

NOTICE

Decision filed 08/24/26. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of the same.

2026 IL App (5th) 250393-U

NO. 5-25-0393

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

MICHAEL L. RAMSEY,	)	Appeal from the
	)	Circuit Court of
Petitioner-Appellee,	)	Madison County.
	)	
v.	)	No. 12-F-263
	)	
KATHLEEN P. RAMSEY,	)	Honorable
	)	Janet R. Heflin,
Respondent-Appellant.	)	Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Boie and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 *Held*: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in terminating petitioner's child support obligation to respondent and enforcing the college expenses provision of the parties' divorce decree. Additionally, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding petitioner reimbursement for overpaid child support, respondent's share of college expenses, and attorney fees. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 2 Respondent, Kathleen P. Ramsey, appeals *pro se*¹ from the Madison County circuit court's order of April 9, 2024, terminating petitioner, Michael L. Ramsey's child support obligation and enforcing the college expenses provision of the parties' divorce decree. She further appeals from the circuit court's April 29, 2025, order denying her motion to reconsider. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¹Respondent was represented by counsel at times below, but she represented herself *pro se* when the circuit court entered its April 9, 2024, and April 29, 2025, orders.

¶ 3

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The parties were married on January 13, 2000. They had two children, Joseph Ramsey (born in 2002) and John Ramsey (born in 2005). On March 24, 2010, the Chancery Court of Madison County, Mississippi, entered a judgment of divorce, incorporating a divorce agreement between the parties dated June 29, 2009 (hereafter, divorce decree).

¶ 5 The divorce decree provided, *inter alia*, that the parties would share joint legal custody of the children and that respondent would have sole physical custody of them. Petitioner had to pay respondent \$1,500 per month in child support until each child reached the age of 21 or otherwise became emancipated or self-supporting. Additionally, the parties had to equally share college education expenses “until each child graduate[d] from college upon the receipt of a bachelor’s degree, including semesters of enrollment after the child reache[d] the age of majority, but not more than the traditional four years tenure.” These expenses included registration fees, tuition, activity fees, laboratory fees, books, and reasonable travel costs. Meanwhile, the parties relocated to Illinois.

¶ 6 On May 10, 2012, petitioner filed a petition for registration of a foreign judgment in the circuit court, asserting he had been a resident of Madison County, Illinois, for more than 90 days and that neither party remained a resident of Madison County, Mississippi. Petitioner therefore asked the circuit court to register the parties’ divorce judgment in Illinois for purposes of modification and enforcement. Respondent did not object to the petition. Instead, she filed petitions to modify visitation and child support, respectively, on May 31, 2012. Respondent sought, among other things, an increase in monthly child support due to a substantial change in circumstances. Specifically, she alleged that petitioner was earning more money, that the

children's expenses were greater, and that there had been a substantial increase in the cost of living since the parties' divorce judgment was entered in 2010.

¶ 7 On January 11, 2013, the circuit court entered a modification order. In its order, the circuit court initially noted that respondent did not contest the jurisdiction of Madison County, Illinois, and that she had petitioned the court to modify visitation and child support. The court further noted that the parties had participated in mediation and reached an agreement on the outstanding issues. The court then ordered, as relevant here, petitioner to pay respondent "28% as per the Illinois guideline," or \$939.98 every two weeks, in child support.

¶ 8 On August 30, 2023, petitioner filed a motion to terminate child support, asserting that both children had reached the age of majority, 18 years old, under Illinois law, and they had graduated from high school. The same day, petitioner also filed a motion to enforce the parties' divorce decree insofar as it required them to "pay equal shares" of the children's college education costs. Petitioner asserted that respondent had not contributed to the costs associated with their eldest son's college education at Lewis and Clark Community College, and she had not indicated whether she would contribute to their younger son's college education at the University of Missouri, also known as Mizzou, which had already begun. Consequently, petitioner had to advance both parties' portions of the college-related expenses since respondent had failed to contribute. Accordingly, he sought reimbursement from respondent for her share of the college education costs, as well as attorney fees that he incurred in filing the motion to enforce.

¶ 9 Respondent proceeded to file several *pro se* pleadings, including multiple motions "to Correct Clerical Error" where she claimed the circuit court incorrectly referred to her as a "*pro se*" litigant. Additionally, she filed a "Motion for Entry of Order Providing for Confidential Information Court Filing Financial Affidavit (Family & Divorse [*sic*] Cases) Pursuant to Supreme

Court Rule 138” where she sought to file certain documents confidentially. Respondent filed a “Motion to Dismiss Motion to Enforce,” asserting, *inter alia*, that pursuant to the divorce decree, petitioner had to pay child support until the children reached 21 years of age, along with increased child support “retroactive” to January of 2022. She further filed a “Motion to Request Oath of Office,” seeking a copy of the circuit court judge’s oath of office, as well as an “Updated Motion to Compel Enforcement of Agreement and Petition to Modification of Child Support,” seeking to enforce the divorce decree as it related to child support, among other things. Last, respondent filed a largely incoherent “Updated Motion to Compel Enforcement of Beneficiary Request to Trustee” wherein she sought \$432,200 from a “Trustee” and/or the “Clerk of Court.”

¶ 10 A trial on the parties’ motions commenced on February 22, 2024. Briefly stated, petitioner testified that he was moving to terminate his child support obligation to respondent since their children were 18 years of age or older and had both graduated from high school. Additionally, he was seeking reimbursement for the child support he had paid since he filed his motion to terminate support. Petitioner further testified that he had paid college-related expenses for both children and was seeking reimbursement from respondent for her share of those expenses. Respondent testified that she could not afford the children’s college education costs since she was unemployed and living off her 401(k) and a home equity line of credit (HELOC). She also claimed that petitioner verbally agreed to pay for at least one of their son’s college expenses to date.

¶ 11 The circuit court entered a written order and judgment on April 9, 2024.² Initially, the court rejected respondent’s arguments that petitioner had to pay child support until the children reached the age of 21, as will be discussed more below. The court therefore effectively denied respondent’s

²We note that the circuit court made oral rulings following the parties’ trial that were consistent with its April 9, 2024, written order. With respect to respondent’s request to file certain documents confidentially, the circuit court orally ruled that her bank statements could be sealed.

motions to dismiss petitioner's motion to enforce and compel enforcement of the divorce decree. Next, the court denied respondent's "Updated Motion to Compel Enforcement of Beneficiary Request to Trustee," finding the motion sought relief that could not be granted by the court. The court noted that respondent did not cite any legal authority under the Illinois Compiled Statutes that would allow her claim seeking compensation from the State of Illinois. The court also denied respondent's "Motion to Request Oath of Office," noting respondent was informed in open court that she could request a copy of the oath from the Chief Judge's office. The court further denied her motions to correct clerical errors in the prior court orders referring to her as a "*pro se*" litigant.

¶ 12 The circuit court granted petitioner's motions to terminate child support and to enforce the college expenses provision of the parties' divorce decree. While the court acknowledged the age of majority in Mississippi was 21 years of age, the court found that the parties consented to jurisdiction in Madison County, Illinois, and therefore, Illinois law was "the controlling authority." Since the age of majority in Illinois was 18 years of age, and both children were at least 18 years old and had already graduated from high school, petitioner no longer had to pay respondent child support. The court found that petitioner's child support obligation was terminated retroactive to September 1, 2023, and ordered respondent to pay him \$12,219.74, the amount of child support that he had overpaid, within 30 days of the entry of the court's order. The court also ordered respondent to pay petitioner \$9,529.12, for past owed college-related expenses, within 60 days of the entry of the court's order. Finally, the court ordered respondent to pay petitioner \$2,000, for attorney fees, within 120 days of the entry of the court's order.

¶ 13 The circuit court denied respondent's motion to reconsider on April 29, 2025, and she appealed.³

³The circuit court also denied several "nonsensical" motions filed by respondent after she filed her motion to reconsider.

¶ 15 On appeal, respondent contends that the circuit court (1) did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the issues presented; (2) violated article I, section 10, clause 1 of the United States Constitution; (3) acted with unlawful authority; (4) erred in terminating child support and awarding retroactive reimbursement; and (5) erred in enforcing the college expenses provision of the parties' divorce decree. Respondent notes in her appellate brief that her "appeal does not challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings, but rather the jurisdiction, authority, intention, and equity of [the circuit court] Orders."

¶ 16 The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Foreign Judgment Act) (735 ILCS 5/12-650 *et seq.* (West 2022)) governs the enforcement of judgments from other states. *Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Duree*, 319 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1039 (2001). The Foreign Judgment Act "is intended to implement the Constitution's full faith and credit clause and to facilitate the enforcement of interstate judgments by providing a summary procedure through which a judgment creditor may seek enforcement expeditiously in any jurisdiction where the judgment debtor is found." *Id.* "The full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution provides that full faith and credit must be given to the judicial proceedings of every other State." *Id.* Section 12-652(a) of the Foreign Judgment Act states,

"A copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with the acts of Congress or the statutes of this State may be filed in the office of the circuit clerk for any county of this State. The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the circuit court for any county of this State. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a circuit court for any county of this State and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner. A judgment filed or registered under this Act shall be construed to be an original Illinois judgment from the date it is filed with the clerk of the circuit court and for purposes of enforcement and revival, shall be treated in exactly the same manner as an Illinois judgment entered on that same date." 735 ILCS 5/12-652 (West 2022).

Additionally, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) (750 ILCS 22/101 *et seq.* (West 2022)) sets forth a unified process to modify and enforce child support orders across state borders. *In re Marriage of Cox*, 2026 IL App (1st) 242290, ¶ 23. Section 613(a) of the UIFSA states, “If all of the parties who are individuals reside in this State and the child does not reside in the issuing state, a tribunal of this State has jurisdiction to enforce and to modify the issuing state’s child-support order in a proceeding to register that order.” 750 ILCS 22/613(a) (West 2022).

¶ 17 Our supreme court has made clear that—with the exception of administrative review actions—a circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction is derived entirely from our state constitution. *In re Marriage of Cox*, 2026 IL App (1st) 242290, ¶ 26. Subject matter jurisdiction “refers to the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *McCormick v. Robertson*, 2015 IL 118230, ¶ 19. “To invoke the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction, a party need only present a justiciable matter, *i.e.*, a controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, touching upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice*, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 35. Where, as here, a matter brought before the circuit court is justiciable and does not fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme court, the circuit court has jurisdiction to consider it. *In re Marriage of Cox*, 2026 IL App (1st) 242290, ¶ 26. Whether a circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a claim presents a question of law, which we review *de novo*. *McCormick*, 2015 IL 118230, ¶ 18.

¶ 18 Here, the parties’ judgment of divorce, which incorporated their divorce decree, was entered on March 24, 2010, in the Chancery Court of Madison County, Mississippi. Following both parties’ relocation to Madison County, Illinois, petitioner filed a petition to register the

divorce judgment in that county on May 10, 2012. Respondent did not object to the petition. Instead, later that month, she petitioned the circuit court to modify visitation and increase child support. The circuit court entered a modification order on January 11, 2013, increasing petitioner's child support obligation. In its order, the court noted that respondent "did not contest jurisdiction in Madison County, Illinois."

¶ 19 To the extent respondent now claims in her appellate brief that she "expressly challenged jurisdiction," the record shows that at the parties' trial, she challenged the circuit court's jurisdiction rather incoherently. While it is not entirely clear, respondent stated, "the law is God's law" and suggested the court did not have "jurisdiction over superior law." The court rejected respondent's assertions, stating that it had already made its finding and ruling regarding jurisdiction and that it had jurisdiction over the matter. The court presumably was referring to its January 11, 2013, order where it indicated that respondent did not contest jurisdiction in Illinois.

¶ 20 In any event, the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to enforce and modify the child support orders in this case. Under section 611(a) of the UIFSA, a circuit court may modify a previously issued child support order if, after notice and hearing, the court finds that one of two sets of conditions are met. See *In re Marriage of Vailas*, 406 Ill. App. 3d 32, 37-38 (2010); 750 ILCS 22/611(a) (West 2022). First, the order may be modified if "(A) neither the child, nor the obligee who is an individual, nor the obligor resides in the issuing state; (B) a petitioner who is a nonresident of this State seeks modification; and (C) the respondent is subject to personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this State." 750 ILCS 22/611(a)(1) (West 2022). Conversely, the order may be modified if Illinois is the residence of the children or a party who is an individual is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of Illinois, "and all of the parties who are individuals have filed consents in a record in the issuing tribunal for a tribunal of this State to

modify the support order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.” *Id.* § 611(a)(2). In this case, the children and parents were residents of Madison County, Illinois, and the parties consented to jurisdiction in that county. Therefore, the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over their claims.

¶ 21 We now turn to respondent’s contention that the circuit court violated article I, section 10, clause 1 of the United States Constitution, also known as the contract clause, which states,

“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, *ex post facto* Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.” U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 1.

Respondent asserts that the lower court violated this clause by impermissibly “modifying and impairing” the parties’ divorce decree, “despite the constitutional prohibition against state interference in private contracts.” More specifically, she asserts that the court “substituted statutory law for private contract,” in violation of the Constitution’s contract clause. We disagree.

¶ 22 Respondent has misconstrued the contract clause insofar as it does not regulate private parties directly. Instead, it regulates state action by providing that “no state shall pass any law impairing the obligations of contracts.” *In re Marriage of Rosenbaum-Golden*, 381 Ill. App. 3d 65, 75 (2008). Here, respondent has not identified any law that was passed impairing the parties’ divorce decree. The circuit court simply modified the terms of the decree pursuant to Illinois law, and respondent has not developed a legal argument or cited any relevant authority showing this was in error. See *Nissan North America, Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Review Board*, 2014 IL App (1st) 123795, ¶ 15 (noting that questions involving constitutionality and constitutional challenges to statutes are reviewed *de novo*). Accordingly, we find no constitutional violation.

¶ 23 Third, respondent contends that the circuit court judge in this case acted without lawful authority because she refused to recite her oath of office upon respondent’s request, and therefore, her judgments were “void *ab initio*.” Section 2 of the Circuit Courts Act (705 ILCS 35/2 (West 2022)) provides, in relevant part, that,

“The several judges of the circuit courts of this State, before entering upon the duties of their office, shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation, which shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of State:

‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of the State of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of judge of....court, according to the best of my ability.’ ”

Whether a judgment is void presents a question of law, which we review *de novo*. *In re Marriage of Winters*, 2026 IL App (5th) 250283, ¶ 27.

¶ 24 The record in this case contains a copy of the oath of office from the circuit court judge, the Honorable Janet Heflin, who presided over the parties’ trial and entered the orders at issue in this appeal. She took the oath of office on June 14, 2019, and it was filed with the Secretary of State on September 24, 2019. This was well before the parties’ trial commenced on February 22, 2024. It was also before the court’s order terminating petitioner’s child support obligation and enforcing the divorce decree’s college expenses provision was entered on April 9, 2024. The record further shows that Judge Heflin informed respondent she could get a copy of her oath of office “from the Chief Judge’s Office.” Respondent has not directed us to any pertinent authority showing that Judge Heflin was required to recite her oath of office on demand during the parties’ trial. Instead, she claims, without citing authority, that “[b]y refusing to place the oath on the record and by speaking in the first person (‘I / me / my’), the trial judge blurred the line between judicial capacity and private capacity” and thus her “rulings lack authority and are void *ab initio*.”

¶ 25 It is axiomatic that a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues on appeal clearly defined with relevant authority cited and cohesive legal arguments presented. *Eberhardt v. Village of Tinley Park*, 2024 IL App (1st) 230139, ¶ 60. This court is not a repository in which an appellant may foist the burden of argument and research; it is neither our function nor obligation to act as an advocate for the appellant or search the record for error. *Melamed v. Melamed*, 2016 IL App (1st) 141453, ¶ 21. Moreover, *pro se* litigants “are not excused from following rules that dictate the form and content of appellate briefs.” *Lewis v. Heartland Food Corp.*, 2014 IL App (1st) 123303, ¶ 5. Here, respondent has not shown that a circuit court judge must recite his or her oath of office upon request. Accordingly, we have no basis on which to find the lower court acted with unlawful authority and therefore reject respondent’s contention.

¶ 26 We now turn to respondent’s claim that the circuit court erroneously terminated petitioner’s child support obligation and awarded him reimbursement for overpayment of child support. Pursuant to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 *et seq.* (West 2022)), provisions for child support are typically terminated by emancipation. *In re Marriage of Loomis*, 348 Ill. App. 3d 972, 974 (2004). In Illinois, “[a]ttaining the age of majority, 18 years, is an emancipating event.” *Id.* Section 510(d) of the Marriage Act states, as relevant here, that,

“Unless otherwise provided in this Act, or as agreed in writing or expressly provided in the judgment, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child, or if the child has attained the age of 18 and is still attending high school, provisions for the support of the child are terminated upon the date that the child graduates from high school or the date the child attains the age of 19, whichever is earlier, but not by the death of a parent obligated to support or educate the child.” 750 ILCS 5/510(d) (West 2022).

The award of maintenance, child support, and attorney fees are within the sound discretion of the circuit court; thus, we will not reverse the court’s determinations absent an abuse of discretion.

Hupe v. Hupe, 305 Ill. App. 3d 118, 122 (1999); *In re Marriage of Gabriel*, 2020 IL App (1st) 182710, ¶ 56.

¶ 27 After reviewing the record in this case, we cannot say the circuit court abused its discretion when it terminated petitioner’s child support obligation and awarded him reimbursement for the child support he had overpaid. As set forth, the parties had two children, Joseph and John. Joseph turned 18 years old on December 27, 2020, while John turned 18 years old on March 16, 2023. Petitioner moved to terminate child support on August 30, 2023, after both children had reached 18 years of age, the age of majority in Illinois, and had graduated from high school. Thus, he was no longer required to pay child support under Illinois law. While the parties’ divorce decree indicated that petitioner had to pay child support until both children were 21 years old, the age of majority in Mississippi, the circuit court determined that Illinois law applied since the parties consented to jurisdiction in Madison County, Illinois (see *supra* ¶ 12).

¶ 28 Moreover, it is important to note that respondent successfully petitioned the circuit court for an increase in petitioner’s child support obligation under Illinois law (see *supra* ¶¶ 6-7), so we find it somewhat disingenuous of her to now claim that Illinois law did not apply. Likewise, the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in reimbursing petitioner for the child support he had paid since filing his motion to terminate. Section 510(a) of the Marriage Act provides, as relevant here, that “the provisions of any judgment respecting maintenance or support may be modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to due notice by the moving party of the filing of the motion for modification.” 750 ILCS 5/510(a) (West 2022). As stated, petitioner filed his motion to terminate child support on August 30, 2023. While his motion was pending, he paid child support through February 22, 2024. The circuit court ultimately granted petitioner’s motion and

found that his child support obligation was “terminated retroactive to September 1, 2023,” and therefore awarded him \$12,219.74, in back payment.

¶ 29 Respondent has not shown, or even argued, that this was improper under the Marriage Act. Rather, she claims the circuit court failed to recognize “unrebutted affidavits,” although she has not identified the affidavits to which she is referring. The record before us contains some financial affidavits from respondent that set forth largely irrelevant and incoherent information, in addition to detailed lists of her financial obligations and living expenses. The affidavits, however, do not establish that the lower court’s termination of petitioner’s child support obligation and award of back pay amounted to an abuse of discretion, and respondent has not shown otherwise.

¶ 30 Last, we reject respondent’s contention that the circuit court erred in enforcing the college expenses provision of the parties’ divorce decree because the court failed to consider her inability to pay and petitioner’s higher income. Section 513(a) of the Marriage Act states, in relevant part, that the “court may award sums of money out of the property and income of either or both parties or the estate of a deceased parent, as equity may require, for the educational expenses of any child of the parties.” *Id.* § 513(a). It is well settled that a provision for payment of college expenses falls within the purview of child support and is modifiable. *Hupe*, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 125. Moreover, a circuit court has the authority to modify provisions of a marital settlement agreement pertaining to the payment of college expenses, and its award of educational expenses will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. *In re Marriage of Deike*, 381 Ill. App. 3d 620, 627 (2008).

¶ 31 The parties’ divorce decree in this case expressly stated,

“[Petitioner] and [Respondent] shall each pay equal shares of each child’s college education until each child graduates from college upon the receipt of a bachelor’s degree, including semesters of enrollment after the child reaches the age of majority, but not more than the traditional four years tenure.”

This provision of the divorce decree established respondent's obligation to pay for half of the children's college expenses. Petitioner filed his motion to enforce the parties' divorce decree with respect to those expenses on August 30, 2023. Petitioner alleged that as of the filing of his motion, respondent had not contributed to the college expenses for their son, Joseph, who was attending Lewis and Clark Community College. Additionally, respondent had not indicated whether she would contribute to the college expenses for their youngest son, John, who was beginning classes at Mizzou in August of 2023. As a result, petitioner had "to advance both parties' portions of the college expenses incurred to date, since Respondent ha[d] failed to contribute."

¶ 32 The evidence at trial showed that petitioner had paid a total of \$19,058.24 in college expenses for the children. The circuit court granted petitioner's motion, and ordered respondent to reimburse him \$9,529.12, half of the amount of the college expenses he had paid. The circuit court's order enforced the divorce decree, which required the parties to share the children's college education costs equally. Respondent now claims, as she did below, that she did not have the ability to pay, but she never sought to modify the divorce decree as it related to college expenses.⁴ While we acknowledge her claims of financial hardship, we cannot say the lower court abused its discretion in enforcing the college expenses provision of the parties' divorce decree when respondent did not move to modify it.

⁴We note that respondent asserts the United States Constitution and Illinois law "require courts to make findings of a party's ability to comply before imposing financial obligations," relying on *In re Marriage of Logston*, 103 Ill. 2d 266 (1984). According to respondent, judgments that impose obligations in the absence of such a finding constitute "a denial of due process and [are] void." Respondent's reliance on *In re Marriage of Logston* is misplaced as that case involved a contempt judgment that was entered against the ex-husband to enforce his maintenance obligation in a dissolution of marriage case. *Id.* at 271-72. Since there was no contempt judgment in this case, we need not address that case here.

¶ 33

III. CONCLUSION

¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in terminating petitioner's child support obligation and enforcing the provision of the parties' divorce decree concerning the children's college expenses. Additionally, the court properly awarded petitioner back pay for child support retroactive to when his motion to terminate support was filed, as well as reimbursement for respondent's share of the college expenses and attorney fees incurred in obtaining her share of those expenses. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 35 Affirmed.