of 24 months average time lapse from date of filing to date of verdict is a realistic possibility within a reasonable time in the Circuit Court of Cook County." With continuing determination and spirit, it would appear that the judges of the Circuit Court can realize the goal of 24 months in law jury cases terminated by verdict.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY LAW DIVISION, COUNTY DEPARTMENT

AGE OF LAW CASES PENDING IN THE LAW DIVISION, COUNTY DEPARTMENT*

Totals		28,171**			**628,	/
During 1973 To	11,615	10,838 2	6.7%	14,370	5,268	63.3%
During 1972	11,912	698'6	17.2%	13,797	1,999	85.5%
During 1971	21,256	5,428	55.3%	13,510 13,797	582	95.7%
During 1970	13,023	2,036	84.4%	14,116	30	%8.66
During 1969	13,447	0	100.0%	15,012	0	100.0%
During 1968	13,005	0	100.0%	14,857	0	100.0%
During 1967	12,951	0	100.0%	14,881	0	100.0%
During 1966		0			0	/
1965 & Earlier		0			0	
	Total Filed or Transferred In	Pending	% Terminated	Total Filed	Non- Pending	% Terminated or Transferred out
	¬:	э <u>с</u>	>		Non-	(i)
	Law	Cases	Over	\$15,000	Total Control	

AVERAGE TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN DATE OF FILING AND DATE OF TERMINATION OF LAW JURY CASES IN THE LAW DIVISION, COUNTY DEPARTMENT

			,
	of Filing and	Average	42.0
ed by Verdict	Months Elapsed Between Date of Filing and Date of Verdict	Minimum	1.9
Cases Terminated by Verdict	Months Elaps	Maximum	100.7
	Total Number of	Verdicts Reached During the Period	593

Cases	Terminated by Any	Cases Terminated by Any Means, Including Verdict	erdict
Total Number of	Months Elap	Months Elapsed Between Date of Filing and Date of Termination	of Filing and
Cases Terminated During the Period	Maximum	Minimum	Average
15,763	Figures to Com	igures to Complete This Analysis are Unavailable	are Unavailable.

^{*} Also see Appendix at page 155. ** Does not include 516 jury and 106 nonjury cases pending on Special Calendars (military, appeal, insurance liquidation and bankruptcy).

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY
LAW DIVISION, COUNTY DEPARTMENT
ANALYSIS OF LAW JURY CASES PROCESSED BY THE TRIAL JUDGES OF THE LAW DIVISION, COUNTY DEPARTMENT
COMPARISONS WITH PRECEDING YEARS

	PuN	Number of Law Jury Cases	lury Cases	Number	Number of Verdicts	Ratio of	Law Jury	Law Jury Trial Judges
	Total Added	Total Terminated	Total Assigned For Trial	Total	Contested	Contested Verdicts to Total Cases Terminated	Substantially Full-Time	Substantially Part-Time
Number For December,								
1973	1,252	299	295	25	23	3.4	48	12
Average Per Month, 1973 .	1,279	1,313	467	47	47	3.6	25	9
Average Per Month, 1972 . 1,187	1,187	1,585	518	53	52	3.3	24	7
Average Per Month, 1971.	1,228	1,521	429	65	09	3.9	26	7
Average Per Month, 1970 .	1,200	1,393	302	62	53	3.8	28	13
Average Per Month, 1969 .	1,345	1,474	398	62	20	3.5	33	18

IN THE LAW DIVISION, COUNTY DEPARTMENT CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY ANALYSIS OF LAW JURY TERMINATIONS DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1973

(1) Age of Law Jury Cases Disposed of During the Period

		1965 and Earlier	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Law-Jury Cases Disposed of During	No	12	21	97	471	3,044	5,150	4,367	1,886	715
the Period	%age	0.1%	0.1%	0.6%	3.0%	19.3%	32.7%	27.7%	12.0%	4.5%

(2) Law Jury Cases Terminated During the Period

Terminations Credited by Clerk To	Number of Terminations
Assignment Judge	3,948
Pre-Trial Judges*	5,055
Motion Judges	1,121
Full-Time Trial Judges**	4,434
Part-Time Trial Judges***	451
No Progress Call	754
TOTAL	15,763

^{*} Includes trial judges hearing summer pre-trials.

** Includes only Cook County judges who spent 75% or more of their time in the Law Division.

(3) Maximum, minimum and average productivity of full-time trial judges and stages at which full-time trial judges terminated law jury cases during the period

		V	erdicts		Cases Settled			
	Total Law Jury Cases Terminated	Contested	Uncontested	Without Use of Jury	During Selection of Jury	After Selection of Jury		
Maximum*	648	28	3	619	19	22		
Minimum*	69	2	0	39	0	2		
Average	155.0	16.0	0.4	124.9	4.8	8.9		

^{*}Maximum and Minimum reported by any judge in each category not necessarily the same judge in each category.

^{***} Includes Cook County judges who spent less than 75% of their time in the Law Division and downstate judges who served in the Law Division on assignment.

STATEMENT OF TOTAL LAW JURY CASES TERMINATED AS REPORTED BY THE CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1973

During calendar year 1973, the Law Division of the County Department of the Circuit Court of Cook County terminated 15763 Law Jury cases which were credited by the clerk as follows:

	atoa 10.00 Zan cary cases man nore croanea a, are com as care	
I.	To the Assignment Judge (Judge Butler*) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	3,948
11.	To the Motion Judges (Judges Brussell, Bua, Hallett, Jiganti and Schwartz)	1,121
III.	To the Pre-Trial Judges (Judges Harewood, Iseberg, Jones, Landesman, Matkovic, Morrissey, Nash, Nelson and Stefanowicz)	3,285
IV.	To the 24 Judges who participate in the Summer Pre-Trial Program as follows (Judges Barry, Berg, Brown, Canel, Carey, Cherry, Crosson, Crowley, Ellis, Elward, Felt, T. H. Fitzgerald, Geroulis, Heilingoetter, Holzer, Kowalski, Lefkovits, Norman, Schaller, Sorrentino, Stark, Wells, Wilson and Wosik)	1,770
V.	To the Law Jury Trial Judges as follows:	
	A) To the 27 Judges (Judges Barry, Berg, Brown, Canel, Carey, Crosson, Crowley, Ellis, Elward, Felt, Fiedler, J. C. Fitzgerald, T. H. Fitzgerald, Geroulis, Heilingoetter, Hershenson, Holzer, Kowalski, Lefkovits, McAuliffe, Norman, Schaller, Sorrentino, Stark, Wells, M. K. Wilson and Wosik) whose service in the Law Jury Division was not substantially interrupted by other judicial duties or illness during the entire period.	4,186
	B) To the 11 Judges (Judges Barth, Cherry, Collins, Daly, DeBow, Epton, Hickey, Jiganti, Murray, Roberts and K. E. Wilson) whose service in the Law Jury Division was limited by other judicial duties, assignments or illness during the entire period	546
	C) To the 16 Judges (Judges Beam, Clark, Davis, Immel, Kasserman, Koch, Lipe, Mills, Murphy, Scott, Stengel, Thornton, Watson, C. M. Wilson, Young and Ziegler) on assignment from circuits outside of Cook County	153
D)	To the Status Call/No Progress Call Judges (Judges Palmer, Jiganti and Iseberg)	754
	Total Terminations	15,763

^{*}Includes terminations by the pro tem assignment judges.

SUMMARY OF THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDING OF THE 5161 LAW JURY CASES REPORTED THROUGH THE MONTHLY REPORTS OF THE LAW JURY TRIAL JUDGES (LAW DIVISION, COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY) DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1973

Method Of Disposition	No. of Cases	No. of Jury ¹ / ₂ Days	No. of Judge 1/2 Days in Excess of Jury 1/2 Days
1. With Use Of Jury:			
A. Dismissed By Agreement During Selection Of Jury	179	302	214
B. Dismissed By Agreement After Selection Of Jury	312	1,282	535
C. Contested Verdicts For Plaintiff	319	2,007	618
D. Contested Verdicts For Defendant	254	1,635	502
E. Uncontested Verdicts For Plaintiff	14	63	66
F. Uncontested Verdicts For Defendant	6	46	16
G. Other Terminations	3	0	17
2. Mistrials For Error	28	137	33
Mistrials For Disagreement	9	176	57
A. Court Finding For Plaintiff	695	X	1,392
B. Court Finding For Defendant	81	Х	115
C. Uncontested Prove-Ups	444	Х	593
D. Dismissed Or Terminated By Agreement	2,419	Х	3,601
E. Dismissed For Want Of Prosecution	110	Х	197
F. Other Terminations	49	X	102
5. Returned To Assignment Judge	239	50	181
TOTALS	5,161*	5,698	8,239

^{*} Includes Law Jury Cases Processed By The 16 Judges On Assignment From Circuits Outside Of Cook County During Calendar Year 1973

OF COOK COUNTY, COUNTY DEPARTMENT, FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1973 - AS REPORTED THROUGH THE AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAW JURY PRODUCT OF THE LAW JURY TRIAL JUDGES OF THE CIRCUIT COURT MONTHLY REPORTS OF LAW JURY TRIAL JUDGES

The Monthly Reports Of The Law Jury Trial Judges Of The County Department Of The Circuit Court Of Cook County, Indicate A Total Of 5161 Cases Processed And 4885 Cases Terminated. Subsections A, B & C Below Describe The Processing Of These Cases, Classified According To The Amount Of Time A Judge Was Assigned To The County Department, Law Division, Jury Section.

alendar 1/2	Days Avail-	able for	ssignment
Calenc	Days	able	Assign
Total Judge	1/2 Days In	Excess Of	Jury 1/2 Days
Total	1/2 □	Exc	Jury 1
Total	Jury	1/2 Days E	
Total Law	Jury Cases	Processed	
Total Law	Jury Cases	Terminated	
		Mistrials	
	Returned	To Assign-	ment Judge
/erdicts			Uncontested
Ver			Contested
Settled	After	Selection	Of Jury
Settled	During	Selection	Of Jury
Settled	Without	Use Of	Jury

The Law Jury Record Of The 27 Law Jury Judges Whose Service In The Law Jury Trial Division Was Not Substantially Interrupted By Other Judicial Duties, Assignment Or Illness During The Period Ä

TOTALS	3,374	130	239	433	10	203	31	4.186	4.420	4.686	6.915	11 595
Maximum	619	19	22	28	ო	47	4	648	648	273	425	496
Minimum	39	0	C/l	2	0	0	0	69	73	77	111	384
Average 124.9	124.9	4.8	8.9	16.0	0.4	7.5		155.0	163.7	173.5	256.1	4294

The Law Jury Record Of The 11 Law Jury Judges Whose Service In The Law Jury Trial Division Was Substantially Limited By Other Judicial Duties, Assignments Or Illness During The Period ä

TOTALS	347	33	54	97	0	32	9	546	584	821	1,169	1,990
Maximum	28	15	17	21	4	12	2	105	119	202	235	360
Minimum	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	80	_	10	10
Average	31.5	3.5	4.9	8.8	8.0	2.9	0.5	49.6	53.1	74.6	106.3	180.9

The Law Jury Record Of The 16 Judges On Assignment To The Circuit Court Of Cook County, Law Jury Division From Circuits Outside Of Cook County During The Period Ċ

	-	-										
TOTALS	77	9	22	43	-	4	0	153	157	191	155	387
Maximum	10	2	C)	4	-	2	0	15	15	30	21	40
Minimum	-	0	0	-	0	0	0	9	2	8	4	17
Average	4.8	9.0	1.4	2.7	0.1	0.3	0	9.6	9.8	11.9	9.7	24.1

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY DIVORCE DIVISION, COUNTY DEPARTMENT DISPOSITION OF DIVORCE CASES DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1973

PART I		
TOTAL DIVORCE CASES TERMINATED		
29,537		
PART II		
DECREES		
TOTAL DECREES		21,418
1. Divorce	21,034	
2. Separate Maintenance	128	
3. Annulment	256	
PART III		
CASES DISMISSED		
TOTAL DISMISSALS		8,119
1. Divorce	8,119	
2. Separate Maintenance	0	
3. Annulment	0	

THE TREND OF CASES IN THE COUNTY DIVISION CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY FOR THE PERIOD CALENDAR YEAR 1973

Type of Case	Pending at Start	Filed	Trans- ferred	Term- inated	Pending at End
(A) TAX (Subtotal)	(10,911)	(26,011)	0	(15,083)	(21,839)
a. Chicago	402	146		101	447
b. Suburban	386	65		12	439
(2) Tax Deeds	1,541	1,344		1,369	1,516
(3) Scavenger Tax Deeds	26	153		109	70
(4) Inheritance Tax Petitions	4,932	8,780		8,134	5,578
(5) Inheritance Tax Reassessments	62	45		0	107
(6) Tax Refund Petitions	118	30		2	146
(7) Tax Objections	3,378	14,655		4,618	13,415
(8) Condemnations (in conjunction with special					
assessments)	27	8		0	35
(9) Other	39	785		738	86
(B) ADOPTIONS (Subtotal)	(706)	(2,935)	0	(2,786)	(855)
(1) Related	251	1480		1,318	413
(2) Agency	130	960		932	158
(3) Private Placement	325	495		536	284
(C) MENTAL HEALTH (Subtotal)	(15)	(3,868)	0	(3,845)	(38)
(1) Commitment Petitions					
a. Adults	15	3,781		3,766	30
b. Minors	0	82		74	8
a. Adults	0	3		3	0
b. Minors	Ô	Ő		0	0
(3) Discharge Petitions	_			Ū	Ĭ
a. Adults	0	2		2	0
b. Minors	0	0		0	o l
(D) MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (Subtotal)	(66)	(41)	0	(26)	(81)
(1) Petitions to Organize	` 3	` 6		` ź	` 7
(2) Petitions to Annex, Disconnect and Dissolve	34	18		9	43
(3) Local Options and Propositions	17	5		9	13
(4) Election Matters	12	12		6	18
(E) RECIPROCAL NON SUPPORT	3,164	1,191	0	972	3,383
(F) MARRIAGE OF MINORS	15	134	0	132	17
GRAND TOTAL	14,877	34,180	0	22,844	26,213

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY PROBATE DIVISION, COUNTY DEPARTMENT STATISTICAL REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1973 CASES BEGUN AND TERMINATED IN THE PROBATE DIVISION

	Decedent Estates	Guardianships	Conservatorships	Total
Number of Cases Begun	7,978*	1,797	748	10,523
Number of Cases Terminated	7,278*	1,427	1,072	9,777

^{*} Includes Supplemental Proceedings Petitions: 110 filed and 129 terminated. Supplemental Proceedings Petitions are proceedings concerning contracts to make a will, construction of wills and the appointment of testamentary trustees during the period of administration.

INVENTORIES FILED, FEES COLLECTED AND WILLS FILED IN THE PROBATE DIVISION IN 1973 PART I

INVENTORIES FILED AND VALUE THEREOF

		nventories
Kind of Property	Number	Value
Personal	7,121	\$720,204,357.64
Real Estate	2,379	\$ 82,531,705.00
TOTALS	9,500	\$802,736,062.64

PART II FEES COLLECTED (NET) BY THE CLERK

\$768,177.71

PART III WILLS FILED AND PROBATED

Filed	Probated	%Probated
13,124	5,236	39.90%

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY JUVENILE DIVISION, COUNTY DEPARTMENT STATISTICAL REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1973

Children referred to the County Department, Juvenile Division

Delinquents	Dependents	Truants	Victim of Delinquent or Criminal Offense	Victim of Neglect	Other	Reactivated Cases	Total
15,983	. 235	3,719	0	2,326	223	0	22,486

Initial action taken on cases referred to the County Department, Juvenile Division

Adjusted	Social Investigation Ordered	Petition Recommended	Total
159	51	22,276	22,486

Cases adjusted in the County Department, Juvenile Division

	Dependents	Delinquents	Minors in Need of Supervision	Mental Deficients	Others	Total
By the Probation Staff	0	0	0	0	0	0
By the Complaint Unit Staff	153	0	0	0	0	153
TOTAL	153	0	0	0	0	153

Nature of petitions disposed of in the County Department, Juvenile Division

Petitions Dismissed	Continued Generally		Guardian Appointed with Right to Consent to Adoption	Guardian Appointed with Right to Place	Probation	Institutional Commitments	Total
23,058	35,416	12,512	559	2,329	2,416	2,203	78,493

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY CRIMINAL DIVISION, COUNTY DEPARTMENT

Table of Criminal Offenses Commenced by Indictment and Information In The Griminal Division During 1973

	Numbe	r of
CHARGED OFFENSE	Indictments & Informations	Defendants
Attempted Arson Burglary Controlled Substance (acquisition of) Escape Kidnapping Murder (including assault) Rape Robbery Theft	4 57 1 2 2 37 27 120 33	4 72 1 2 2 43 27 148 40
Commission of- Bail Jumping Battery (including aggravated battery). Bribery Burglary (including possession of burglary tools) Child Abandonment Criminal Damage to Property Cruelty to Children Deceptive Practices Deviate Sexual Assault Escape Explosives (possession of) Forgery Gambling Illegal Voting Incest (including aggravated incest) Indecent Liberties Intimidation Kidnapping Manslaughter (voluntary & involuntary) Mob Action Motor Vehicle Act Violation Murder Narcotic, Cannabis & Controlled Substances Violations (including sale, possession, delivery, manufacture) Obscenity Official Misconduct Perjury Rape Robbery (including armed robbery) Stolen Auto (possession of) Theft (includes grand theft, theft of auto, theft by deception, theft from person) Unlawful Restraint Unlawful Use of Weapons Miscellaneous Offenses	37 337 346 46 882 2 4 1 4 19 8 2 32 32 3 2 13 35 29 20 74 5 7 474 866 5 9 5 263 1,519 16 564 5 145 30	42 341 392 46 1,093 2 5 1 5 29 8 2 32 3 2 13 35 35 20 76 6 7 565 933 21 9 7 298 2,027 16 730 5 15 16 17 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
TOTAL	6,092	7,347

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY CRIMINAL DIVISION, COUNTY DEPARTMENT

Method of Disposition of Defendants Charged By Indictment and Information In The Criminal Division During 1973

Disposed of	Disposition of	Defendants
Ву	Not Convicted	Convicted
Guilty Plea	0	4,385
Bench Trial	330	555
Jury Trial	82	274
Stricken Off With Leave to Reinstate	1,559	
Nolle Prosequi	219	
Other Discharge	125	
TOTALS	2,315	5,214

Disposition of Defendants Sentenced In The Criminal Division During 1973

Sentenced	Disposition of D	
То	Indictment/Information	Actual Defendants
State Department of Corrections	2,414	2,045
County Department of Corrections	99	84
Probation with:		
Conditions, but not jail	2,156	2,122
Some jail time	241	226
Pay Fine	16	13
Committed to Department of Mental Health	223	179
TOTALS	5,149	4,669

Writs Filed and Disposed Of In The Criminal Division During 1973

	Post-Conviction	Habeas Corpus
Number of Writs Filed	N/A	N/A
Number of Writs Disposed of	333	248

TREND OF ALL CASES IN THE MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT, CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1973

		Pending at	*	Rein-	Trans-	Total	Termi-	Pending at	Inve	ntory
Programme		Start	Begun	stated	ferred	Added	nated	End	Decrease	Increase
Law	Dist. 1	13,895	6,853	1,669	+730	9,252	9,288	13,859	36	
Jury	Dist. 2	208	0	0	+224	224	295	137	71	
Cases	Dist. 3	324	110	0	+182	292	327	277*	47	
\$15,000	Dist. 4	297	52	26	+255	333	355	275	22	
and	Dist. 5	217	5	12	+112	129	277	139**	78	
Less	Dist. 6	186	36	3	+291	330	334	182	4	
Law	Dist. 1	22,509	70,220	1,344	-730	70,834	73,023	20,320	2,189	
Non-Jury	Dist. 2	71	520	0	-224	296	297	70	1	
Cases	Dist. 3	238	578	0	-182	396	474	160	78	_
\$15,000	Dist. 4	144	930	36	-247	719	720	143	1	
and	Dist. 5	186	297	48	-110	235	294	127	59	
Less	Dist. 6	224	762	0	-289	473	479	218	6	
	Dist. 1	4,104	69,640	722	Ö	70,362	70,257	4,209		105
Small Claims	Dist. 1 Pro Se	387	5,441	0	0	5,441	4,803	1,025		638
	Dist. 2-6	1,081***	4,890	45	-12	4,923	4,912	1,092		11
Ordinance Violations &	Dist. 1		280,807	0	0	280,807	230,470			
Misdemeanors	Dist. 2-6		65,215	0	0	65,215	42,047			
Traffic	Dist. 1		840,402	0	0	840,402	793,833			
	Dist. 2-6		434,024	0	0	434,024	435,220			
Taxes	Dist. 1	4,970	41,089	2,411	0	43,500	43,022	5,448		478
	Dist. 2-6	34,912	14,105	0	0	14,105	12,453	36,564		1,652
Family & Youth	Dist. 1		42,849	0	0	42,849	39,732			
TOTALS		83,953	1,878,825	6,316	0	1,885,141	1,762,912	84,245		292

^{*}Adjusted by -12 after physical inventory. **Adjusted by +70 after physical inventory. ***Adjusted by +41 after physical inventory in District 5.

AVERAGE TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN DATE OF FILING AND DATE OF VERDICT OF LAW JURY CASES IN THE MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT, CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY

	Terminated	by Verdict, Mun	Cases Terminated by Verdict, Municipal Department, Circuit Court of Cook County	t, Circuit Court of	Cook County			
		District 1	District 2	District 3	District 4	District 5	District 6	
Total number of verdicts reached during period	period	270	18	23	24	21	26	
Months elapsed between date of	nm	96.5	34.4	37.4	80.3	42.0	50.1	
filing and date of verdict Minimum	mt	0.5	4.0	0.5	3.7	4.7	4.9	r
Average .	Je	34.0	20.1	16.7	18.8	26.5	14.5	·

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT, DISTRICTS 1-6
AGE OF PENDING LAW CASES IN THE MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT, CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY*

		1967		1968	1	1969	Ţ	1970		1971	,	1972		1973
	Jury	Jury Non-Jury Jury Non-Jury	Jury		Jury	Non-Jury	Jury	Non-Jury	Jury	Non-Jury	Jury	Non-Jury	Jury	Non-Jury
First District	0	0	44	-	124	47	809	57	2,808	348	4,756	8,941	5,519	10,926
Second District	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	17	-	16	4	86	65
Third District	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	23	7	80	14	170	139
Fourth District	0	2	2	-	က	0	3	-	6	2	53	8	205	129
Fifth District	0	0	0	0	2	0	က	-	11	7	39	17	84	102
Sixth District	0	0	0	0	0	_	2	-	5	-	18	6	157	206
Totals	0	2	46	2	129	48	626	09	2,873	366	4,962	8,993	6,233	11,567

^{*}Also see Appendix at page 156.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT, DISTRICTS 1-6 NATURE OF TERMINATION OF CRIMINAL, ORDINANCE AND TRAFFIC CASES DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1973

	Preliminary	/ Hearings		eanors & Violations	Tra	affic
Method of Termination or Disposition	District 1	Districts 2-6	District 1	Districts 2-6	District 1	Districts 2-6
1. Fine			19,692	6,776	299,398	261,156
2. Fine and Jail Sentence or Probation			_		11,448	5,436
3. House of Correction			4,167	621		
4. County Jail			856	757		_
5. Probation			5,769	2,587		-
6. State Institutions		-	52	173		
7. Transferred to Criminal Division	3,549	1,250	_			-
8. Ordered to Pay			229	114		
9. Ex Parte, Satisfied					0	0
10. Ex Parte, Execution to Issue					0	0
11. Fine and Costs Suspended					12,396	62
12. Discharged		414	25,813	8,069	286,442	76,551
13. D.W.P		255	35,986	4,155	126,073	30,034
14. Leave to File Denied		71	98,993	387	423	789
15. Leave to File Denied—No Number		3	0	0		
16. Non-Suit		8	24,153	627	25,391	11,251
17. Nolle Prosequi		988	8,444	1,508	22,091	15,874
18. Stricken Off—Leave to Reinstate		2,602	41,933	9,025	10,171	34,067
19. Other		538	566	1,119	0	0
Total	3,549	6,129	266,653	35,918	793,833	435,220

APPENDIX

CHARTS COMPARING AGE OF PENDING CASES

LAW DIVISION, COUNTY DEPARTMENT CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY

CUMULATIVE ANALYSIS: YEAR-END AGE OF PENDING LAW JURY CASES

Year Ending Dec. 31	Up to One Year Old	Between One and Two Years Old	Between Two and Three Years Old	Between Three and Four Years Old	Between Four and Five Years Old	Five Years Old and Older	Total
4000	11,464	12,211	11,400	8,276	4,487	1,421	49,259
1966	23.3%	24.8%	23.1%	16.8%	9.1%	2.9%	100.0%
1007	11,108	10,996	9,137	7,675	6,467	208	45,592
1967	24.4%	24.1%	20.0%	16.8%	14.2%	.5%	100.0%
1000	10,478	11,226	8,309	6,875	5,152	721	42,761
1968	24.5%	26.3%	19.4%	16.1%	12.0%	1.7%	100.0%
	10,691	10,414	8,205	6,257	4,822	1,538	41,931
1969	25.5%	24.8%	19.6%	14.9%	11.5%	3.7%	100.0%
	9,539	9,228	6,911	5,831	3,842	845	36,196
1970	26.4%	25.5%	19.1%	16.1%	10.6%	2.3%	100.0%
	9,472	9,690	6,436	5,109	2,061	107	32,875
1971	28.8%	29.5%	19.6%	15.5%	6.3%	0.3%	100.0%
	9,495	9,378	6,846	2,351	518	192	28,780
1972	33.0%	32.6%	23.8%	8.2%	1.8%	0.6%	100.0%
	10,838	9,869	5,428	2,036	0	0	28,171*
1973	38.5%	35.0%	19.3%	7.2%	0%	0%	100.0%

^{*} Does Not Include 516 Law Jury Cases Pending On Special Calendars (Military, Appeal, Insurance Liquidation, And Bankruptcy).

APPENDIX (Continued)

MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY

CUMULATIVE ANALYSIS: YEAR-END AGE OF PENDING LAW JURY CASES

		Between One and	Between Two and	Between Three and	Between Four and	Five Years	
Year Ending Dec. 31	Up to One Year Old	Two Years Old	Three Years Old	Four Years Old	Five Years Old	Old and Older	Total
1966	10,524	7,289	3,435	2,166	1,757	383	25,654
1300	41.4%	28.4%	13.4%	8.4%	6.9%	1.5%	100.0%
1967	6,277	5,134	2,543	1,693	1,530	645	17,822
1307	35.2%	28.8%	14.3%	9.5%	8.6%	3.6%	100.0%
1000	5,910	5,227	3,392	2,207	147	0	16,883
1968	35.0%	31.0%	20.1%	13.1%	.8%	.0%	100.0%
1000	6,310	5,086	2,730	880	70	0	15,076
1969	41.9%	33.7%	18.1%	5.8%	.5%	.0%	100.0%
1070	6,966	5,580	3,123	855	550	408	17,482
1970	39.9%	31.9%	17.9%	4.9%	3.1%	2.3%	100.0%
1074	6,669	5,762	3,306	854	409	72	17,072
1971	39.1%	33.7%	19.4%	5.0%	2.4%	0.4%	100.0%
1070	5,728	6,126	2,749	389	129	6	15,127
1972	37.9%	40.5%	18.2%	2.5%	0.8%	0.1%	100.0%
1072	6,233	4,962	2,873	626	129	46	14,869
1973	41.9%	33.4%	19.3%	4.2%	0.9%	0.3%	100.0%